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NILS JACOBSEN and
HANS-JÜRGEN PUHLE (eds.)

The Economies of Mexico and Peru During the Late Colonial Period, 1760—1810

The essays presented here, nearly all originally written for this volume by scholars from Latin America, North America and Europe, bring together much of the results of the rich research on the late colonial economies of both viceroyalties during the past fifteen years. They allow a reevaluation of many old questions and open the vista to new ones: Did mining function as a lead sector? What effect did growing demand for agricultural commodities have on the social distribution of resources and benefits in the countryside? Do Mexican and Peruvian processing industries have anything in common with European proto-industrialization during the eighteenth century, and how can we account for their relative feebleness? How did merchants adapt to the liberalized commercial environment after the 1770s? What effect did the sweeping commercial and fiscal reforms of Spain's Bourbon monarchs have on particular groups of producers and consumers in the colonies? — What emerges from this comparative approach is a better understanding not just of conjunctural, but of structural differences between the economies and societies of Mexico and Peru.

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COLLOQUIUM VERLAG
BERLIN

BIBLIOTHECA IBERO-AMERICANA

Veröffentlichungen des Ibero-Amerikanischen Instituts

Preußischer Kulturbesitz

Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Stegmann

Band 34

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COLLOQUIUM VERLAG BERLIN 1986

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek

*The economies of Mexico and Peru During the
Late Colonial Period, 1760-1810* / Nils Jacobsen
and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (ed.). — Berlin: Colloquium-
Verlag, 1986.

(Bibliotheca Ibero-Americana; 34)

ISBN 3-7678-0666-5

NE: Jacobsen, Nils [Hrsg.]; GT

© 1986 Colloquium Verlag GmbH, Berlin

Satz: HRZ Bielefeld

Druck: Copy-Center 2000, Erlangen

Schrift: Baskerville

Printed in Germany

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. *Archives*

AAL	Archivo Arzobispal de Lima
AAP	Archivo del Ayuntamiento de Puebla
ADA	Archivo Departamental de Ayacucho
AGI	Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla)
AGN (M)	Archivo General de la Nación (México)
AGN (P)	Archivo General de la Nación (Perú)
AHMC	Archivo Histórico Municipal de Cochabamba
AHML	Archivo Histórico de la Municipalidad de Lima
AHPM	Archivo Histórico del Palacio de Minería
AHRA	Archivo Histórico de Ramírez de Arellano
AJP	Archivo Judicial de Puebla
AM	Archivo Municipal
ANP	Archivo de Notarías de Puebla
BL	British Library
BM	British Museum (London)
BNP	Biblioteca Nacional del Perú
CDIP	Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú
RAH	Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid)
SBPL	Archivo de la Sociedad de Beneficiencia Pública de Lima

II. *Journals*

AEA	Anuario de Estudios Americanos (Sevilla)
AH	Agricultural History
AHR	American Historical Review
BELC	Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe (Amsterdam)
BHR	Business History Review
BSMGE	Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística
CAL	Cahiers des Amériques Latines
CC	Cuadernos Colombianos
HAHR	Hispanic American Historical Review
HC	Historia y Cultura
HI	Historia Ibérica
HL	Histórica (Lima)
HM	Historia Mexicana

HPE	Hacienda Pública Española
IAA	Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv, Neue Folge
IESHR	The Indian Economic and Social History Review
JEH	The Journal of Economic History
JLA	Jahrbuch für die Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas
JLAS	Journal of Latin American Studies
LARR	Latin American Research Review
MP	Mercurio Peruano
NA	Nova Americana
PP	Past and Present
RANP	Revista del Archivo Nacional del Perú (Lima)
REAA	Revista Española de Antropología Americana (Madrid)
RH	Revista Histórica (Lima)
RHA	Revista de Historia de América
RHAA	Revista de Historia Americana y Argentina (Universidad de Cuyo, Mendoza)
RI	Revista de Indias
RLAS	Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología (Buenos Aires)
RU	Revista Universitaria (Cuzco)
SDC	Suplemento Dominical de El Comercio (Lima)
TA	The Americas

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, the Fakultät für Geschichtswissenschaft und Philosophie and the Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung of the University of Bielefeld financed the symposium of 1982, for which most contributions to this volume were originally written, and helped with its organization. The publication of the results was made possible through inclusion of this volume in the series "Bibliotheca Ibero-Americana" and through financial aid by the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut of the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, generously granted by its director. Astrid Frevert, Thomas Krüggeler and Peter Strack, students at the University of Bielefeld, and Paul Schmarling helped with great dedication in the technical preparation of the manuscript. We would like to express our gratitude to all these persons and institutions. Lastly, but certainly not least, we are thankful to the contributors to this volume, and hope that for them the great patience they have shown with this publication project will turn out to have been worth it.

Bielefeld, Summer 1985

Nils Jacobsen
Hans-Jürgen Puhle

I. INTRODUCTION

Nils Jacobsen and Hans-Jürgen Puhle

This volume has its origin in a rather straightforward intellectual curiosity: Is it really true that the two core areas of Spain's American empire were economically moving in opposite directions during the last half-century of the colonial regime, Mexico undergoing an unprecedented boom and presenting itself as a wealthy colonial society, while Peru at the same time was becoming impoverished through a prolonged crisis? This seemed the more puzzling since both viceroyalties, as exporters of precious metals, with a large share of Indian population, and evidencing a similar mix of agricultural enterprises, from tropical plantations to highland cereal and livestock haciendas, appeared to have quite similar economic structures. Indeed it became profitable to raise this question, since recent research on Peru had brought to light much information that contradicted the idea of a secular crisis during the late colonial period. At the same time the past fifteen years had seen an outpouring of innovative research on Mexico's economy during the eighteenth century, which suggested serious restraints, bottlenecks and even reversals to that viceroyalty's late colonial boom.

These developments let it appear timely to bring together some of the scholars who have recently done research on the late colonial economies of Mexico and Peru and attempt a broad comparison between the structures and conjunctures of the two viceroyalties' economies during the half century preceding the Wars of Independence. This is what we had in mind when we organized a symposium of some twenty scholars from Peru, the United States, Canada and various European countries held at the University of Bielefeld in September of 1982. The essays published in this volume are, with two exceptions, revised versions of the papers presented at that symposium. This was the first in a series of European conferences dealing with research problems of Latin American economic history for concise periods between the late colonial era and the last few decades. In the meantime a second conference, organized by Reinhard Liehr in Berlin during September 1983, dealt with the formation of Latin America's national economies and European economic interests in the region during the first half of the nineteenth century. Its results will

soon be published in this series also. Two further symposia covering the periods 1850 to 1930 and the epoch since 1940 are in the planning stage. For the crucial years of the world depression there now exists the valuable volume edited by Rosemary Thorp.¹

Specifically we hoped to focus the comparison between both late colonial economies on three broad strands of inquiry:

1. A comparison between the overall growth of the Mexican and Peruvian economies, 1760–1810: Is it possible to arrive at indices for the global development of both viceroyalties, demonstrating changes in gross product, prices and real incomes of various social groups, and the value of foreign trade? Which impact did exogenous factors, such as the onset of Europe's industrialization process, Spanish commercial policies, as well as international wars and disruptions of sea-lanes have on the colonial economies? What was the relative weight of the various economic sectors within the overall structure of Peru's and Mexico's economies?

2. The possibilities and limits of a supraregional economic analysis for each viceroyalty: in view of the marked regional discrepancies of economic development *within* each viceroyalty which have come to light in many recent studies, we hoped to elicit some answers to the question to which degree it still makes sense at all, to speak of a global economic process for New Spain and Peru during the late colonial period. The task here in the first place would consist in checking whether the structures and conjunctures of regional economic complexes within each viceroyalty evinced parallel movements. To which degree did there exist an inter-regional integration of markets for commodities, labor and capital? Was the era characterized by a progressive integration of markets in the viceroyalties? Or can we see the beginning of the trend characterizing much of Latin America during the nineteenth century by which stronger direct links of regional export economies with Europe lead to the atrophy of broader interregional commercial circuits?

3. These problems immediately raise the question as to the mechanisms by which various regional and sectoral production complexes may have been linked in the late colonial viceroyalties. What kind of multiplication effects were exercised not only by mining, a sector which has long been considered the principal motor of both viceroyalties' economies, but also by agriculture, manufacturing, commerce and transport? What consequences did sectoral growth produce for the social structure of production and markets in other sectors? Did, for example, increasing demand for foodstuff in many of Mexico's booming silver mining

districts during the eighteenth century lead to a long-term rise in the income of appreciable numbers of agricultural producers (i.e. not just a handful of owners of large cereal and livestock estates) and consequently give rise to multiplication effects for the production and trade of textiles and household wares? Or, conversely, did the socio-political control over the peasantry remain sufficiently strong that only a small group of traders and provincial officeholders – other than a few large landholders – profitted from increasing demand for foodstuff? In which directions did sectoral transfers of capital run (only from trade and mining into agriculture, as suggested by David Brading)?² Were regional wage differentials large enough to produce interregional labor migrations, or, conversely, what importance did forced labor recruitments still hold in both viceroalties during the final decades of the colonial period?

4. Finally we hoped to focus attention on the role of the colonial state and church, both regarding their influence on the economic order and the disposition of their income from taxes and tithes and the various and sundry other revenues.

During and even before the symposium it became obvious to us that these ambitious goals of a global comparison between both viceregal economies during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were difficult to achieve in their totality for three principal reasons: 1. problems inherent in comparative history; 2. the limits of our knowledge of both viceregal economies and the different state of the historiography on Mexico and Peru; 3. the great variety of historiographical approaches towards Spanish America's colonial economies, not only among the contributions to this volume, but in the literature at large.

Comparative studies in history, as in the other social sciences, are difficult but necessary. Comparison is, as Emile Durkheim has noted, the only "indirect experiment" in the social sciences. In order to be able to make – albeit limited – general statements, we have to compare. Comparative studies make it, more in particular, possible

- to control, to modify or to falsify the generalizing assumptions and hypotheses;
- to clarify the similarities and the differences between the phenomena involved;
- to propose and check the criteria of periodization, and to indicate the open questions, the direction and the adequate dimensions of further research. The latter function is of special importance in such cases, in which the original hypothesis has not been corroborated.

Most comparisons which have been made have remained implicit ones. It is, however, the explicit comparison which is much more needed, although it tends to require a great amount of hard work. Only the explicit comparison can explain its initial assumptions, its theoretical background (or its prejudices and biases!), and give reasons for the criteria for choosing the functional equivalents to be compared.

One problem is that there is no general rule about what is to be and can be compared. What is to be compared depends very much upon the questions we want to raise and the hypotheses we want to check. They define the elements and the scope of a comparison. There is no general rule as to only comparing synchronic events. A concrete set of questions can, on the contrary, make diachronic comparisons necessary. Nor is there a rule that we are only to compare phenomena of a certain similarity, as some theoreticians, like Karl Marx and Marc Bloch, have suggested. Even phenomena which seem to be completely dissimilar, can be legitimate objects of a comparison, if our questions give reasons for comparing them. Nor do the systems, between the elements of which we want to do comparisons, necessarily have to be of the same category or at the same level of their development.

A more fundamental problem of comparative work consists in the fact that in order to be able to embark upon a reasonable and explicit comparison, we need a certain theoretical framework. It is required in order to find the adequate hypotheses and questions to begin with. The problem is that in most cases the elements of this theoretical framework do not become completely clear before we are in the midst of our comparison, so that our questions might be much more general in the beginning than in the end of our study. For some people this has been reason enough not to make explicit the questions they are, in fact, pursuing.³

The general problem for comparative work on Latin American societies consists in the fact that much of the empirical data are considerably less elaborated than they are for European or North American history or that they are missing altogether. But this does not obviate the necessity of pursuing the comparative approach, because it is methodologically impescindible. The necessary adjustment to these difficult conditions for comparative work on Latin American history would seem to consist in the particularly careful design of the questions to be pursued comparatively: The guiding questions and the objects of the comparison must be chosen in such a way that the empirical data, either existing in

the literature previously or to be elaborated in the course of the comparative research, allow satisfactory findings.

The most serious obstacle for a global comparison of both viceregal economies in the late colonial period lies in the limitations of our knowledge, in spite of the many significant studies which have recently appeared. For several of the key variables which would need to be considered for a comparison between the conjunctures and the structures of the two economies, we do not possess any data, while for other variables data exist only for regional case studies or for a limited number of years. Thus we practically possess no systematic information on transportation and transaction costs in either viceroyalty. Other than John Coatsworth's base line figures for the value of Mexico's sectoral products in 1800, we do not have any estimates for global production figures – either by volume or by value – for agriculture or for manufacturing, admittedly scarce information for any pre-industrial society. As a consequence, any statements about the growth of the Mexican and Peruvian economies during the late colonial period continue to be mere extrapolations from the data on precious metal mining and foreign trade and from qualitative indicators on the other sectors.

Many key problems have been carefully studied on the local or regional level in recent years. For various areas in both economies we now possess series on prices of agricultural, livestock and even some manufactured commodities, while studies on the volume of agricultural production – based on tithe records – or on wages are still rare. The greatest advances in our understanding of the Spanish American economies during the eighteenth century, particularly concerning Mexico, have come through the large number of recent studies on regional agrarian complexes: For quite a few areas in both viceroyalties we now have abundant information on changing distributions of land, the development of property values, rental rates, shifts in the emphasis in production, credit systems and labor regimes.

Yet, while all these studies greatly facilitate comparisons between the economic development of various regions of both economies, it is at best problematic to generalize from regional data to the global development of Peru's and Mexico's late colonial economies. The number of natural or man-made events and developments which could effect economic growth in a circumscribed region only and not in the rest of the vast and geographically heterogeneous viceroyalties is large: it includes climatic crises, epidemics, new mining strikes and shifting commercial circuits.

All these limitations of our knowledge are made more serious by the highly uneven historiography on the late colonial economies of Mexico and Peru: We simply know much more on many aspects of the Mexican economy than we do about corresponding Peruvian problems, a fact which also is evident in the contributions to this volume.

Comparisons require a clear framework of issues, variables and methodological approaches, all equally applied to the various subjects of the comparison. In contrast, historiography on the Latin American economies has been characterized by a great diversity of issues and methodological approaches. This is, of course, neither a bad thing in itself, nor is it so different from economic historiography on other continents or countries, although we would suggest that in the Latin American case the extremely weak impact of a historiography oriented by issues and methodology of professional economics makes the debate particularly disjointed. In any case, whatever the merits of such methodological diversity, it does pose serious problems for systematic comparisons, and this volume is not free of such problems.

Studies on the institutional framework of trade and production have influenced the economic history on colonial Spanish America longer than the historiography on Europe and North America. Besides its obvious emphasis on the prescribed rather than the real structure of the colonial economies, this approach resulted in a strong emphasis of the Spanish metropolis and a neglect of autonomous economic processes in the colonies. The long survival of the periodization scheme, according to which in the Spanish American core areas a boom during the second half of the sixteenth century was followed by a secular depression between the 1630's and the early eighteenth century which – other than in Peru – gave way to a renewed boom in the era of the Bourbon reforms owes much to this historiographic approach. Also the insistence on the importance of particular Spanish policies for the actual economic evolution of the colonies, which is shared by several contributors to this volume, owes much to the strong impact of institutional studies on the historiography of colonial Spanish American economies. Modern policy studies have overcome many of the problems of this older approach, especially by taking into consideration social and economic conflicts of interest and the evolving economic conjuncture bearing upon the decision-making process of the *Consejo* (or *Ministro*) *de Indias*, viceroys and lesser bureaucrats. Jacques Barbier, probably the foremost practitioner of this approach for the late colonial period, in his contribution on the Spanish policy concerning trade between Vera Cruz and Habana

demonstrates the rich potential of such studies.

During the last fifteen years or so probably the greatest number of contributions to Latin American economy history has come from eclectic studies which focused on both social and economic issues. Utilizing hitherto neglected sources, they contributed much quantitative and qualitative information on the economic activities and income levels of certain social groups, their career patterns, the structure of enterprises in various sectors, etc. But in a period in which economic development theory had become suspect, the issues which most of these studies dealt with stemmed rather from debates in social history than from economic history. Their contributions to the economic history of the Spanish American colonies were incidental to their attempts to analyze societies. The majority of the contributions to this volume follows this approach. Many of these studies have chosen a regional focus in order to be able to analyze the complex web of social and economic interrelationships between the various strata and sectors.

As a reaction to a social analytical approach which tended to portray people as the objects of broad, anonymous historical processes, quite a few historians during the last decade have opted for a vantage point, by which they hope to portray the subjective experience of social, economic and political change particularly by lower class contemporaries, and their struggles to improve their condition. This history "from the bottom up," in the Latin American case closely tied to ethnohistory, can contribute to the field of economic history an appreciation of the differential effects of economic growth on various social strata. In the present volume the contributions by Brooke Larson, Christine Hünefeldt and Albert Meyers owe much to this approach.

The type of economic history, which builds upon the issues and methods developed in the field of economics, has until now found few adherents among students of the colonial period in Latin American history. This poses rather serious problems for the field as it is precisely such an approach which could contribute much towards laying systematic foundations for international comparisons of economic development. In his paper on New Spain's late colonial mining sector in this volume, John Coatsworth skillfully demonstrates the potential of this approach.

Given the limitations of our knowledge and the great variety of methodological approaches characterizing Latin American economic history in general and the contributions to this volume in particular, it will be easily seen how difficult it is to fulfill the exigencies of a systematic comparison between the late colonial economies of Mexico

and Peru. This volume cannot claim to present a comprehensive overview over both economies within a comparative framework. But it does present a substantial body of analyses on comparable sectors and problems in both viceregal economies, which put into relief many key similarities and differences between both cases. While achieving less than a comprehensive systematic comparison of both economies, the volume, for its very methodological diversity, also does more: Several contributions emphasize social aspects of economic change, while others carefully demonstrate the complex web of interests and the ideological conditions shaping circumscribed regional economies.

In the following pages we shall outline some of the major substantive findings on the economies of the late colonial Mexico and Peru which result from the papers in this volume.

Periodization: For the case of New Spain Coatsworth and TePaske suggest that the real value of mining output and revenue collection grew most rapidly during the early and middle decades of the eighteenth century respectively. The years of the famous reform era boom, roughly between the late 1770's and mid-1790's, in their view saw the real value of mining output and revenue stagnate inspite of impressive nominal growth. For the period between 1795 and 1810 Coatsworth suggests decline.

Comparisons with the Peruvian case are difficult, since for the lack of long-range price series so far nobody has undertaken to deflate figures indicating the value of mining production, fiscal revenues, or any other indicators of economic growth. Nevertheless some broad outlines of periodization become discernible. Nearly nobody argues that Peru underwent noteworthy economic growth between the late seventeenth century and 1730. For the decades of the Bourbon reform era, roughly from the mid-1770's to the early 1790's, TePaske's figures on revenue and Fisher's data on mining output and on imports from Spain, show very strong growth, commensurate with comparable Mexican nominal growth rates. Flores Galindo even locates the beginning of commercial affluence of Lima's merchants in the 1750's. Just as in the Mexican case, there is a change in Peru's economic conjuncture during the mid-1790's, coinciding with Spain's involvement in the Napoleonic Wars: While both Fisher and Haitin demonstrate that sectors as mining and Lima-based commerce did not enter a severe crisis before the outbreak of the Wars of Independence, the years between 1796 and the early 1810's show stagnation in most available indices on Peru's economic growth. If Tandeter's and Wachtel's recently published price series

for Potosí during the eighteenth century are indicative of the general Peruvian trend, then the rapid nominal growth between the mid-1770's and early 1790's may safely be translated into equally rapid or even greater real growth, since prices for both agricultural and manufactured commodities were declining between 1755 and 1790.⁴ Since the 1790's Peru, according to Haitin and Tandeter/Wachtel, again joins the Mexican tendency towards price rises, although they appear steeper in the northern viceroyalty.

In the perspective of the year 1800 Peru, the erstwhile pearl of the Spanish Indies, had become the relatively poor cousin of wealthy New Spain. But it is becoming clear, that the diverging rates of economic growth which lead to this reversal, or at least vast differentiation, in the magnitude of both economies, did not occur in the era of the Caroline reforms, say between the 1770's and the early 1790's. The period in which New Spain's economy surged ahead, while many indicators for Peru suggest not merely stagnation but decline, spanned the decades from about 1690 to 1730.

The middle decades of the century, from the 1730's to about 1770, render more ambivalent results in the comparison of economic performance between the two viceroyalties: In the Mexican case Coatsworth posits a slowing growth of the real value of mining output, with a long phase of stagnation between the late 1720's and early 1750's, followed by stop and go growth until the late 1770's. TePaske locates the most rapid expansion of revenue between 1740 and 1775, while van Young's and Thomson's studies suggest a gradual expansion of agriculture and cotton textile production during this period. But there are also signs for a recovery of the Peruvian economy since the 1730's, with a slow growth of mining output, and, according to Tandeter's and Wachtel's figures for High Peru, an expansion of agriculture production.

According to this periodization scheme, then, the great divergence in the economic growth of both viceroyalties would have occurred early in the eighteenth century. When Peru turned around from decline to slow recovery since the 1730's, the margin between the growth rates for both viceroyalties may have gradually narrowed. By the time of the Bourbon reforms, between the 1770's and mid-1790's nominally the Peruvian economy seems to have grown as much as the Mexican economy. Between 1796 and the outbreak of the Wars of Independence both economies stagnated. The various external and internal strains and bottlenecks probably hit the Mexican economy harder and earlier than the Peruvian economy, as suggested by the growing inflationary pressures

which in New Spain began to affect purchasing power and real economic growth since the 1780's.

In their commentaries on the papers of Coatsworth and TePaske, Carmagnani and Kossok raise important caveats on the methodology which produced the reevaluation of New Spain's phases of economic growth and stagnation during the eighteenth century. In fact nobody draws into question the tremendous wealth which characterized the various entrepreneurial groups as well as the royal and church institutions in New Spain during the forty years preceding the Hidalgo revolt. But it would seem that since about 1780 an increasingly skewed distribution of income, coupled with inefficient allocation of capital and a mounting tax burden on most sectors other than mining and overseas commerce acted as a ceiling on New Spain's economic growth.

Population: The periodization scheme just outlined suggests the significance of demography for economic growth in late colonial Mexico and Peru: The Andean viceroyalty's lag in the commencement of population recovery - it only set in around 1730, some eighty to hundred years later than in New Spain - is mirrored in a lag of at least forty years in the onset of economic growth. For agriculture population growth provided both an increased supply of the labor force and growing demand for foodstuff, as Eric van Young has shown. The renewed expansion of silver mining in Mexico and Peru during the eighteenth century was unthinkable without the onset of recovery from the extremely low demographic nadirs. Either the necessary labor for new mining operations would not have been available or high wage levels would have made many enterprises unprofitable.

Production technologies, productivity: The general stability of the price of labor throughout the eighteenth century, a consequence of demographic expansion, royal policies and increasingly unequal distribution of productive property and income, apparently operated as a disincentive for the employment of labor saving devices in most sectors of both viceroyal economies. Increasing availability of capital usually led to the expansion of production in periods of high profit margins by putting increments of the factors of production into operation - be they land, labor, looms or mining shafts. Usually these processes of expansion neither lead to a shift in the ratio of factor inputs, nor to the employment of more efficient productive technology. In the face of growing competition, the textile industries in both viceroyalties attempted to turn to the production of better quality, higher priced products, rather than pursue a reduction of costs of production.

There did occur technological changes in Mexican mining, such as the application of gunpowder to obtain the ore and to construct drainage tunnels, the installations of whims for hauling ore and water out of the mining shaft, and the increased use of mule-drawn mills to crush the ore. But according to John Coatsworth such changes did not lead to productivity increases. These changes undertaken simultaneously with rising costs of production due to increasing input prices as well as deeper shafts and water problems, could not have kept the operation of many mines from becoming uneconomical, had it not been for the substantial government help for the industry. Nevertheless, the productivity of the Mexican mining industry during the late colonial period now appears as a key problem for future research. On the other hand, the backwardness and low productivity of Peru's mining industry seems beyond doubt, as becomes evident from John Fisher's research.

While most authors see little technological advances in the growing economies of late colonial Mexico and Peru, several contributions stress changes in the industrial organization of enterprises, at least for the case of New Spain. In various sectors their average size grew significantly during the eighteenth century and there was a tendency to integrate all phases of production within one enterprise. Such changes could come about as a consequence of market forces and the unequal distribution of capital and credit, as in the case of New Spain's cotton and wool industries or in the mining sector. It could also be the result of government intervention, as in the case of Mexico's and Lima's tobacco factories, described by Susan Deans-Smith and Christine Hünefeldt. There is much less evidence for such changes occurring in Peru than for New Spain.

In his comments on the contributions dealing with the textile industry, John Coatsworth ventures the hypothesis (and it can be no more than that at the present state of our knowledge), that productivity was "substantially lower" in Peru than in Mexico in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Given the quite similar level of technology in both viceroyalties (with the possible exception of the mining sector), however, "physical productivity" (i.e. physical output per unit of input) could hardly have been much higher in Mexico than in Peru. Indeed, Coatsworth would not deny this, but suggests that still Peruvian productivity *in market terms* was much lower, since its economy probably faced "higher transport costs, limited effective demand, high information and transaction costs, fewer opportunities for regional specialization, minimal access to credit, and inelastic supplies of labor." A key difference

between both economies would thus have its origins in the distinct ecologies, socioethnic structures and settlement patterns of both viceroyalties. Jacobsen sees these same factors as differentiating both colonies' live-stock economies.

The impact of the colonial state on the economy: The debate about the significance of the "Bourbon reforms", that catch-all phrase covering all the decrees, reorganization schemes and fiscal measures churned out by the Spanish Crown and its new corps of bureaucrats between the 1760's and 1790's, continues vigorously and is in evidence among the contributions of this volume. Any discussion of the impact of the various reformist crown policies on the American colonial economies must keep in mind that they were far from homogeneous. As Horst Pietschmann suggests, it is possible to discern both a mercantilist and a proto-liberal strand of policy-making during the reign of Charles III.

John TePaske demonstrates that between the 1740's and early 1790's tax revenues in New Spain grew considerably faster than population. Even if we account for economic growth, and the loans raised by the treasury from civil and ecclesiastical corporations, there can be little doubt that for numerous social groups in both New Spain and Peru the burden of taxation was increasing particularly during the 1770's and 1780's. Scarlett O'Phelan shows how the new fiscal policies affected Indian peasants, mestizo muleteers and creole landholders and merchants alike by raising the rate of old taxes, decreeing their extension to cover previously exempted segments of the population, and establishing new levies. In O'Phelan's view this new taxation program overestimated the strength of Upper and Lower Peru's monetary economy and thus led to the crisis of the colonial society which erupted into the cycle of rebellions in the early 1780's. - Yet the viceroyalty of New Spain was not shaken by similar rebellions at that time, although, as John TePaske tells us, the levying of new taxes was much more marked there than it was in Peru. This discrepancy in the correlation between rising level of taxation and rebellion either might point to a higher degree of monetarization and, possibly, a higher income level for large segments of Mexico's population - making it easier to absorb increasing taxes without serious disruptions of the economy -, or alternatively might suggest a greater degree of acceptance and legitimacy of the Crown and its viceregal bureaucracy.

Parallel to other regimes of enlightened despotism in Europe, the Spanish Bourbons attempted to strengthen the influence of the state on the economy, also in its American colonies. This goal was not pursued

only through the intensification of the fiscal and administrative infrastructure but also through a greater direct involvement in the economy. The papers by Deans-Smith and Hünefeldt demonstrate that the tobacco monopolies, while successful fiscally, contributed rather little to the economic development of the two viceroyalties. The concentration and supervision of production and processing of the tobacco did not lead to changes of technology and productivity increases. The real income of most growers and of the workers in the factories declined under the monopoly. The only beneficiaries were a handful of large growers, the bureaucratic administrators, and a few muleteers and traders, most of whom improved their income through some form of trickery, graft or contraband.

Also in this case one can observe that the Peruvian viceregal bureaucracy had much greater difficulties to impose an effective control over the industry than its Mexican counterpart. Given the haphazard operation of the Peruvian monopoly, shot through with generous loopholes for contraband trade in the interior of the viceroyalty, it is difficult to understand that nevertheless it was able to create the kind of artificially shielded market conditions under which Peruvian tobacco could withstand foreign competition. Since the early 1820's, with the monopoly's gradual demise, Peru was rapidly swamped by tobacco imports from Virginia and Cuba.

The direct impact of the new Bourbon policies varied from sector to sector. Van Young speaks of the almost total neglect of agriculture by the Bourbon reformers. In his view, whatever changes occurred in the agrarian economy of New Spain during the late colonial period, these were consequences of exogenous factors, primarily the rise of population and the large upswing in transatlantic trade. Salas and Larson do not note any significant royal policies directed towards the development of textile production in Lower and Upper Peru. Thomson sees Puebla's cotton industry indirectly benefitting from policies designed to promote the Catalan textile producers, and particularly from Spain's frequent wars, blocking transatlantic trade. The wars, to be sure, were a boon for industries everywhere in Spanish America, and lead to many short-lived cycles of rapid industrial expansion, as in the case of Cochabamba's cotton trades between 1796 and 1802. But they can hardly be considered as asset of the Crown's economic policies towards the colonies. At the same time, these three studies present little evidence for the often repeated hypotheses that Spain's policy explicitly aimed at disrupting the American colonial textile industries during the late eighteenth

century. On balance Spain's *explicit* policies towards this sector in Mexico and Peru might best be described as one of neglect.

It is in trade and in mining where the direct impact of the Bourbon reform policies is usually considered to be most evident. Indeed at face value it appears obvious that both Peru and Mexico saw their trade with Europe expand tremendously as a consequence of Charles's III free trade ordinance of 1778 (1789 for New Spain). But while the precise timing of this quantum leap owed much to Crown policy, its underlying causes lie in the upswing of Europe's industrial and proto-industrial production, improved ship technology, and growing amounts of species in the colonies with which to purchase European goods. There is much cause to agree with Lockhart's and Schwartz's recent assessment that the Caroline trade reforms reacted to secular changes rather than having created them.⁵ As Jacobsen notes in his commentary on Jacques Barbier's paper, this type of reactive trade liberalization in the face of the inevitable also characterized Madrid's decision in 1807 to allow the reexport of European goods from La Habana to Vera Cruz.

The case of silver mining was different. In both Peru and Mexico during the late eighteenth century the industry reached what Carmagnani calls "the maximum of its possibilities given its technology of extraction and refining" due to government subsidies such as lowered mercury and gunpowder prices and tax reductions. Coatsworth thinks that in New Spain these subsidies lead to an expansion of output at ever lower or even negative marginal productivity. For fiscal reasons the crown in this view would have propped up a mining industry, which without this aid inevitably needed to shrink drastically. In John Fisher's view, however, it was the disruptions brought about by the Wars of Independence, and not intrinsic problems of the industry, which brought the decline of Lower Peru's silver output during the second decade of the nineteenth century. Put differently, the vast expansion of output between the 1770's and 1790's, which owed much to Crown policy, according to Fisher did not create an oversized industry characterized by rapidly declining marginal productivity. For Upper Peru's modest mining recovery during the second half of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, Fisher's assessment is more compatible with Coatsworth's evaluation of the case of New Spain between the 1780's and 1810, when he notes that "the industry in Potosí remained dangerously dependent upon the state for the provision of labour, mercury and financial subsidies." It is perhaps germane as further evidence for the difference between Mexico's and Upper Peru's silver industries on the one hand and that of Lower Peru

on the other, that only Lower Peru's industry seems to have recovered the high level of its late colonial output within fifteen to twenty years after the Wars of Independence.

But what about indirect, not explicitly aimed at, effects of the Bourbon policies on the two viceregal economies? John Coatsworth succinctly outlines one major position on this question: The Bourbon's singleminded pursuit of revenue maximization lead them to favor the increasingly inefficient mining sector to the detriment of the rest of the economy. The transferral of capital (through subsidies and credits) and other factors of production (especially labor) to the mining sector represented a misallocation of resources. The withdrawal of these resources from sectors like agriculture and manufacturing throttled their growth prematurely and contributed greatly to bottlenecks and inflationary pressures, which characterized New Spain's economy at least since the 1790's.

The opposite view is taken by Guy Thomson. Referring specifically to New Spain's industries, he rules out that a putative "Leviathan - like colonial state or tyrannous and interventionist petty officials" were among "the primary obstacles to the further growth." It should be noted that this view does not imply a strongly favorable impact of the Bourbon policies on the economies of Mexico and Peru, a position which does not find any convinced adherents in this volume. Rather it turns the primary focus in accounting for the stagnation of both economies at least since the 1790's to key structural, not policy-related elements in the two colonies' ecology, economy and society.

It is not possible to come down on either side of this debate conclusively. We would need to measure to which degree increasing subsidies to the mining sector and rising revenue collections made capital for other sectors of the economy scarcer and more expensive. It does seem clear, however, that in specific instances the Bourbon policies, affected the social and geographic distribution of production and income. *Comercio libre* may have hurt the established monopoly merchants, as Alberto Flores Galindo contends, while at the same time it created new opportunities for numerous new traders, often with "lesser means." The tobacco monopoly brought decreasing incomes to the majority of the producers and workers, while it was a boon for a few large privileged growers. At the same time the monopoly in New Spain favored a handful of cities, notably Mexico, as locations of tobacco factories, while withdrawing income earning possibilities in this industry from other towns.

Overall one arrives at a rather motley picture of the Bourbon reformers' impact on the colonial economies of Mexico and Peru. It would appear, as if the policies may have affected the timing and rate of economic changes, but not the secular trends. Economic growth depended primarily on the structure of production and markets, factor costs and productivity. These may have been influenced to a degree by higher taxation, subsidies for mining inputs and liberalization of trade flows. But the primary variables having a bearing on these factors were the demographic development, the natural environment, technology and the social distribution of the means of production.

More significant than the Bourbon policies' immediate impact on economic growth in Mexico and Peru was the fact that the reforms initiated by Charles III and his ministers and bureaucrats began a long-term trend towards rearranging the relation between the state and the economy. The expansion and the intensification of the fiscal infrastructure in the viceroyalties, coupled with a more activist economic policy, heightened the stakes involved in Crown economic and fiscal decision-making for the colonies' *intereses creados*. This increased the potential for conflicts between various social groups and the viceregal administrations. The outcome of such conflicts did not inevitably have to lead to a permanent alienation of the wealthy creole social strata in America from the Spanish metropolis, as Manfred Kossok assumes. The weakness of the Spanish state – and hence its narrow limits of autonomy – became fully apparent with the mounting fiscal crisis since the mid-1790's. In Mexico and Peru the Crown's dependence on donations and loans, forced or otherwise, from the Consulados and other civil and ecclesiastical corporations grew considerably during the remaining twenty-five years of the colonial regime. This opened the door to renewed accommodations with the *intereses creados*, albeit in a new political and economic environment. The legacy of the late colonial regime in Mexico and Peru would seem to consist in a weak state, which nevertheless pursued an activist economic project containing both neo-mercantilist and proto-liberal facets, and thus laid itself open to dependence on powerful economic pressure groups.

Regional economic development within the viceroyalties: Both in Mexico and in Peru there were significant shifts in the economic center of gravity during the late colonial period, or, put differently, some regions experienced a notably higher rate of growth than others. In both cases the direction of the shift was northwestwards and was accompanied or caused by shifts in the distribution of population. But while in

Mexico it was a gradual process, gaining steam over most of the eighteenth century, in Peru the shift may have been more dramatic, becoming evident to contemporaries within a short time span.

In New Spain it was primarily the regions lying on, or slightly north of a belt stretching from Vera Cruz over Mexico City, Querétaro, León, Guanajuato, Celaya to Guadalajara, which experienced strong growth during the eighteenth century. Responding to rapid demographic increase – particularly in the burgeoning cities – and the upswing of the silver output in nearby mining districts, agricultural production, both of cereal and industrial crops, some branches of manufacturing, and trade in both European and domestic goods underwent a sustained growth during most of the eighteenth century.

In contrast the economies in the Intendancies of Puebla and Oaxaca developed much more haltingly and in some aspects experienced serious reversals. The middle decades of the century saw an agricultural crisis in both Intendancies – accompanied in Puebla by a great loss of population through epidemics and emigration. While cereal production seems to have increased again during the last three decades of the century, and in Puebla cotton manufacturing underwent its erratic growth process, other trades in that old industrial center decayed, and Oaxaca saw its important cochineal production decline since 1780. Apart from deleterious government policies (affecting the cochineal trade), major causes for the southeastern regions' more sluggish economic development may have consisted in the difficulties to compete with the central and western regions in supplying the largest urban centers and mining districts with agricultural and manufactured goods and the greater share of Indian population which brought with it slower population growth (especially in cities), a lower degree of monetarization, and narrow limits for commercial agriculture.

In Peru the regional economic differentiation was more dramatic and of greater consequence than in New Spain. The decline of the Lima – Potosí circuit, although a long-term process, reached a critical phase during the late 1770's and early 1780's. The integration of the Audiencia of Charcas (High Peru) into the newly formed viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1776 seriously affected the trade from Lower Peru's southern highlands (the regions of Cuzco, parts of Arequipa, and Puno – even though this intendancy belonged to the new viceroyalty until 1796) to Upper Peru, as Scarlett O'Phelan affirms. In spite of John Fisher's suggestion that southern Peru's late colonial regionalism had more cultural than economic causes, the evidence for deep economic problems

is mounting. Miriam Salas shows, how by the 1780's woolen textile production in Vilcashuaman was declining and the *obrajeros* were attempting to redirect their trade from Upper Peru to Lima. Recent studies have also suggested the stagnation or decline of agriculture and livestock herding in Cuzco and Puno since the 1770's.⁶ Since that decade, Upper Peru's modest mining recovery apparently benefitted mostly the economies of that region itself and certain parts of the La Plata basin.

With this multifaceted crisis of trade and production in much of southern Peru, the center of gravity of the viceroyalty shifted northward. For the period between the 1780's and 1810 most indications for economic growth concern the central and northern Sierra and the central coast. These regions benefitted from expanding silver mining output, more rapid population growth than in the south, and Lima's growing urban demand, all of which seemed to have spurred agricultural production on the central coast and in at least some of the *serrano* provinces in the Intendancies of Tarma and Trujillo. The increasing imports of European commodities, channelled by Lima's merchants into the new mining regions and made possible by the growing output of silver, apparently affected the textile manufactories in the central and northern Sierra as adversely as in the south.

Did the integration of commodity, capital and labor markets above the regional level increase in late colonial New Spain and Peru? Alberto Flores Galindo's contribution outlines for the Peruvian case, as John Kicza's recent monograph does for Mexico, how the wholesale merchants of the capital constructed a web of itinerant traders, stores and agents throughout the viceroyalty.⁷ Through this web flowed European products and a few imports from other colonies, such as cocoa, downward, and high value colonial products such as sugar, cochineal, livestock products and chinchona bark upward. As the spatially distant and socially low echelons of the trade hierarchy were characterized by a severe chronic shortage of specie, these interregional commercial webs were articulated through credit. The growing output of silver permitted the commodity and credit flows through these interregional commercial webs to increase considerably during the last third of the eighteenth century. In New Spain the credit system appears to have become more agile also during this period, as bills of exchange became a common instrument for domestic transactions.

Nevertheless the greater part of the credit transactions and certainly the bulk of commodity flows never went beyond the realm of a region

articulated by a provincial urban center. While credit for mining more often than not was handled by the importers and wholesalers in the viceregal capitals, the credit for manufacturing and particularly for agriculture, for which provincial ecclesiastical lending institutions played such a prominent role, was raised overwhelmingly within the region. Most agricultural products, building materials and even the cheaper types of domestic manufactures had a too low unit value to stand the extraordinary costs of interregional transport. Most importantly, as Flores Galindo underlines, the expansion of an integrated viceregal market encountered a barrier in the continued vitality of a subsistence economy, in which the majority of the rural population kept monetary exchanges to the minimum required by state, church and private surplus extraction.

— John Coatsworth suggests, that both the degree of monetarization and per capita incomes were higher in Mexico than in Peru. But much of this higher margin of per capita commercial transactions in New Spain might have resulted in the intensification of *intra* – regional commerce, the exchange between a provincial urban center and its hinterland, the importance of which is underscored by Van Young.

One key variable determining the rate of integration of interregional markets is the degree of specialization of the regional economies and hence their complementarity. The contributors disagree on this issue: Thomson and Van Young assume that the specialization of regional economies in New Spain did not advance enough during the late colonial period to broaden the interregional market through significant volumes of complementary exchanges. Coatsworth, on the other hand, does see a movement in this direction. The relocation and concentration of some previously dispersed economic activities during the late colonial period, such as wheat growing, livestock raising, cotton and wool manufacturing, would seem to present evidence in this direction. Except for shifts in the production of sugar from the north to the central coast, there are no signs of growing specialization in regional economies in Peru during the eighteenth century.

In sum, the limited information which we have so far on the question of interregional market integration, renders a contradictory picture: In both viceroyalties the volume of trade with European commodities increased particularly since the 1780's. But in New Spain the bottleneck which constrained the growth of commercial circuits was woven into the very model of eighteenth century expansion: The falling real income of labor in the countryside and in the city, without which neither silver mining nor, as a consequence, overseas trade could have grown so much,

limited the expansion of the interregional market. Again it would seem that the model of economic growth followed in New Spain during the eighteenth century contained its own barrier through the increasingly unequal distribution of income and factors of production.

Mining as a lead sector for the late colonial economies? Much recent literature has suggested that economic fluctuations in the core areas of colonial Spanish America had their origin in the ups and downs of precious metal mining. John Fisher cautiously takes this position for late colonial Peru, and is seconded for the Mexican case by Marcello Carmagnani. Systematic research testing the correlations between output, productivity and wage levels in the mining sector with the corresponding values for other sectors and tracing the effects of increments of silver output in the economy at large have not been undertaken so far. But some bits and pieces of evidence, also contained in this volume, make it necessary to attach a more limited, but also more complex role to the mining sector.

Silver mining could affect the economy primarily through its demand for inputs and its supply of circulating medium, silver coin. Even if the volume of inputs demanded by the industry, and silver output entering the Mexican and Peruvian economies had fluctuated parallelly – which they did not, due to changes in productivity and the share of silver immediately withdrawn from the domestic circuit as Crown revenue –, the impact of these two aspects of mining on the general economy at any given time could be rather different.

The silver output was primarily diffused through the whole monetarized viceregal economy by way of the commercial webs controlled by the large wholesale merchants in the capitals (and the one or other large provincial city in New Spain). As we have seen, these merchants channelled their money primarily into the import of European goods and secondarily into the purchase of high value colonial goods. Thus any increment in the mines' output of silver only lead to a much smaller increment in the demand for goods produced in the colony itself, and was smallest for the great mass of low value goods, such as food crops, building materials and low grade textiles. Conversely, any decrease in the output of silver would have created a proportionally much smaller decrease of demand for these low value colonial goods. To the degree European imports competed with commodities produced in the viceroyalty, any increase of silver output threatened the domestic commodities' market position through expanding European imports. There can be little doubt that much of the textile industry in both Mexico and Peru

suffered from this consequence of growing silver production during the last third of the eighteenth century.

The mining sector's demand for domestically produced inputs affected primarily the local and regional economies in which the mining districts were situated. Only for those higher value domestic products which were not replaced by European imports – especially transport and draft animals and livestock products –, the demand from the mining districts affected interregional markets. Some regional markets in New Spain, such as those of Zacatecas, Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí, benefitted comparatively more from the silver mines' demand for inputs than any Peruvian region, since the size of the operations was much larger in the important Mexican districts. While the share of the total population permanently employed in mining was at least as high in Peru as in Mexico towards the end of the eighteenth century (0.8 and 0.5 percent respectively according to Fisher), the size of the operations in Lower Peru, in terms of their labor force, was quite small – only one district had a permanent work force of 2,500 laborers, and three more between 500 and 1,000 –, so that demand for domestically produced inputs could largely be met by narrowly circumscribed regional economies. The rapidly expanding silver mines of Hualgayoc, for example, did not even constitute a sufficiently large market to pull the nearby coastal province of Trujillo out of its late colonial doldrums. In both viceroyalties the cities constituted a larger market for agricultural products than the mining camps and, at least in Mexico, urban demand would seem to have grown faster than that of the mining sector during the half century before the Wars of Independence.

In sum, silver mining affected the various regions and sectors of the two viceroyalties' late colonial economies in rather different ways. Its impact on demand for low value colonial products was rather limited, although it may have accentuated the short-term price cycles for cereals. On the other hand, the growth of silver output played a key role for the vast increase of European imports into the colonies. Through this crucial link to transatlantic and interregional trade, silver mining exerted a strong influence on the structural changes experienced by the viceregal economies, particularly regarding the articulation with the ubiquitous stratum of subsistence production by means of vast credit networks.

Summary:

Parallel and Divergent Trends in the Economies of Late Colonial Mexico and Peru:

Looking at available indices of aggregate economic growth, both viceroyalties seem to have undergone remarkably similar processes during the last half century of unchallenged colonial rule: Mining output, overseas (and probably domestic) commerce, agricultural production and government revenue all grew, at least nominally, from the early 1770's until some time during the 1790's. Most sectors of both economies then entered a phase of stagnation or modest decline lasting until the outbreak of the Wars of Independence. Only the textile manufacturing sector in both viceroyalties hit hard times no later than the 1780's. It experienced short-term cycles of growth in times of international war, which were difficult for other sectors of the economy.

The strong correlation between both viceroyalties' rhythm of expansion and that of the international economy underlines the significance of exogenous influences on the colonies' economy. In the long-term process of increasing flows of commodities, capital and labor between the European metropolis and Spanish America, which has continued, with spurts and pauses, from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, the *rhythm* of economies as those of Mexico and Peru has become ever more tied to that of the European and later North-American economies. The years between the mid-1760's and early 1790's constituted a period of intensification of these links, as European merchants placed a growing share of some key industrial and proto-industrial commodities (the French "*bretañas*," Silesian linens and English wool and cotton cloth) in the South- and, especially, North-American markets. Obviously the fairly uniform application of the Bourbon fiscal and economic policies in New Spain and Peru also fostered parallel developments in both viceroyalties, what with the growing taxation of domestic trade and Indian tributaries, the establishment of new Crown monopolies, subsidies for mining, and the liberalization of overseas trade which lead to changes in the composition of merchant communities.

But these homogenizing exogenous factors worked upon two colonial economies which, inspite of their common hispanic institutional, social and political heritage, differed from each other concerning some structures of long duration. Perhaps most importantly, the demographic recovery had advanced further in Mexico than in Peru. By the late colonial period in New Spain this lead to rising values of rural property, and increasingly unequal distribution of land and income, and a growing

supply of labor. Although the population also increased in late colonial Peru, its absolute size and its density were still too low in most parts of the viceroyalty to lead to similar processes as in New Spain. Inflationary pressures, due to faster growth of population than of agricultural production, became a problem earlier and more intensely in Mexico than in Peru. Labor mobility was probably also higher in the northern viceroyalty. All of these factors owed much to the stronger entrenchment of the Indian peasant communities in large parts of central and southern Peru, compared with most of Mexico, something underlined by Friedrich Katz.

Mexican late colonial markets were larger than those of Peru, not only because of the different demographic situation (especially regarding the large cities) and the higher degree of monetarization, but apparently also as a consequence of lower transportation costs, which tended to extend the radius in which goods could be profitably sold. The rapid growth of markets in Mexico during the eighteenth century constituted a stimulus for internal colonization, changing crop patterns, and probably even some more regional economic specialization, developments which were scarce in Peru during the period.

The comparison between the experience of the tobacco monopolies has lead us to suggest that in Peru the colonial state may have been weaker than in New Spain. The effectiveness of its measures out in the provinces was very low indeed. This is in a sense paradoxical, because, more than in Mexico, the archaic nature of the viceroyalty's economy, characterized by a low elasticity of labor supply and a low degree of monetarization, required the coercive power of the "state" to articulate the still weak commercial sphere with the vast subsistence sector. But although forced commodity sales and corvée labor drafts ultimately were based on Crown sanction, they only became effective through the consent and involvement of local and provincial authorities and notables. Without their cooperation the state remained weak in Peru, and if the interests of the central Crown bureaucracy and provincial authorities and notables were opposed, this might result in widespread contraband or rebellion.

In all, one is left with the impression that economic growth in late colonial Peru only spread a thin and fragile veneer of progress over parts of the viceroyalty. This type of growth relied on the articulation of a rather archaic socio-economic substrate, characterized by widespread subsistence production, a low degree of monetarization, scarce and inelastic labor supplies, extremely high transaction and transportation

costs, weak integration of local and regional markets and the continued importance of coercive practices.

While such elements were of course not absent in Mexico, it nevertheless appears that the northern viceroyalty experienced more profound transformations in the course of the eighteenth century. Here economic growth was coupled with changes in the land tenure pattern and the spatial distribution of agricultural production, growing importance of wage labor, increasing inequalities in the distribution of income, expansion of markets, reorganization of the surviving textile industry towards more complex arrangements reminiscent of proto-industrial complexes in Europe and, possibly, an increase of productivity in market terms.

By 1800 both the Peruvian and Mexican economies had entered a phase of stagnation. While the Napoleonic wars certainly played a role in this, there were important domestic structural causes as well. In Mexico they had to do with the inflationary pressures brought about by the very model of economic growth: Markets having grown faster than agricultural production and population; growing costs of industrial inputs, declining real wages. In Peru the problems may have consisted in the very limited market sphere, coupled with a crisis of commercial agriculture for export.

In this introduction we have only touched upon some of the issues involved in a comparison of the late colonial economies of Mexico and Peru. Many more problems are raised by the contributions themselves. Quite a few questions remain unresolved and will require further research. But we hope that this volume will demonstrate that the difference between the late colonial economies of Mexico and Peru has little to do with varying or even opposite conjunctures. Rather it is in some important structural elements of both economies and societies, where we should hope to find the roots of their distinctiveness.

NOTES

1. Rosemary Thorp, ed., *Latin America in the 1930's. The Role of the Periphery in World Crisis* (London, 1984).
2. David Brading, "Government and Elite in Late Colonial Mexico," *HAHR*, 53(1973), 398-414.
3. Cf. more in detail: Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Theorien in der Praxis des vergleichenden Historikers," in Jürgen Kocka and Thomas Nipperdey, eds., *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte* (Munich, 1979), pp.119-136.

4. Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, *Precios y producción agraria, Potosí y Charcas en el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires, n.d.[1983]).
5. James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America. A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil* (Cambridge, 1983), p.368.
6. Luis Miguel Glave and Maria Isabel Remy, *Estructura agraria y vida rural en una región andina; Ollantaytambo entre los siglos XVI y XIX* (Cuzco, 1983); Magnus Mörner, *Perfil de la sociedad rural del Cuzco a fines de la colonia* (Lima, 1978); Nils Jacobsen, "Landtenure and Society in the Peruvian Altiplano Azángaro Province, 1770 - 1920," (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1982).
7. John Kicza, *Colonial Entrepreneurs, Family and Business in Bourbon Mexico City* (Albuquerque, N.M. 1983).

II. THE MINING SECTOR

1. THE MEXICAN MINING INDUSTRY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

John H. Coatsworth

This paper describes trends in the growth of precious metals production in eighteenth century New Spain, assesses the relations between government and industry in the Bourbon era, analyzes the role of the mining sector in the colonial economy, and sketches the causes of the collapse of the mining industry after 1810. The principal focus of the paper is economic, rather than institutional. The approach is general, rather than detailed. The purpose is to present a somewhat different view of the Mexican mining industry in this period than that found in the historiography, and to indicate the research tasks that promise the most significant results in the future. A more general objective of the paper is to contribute to new currents of work on the late colonial economy at a moment when – as this timely volume demonstrates – research in this area is already transforming the field. It will become clear in the course of this paper, however, that the author owes a large debt to scholars who have published an indispensable series of monographic studies on the colonial mining industry over the course of the past decade, and especially to David Brading, whose work on *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico* set a standard for the field.¹ The story of the eighteenth-century mining industry that emerged from the new work of the past ten years did not always fundamentally alter received wisdom about the industry. Late colonial Mexico experienced an unprecedented mining "boom"; the task was to explain how this boom was achieved. Government promotion played an important role in the boom; the problem was to explain the origins of official activism and to distinguish its effects. The industry collapsed when the 1810 insurgents, in their zeal to destroy all things Spanish, laid waste to mine works and refineries; little research was required to document this conclusion.

For the most part, this story is false. Mexico did not experience an unprecedented mining boom at the end of the century, but at the beginning, as Garner has already shown.² In fact, the late colonial

mining industry was in such deep trouble that it survived by draining the public treasury and diverting resources from other sectors. Government promotion cannot explain a boom that did not occur; it can only explain an increase in physical output based on propping up marginal operations (some quite large). The insurgents did not cause the collapse through destruction of plant and equipment (which could have been repaired). They merely accelerated the fiscal crisis that would have ended public subsidies and produced the collapse of industry in a short time anyway. The mining industry was so sick by 1810 that it can be doubted whether the industry's decline had anything to do with the insurgency at all.

This rather different story emerges from a study of published data, rather than new research. It is thus based on the work of other scholars whose studies departed from a much different set of assumptions and embodied different research strategies. The data they report are therefore imperfect for testing the hypotheses sketched here. Nonetheless, they are sufficient to demonstrate the significance that new primary research in this area could have for understanding economic trends in the late colonial era. The first section below reviews descriptive accounts of trends in physical output, the second questions the significance of this raw data for analyzing the health of the industry and recomputes output to reflect the purchasing power of the gold and silver produced in market terms, the third addresses the related questions of industry productivity and profit trends, the fourth reviews government efforts to prop up the industry, the fifth discusses the role of the mining industry in the economy as a whole, the sixth takes a new look at the industry's decline after 1810, and the final section comments on the future of research in this area.

I.

Descriptive accounts of the growth of precious metals production in eighteenth-century New Spain can rely on reasonably accurate data.³ Table I reproduces the well-known statistics, with the data grouped into five year periods. Table II presents the same data in index form, showing the output of each period as a percentage of the output of the period 1755-59. Measured from the endpoints of each quinquennium, output increased at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent from 1695/99 to 1805/09. This growth represents an impressive achievement, the more so when it is recalled that population grew in this period at only about 0.5 percent.⁴

TABLE I: *Production of Precious Metals, 1695 - 1814*
(Millions of pesos, by quinquennia)

1695/99	19.6	1755/59	65.7
1700/04	25.3	1760/64	58.5
1705/09	28.5	1765/69	60.9
1710/14	32.8	1770/74	80.8
1715/19	35.0	1775/79	91.0
1720/04	50.3	1780/84	100.3
1725/09	52.0	1785/89	93.2
1730/04	52.5	1790/94	109.7
1735/09	47.7	1795/99	121.2
1740/04	48.6	1800/04	104.6
1745/09	59.6	1805/09	122.0
1750/04	64.6	1810/14	47.1

Source: Manuel Orozco y Berra, "Informe sobre la acuñación en las Casas de Moneda de la República," Anexo to the *Memoria* of the Secretaría de Fomento (Mexico, 1857).

TABLE II: *Index of Physical Output, Mexican Mining, 1695 - 1814*
(1755 - 59 = 100)

1695/99	29	1755/59	100
1700/04	39	1760/64	89
1705/09	43	1765/69	93
1710/14	50	1770/74	123
1715/19	53	1775/79	139
1720/24	77	1780/84	153
1725/29	79	1785/89	142
1730/34	80	1790/94	167
1735/39	73	1795/99	185
1740/44	74	1800/04	159
1745/49	91	1805/09	186
1750/54	98	1810/14	72

Source: See Table I.

Rather than steady increases, decade by decade, New Spain's mining industry appears to have grown in sharp spurts, followed by prolonged periods of stagnation. In the first half of the 1720's, output reached an annual average of more than ten million pesos. Then, for the next two decades it stuck there. In the late 1740's, production leaped to twelve million a year and stuck again at the new level, this time for a quarter century, until a new spurt in the 1770's. In the 70's and 80's, output stuck again between sixteen and twenty million pesos per year. In the

final two decades of the period, annual production averaged between twenty – one and twenty – four million pesos per year. Historians of the eighteenth century mining industry have thus correctly searched for discrete events, local bonanzas, and policy initiatives to explain the achievement of each new plateau.

This pattern is also revealed in the data displayed in Table III. Here, the data have been grouped into irregular periods suggested by the plateau pattern. The growth rates displayed in the table represent the compound annual rate of increase (or decrease) for the five year average measured from the last year of one quinquennium to the last year of a subsequent quinquennium. The table shows that the most prolonged period of rapid growth in the entire century occurred in the first quarter when the output of precious metals advanced at an annual average rate of 3.2 percent. This is the only period which does not display the plateau pattern, although growth did slow somewhat in the late 1710's. From the 1720's to the 1740's, production declined at just under 0.1 percent per year. The spurt in the late 1740's reached a rate of 4.1 percent per year. From the 1740's to the 1760's growth declined to a mere 0.1 percent per annum. The spurt in the 1770's lasted most of the decade; annual growth averaged 2.7 percent. From the late 1770's to the late 1780's, growth fell to 0.2 percent per year. The spurt in the late 1780's

TABLE III: *Growth of Mining Output, 1695 – 1809*
(Average Annual Increase in Percent)

1695/99 – 1720/24	+ 3.2
1720/24 – 1740/44	- 0.1
1740/44 – 1745/49	+ 4.1
1745/49 – 1765/69	+ 0.1
1765/69 – 1775/79	+ 2.7
1775/79 – 1785/89	+ 0.2
1785/89 – 1790/94	+ 3.3
1790/94 – 1805/09	+ 0.1
1765/69 – 1805/09	+ 1.7
1775/09 – 1805/09	+ 0.7

Source: See Table I.

to early 1790's reached a rate of 3.3 percent, while the succeeding period saw stagnation at 0.1 percent per year. Measured without the brief spurt in the 1790's, the annual average rate of increase from the late 1770's to 1805/09 was 0.7 percent. This exercise suggests that historians of growth should focus on the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the

early 1740's, and the decades of the 1770's and the 1790's in looking for the causes of New Spain's mining "boom". Most of the growth in physical output of precious metals occurred in these brief periods.⁵

Although two decades of significant growth occurred during the Bourbon period, it is not clear from the data whether the historians are justified in referring to the period as a "boom". Measured from the beginning of the era in the late 1760's to its end in the quinquennium 1805/09, output grew at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent. This is certainly a respectable rate of growth, even if it was largely confined to two of the four decades in the period. It is more than twice the rate of population increase, and rapid even by the later standards of the industrial revolution. This conclusion stands, even if the data are adjusted to take into account the debasement of the coinage that occurred in small doses in 1732, 1772 and 1776.⁶ By the latter date, the silver content of the coins minted in Mexico had fallen to just over 93 percent of the silver content of the pre-1732 period. Adjusted for this debasement, the growth rate over the whole Bourbon period drops only slightly, to 1.4 percent per annum. Nonetheless, the growth of output at the beginning of the century over a period of equal length averaged 3.2 percent per year, a much more impressive achievement.

II.

Measuring the growth of the mining industry in terms of physical output gives only a partial and not altogether accurate picture of trends in the industry. Mining produced money. The law required that all metals produced be dispatched to the mint to be converted into bars of coin. The prices of the goods and services for which gold and silver were exchanged fluctuated constantly. To assess the productivity of the mining industry, it is necessary to take into account these fluctuations in the purchasing power of the industry's output.

To measure productivity, physical output is not always the appropriate measure, since it does not measure output growth in market terms. Economists define productivity as the return to scarce factors of production. When the commodity produced is money itself, its value must be expressed in terms of its capacity to command other resources. Only then can costs incurred in the marketplace to produce the output be measured against the market value of the product.

Unfortunately, no adequate measure of the purchasing power of gold and silver coins yet exists for eighteenth-century Mexico. To analyze

the health of the industry, metals production should be deflated by an index of the prices of the commodities purchased by metals producers. Although the history of prices is still in its infancy, two long price series do exist that provide a crude measure of the purchasing power of the peso. One is the study by Enrique Florescano of the price of maize in eighteenth-century Mexico City; the other is an index of the prices of seven agricultural and livestock commodities produced by Cecilia Rabell in her study of San Luis de la Paz, a small farming community near Guanajuato.⁷

TABLE IV: *Market Value of Precious Metals Production in Mexico, 1695 - 1814 (Millions of pesos of 1775/79)*

	Florescano index	Rabell index
1695/99	-	13.1
1700/04	-	18.6
1705/09	-	22.0
1710/14	-	32.1
1715/19	-	39.8
1720/24	52.2	58.1
1725/29	54.1	43.2
1730/34	52.2	42.1
1735/39	45.6	47.7
1740/44	40.8	43.7
1745/49	49.5	41.2
1750/54	50.1	64.9
1754/59	65.7	65.7
1760/64	57.2	70.0
1765/69	75.2	-
1770/74	62.5	110.7
1775/79	99.1	133.3
1780/84	78.3	-
1785/89	42.6	-
1790/94	93.6	-
1795/99	81.3	71.6
1800/04	67.5	51.7
1805/09	69.3	-
1810/14	18.1	-

Source: See text.

Table IV reestimates mining output by deflating data on physical output using the Florescano and Rabell price indices. The results of this exercise are striking. The three decades at the beginning of the eighteenth century stand out even more than before for sustained and rapid growth, reaching an average of 6.1 percent per year when deflated by

the Rabell index. At the same time, the Bourbon period looks much more anemic than before. Deflated by either index, the series reaches a peak in the five year period 1775/79. Measured from that point to any later point, the growth rate is negative. The market value of the precious metals produced between 1775/9 and 1805/9 declined at an annual average rate of 1.0 percent.

TABLE V: *Index of Market Value of Precious Metals Production in Mexico, 1695 – 1814 (1755 – 59 = 100)*

	Florescano	Rabell	(Physical Output)
1695/99	–	20.0	(29)
1700/04	–	28.3	(39)
1705/09	–	33.5	(43)
1710/14	–	48.9	(50)
1715/19	–	60.6	(53)
1720/24	79.5	88.4	(77)
1725/29	82.3	65.8	(79)
1730/34	79.4	64.1	(80)
1735/39	69.4	72.6	(73)
1740/44	62.1	65.5	(74)
1745/49	75.3	62.7	(91)
1750/54	76.3	98.8	(98)
1755/59	100.0	100.0	(100)
1760/64	87.1	106.5	(89)
1765/69	114.5	–	(93)
1770/74	95.1	168.5	(123)
1775/79	150.8	202.9	(139)
1780/84	119.2	–	(153)
1785/89	64.8	–	(142)
1790/94	142.5	–	(167)
1795/99	123.7	109.0	(185)
1800/04	102.7	78.7	(159)
1805/09	105.5	–	(186)
1810/14	27.5	–	(72)

Source: See Tables II and IV.

The plateau pattern observed in the physical output data can also be observed in the purchasing power of value series, and the timing is roughly the same. The value series reaches its first plateau in the first half of the 1720's, spurts again in the early 1750's (later than physical output), and reaches a new plateau in the 1770's. Only the low level of prices at the beginning of the century and the marked inflation at the end of the period produce noteworthy alternations in the trends, sharpening the expansion at the beginning and converting modest growth into depression at the end of the century. Table V displays the data in index

form, while Table VI recomputes industry growth rates.

Caution should be exercised in interpreting the market value series. The new figures represent the total value of mining production solely in terms of domestically produced agricultural commodities. In the absence of other price indices for eighteenth-century Mexico, however, the series can help to correct impressionistic accounts that have relied on measures of physical output alone. Moreover, the significance of agricultural prices for mining operations have never been doubted. As Brading observed, "any increase in the price of maize and hay could easily drive a miner close to bankruptcy."⁸ For more precise analytical uses, however, the data are still far from satisfactory.

TABLE VI: *Growth Rate of Market Value, Precious Metals, 1695 - 1809 (Annual Average Percentage Change)*

	Florescano index	Rabell index
1695/99 - 1720/24	-	+ 6.1
1720/24 - 1740/44	- 0.1	- 1.1
1740/44 - 1765/69	+ 2.1	-
1765/69 - 1775/79	+ 2.8	-
1775/79 - 1785/89	- 8.8	-
1785/89 - 1790/94	+ 8.2	-
1790/94 - 1805/09	- 1.5	-
1775/79 - 1805/09	- 0.1	-
1765/69 - 1805/09	+ 0.2	-

Source: See text.

III.

Systematic data on factor and input costs facing the eighteenth-century mining industry have yet to be collected. It is therefore impossible to make precise estimates of trends in productivity. There are no reliable data with which to compare the market value series. An indirect and partial measure may be suggestive, nonetheless. If costs rose in proportion to the level of prices, then the ratio of market value to physical output can serve as an indicator of the productivity of the industry. (In this case, the ratio of market value to physical output would equal the ratio of total costs to physical output.) Alternatively, this ratio can be used as a rough index of changing profit levels. (In this case, profits would be assumed to depend on the "basket" of commodities that a given

level of output could command in the market.) Combining the two interpretations would make the series into a rough measure of the health of the industry. The data are presented in Table VII. The table shows the number of pesos of constant purchasing power of 1755/59 that mine owners earned for each 100 pesos of coin produced.

TABLE VII: *Ratio of Market Value to Physical Output, Precious Metals, 1695 - 1814*

	Florescano index	Rabell index
1695/99	-	57
1700/04	-	63
1705/09	-	66
1710/14	-	84
1715/19	-	97
1720/24	120	99
1725/29	120	71
1730/34	106	69
1735/39	110	79
1740/44	97	77
1745/49	96	59
1750/54	91	86
1755/59	115	86
1760/64	113	102
1765/69	143	-
1770/74	89	117
1775/79	126	126
1780/84	90	-
1785/89	53	-
1790/94	98	-
1795/99	77	51
1800/04	75	-
1805/09	66	-
1810/14	44	-

Source: See text.

The ratio series correlates roughly with the output and value series. The ratio increases by nearly 50 percent between 1695/99 and 1720/4, as the industry boomed. The period of highest index values occurs in the third quarter of the century, between 1750/4 and 1775/9. The decline after this point to the end of the century is quite marked.

Of course, this index measures productivity only if the unit cost of producing a mark of silver moved in concert with the price indices employed to construct it. If unit costs were rising more rapidly than prices, the ratio will overestimate productivity. If unit costs rose more

slowly, productivity will be underestimated by ratio. The question yet to be answered is whether the real cost of producing a unit of constant market value was rising or falling.

The evidence is mixed on this point, but it appears easier to interpret toward the end of the eighteenth century than at any point earlier. The hypothesis that best explains the evidence is that the industry faced rising marginal costs for at least the period 1780 to 1810. That is, the cost of producing a fixed quantity of metallic purchasing power was rising. The industry was in trouble.

The evidence on this point can be summarized briefly under three headings. First, there is abundant evidence that quality of the ores mined was declining. An increasing proportion of the output of Mexico's mines consisted of low grade ore for which the *patio* or amalgamation process (as opposed to cheaper and faster smelting) had to be employed to extract the metal. Brading presents very clear evidence of this. In Zacatecas, the proportion of low grade ore processed by amalgamation increased from 66 to 85 percent between 1763 and 1806. In Guanajuato, the entire increase in production between the 1760's and 1804 was due to amalgamation. The output of smelted ore actually decreased in this period.⁹

Second, the size and depth of mine shafts and their attendant drainage works was increasing. As shafts were driven deeper, drainage problems increased. The revival of Zacatecas (and its later decline), as well as the fortunes of all the other major mining centers, came to depend critically on reaching ever lower depths. Such excavations and drainage operations made it more costly both to reach the ore and to extract it.¹⁰

Third, labor costs appear to have been rising along with the cost of other inputs miners had to acquire in the market, mules, timber, tools, and the like. The evidence on labor costs is mixed, since efforts were made, quite logically, to reduce costs either by forcing down wages, eliminating or reducing the *partido* or resorting to government aid (exemption of the labor force from the tribute, forced labor drafts, and the like).¹¹

The evidence on industry profits has not been systematically collected and analyzed. Two main sources of profit support have been identified in the literature. The first consisted of organizational and, though less likely, technological changes that could have offset rising factor and output costs. The second, discussed below, was government support for the industry.

One way to approach the issue of profit is to revise the market value series to reflect more closely the "basket" of commodities on which profit earners may have been spending their gains. The series in Table IV above provides a measure of the purchasing power of mining output in the market for maize (Florescano) or maize plus six other products (Rabell). The owners of New Spain's principal mines, however, built their reputations for opulence in conspicuous consumption and for marshalling investment capital through their command over a far wider variety of products and services.

For both consumption and investment, it is safe enough to assume that these were highly labor intensive. Thus, actual profit depended on labor market conditions and social organization (in which conditions appear to have favored employers, at least from the 1750's to the 1810's).¹² Qualitative evidence also suggests that consumption, and possibly some investment activity, depended to an unmeasured degree on imports from abroad.¹³ While there are no measures of elite propensities to consume imports, descriptive accounts suggest that they were high, especially in clothing, wine, consumer durables like pianos and furniture, and (possibly for investment) iron and steel products.

Price trends for commodities imported to New Spain have not yet been studied systematically. The data remain scattered through an immense *ramo* of the Archivo General de la Nación. Nonetheless, two observations can be made from the quantitative evidence available at present. First, as Brading has observed, the Bourbon liberalization of intra-imperial trade appears to have reduced the prices of imported products to consumers in the colony, in part through reducing the inconvenience and cost of shipping between New Spain and the rest of the empire and in part through abolishing (in 1778) the monopoly on foreign trading once held tightly by the Consulado de México.¹⁴ Secondly, however, international trade prices in the late eighteenth century are known to have been rising, especially in periods of war (1756-63; 1778-83; 1796-1802; 1803-1812). For New Spain, the positive effects of liberalization were probably felt most strongly in the 1770's and 1780's (but offset in the 80's by the great famine of 1784-85), while the negative impact of international warfare was strongest later in the period. The Bourbon reforms may have produced a series of once-and-for-all decreases in the level of prices consumers would otherwise have paid for imports, while the sharply rising trend in international prices after 1796 clearly offset these earlier gains by the turn of the century.¹⁵

Thus, for mine owners and other consumers (and investors) of imported products the qualitative literature indicates that long-run international price trends were consistent with those observed for domestic prices. In both cases, any gains made earlier in the century had disappeared by the war years that preceded the Hidalgo revolt. In terms of its purchasing power, the international market value of Mexico's silver output was probably declining at least as rapidly as it was on domestic markets.

However it is measured, the mining industry of New Spain entered into a crisis during the era of the Bourbon reforms, an economic crisis in which the declining market value of precious metals combined with rising costs of production. Each mark of silver produced bought less and cost more to produce.

IV.

Government policy towards the mining industry not only recognized this crisis, but in part created it. As Brading has clearly shown, government policy was directed towards maximizing output on the assumption that the output of the mining industry determined the level at which the colony could be taxed.¹⁶ This assumption was based on experience. There was a close correlation in the eighteenth century between government revenue and mining output. This relationship is shown in Table VIII, where the production of precious metals is expressed as a percentage of government revenues. As the table indicates, this ratio was fairly stable throughout the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, varying around a mean of 225. The only exceptional period was the decade of the 1720's when mining output reached very high levels and the ratio leaped to more than 300. In the 1780's, the ratio declined to its lowest level in the century and dropped steadily thereafter. By 1805/09, the ratio reached 42, that is, mining output accounted for less than half of government revenue. The Bourbon reforms culminated in what even the Spanish rulers themselves must have recognized as a drastic decapitalization, or at least demonetization of the colony.

In any case, until this final period of desperate expedencies, the Crown found that the amount of gold and silver it could extract from the colony depended on the level of production of the two metals. When the Seven Years War pushed the Crown to "reforms" that could increase colonial revenues, it mixed new exactions and more effective adminis-

tration with measures to promote mining production. These measures included a series of steps to stimulate the revival and rehabilitation of marginal producers in the industry. With tax breaks, government aid in recruiting labor and generous credit to undertake the necessary excavation and construction, entrepreneurs found they could make a profit of mines long abandoned. For the existing mines, the government was somewhat less generous but equally concerned. The entire industry benefitted when the prices of *estanco* mercury and blasting powder were

TABLE VIII: *Precious Metals Production as a Percentage of Government Revenue in Mexico, 1695 - 1809*

1695/99	169	1755/59	211
1700/04	184	1760/64	259
1705/09	204	1765/69	173
1710/14	186	1770/74	199
1715/19	185	1775/79	203
1720/24	380	1780/84	153
1725/29	333	1785/89	129
1730/34	226	1790/94	135
1735/39	251	1795/99	70
1740/44	192	1800/04	44
1745/49	246	1805/09	42
1750/54	229		

Source: See Table I and John TePaske, *La Real Hacienda de Nueva España: La Real Caja de México (1576-1816)* (Mexico: INAH, Colección Científica No.41, 1976).

reduced, when the crown created the Real Tribunal de Minería to service the industry, and when a range of services and protections (including special mining courts, a new mining code and technical assistance missions) were provided.¹⁷ The result of these measures was to make production profitable despite higher costs. Physical output reached very high levels.

It is also possible that government aid to the industry made possible technological advances that would otherwise have been impossible to achieve. The extent and effect of technological advance has never been measured, however, and Brading was probably right in according it no more than a minor role, certainly too small to have arrested the rise in marginal costs.¹⁸

In short, the mining industry was already in decline by the time the independence movement erupted in 1810. That it did not collapse earlier

was due in large part to direct and indirect subsidies from government. The government taxed to stimulate more mining production to tax still more. When the combined forces of Napoleon Bonaparte and Padre Hidalgo destabilized the state, they doomed the mining industry at the same time.

V.

The role of the mining industry in the economy of New Spain has often inspired discussion. Two broad and somewhat contradictory notions may be found in the literature. One of these holds that the mining industry was overdeveloped to serve the interests of the Mother Country. Overdevelopment of mining distorted the colonial economy in both traditional and dependency school analysis.¹⁹ The second broad interpretation suggests that the mining industry acted as a kind of "leading sector", promoting the growth of agriculture, commerce, and industry through backward linkages, dynamizing the economy of New Spain much in the manner of a modern export staple.²⁰ It may be noted in passing that these two views are not necessarily opposed to each other. They may be reconciled in various ways. For example, more sophisticated versions of the dependency argument no longer challenge the dynamic linkages created by export booms. The argument now turns on the long term as opposed to short-term benefits of such episodes.²¹ Alternatively, it has been suggested that social, cultural or institutional constraints may dampen or thwart altogether the dynamism of the export sector.²² Distortion occurs in this model as mining profits "sink" into a backward agricultural sector or are dissipated in conspicuous consumption.

The present state of research does not make it possible to reach firm conclusions, but the data do suggest a somewhat more complex picture than is usually drawn. The relations between agriculture and mining can serve to illustrate this point. Regional accounts of agricultural development in the first quarter of the eighteenth century provide evidence of trends in agricultural development that appear to have coincided roughly with the growth of mining. Areas close to mining centers, like the Bajío and portions of Michoacán and Jalisco, benefitted from the rapid increase in mining production in this period.²³ It is precisely in the 1700's to 1720's that many abandoned or rundown estates were purchased by new owners and refurbished. This trend appears to have continued during the 1730's and 1740's, but there is some evidence that agricultural investments were less successful in this period.²⁴ After

mid-century, a second trend emerged, that is, the movement of the livestock frontier towards the far north and the conversion of cattle and sheep haciendas in the central regions to the production of grain and *pulque*. The timing of this shift varied, but appears to have taken hold in the Bajío by the 1760's and in the Guadalajara region by the 1770's.²⁵ Population growth played a role in this shift. In part, however, it may be attributed to the growth of the mining industry, but the data are too fragmentary to permit a conclusive test.

One clue to the relationship between mining and agriculture may be found in the market value data in Table VI. This series may also be read as a rough index of the commodity terms of trade between mining and agriculture. For most of the century, terms of trade moved in favor of mining and against agriculture. The high point was reached in the 1770's. While mining growth may have stimulated production, this linkage cannot explain the downward trend in the terms of trade. The falling relative prices for agricultural commodities could be explained by increasing productivity. While conclusions must necessarily be tentative, it appears that the stimulus to increased agricultural output, particularly to the production of food and beverage crops, promoted increased productivity through greater regional specialization in production, at least through the 1770's.

It is possible that the growth of mining production inspired productivity gains in other sectors as well. Scattered evidence suggests that commerce, or the transactions sector as economists call it, became more efficient in part because markets expanded. Capital markets certainly became more fluid and better organized. The development of the mining regions attracted labor, especially to the Bajío, so the economy gained from the greater mobility of labor. Productivity gains in industrial activity – textiles, tanning and leather goods, soap and other "chemicals" – appear less likely, although processing industries like milling and sugar refining may be exceptions. In any case, the causes and the timing of these gains have yet to be investigated.²⁶ It is noteworthy that not a single study has yet been completed that addresses the question of productivity in this period. The single exception remains the necessarily partial analysis by Ward Barret in his monograph on the sugar haciendas of the Cortes family.²⁷ No one has challenged his conclusion that output per unit of labor on these sugar estates tripled between the late sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries.

The data do make clear that the role of the mining industry had changed significantly by the 1780's. By this time, the dynamism of the

industry had disappeared. By the end of the eighteenth century, the mining sector had become a drag on the economy. It is an open question whether marginal product was declining faster in agriculture than in mining, but the shift of the terms of trade toward agriculture is suggestive. In Mexico, as in the rest of the world, precious metals were becoming less scarce and agricultural products more scarce in relation to demand. Resources that would otherwise have shifted from mining to agriculture responded to public policies designed to maintain the attractiveness of mining for investors. Wages in both sectors failed to keep up with inflation, not only because unemployment was higher as a result of the misallocation of capital to mining and away from agriculture.

While precious metals poured from the world's mines in immense quantities by the end of the eighteenth century, this commodity was always scarce from the point of view of the Spanish treasury. Hence the obsession with policies that could not have been better designed to weaken the Mexican economy, increase the world supply of silver, and thus increase still more the treasury's appetite for this effectively devalued commodity. More measures to stimulate mining production and tax revenues followed, with still greater distorting effects of the allocation of capital and labor in the Mexican economy.

It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the significance of this vicious circle for New Spain's economy as a whole. At the end of the eighteenth century, the mining industry accounted for no more than about 8 percent of the colony's gross domestic product of some 240 million pesos.²⁸ Even if the entire increase in mining output after the 1760's could be attributed to the distortion of investment induced by government subsidies, it is not clear that the capital involved, even if it equalled as much as an entire year's output of some 20 million pesos, could have reversed the decline in agricultural productivity or much improved the performance of other sectors of the economy. In any case, the data do not yet exist to make feasible a test of this counterfactual proposition. It is possible only to conclude that the mining industry contributed to the general economic crisis that occurred at the end of the colonial period, and that this contribution was actively promoted by government policy.

VI.

The collapse of the mining industry after 1810 occurred not because of the violence and predations of the independence movement, but

because the government, already under siege after Napoleon's invasion of the peninsula in 1808, was unable to continue supporting the industry. Between 1800 and 1809, Mexico's mines produced an annual average of 22.2 million pesos. Between 1810 and 1819, output dropped to an annual average of only 11.3 million, a decline of nearly 50 percent. A portion of this decline was due to the violence and destruction wrought by the Hidalgo movement and by the effort to suppress it, but only part. The records of the Tribunal de Minería are full of accounts by mine owners of the conflict and its effect on output. Many petitioned to be exempted from the provisions of the mining code that specified revocation of the mine owner's right to exploit a mineral deposit after four months without working it. Most of the petitions were granted.²⁹ By 1812, however, the mine owner's complaints had changed. From this point until Iturbide's coup, their letters and petitions, and the meetings of the mining deputies, are filled with other problems. High on the list of problems was the scarcity of mercury. In 1811, the Cortes had decreed an end to the *estanco* and declared mercury open for *comercio libre*. The mineowners were appalled. Private suppliers ran the price up from the monopoly's subsidized price of 41 pesos to as high as 200. Even then, supplies were often impossible to obtain.³⁰ In 1812, the Tribunal proposed to raise the funds necessary to outfit a naval expedition whose sole object would be to seize the mercury stored at Seville and Almaden in occupied Spain.³¹ The project was set aside when Ferdinand recovered the throne, but mercury remained scarce and the price high even after restoration of the monopoly.

Most of the tax exemptions, official credit, and other privileges of the mining industry also came to end after 1810. Miners complained repeatedly about the tax surcharges imposed by royalist commanders throughout the decade.³² The Tribunal defaulted on its loans after making extraordinary contributions to the war effort. Official credit to miners for the purchase of mercury ended.³³ Private capital dried up. To make matters worse, transport charges rose precipitously with brigandage and labor became scarce.³⁴ In short, Hidalgo and Napoleon, even though defeated militarily, made it impossible for the government to provide either the subsidies or the security the industry needed to restore production to its former levels. Mining collapsed when government disintegrated.

VII.

Much more research on the mining industry in pre-modern Mexico will be needed before the revisionist account presented here can be accepted, modified or cast aside. My purpose has been to show that the literary and quantitative data now available provide little support for the traditional view of boom and prosperity, benign government, and collapse by destruction. Instead, the evidence points to a sick industry, propped up by distorted public incentives, that collapsed of its own weight when the colonial government could no longer intervene to prevent it. Testing these opposing images systematically will no doubt help to produce a picture with more subtle shadings, but this is scarcely the point. Future research can now rely on a large number of recent monographs that have effectively illuminated the institutional history of the mining industry. Because of this, scholars are now in a better position to analyze the economic aspects of the silver legend directly.

Such an effort will require far more attention to the systematic collection of quantitative data that bear directly on the economic issues. The history of prices is crucial, as are more microeconomic (firm-level) data that can be manipulated to estimate the critical indicators of industrial health – costs, productivity, profit rates, the impact of subsidies – over time. The data do not have to be exhaustive, merely useful for analytical purposes.

At the aggregate level, progress in interpreting the articulation of the mining industry with the rest of the economy will remain dependent, to an extent, on the development of economic historical work on other sectors of New Spain's economy and on the international economy in the eighteenth century. Price history will be critical here, too, as will studies that address sectoral (or even micro-level) rates of output and productivity change, returns to capital and land, and the like. Much more is known already, however, than historians have put to use for analytical purposes. Long run price trends for agricultural commodities in diverse regions of Mexico have proved to be highly correlated with each other, and with international price movements, for example. Regional studies of agricultural development, though often lacking in economic analysis, have produced important and convergent findings on crop mix changes and investment patterns across wide areas of the colony. New studies of trade and public finance have added immense stores of data to be assimilated.³⁵

In short, the economic history of the colonial mining industry in the eighteenth century can now be approached from a fresh perspective and with the support of a monographic literature that already provides the foundation for new discoveries. Some of them will be bonanzas.

NOTES

1. David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810* (Cambridge, 1971).
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30. Contestaciones de las diputaciones territoriales a la circular de 24 de diciembre de 1816, Carta de la diputación de Guanajuato al Real Tribunal de Minería, 3 de marzo de 1817, AHPM, 1175-1817. See also the Carta de la diputación de Zacatecas, 4 de marzo de 1817, in the same file.
31. Sobre adoptar arbitrios del Real Tribunal de Minería para surtir el Reyno de Azogue, AHPM, 1053-1812.
32. All of the documents cited above raise complaints about new taxation; that of Guanajuato delegation in 1817 is especially poignant.
33. See, for example, La diputación de Zacatecas en Asuntos de Azogue, AHPM, 2454-1817.
34. On the matter of freight costs and the scarcity of transport, the Mining Tribunal repeatedly implored the Viceroy for aid. See, for example, the letter from the Real Tribunal de Minería al Virrey, dated 27 October, 1812, in "Azogues," AHPM, 1397-1812.
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2. MINING AND THE PERUVIAN ECONOMY IN THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD

John Fisher

It has tended hitherto to be necessary, when one has written papers on the welfare of either the overall Peruvian economy or, more specifically, the mining industry in the late colonial period, to outline and then challenge the deep-rooted historiographical tradition which identified the last fifty years or so of the colonial period as an era of economic decline for the viceroyalty of Peru.¹ On this occasion, thankfully, such an introduction would be superfluous, for, it is now generally accepted, at least by specialist researchers, that it is invalid to identify the period between 1760 and 1810 as one of global crisis for the Peruvian economy. Some recent commentators, it is true, have accommodated this revised interpretation grudgingly, and continue to argue, for example, that, even if it can be demonstrated that the mining industry increased its production, "the colony's other economic sectors - manufacturing, agriculture, and commerce - presented a picture of gradual decline throughout the eighteenth century."² According to this interpretation "the most disastrous blow" was the loss of Upper Peru to the new Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata in 1776, a step which, together with the revocation of Lima's formal monopoly of Spanish South America's overseas trade in 1778, led to Buenos Aires supplanting Lima as the importer of European goods and the exporter of bullion. An alternative view, and one which is both more persuasive, and, as we shall see, supported by the fragmentary evidence available on internal and external commerce, is that most recently restated by Assadourian and others in their outline of a research project on Andean mining from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.³ Their essential hypothesis is that the mining industry in colonial Peru and Upper Peru was of such dynamic importance to the rest of the economy that the significant increase in silver production which characterized the period after 1750 necessarily both reflected and acted as a stimulus to the general expansion of the late colonial economy.

It remains true, of course, that our understanding of the social and economic structures of late colonial Peru is generalized and superficial.⁴ Significant progress is being made, however, as the contributions to this volume indicate and it has been reassuring to discover during recent

visits to Peru both that welcome advances are finally being made in the organization of regional archives, and that a new generation of domestic scholars is demonstrating an increased willingness to undertake detailed research in them.⁵ My own contribution to the debate has been to provide not a definitive, detailed statement of the state of the late colonial economy as a whole – it will be many years, surely, before any scholar will be capable of offering this – but a general survey of the state of the mining industry in the half century between the separation of Upper Peru and the obtaining of independence in 1824. This monograph, published in 1977 in both English and Spanish, was based essentially upon general documentation in Spanish archives concerning crown policy towards the mining industry in the reigns of Charles III and Charles IV, and upon the rich but somewhat introspective archive in Lima of the Mining Tribunal, the body founded in 1787 to regulate and promote silver mining in the viceroyalty.⁶ One is conscious that the study was limited chronologically – it deliberately ignored the pre-1776 period primarily because of the immense difficulty of locating detailed data about production for the years prior to the inauguration of the *visita general* of José Antonio de Areche and Jorge de Escobedo –, geographically – little attempt was made to examine the continuing links between Lima and Upper Peru –, and thematically, in that the relationship between merchants and miners was hinted at rather than analysed in detail. But it was considered appropriate to present the fruits, immature though they were, of my investigations to fellow researchers, partly because they provided a reasonably full account of crown policy towards the reorganization and modernization of the mining industry, and, thus, could make a useful contribution to the overall appreciation of the efficacy of the Bourbon reforms – and also because of the hope that the data therein on silver production, mercury supply, and labour would provide a useful framework within which others might pursue more systematic research at a local level.

Before going on to discuss recent historiographical advances, it is perhaps appropriate to restate the principal conclusions of my 1977 research, which was supplemented by two articles: the first, published in 1976, although written while the monograph was in the press, demonstrated on the basis of *alcabala* accounts kept in the Archivo General de la Nación, a clear dynamic relationship between the rapid increase in silver production at Cerro de Pasco, Peru's leading mining centre in the late colonial period, and the transmission there from the viceregal capital of imported European manufactures.⁷ It thereby supported the thesis

that the mercantile community of Lima benefitted from the expansion of mining through its links with the *aviadores* which enabled it to supply both credit and merchandise to the mining centres, whilst holding back from the longer-term investment which characterized the Mexican industry in the same period. The second article, published in 1978, adopted a somewhat different approach to the same basic problem of the links between miners and merchants, by sampling notarial records in the Archivo Histórico Departamental of Arequipa to trace ties between registered miners and merchants in Huantajaya, the most southerly of Peru's mining centres. It revealed not only links but also a confusion of identities, in that the principal mine owners of Tarapacá were identified as leading residents of Peru's second city, prominent as merchants, landowners, and magistrates.⁸

The first, and most important, conclusion which can be drawn from my research is that the attempts of the Spanish crown to stimulate the mining industry in Lower Peru after 1776 inaugurated a period of impressive growth in the industry. The Spanish Crown, recognizing the vital importance of silver mining to both the Peruvian and the general imperial economies, despite a growing emphasis upon the need for the development of agricultural resources, made a determined effort in this period, as part of an overall strategy of imperial reform, to modernize and revitalize the inefficient mining industry which had been allowed to develop haphazardly during the previous two centuries. It did so against a background of deep pessimism in Peru about the viceroyalty's economic future following the loss of the mines of Upper Peru to the new viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776.

The decade after 1776 was devoted principally to an investigation of the state of the mining industry in Peru and the formulation of plans to reinvigorate it. Areche concentrated upon attempts to improve the supply of mercury from Huancavelica, while Escobedo, his more able successor as *visitador general*, paid more attention to the need for basic structural reform, which he considered an essential preliminary to technical improvement. The fundamental features of his policy were the adaptation of the Mexican mining ordinances of 1783 for use in Peru, and, arising out of this, the organization of the viceroyalty's miners into a guild, headed by a mining tribunal, which, from the beginning of 1787, was endowed with the basic responsibility for the future welfare of the industry. The mining tribunal operated reasonably successfully in certain spheres, such as that of judicial administration, but it failed to improve the social standing of the majority of miners, who were generally

regarded as the inferiors of merchants and bureaucrats, and it also did little to weld them into an effective pressure group. Elections in the local deputations and to the tribunal itself were characterized by confusion, intrigue and manipulation. Successive viceroys met little resistance as they interfered with elections to the tribunal, and, more seriously, as they cynically restricted its attempts to use its revenue for the welfare of miners as a whole. The most serious intervention in the tribunal's affairs was that of Viceroy Francisco Gil, who in 1794 closed the exchange banks established at the beginning of the decade, apparently so as to prevent miners using them in preference to local silver merchants.

In the sphere of mining education there was no progress. Escobedo looked forward in the 1780's to the establishment of a mining college, as suggested in the new mining code, but a combination of official disinterest in Madrid and the stubborn reluctance of miners to consider abandoning time-honoured techniques prevented the opening of such an institution. An alternative means of improving the industry's technology was theoretically provided by the Nordenflicht mining mission. This, too, however, was a disastrous failure. Its basic difficulty was that the new amalgamation which the Swede, Thaddeus von Nordenflicht, and his team of German specialists were supposed to disseminate in Peru, proved, in practice, to be unsuitable for the dispersed type of industry that had developed there. With greater cooperation from the Mining Tribunal and more imaginative deployment of his German colleagues by successive viceroys, Nordenflicht might still have contributed to the improvement of mining technology in Peru, but the antipathy between him and the industry's representatives intensified the longer he remained in the viceroyalty. His mission continued officially for over twenty years, but only because successive ministers in Madrid literally forgot about it as the programme of imperial reform as a whole lost its impetus in the reign of Charles IV.

Despite Nordenflicht's failure to introduce modern European technology to the mining and refining of Peruvian silver ores, and the inability of the Mining Tribunal to promote mining education, the industry experienced a prolonged period of expansion in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. As Figure I indicates, silver production more than doubled in the fifteen years after 1776, and by 1792 it had passed the 500,000 marks level. It reached a peak of 637,000 marks in 1799, and, although somewhat less buoyant in the first decade of the nineteenth century, remained high until 1812. This impressive growth was made possible to a certain extent by an improved supply of mercury,

particular in the period after 1784. The increased demand for the commodity was met not from Huancavelica, which, after being temporarily stimulated by the closure of the old royal mine and the granting of permission for the working of other deposits around the town, gradually became increasingly unable to provide all the mercury required in Peru, but by heavy shipments of Spanish and Idrian mercury from Cádiz.

Figure 1 : Registered silver production in Peru, 1771-1824





Figure 2 : Production of mercury at Huancavelica, 1760-1812



Reserves were never large enough to satisfy silver miners, but, in practice, there was sufficient mercury stockpiled in Peru to prevent major crisis for them during the three periods when warfare between Spain and Great Britain cut off supplies from the peninsula. (See Figure II and Table I).⁹ Had reserves been greater, or Huancavelica more productive, silver production, would probably have been even higher, and it undoubtedly would have been so had the Crown acted before 1809 to bring the price charged for the amalgamating agent closer to that charged in New Spain.

TABLE I: *Peruvian Mercury Imports 1776 - 1816*

YEAR	AMOUNT	YEAR	AMOUNT
1776	4,000.50	1796	1,000
1777	3,968	1797	2,996
1778	5,966.06	1798	-
1779	1,997.86	1799	-
1780	-	1800	-
1781	-	1801	-
1782	-	1802/03	9,930
1783	-	1804/05	7,501
1784	1,998.17	1806	-
1785	-	1807	-
1786	4,002	1808	-
1787	-	1809	5,032
1788	1,500	1810	4,919
1789	8,004	1811	-
1790	4,511	1812	-
1791	3,501	1813	-
1792	2,500	1814	5,044
1793	2,500	1815	-
1794	3,000	1816	2,048 (?)
1795	2,498		

The other general factors governing the level of silver production were the availability of labour and capital, although the former was perhaps less crucial than many miners believed. They frequently protested about the difficulty of persuading Indians to agree voluntarily to work in the mines, but, in fact, it is clear that the viceroyalty's permanent force of mineworkers was large in relation to its total population. Indian communities in some areas still provided men to perform mita service at Potosí and Huancavelica, or cash compensation to miners there instead. But silver mining in Lower Peru was basically dependent

upon voluntary workers. This did not prevent miners from frequently demanding the extension of the mita system to provide them with an improved supply of labour, or viceroys and other administrators from agreeing to the conscription of Indians for certain projects. The difficulties in overcoming steadfast Indian resistance to forced work in the mines, however, outweighed the advantages to be derived from the payment of artificially low wages, and most miners found it easier to recruit men on a voluntary basis. Local labour shortages in times of high silver production occasionally enabled workers to exploit competition for their services, but they usually worked long hours in harsh conditions for very small wages.

With a few important exceptions, the average Peruvian silver miner employed about a dozen men and worked a single pit, producing just enough silver to cover his costs. The mining tribunal frequently drew attention to the fact that in many areas the industry operated almost at a subsistence level, and protested that the main reason for its backwardness was the fact that merchants in Peru, unlike in New Spain, were simply not prepared to invest capital in basic improvements. Their reluctance to provide long-term investment capital was partly a result of the fact that miners were notoriously unreliable at repaying loans, as the tribunal itself discovered when it advanced capital to a number of individuals. A more positive reason, however, for mercantile unwillingness to invest directly in the industry was that there were larger, quicker profits to be made from the investment of capital in the supply of manufactures to miners. As silver mining expanded, in fact, it provided a growing market for imported manufactures, and offered merchants some compensation for the loss of their former lucrative trade with the *corregidores*, following the introduction of the intendant system in 1784. As mercantile confidence revived with the expansion of overseas trade, particularly in the decade before 1796, capital was also channelled to miners through *aviadores*, although generally on a short-term basis and at high rates of interest.

The reliance of the *aviadores* upon capitalists in Lima for both credit and supplies meant that the welfare of the mining industry was closely related to that of trade. The general fall in silver production throughout Peru after 1812 was partly a product of the economic disruption caused by continuing warfare in Europe and revolutionary activity in South America. The most important single cause, however, was a sudden collapse of the industry at Cerro de Pasco, which had emerged in the previous twenty years as the leading mining centre in the viceroyalty.

Cerro de Pasco's expansion had been made possible by the cutting of drainage tunnels, which, although relatively near the surface, had enabled miners there to bring vast quantities of ores to the surface for refining. By 1812, however, most of the pits had reached the maximum depth at which they could be effectively drained by these traditional *socavones*, and the result was an immediate fall in production. The years after 1812 saw a continuing decline at Cerro de Pasco, and also in most other Peruvian mining centres. The situation deteriorated as mercury became increasingly scarce, and, more seriously, as Spanish merchants began to ship their capital back to Europe. But, against the general trend, one small group of capitalists in Lima attempted to solve Cerro de Pasco's drainage problems by importing English pumping engines for use there. With the full support of the viceregal authorities, who were as aware as the promoters of the company of the advantages to be derived from English technology, steam engines were installed and in action by 1820. They made an immediate, dramatic impact upon the level of silver production by enabling miners at Cerro de Pasco to exploit rich ores lying beneath the water level for the first time, and silver registration at Pasco soared to over 300,000 marks in 1820 as a result.

The Wars of Independence destroyed both the steam engines and the prospects of renewed expansion for the silver mining industry in Peru. It is abundantly clear, however, that, contrary to what many historians have asserted, the late eighteenth century, at least, was not a period of decline. The growth of the industry in the late colonial period was relatively limited, it is true, in comparison with what occurred in New Spain, and its backwardness was still sufficiently evident in 1800 to discourage dreams of economic revolution such as were being entertained by the inhabitants of rapidly expanding areas like the Rio de la Plata. Nevertheless, it was surely sufficiently impressive to convince Peruvians that, despite what many of them had believed immediately after 1776, the viceroyalty had not been condemned to permanent economic decline by the loss of Upper Peru.

Little of importance has been published in the last few years specifically on the mining industry of eighteenth century Lower Peru. There have appeared, however, several significant contributions on other aspects of economic activity, and one of their effects has been to further erode the interpretation of the period as one of sustained decline. Nicholas Cushner's incisive 1980 monograph on the Jesuit estates of colonial Peru, for example, depicts the period after 1700 as one of radical improvement in the financial position of the Society of Jesus,

suggesting that this development may be regarded as an indicator of a general expansion of the viceregal economy in the first half of the eighteenth century.¹⁰ His work also provides a fascinating picture of the Jesuit marketing and distribution network for sugar and wine, which radiated from Peru to Quito, the Rio de la Plata, and Paraguay, thus reminding researchers of the existence of a series of overlapping and complex economic infrastructures which often remain invisible to those preoccupied with external trade between Peru and markets further afield. A similar function is fulfilled, albeit on a much more limited scale, for the post-1767 period by Jorge Polo's valuable 1976 study of the fortunes of the former Jesuit hacienda of Pachachaca.¹¹ This work, too, provides a glimpse of a flourishing agricultural economy, and substantiates the now generally accepted assumption that the separation of Upper Peru from the old viceroyalty did little to damage the importance of the Potosí market for the sugar producers of the Cuzco region. Magnus Mörner's 1978 study of rural society in the province of Cuzco at the end of the colonial period – an appetizer for his eagerly awaited analysis of the historical dimensions of the social structure of southern Peru in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – is also worthy of mention in this context.¹² It, too, provides evidence of the continuing and extreme importance of the Upper Peruvian market for the sugar, coca, and cloth of Cuzco, as well as confirmation of a clear population increase between the late seventeenth century and the late eighteenth century. It is interesting to note, however, that the latter process was not uniform, and that one of the suggested reasons for the continuing migration of indigenous males from certain zones, a process which inevitably caused an imbalance of the sexes, was "the destructive impact of the mining mita."¹³ More recently still the pioneering study of Olinda Celestino and Albert Meyers on *cofradías* in central Peru has attributed the incessant and increasing judicial conflicts over land titles in the eighteenth century in part to "the growing pressure of men on the land and the demographic recovery which occurred in almost all the regions".¹⁴

Further evidence of the continuing and, indeed, growing vitality of the Peruvian economy in the final decades of the eighteenth century is provided by recent research into the effects of *comercio libre* upon exports from Spain to America between 1778 and 1796.¹⁵ Throughout this period exports through Cádiz were worth on average 76 percent of total exports from Spain to the empire, and an analysis of their stated destinations provides an interesting measure of the relative economic

importance of different regions. Predictably, New Spain was the most important market, absorbing over 40 percent of the goods exported through Cádiz in 1785–1796; Venezuelan ports took 10 percent, and Cartagena, the Caribbean port of the viceroyalty of New Granada, 8 percent. The Rio de la Plata, served through Montevideo and Buenos Aires, emerged as an important market for the Cádiz merchants, its share of 11 percent of their exports being slightly larger than that of Venezuela. But the Pacific market, within which silver-rich Peru was by far the most important single region, was more important in this period than Venezuela and the Rio de la Plata put together. It absorbed from Cádiz alone goods with an average annual value of 52 million *reales* (2.6 million *pesos*) at 1778 value, compared with 26 million *reales* (1.3 million *pesos*) for the Rio de la Plata, and 24 million *reales* for Venezuela. It is not possible, unfortunately, to calculate the precise distribution of merchandise between Valparaíso, Arica, Callao, and Guayaquil, for, although virtually all the shipping registers name Callao as the single port of destination, a few link it with other Pacific ports without providing details of the proportions of cargoes intended for each. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Peru absorbed the bulk of this merchandise, paying for it with the increasing output of its silver mines: bullion accounted for 88 percent of its exports to Spain in 1785–89 and 85 percent in 1790–94.¹⁶ Although substantially more ships went from Cádiz to the Rio de la Plata than to Peru, they tended to be small vessels, carrying relatively unimportant cargoes, whereas individual vessels supplying the more discerning and richer Peruvian market each carried goods worth up to almost a million pesos at wholesale values in Cádiz.¹⁷ It is clear that Buenos Aires drew some trade away from Lima after 1778, but the idea that it supplanted it is a myth, albeit one created by the Consulado of Lima in its vehement protests against free trade. In the mid-1780's, when the Spanish American market as a whole was being flooded with unsaleable goods, its fears were not entirely groundless, but the pattern of trade quickly stabilized, and during the decade 1787–1796 exports from Cádiz to Callao were substantially larger than those to the Rio de la Plata in every year except 1790. Continuing research on the reverse trade, between America and Spain, in the same period, is planned, and should add substantially to our understanding of the economic effects of the Bourbon commercial reforms in Spanish America.¹⁸

In view of the fundamental importance of the mining industry to the whole economy of late colonial Peru, continuing research into trade and

agriculture will inevitably throw light upon mining, and vice versa. It is also the case that any serious attempt to comprehend the totality of the Peruvian economy in this period must take account of the continuing close commercial links between the truncated viceroyalty and its further dependencies, notably Upper Peru.

The historiographic picture with regard to economic life in Upper Peru has improved considerably. Peter Bakewell's researches into the early history of Potosí have extended, insofar as silver production is concerned, as far as 1735.¹⁹ On the late colonial period proper the outstanding developments have been the appearance of Enrique Tandeter's 1980 doctoral dissertation on the Potosí mining industry, 1750-1826, and the publication of Rose Marie Buechler's monograph on the mining society of Potosí, 1776-1810.²⁰ Tandeter's dissertation ranges widely across labour supply, investment and profit, and royal policy. It is appropriate to point out that he confirms the assumption that silver production continued after 1750 to recover from its early eighteenth century trough, although the industry in Potosí remained dangerously dependent upon the state for the provision of labour, mercury, and financial subsidies. When these props were necessarily withdrawn, as a consequence of the destruction of the colonial state during the Wars of Independence, Upper Peruvian silver mining was left even more exposed to the harsh winds of change than the industry in other Spanish American countries. The contraction of Upper Peruvian mining had already begun about 1800, it is argued, the decline was accentuated from 1810, and continued until the 1870's, despite the somewhat feeble attempts of English investors to pick up the pieces in the 1820's.²¹

Like Tandeter, Buechler does not attempt a definitive statement of the level of silver production in Upper Peru throughout the period under consideration. But her figures of purchases made by the Real Banco de San Carlos between 1779 and 1820, which must approximate closely to total registered production, confirm his suggestion of stable production in the 1780's and 90's, followed by decline after the turn of the century, slow at first and accelerated in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Between 1779 and 1788, the San Carlos purchases exceeded the registration of silver throughout Lower Peru. Thereafter, as Figure I indicates, the output of the Lower Peruvian mines surged ahead, while that of Potosí stagnated and then declined.²² In 1802 purchases at Potosí - 205,000 marks - were only 40 percent of registered Peruvian production - 505,000 marks - of which the single centre of Cerro de Pasco accounted for 283,000. Thereafter, Peruvian output remained

substantially higher than that of Upper Peru for the remainder of the colonial period. Both entered upon a period of decline after 1812, partly as a consequence of economic dislocation caused by continuing hostilities in Europe, partly because of internal revolutionary activity. But whereas Potosí's decline continued inexorably, that of Lower Peru was abruptly arrested in 1820, as we have noted, as the consequence of the installation of the English pumping engines at Cerro de Pasco.

Despite the fact that it contains valuable information on silver production at Potosí, Buechler's meticulous monograph is concerned primarily with social history and the general impact of the Bourbon reforms in Potosí rather than with economic life as such. A thorough analysis is provided of the social composition of the mining guild. It demonstrates the complex links between immigrant silver producers and the creole owners of refining plants, who tended to rent their facilities to the new arrivals rather than engage directly in large-scale production. The internal affairs of the guild, it is shown, were characterized on the one hand by the factious squabbles for which miners throughout the empire were notorious and, on the other, a readiness for all members to combine with local administrators against interference from both Buenos Aires and Madrid.

It seems legitimate to suggest that as a result of this recent work on Upper Peru, coupled with one's earlier researches on Lower Peru, the overall level of silver production in both areas has been established with reasonable accuracy for the late colonial period. It remains true, of course, that a considerable proportion of silver actually produced undoubtedly escaped registration to enter the channels of contraband trade, but it is difficult to find a way of measuring this phenomenon with precision: most commentators reproduce Humboldt's estimate that a quarter of total production was syphoned off.²³

Figures of silver registration, like the even more general data on treasury receipts, can offer at best only a guide to the performance of the mining industry, and, indeed, can sometimes be misleading. For example, the figures presented in John J. TePaske's fascinating paper in this volume on the income of the Lima treasury seem, at first sight, to suggest that the mining industry was more heavily taxed in the 1770's than in the boom period of the 1790's. But reference to his major compilation of treasury accounts for Peru indicates that the yield of taxes on mining in other treasuries, notably Pasco, expanded significantly in the last decades of the eighteenth century.²⁴ The Lima figures, therefore, might be taken as reflecting a relative decline of the mining indu-

stry in the areas adjacent to the capital, coupled with a greater readiness of miners and merchants to do their business with local treasuries.

Another very suggestive contribution to this volume is that of John Coatsworth. One's immediate reaction to this is that, whilst the approach is fascinating, it depends upon the reliability and appropriateness of the indices used to measure the purchasing power of silver. As far as Peru is concerned, the principal commodities which miners needed for their operations were mercury and labour and their other major areas of consumption were in the purchase of imported manufactures, followed by local agricultural and viticultural products. The price for mercury was fixed, that of labour fluctuated from region to region and week to week, although on the whole there was not a "labour shortage." The price of imported goods probably fell in the 1780's and early 90's, while little is known of agricultural prices. One point to bear in mind here, is that many miners were also merchants and/or agricultural producers, large and small. Mining, in other words, can be isolated from the rest of the economy, and miners (who ranged from entrepreneurs to subsistence producers) from the rest of society, but the processes tend to be artificial. What is clear is that at the moment we simply do not possess the detailed data required to establish whether in Peru, for example, the real purchasing power of silver or the costs of labour, altered substantially in the eighteenth century.

One unanswerable question which is touched upon in the introduction to this volume is the extent to which the overall economic structure of Peru in the late colonial period reflected and/or provoked regional differentiation. A comment upon rather than a definitive answer to this question is that regionalism is certainly one of the crucial features of the late colonial political and social structures of Peru, with close identification between racial conflict, insurgency, and the general hostility of the southern interior, represented by Cuzco, towards the viceregal capital.²⁵ There are some indications that this hostility had in part an economic basis, and in this context it is possible, for example, to cite protests from mining deputations in Puno and Huamanga against the extravagance and inutility of the Mining Tribunal in distant Lima, and its neglect of their local interests.²⁶ However, mining was relatively unimportant in the province of Cuzco, which acted as the focus for this regional discontent, particularly after 1810, and one's general view at this stage is that tradition, coupled with racial and social considerations was probably a more important cause of antimetropolitan sentiment than anything specifically economic. It is also feasible that the relative prosperity of the

late colonial period, a prosperity based primarily upon the growth of the mining industry, predisposed and enabled the elite in the viceregal capital to prefer continuing dependence upon Spain to the uncertain future offered by the tentative movements for independence which surfaced between 1810 and 1815 and which were characterized, especially in 1814, by a strong anti - Lima bias.

NOTES

1. John Fisher, "Silver production in the viceroyalty of Peru, 1776 - 1824," *HAHR*, 55(1975), 25 - 45.
2. Timothy E. Anna, *The Fall of the Royal Government of Peru* (Lincoln, 1979), p.4.
3. C. Sempat Assadourian et.al., *Minería y espacio económico en los Andes: siglos XVI - XX* (Lima, 1980).
4. For an ambitious but perhaps premature attempt to provide a synthesis, see Javier Tord and Carlos Lazo, *Hacienda, comercio, fiscalidad, y luchas sociales (Peru colonial)* (Lima, 1981).
5. This is particularly true of southern Peru, where the Archivo Arzobispal of Cuzco is now catalogued and open to researchers, and the Archivo Histórico has recently made available the enormously rich Fondo Vega Centeno.
6. J.R. Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, 1776 - 1824* (Liverpool, 1977), and John Fisher, *Minas y mineros en el Perú colonial* (Lima, 1977).
7. J.R. Fisher, "Miners, Silver Merchants and Capitalists in Late Colonial Peru," *IAA*, N.F., 2(1976), 257 - 268.
8. John Fisher, "The Miners of Peru in 1790," in J. Schneider, ed., *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege (Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz)*, IV: *Übersee - und allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Nürnberg, 1978), pp.117 - 127.
9. The figures and the table are from Fisher, *Silver Mines*, as are these general observations.
10. Nicholas P. Cushner, *Lords of the Land: Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit Estates of Coastal Peru, 1600 - 1767* (Albany, 1980).
11. Jorge Polo y la Borda G., *La hacienda Pachachaca: autoabastecimiento y comercialización (segunda mitad del siglo XVIII)* (Lima, 1980).
12. Magnus Mörner, *Perfil de la sociedad rural del Cuzco a fines de la colonia* (Lima, 1978).
13. *Ibid*, p.153.
14. Olinda Celestino and Albert Meyers, *Las cofradías en el Perú: región central* (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 161.
15. John Fisher, "Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy, 1778 - 1796," *JLAS*, 13(1981), 21 - 56.
16. J.R. Fischer, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System 1784 - 1814* (London, 1970), pp.132 - 136.

17. Fisher, "Imperial 'Free Trade'," pp.46 - 47.
18. The author has undertaken such research in Spanish archives in the past few years.
19. Peter J. Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550 - 1735," *JLA*, 12(1975), 67 - 103. See, too, the same author's "Technological Change in Potosí: The Silver Boom of the 1570's," *JLA*, 14(1977), p.57 - 77, and Antonio López de Quiroga, *industrial minero del Potosí colonial* (Cochabamba, 1973).
20. Enrique Tandeter, "La rente comme rapport de production et comme rapport de distribution. Le cas de l'industrie minière de Potosí 1750 - 1826," Thèse de 3^{me} Cycle en Histoire, (Paris, 1980). Rose Marie Buechler, *The Mining Society of Potosí, 1776 - 1810* (Ann Arbor, 1981).
21. Enrique Tandeter, "Los ingleses en Potosí a fines de 1826," *HC*, 3(1978), 125 - 143. See, too, Antonio Mitre, *Los patriarcas de la plata: estructura socioeconómica de la minería boliviana en el siglo XIX* (Lima, 1981).
22. For Upper Peru see Table 3 in Buechler, *The Mining Society*, p.31.
23. Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre el reino de la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1966), p.406.
24. John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America. Volume 1: Peru* (Durham, N.C., 1982).
25. J.R. Fisher, "Royalism, Regionalism, and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, 1808 - 1815," *HAHR*, 59(1979), 232 - 257.
26. Fisher, *Silver Mines*, p.44.

COMENTARIO

Marcello Carmagnani

Es tarea difícil comparar, a partir de los estudios de Coatsworth y de Fisher, la evolución del sector minero en el área de la Nueva España y en el área peruano en el último medio siglo de dominación colonial. La dificultad emerge del hecho que mientras Coatsworth trata de mostrar la inexistencia de un crecimiento productivo, Fisher insiste en su existencia.

Recogiendo acríticamente los resultados de Coatsworth y Fisher, se debería pensar que los dos áreas conocen una evolución divergente. Pero hay en verdad una tal divergencia? Si observamos la evidencia que nos ofrecen, vemos que Fisher fundamenta su análisis en la serie del volumen físico de la producción mientras que Coatsworth lo fundamenta en la serie del valor de la misma. Sin embargo, por el hecho que el valor de la plata no sufre alteración hasta muy entrado el siglo XIX, ambas series son susceptibles de comparación. Si observamos la Tabla I de Coatsworth y la Figura I de Fisher se tiene la impresión que, todo sumado, tanto en la Nueva España como en el Perú, la producción minera presenta tendencias similares: crecimiento entre 1770 y 1795, estancamiento entre 1795 y 1810, y, decrecimiento, a partir de 1810 - 1820.

La diferencia entre los dos análisis radica en el hecho que Coatsworth, a diferencia de Fisher, trata de verificar si la expansión de la producción se traduce en un verdadero crecimiento de la misma, entendiendo por crecimiento la expansión del valor real, medida en términos de poder de adquisición, de productividad y de rentabilidad. Procediendo en esta forma Coatsworth construye, en forma más rigurosa que Fisher, un análisis sobre el nexo existente entre producción minera y economía global y acepta de correr los riesgos inherentes a toda empresa intelectual nueva.

Coatsworth construye su serie del valor real de la producción minera deflacionando el valor nominal de la misma por los precios agrícolas. Este modo de proceder, convincente como técnica, es poco convincente como resultado, pues - como puede verse comparando su Tabla I con su Tabla IV - se traducen en una progresiva divergencia entre valor nominal y valor real de la producción, a partir de 1760 - 64. Esta divergencia, insuficientemente explicada en su análisis, es de gran

importancia porque es a partir de ella que Coatsworth fundamenta su tesis de la inexistencia de un real crecimiento del sector minero en la Nueva España en el último tercio del siglo XVIII.

A mi parecer la falta está en el tipo de deflactor utilizado para construir su serie del valor real. En efecto, es bien conocido que en el último tercio del siglo XVIII y en el primer decenio del siglo XIX se asiste a una aceleración de los precios agrícolas. Pero hasta qué punto esta aceleración se traduce verdaderamente en una progresiva disminución del valor real de la producción minera? Siguiendo las informaciones de Humboldt y Brading, el valor de los insumos para el sector minero puede así desagregarse: 18 por ciento en mercaderías importadas (fierro y mercurio), 36.8 por ciento en mercaderías nacionales (pólvora, cal, sal, madera y mulas) y 44.3 por ciento en salarios. Ahora bien, dado que el crecimiento de los precios agrícolas incide esencialmente en los salarios y por el hecho que ellos representan menos de la mitad del valor de los insumos, se puede pensar que el deflactor que Coatsworth debería haber utilizado debería haber sido un deflactor ponderado o, en su defecto, un deflactor de precios agrícolas construido usando los precios mínimos y no los medios. Con un nuevo deflactor, posiblemente el valor real de la producción minera se acercaría, como sucede hasta 1760-64, más a su valor nominal, confirmando por lo tanto la validez de la tesis tradicional de existencia de un crecimiento en el último tercio del siglo XVIII.

Interesante, aunque difícilmente aceptable, es su serie valor de mercado - producción física a partir de la cual construye Coatsworth sus hipótesis de disminución de productividad y de beneficios mineros en el último tercio del siglo XVIII. En efecto, siempre utilizando las informaciones de Humboldt y de Brading, se puede ver que, por efecto de escasa monetarización de los salarios, el costo de producción de la plata es inferior de un 25 por ciento a su costo de producción nominal (36 reales por marco) en los años de 1790.

Coatsworth y Fisher parecen por lo menos concordar en un hecho: el sector minero en la Nueva España y en el Perú ha alcanzado a fines de la época colonial el máximo de sus posibilidades dada la tecnología extractiva y de refinación utilizada, esencialmente *labor-intensive*. De allí entonces que el *boom* se pueda explicar más por las condiciones favorables del contexto comercial internacional y por la política de subvenciones seguida por la corona en el aprovisionamiento del azogue y, yo agregaría, el precio político de la pólvora. Sin embargo, en este contexto sin la estructura mercantil del avío o habilitación, como emerge muy bien del análisis de Fisher, la producción minera no habría podido

alcanzar su máximo de expansión a nivel de circulación. Es además esta estructura mercantil, basada en la anticipación de bienes a cambio de metales preciosos que continuó funcionando hasta casi mediados del siglo XIX, que nos permitiría comprender, si dispusiéramos de más estudios, el verdadero significado del sector minero en la economía mexicana y peruana.

Decir, como hace Coatsworth, que la minería representa apenas un ocho por ciento del producto territorial bruto mexicano, dice poco sobre su rol de generador de recursos monetarios en economías que, todo sumado, poseen todavía amplios sectores no monetarizados o escasamente monetarizados. Las observaciones de Fisher sobre el significado de la minería en la economía peruana pueden entonces ser comparables a la que tuvo en la economía mexicana. La sugestiva hipótesis de Coatsworth relativa la progresiva mayor importancia del sector agrícola en la economía global merecería pero ser recogida y verificada en los dos contextos productivos, pues, tengo la impresión que ella contenga una buena dosis de verdad aunque tal vez tenga poco que ver con la productividad y la rentabilidad de la producción minera y esté posiblemente asociado a la imposibilidad de una transformación estructural del sector.

III. AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK RAISING

3. THE AGE OF PARADOX: MEXICAN AGRICULTURE AT THE END OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1750 – 1810

Eric Van Young

The eighteenth century was, for Mexico, an age of paradox. In a period of Baroque splendor – witness those sumptuous monuments to the Churrigueresque style: Santa Prisca, Tepotzotlán, La Valenciana – the *lépero* became a familiar figure on the streets of the viceregal capital. As the sphincters of imperial trade policy loosened and commercial prosperity increased, the fiscal machinery was cranked up to extract ever larger surpluses from New Spain, and political controls were tightened on the colony, producing a real sense of disfranchisement within a large segment of the colonial elite. While educated, white, and wealthy urban dwellers sought increasingly to be a part of a wider western culture, large groups of the uneducated, brown, and poor rural masses fought tenaciously to preserve a traditional way of life slipping from their grasp. These contradictions and many others were not of course children of the Bourbon century exclusively. Every age has its paradoxes, and the seeds of these had been planted long before. But the eighteenth century – and especially its latter half – seems to have been a period of particularly sharp contradictions and of accelerating change.

In no aspect of Mexican life of the period was this characteristic more marked than in rural economic structure. Thus, for example, while absolute levels of agricultural and livestock production seem to have risen considerably, productivity – that is, the relative capacity to produce of a given unit of capital, land, or labor – seems to have stagnated or grown little. Rising prices for agricultural and livestock products made large-scale agriculture more profitable, while declining real wages for farm labor helped produce a general scenario of rural impoverishment and proletarianization. Large landholdings seem to have grown more valuable and effectively larger, and small ones smaller. While agricultural surpluses grew and commercialization spread through the countryside, crises of death and famine seemed to come more frequently and to be of greater magnitude. Rural population grew

precipitously, but poverty was ever more widespread. In terms of the overall social distribution of wealth, then, the eighteenth was a century in *chiaroscuro* – a pattern of light and dark, of vivid contrast and contradiction.

Most modern historiography on late colonial Mexico has tended to emphasize the boom aspects of the period after 1750, the age of the "new prosperity" as Leslie B. Simpson called it.¹ It has been assumed that the agricultural economy, *ipso facto*, must have shared in the prosperity and growth, following the more dynamic commercial and mining sectors.² Yet there are important reasons to doubt the accuracy of this knee-jerk model of agricultural development. In the first place, as mentioned above, the putatively bright picture of the late colonial rural economy offers darker shadings as well. Secondly, evidence is beginning to accumulate that even in the leading sectors of the Mexican economy, notably mining, the vaunted late colonial boom was not as strong as investigators have always thought, and may even have represented a decline relative to earlier cycles of prosperity.³ If the condition of commercial agriculture, in particular, is seen to be linked to that of other economic activities, and if those activities did not undergo the kind of degree of development we have thought previously, then some doubt must be cast on the optimistic view of rural economic development as well. Thirdly, it is becoming fairly clear that even in some areas where the prosperity of agriculture was very marked – in the Guadalajara region and in the Bajío, for example – the changes evident in the late eighteenth century were ones of degree, and not of kind. That is to say, we are looking at situations in which growth is present, but development may not be present, or may be significantly distorted.⁴ These reservations notwithstanding, the evidence of considerable agricultural prosperity in late colonial Mexico is substantial. How, then, can views of boom and poverty or stagnation be reconciled?

This apparent contradiction can, in fact, be explained by the consideration of a somewhat more complex model of agrarian change – a model that goes beyond the compilation of aggregate figures or general descriptive statements. Such a model would need to take into account distributional factors, both horizontal and vertical, as well as overall quantitative ones – that is, the distribution of agricultural property and product among identifiable regions within New Spain (horizontal), and among class and ethnic groups (vertical). If these cross-cutting variables are ignored, then the averaging tendency of general statements, both descriptive and statistical, will obscure not only spatial and social parti-

cularities which are interesting in themselves, but also the internal dynamism of the rural economy considered as a system. Seen from this perspective, the apparent contradictions of late colonial agrarian structure can be treated as a series of interlocking, symbiotic sub-systems rather than as sets of irreconcilable inconsistencies. To cite but one example, the relative growth and florescence of some Mexican cities can be associated with a dual process involving both spatial and social shifts in economic resources. On the other hand, resources were in a sense transferred from hinterlands to urban areas in the form of declining rural wages and only moderately rising food prices for urban-dwellers.⁵ On the other hand, the process of agricultural commercialization spurred by expanding urban demand implied a greater social concentration of wealth in the non-subsistence sector of the farming and stock-raising economy – thus the horizontal and vertical shifts, respectively. We shall have occasion to cite other examples of seeming paradox within Mexican agrarian structure, aspects of late colonial developments which are really more dialectical than inconsistent with each other.

The present essay is an effort to define some of the characteristics of late colonial agrarian structure in New Spain with reference to the apparent contradictions of the age – factors which upon closer inspection turn out to be the obverse and reverse sides of the same coin. Rather than aim at presenting a unified, coherent vision of Mexican rural economy from 1750 to 1819 – impossible in any case one would think, in an essay of this length – I have opted to focus on sets of problems and of processes. The approach is therefore necessarily allusive, cleaving closely to the limitations of the secondary literature which it synthesizes incompletely. The central method is to fit the characteristics discussed into the matrix formed by the cross-cutting variables of horizontal and vertical resource distribution mentioned above.

I. Agriculture and the Bourbon Policies: Step-child in an Age of Reform

Perhaps the most dramatic and noisiest development of the late colonial period, at least as portrayed by modern investigators, was the advent of the Bourbon reforms – what one scholar has dubbed a "revolution in government."⁶ Whether these reforms – a largely incoherent mass of imperial legislation created in the name of military preparedness, fiscal efficiency, and economic revitalization – revolutionized anything more than the structure of the colonial bureaucracy is open to

serious question. Nonetheless, the reforms and the general atmosphere of "enlightened despotism" which prevailed at the end of the colonial period did bring about certain changes in the Mexican economy, particularly in the area of taxation, but also notably in commerce, and to a lesser degree in mining and manufacturing.⁷

Agriculture was the step-child in the age of enlightened despotism – it was almost totally neglected by the Bourbon reformers, both in a philosophical and a practical way. Compared with the perceptible restructuring of activity that occurred under the impact of the Bourbon reforms in bureaucratic organization, fiscal policy, international and domestic commerce, and to some degree in the mining sector, state-induced change in agriculture was minimal. The agricultural economy was thus the passive recipient of effects produced in other sectors of the colonial economy which were directly affected. David Brading has suggested, for example, that one result of reduced trade restrictions within the Empire beginning in the 1770's was to drive mercantile capital out of international commerce, where it had enjoyed strongly monopolistic advantages and concomitantly high profits, and into large-scale landownership.⁸ Other investigators, on the other hand, have pointed to the continuing functional links between large-scale commerce and landownership to the very end of the colonial period, since the business of agriculture often required a constant injection of capital to yield its unspectacular but steady profits.⁹ The relationship suggested by the latter situation, then, would be one not so much of capital flight or self-liquidation as of constant symbiosis. Whatever interpretation one elects, it seems clear that the late colonial commercial boom was stimulated by population growth and imperial trade reform, and that commercial capital in turn was made available to finance agriculture. The change itself was exogenous to the agricultural economy to a large extent, however.¹⁰

Attempts to change Mexican agriculture substantially by royal fiat, or at least to regulate it, were made, but in the first case demonstrated little success, and in the second were implemented with quite different ends in mind. Crown efforts to encourage the planting of new crops, such as flax, by Indian peasants and other farmers met with indifferent results.¹¹ The creation during the latter part of the century of royal monopolies, or increases in fiscal exactions on semi-processed agricultural products of wide popular consumption such as tobacco and the ubiquitous *pulque* certainly rendered profits to the crown by concentrating production and keeping prices high, but they also limited the diffu-

sion of incomes from such activities, stimulated contraband, and may ultimately have damaged the industries.¹² Agricultural colonization in the far north of New Spain, despite its long-term significance, did little to relieve population pressures in the central part of the country, and indeed, if it had, would probably have driven up rural wages and inhibited the commercialization of large-scale farming.¹³ At the end of the period the infamous *Consolidación de Vales Reales* of 1804-1809 succeeded in wringing several million pesos of borrowed ecclesiastical capital from the agricultural economy, but this was an ad hoc policy initiated without regard for that economy per se, and its actual effects on the rural economy of New Spain are still not clear.¹⁴

Why should the reformist Bourbon monarchy have, at best, taken a few half measures towards stimulating the Mexican agricultural economy and, at worst, have preyed upon it as a source of revenue without thought as to the effects of fiscal exactions? Two interrelated reasons suggest themselves. In the first place, despite the awareness of contemporaries (Alexander von Humboldt and José María Queiros, for example) that agricultural production in New Spain had a greater aggregate yearly value than any other sector of the economy, the Spanish crown simply was interested in other things as targets for reform, activities which the Bourbon ministers and *proyectistas* felt offered greater fiscal benefits in the short-run and which were more in keeping with current European notions of political economy.¹⁵ Thus, despite the beginnings of a mild, Physiocratic-like critique of latifundism in the colony, taken up even by such illustrious members of the colonial establishment as Bishop Abad y Queipo of Michoacán, a fundamental attempt to restructure Mexican agriculture in general and the landholding system in particular was not forthcoming, let alone any widespread public debate on the issue.¹⁶ In the second place, the agricultural economy, even had reformers wanted to change it significantly, was much harder to get at than commerce or the fiscal structure. As an economic activity it was ubiquitous, less concentrated, and more heterogeneous than other sectors: its ills were harder to analyze and its processes harder to control. Therefore, to the degree that the Bourbon reforms, although they took place over several decades, were a "quick fix" for imperial ills, they quite naturally ignored the ponderous and glacier-like socio-economic structures represented by the rural economy.

II. *Capital and Technology: Growth without Development*

Although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to construct figures regarding productivity in agriculture for the last half-century of the colonial era, it seems reasonable to say that overall increases in production can be ascribed to higher levels of capital investment and labor inputs, rather than technological improvements or new production arrangements. In terms of the distributional variables discussed above, capital investment in market-oriented agriculture, especially among large and middling haciendas, seems to have moved up and in; that is to say, from the mass of the rural population towards large landowners, and from the countryside to the city. Low rural wages (on which more below) partially underwrote the profitability of investment in large-scale agriculture, and in turn fed the burgeoning cities of the realm. Under such circumstances, the landholding elite, new and old, exacted a kind of brokerage fee in the transfer of resources from country to city in the form of profits on agricultural investment. Wages lagged behind prices for agricultural commodities and manufactured goods, creating an available surplus for a form of primitive accumulation which fueled some forms of economic development, albeit in a truncated way.

Capital investment in commercial agriculture apparently tended to assume the form of land acquisition, where possible; or of *mise-en-valeur* of land previously underutilized; or of the expansion of a technology already basically in place. One common form of the latter process was the pattern of crop successions and displacements typical of areas of commercial agriculture. In the valley of Mexico, for example, Tutino has noted the northward displacement of stock raising in the late eighteenth century in favor of *pulque* production and other more intensive activities which grew up in response to the expanding market of Mexico City. Similarly, in the Guadalajara region and Bajío tillage expanded at the expense of livestock raising, and wheat cultivation at the expense of maize, while in large parts of Michoacán, considerable capital was invested in irrigation works.¹⁷ Land values rose, particularly in the commercial agricultural sector, not just owing to the passive processes of population growth and the limitation of resources, but also due to active capital investment, much of it supported by landowner borrowing from the church. In the case of the Guadalajara region, which I have studied, increases of several hundred percent in the value of major grain-producing haciendas were not uncommon. For example, the important Hacienda de Atequiza, near Lake Chapala, grew 800 percent

in value between 1725 and 1821, and the great Hacienda del Cabezón, further to the west, increased in value by 300 percent in the thirty years between 1763 and 1793. By way of contrast, rural wages remained virtually stable during the eighteenth century, while maize prices barely doubled between 1700 and 1810.¹⁸ Capital continued to flow into large-scale agriculture, as we have noted above, from the mining and commercial sectors of the colonial economy, supporting traditional elite status aspirations and the optimizing strategy of economic diversification so characteristic of late colonial family enterprises.¹⁹

The late colonial rise in production levels was created principally by capital investment in dams, irrigation works, storage facilities, etc.; by the intensification of existing technologies; and by increased labor inputs. Productivity increases ascribable to the natural fertility of previously unworked lands being brought into production were probably offset by the fact that most prime arable land in the more heavily populated parts of Mexico had already long since been occupied.²⁰ The development or application of new technologies – of new multipliers of human effort – in late colonial agriculture, such as the following practices, fertilizers, or crop rotations which characterized the "new husbandry" in northern Europe, were scarcely to be found in New Spain or elsewhere in Latin America. At the very end of the colonial period contemporary observers, such as Baron von Humboldt, noted the relative backwardness of Mexican agricultural technology even within the commercial sector. Attempts at state-directed innovation in agriculture were not particularly successful, as noted above. Even capital-intensive, specialized agricultural industries, such as sugar production, tended to experience improvement in very small increments, if at all. In the specific case of sugar there were technological innovations, especially in the milling process, but these seem to have been zealously guarded and remained of local impact only.²¹

As other societies have found before us, and as we are finding today, there are definite limits to the amount of technological innovation applicable under given environmental, economic, and social conditions. Some of these limits are natural and some man-made.²² Under the prevailing conditions of late colonial Mexico, three factors operated to keep technological innovation in agriculture to a minimum. First, and most intractable, was the scarcity of arable land (it has been estimated that only about 10 or 12 percent of the total land area of the country is capable of sustaining agriculture under optimal conditions) and water.²³ Second, population densities in the colony had apparently not reached

sufficiently high levels to warrant intensifications of a technological nature such as were occurring in parts of Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. France, for example, which hardly led the way in technological innovation in agriculture in this period, had an overall population density of approximately 127 people per square mile in about 1800, as compared to Mexico's seven per square mile.²⁴ Under such circumstances technological intensifications simply would not have been cost-effective in New Spain, even given the generally low prevailing wages in agriculture. Finally, the low degree of economic specialization in agriculture, represented by the continued importance and resilience of the peasant subsistence sector, acted as a drag on technological innovation in agriculture as a whole. Demographic growth in the peasant sector on a more or less fixed land base tended to force wages downward, thus shifting the production costs in the direction of labor and largely eliminating the need for technological improvement. Within the peasant sector itself an already highly adapted technology, that of maize agriculture, formed the material base of production. Given enough land for the expansion of peasant agriculture, the technology would simply have been extended in an additive manner. Since this was not the case in the peasant sector, the tendency was for Indian and other subsistence producers to invest more labor rather than more capital or technology, along the lines of the model suggested by A.V. Chayanov. Surplus manpower was put to work in what I have elsewhere referred to as "interstitial" economic operations, such as labor-intensive artisanal and collecting activities.²⁵

III. Population Movement and Subsistence Crisis: A Malthusian Scissors?

The growth of population in eighteenth century New Spain seems to have fueled a certain amount of economic expansion while at the same time imposing limits on that very expansion. The increase of rural population in particular, through the process of migration, contributed to the growth of Mexican cities at rates considerably in excess of the natural, thus stimulating the economic division of labor within the country while providing larger markets of agricultural products. This was notably the case with the viceregal capital, which grew from a population of about 100,000 in around 1742, to nearly double that number in 1810, but it also occurred in other regional capitals. For example, Guadalajara, which had a population of about 5,000 in 1700, had

increased to some 35 – 40,000 by 1800, or roughly double the size one would expect to see assuming a natural rate of increase in the 1700 population of even 4 percent annually. Moreover, the growth of this provincial capital was concentrated most strongly in the period after 1750, during which the city nearly quadrupled in size. Much of this growth was the result of migration from the countryside around the city. Other provincial cities, if they experienced less dramatic rates of growth during the later eighteenth century, nonetheless increased in size substantially, such as Guanajuato, which tripled in size to reach some 90,000 between 1742 and 1809, and Querétaro, which doubled its population (from about 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants) between 1750 and 1800.²⁶ Intra – regional migration, then, played an important part in the creation of market opportunities – even though the market thus created may have possessed a relatively low consuming power – by achieving a partial horizontal shift in population.

There is evidence, however, that the same demographic expansion which helped to stimulate the colonial economy by depressing wage levels and contributing to urban growth was flagging by the end of the colonial period as a result of Malthusian pressures. To cite the case of the Guadalajara region once again, the rate of aggregate population growth, combining a recovery in the Indian population (after its nadir in the seventeenth century) with increase of non – Indian groups, hit well over 2 percent by the early eighteenth century, but lost its momentum by the close of the colonial period, dropping to 0.7 percent in the decade 1800 – 1810, and recovering only slightly in the following decade. Other areas in New Spain showed the same general upsurge during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the same tendency to reduce their rates of growth in the last decades of the colonial era. Demographic analyses for San Luis de la Paz and León, both in the Bajío, corroborate this overall trend in population movement, as do those for parts of Oaxaca.²⁷ Within the overall trend of increasing population, but with a decline in the rate of increase setting in at the end of the colonial era, shifts also occurred in the ethnic composition of the Mexican population, though with strong regional variations. The valley of Oaxaca, for example, remained heavily Indian to the end of the period despite major demographic strides by non – Indian groups in the population. In the middling case, the population of the Guadalajara region was divided almost equally between Indians and white and mixed – blood groups by the close of the period, while that of large parts of the Bajío was becoming predominantly mestizo. This would have important implica-

tions for regional agrarian structures, particularly for the resilience of Indian landholding communities, the degree of commercialization in agriculture, and the extent of rural proletarianization and proto-industrialization.²⁸

The reasons for the slackening in Mexican population growth toward the end of the colonial period are not altogether clear as yet. David Brading and Elsa Malvido, among others, have suggested that variations in the death rate, especially in the Indian segment of the population, rather than changes in fertility or other factors account for the characteristic "old regime" demographic movements one sees during the last century of colonial rule.²⁹ These patterns include periodically sharp increases in mortality – e.g., 1690's, 1730's, 1760's, 1780's (though unevenly distributed among the major ethnic components of the general population) – linked to epidemic disease and subsistence crises, and an equally marked tendency for high birth rates and the ability for the population to reestablish relatively rapid rates of growth after each crisis. Although changes in mortality do account convincingly for general population movements during the period, it is impossible to explain the demographic retrogression of the late eighteenth century by reference to the inherent severity of disease and famine alone. Indeed, it is difficult to see that the incidence of disease and famine increased significantly during the late eighteenth century over the early part of the century, or even over the seventeenth.³⁰ What *did* change during the period, however, were the relative relationships of different sectors of the population to the means of production, and the relationship of the Mexican population as a whole to environmental resources. Contemporaries certainly noted the demographic effects of recurrent disease and famine. Navarro y Noriega wrote in 1820, for example, that:

Uno no encuentra que este reino (de Nueva España) esté tan poblado como debería estarlo, excepto en una o dos provincias, porque la miseria en la que el pueblo bajo vive, los desafortunados defectos de su educación y las hambres y las epidemias, han causado la desaparición de un gran número de personas.³¹

Alexander von Humboldt, on his part, ascribed much of the social malaise of New Spain, despite the country's abundant resources, to the highly skewed distribution of wealth.³²

It is with reference to distributional factors, then, that one must seek to explain the severe effects of late colonial subsistence crises and epidemic disease on the Mexican population. Enrique Florescano has

mapped and traced these episodes for the eighteenth century. In addition to describing the dislocative effects of recurrent subsistence crises linked to occurrences of epidemic disease – rising incidence of vagabondage and crime, labor problems, disruptions in mining, manufacturing, and agricultural activities – he emphasizes the periodicity of such crises, the increasingly wild fluctuations in maize production and prices which characterized them, and the secular trend of rising maize prices which set in after 1790 or so. The most serious and so far the best studied of these late colonial breakdowns was that of the famous *año de hambre* of 1785 – 1786, in which agricultural dearth combined with epidemic disease produced truly lethal effects over much of New Spain.³³ It is true that such cycles in New Spain tended during the late colonial period to correspond with those in Europe, lending some weight to the argument that meteorological and other factors extrinsic to the Mexican economy were in part responsible for the demographic slow-down visible after 1760 or so.³⁴ Nonetheless, it is important to note that such mortal episodes were frequent in the era before the population break-down, that they demonstrated a relative intensity on occasion equal to or greater than those of the later period, and that after them population still continued its rapid upward climb.³⁵ What had changed by the late eighteenth century, and what aggravated the effects of dearth and disease, was the economic situation of the mass of the Mexican population, especially in rural areas. Increasing rural proletarianization, declining real wages, growing concentration of property in land, and a number of related socio-economic factors combined to make the popular classes even more vulnerable to the effects of epidemic and subsistence crises. If one cannot speak, precisely, of a terminal Malthusian crises or of a "Malthusian scissors effect," it is nonetheless clear that in large parts of the country the population had begun to press closely upon the available agricultural resources, making the periodic subsistence episodes of the era more formidable than they might otherwise have been, and slowing the momentum of demographic growth.³⁶

IV. *The Land Question: "Nothing is Surer..."*

The most important key to the late colonial situation seems to have been the growth of population in many regions of New Spain relative to available land resources – that is, an increasing concentration in landownership. The indications are, however, that the major impulse for this concentration came from below – from the population end, rather

than from above – from the landowning end. This is not to say that land itself did not change from the Indian/peasant sector in the direction of the large, non-Indian property owners, but simply that major changes in the legal ownership of land were a product of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and not of the eighteenth.

Throughout much of central Mexico – the area between the Chichimec frontier and the isthmus of Tehuantepec – the Indian demographic collapse which took place in the century and a quarter following the Spanish conquest left large stretches of the countryside empty or significantly depopulated. Combined with the general availability of land, the period saw the generation of important market opportunities with the growth of cities and towns and the non-Indian population generally. This conjunction of circumstances gave rise to the classical Mexican great rural estate, the hacienda.³⁷ In general terms, the period which saw the indigenous population reach its low point – the mid-seventeenth century – also saw the hacienda occupy the vacuum in the countryside with a more or less extensive form of exploitation, depending heavily on indebted labor and emphasizing livestock raising. There were, of course, some notable exceptions to this general scenario, in areas which remained relatively heavily populated or outside the orbit of Spanish economic interest. In the valley of Oaxaca, for example, as William Taylor has shown, Indian landholding remained dominant throughout the colonial period.³⁸

By the time the population recovery of the period 1650–1750 began to put significant pressure on agricultural resources, most readily cultivable land had been pre-empted by Indian communities themselves and by non-Indian estates. As the eighteenth century progressed, and with it an increasing development of large-scale capitalist agriculture, the chafing between growing numbers of peasant villagers and estate-owners became even more notable. Litigation, violence, land invasions, and enclosure seem to have increased in frequency in a number of major agricultural regions of New Spain. Minor adjustments were made in the boundaries of already-existing haciendas in many areas of the country, but remarkably few new properties were created by agglomeration of smaller parcels or by large scale expropriation of Indian lands, as studies of the valley of Mexico, the Puebla–Tlaxcala area, the Bajío, and the Guadalajara region have all shown.³⁹ More specifically, the ownership histories of individual rural estates indicate that major land acquisitions for the most part preceded 1750, or even 1700. For example, Herman Konrad's detailed study of the land titles of the great Jesuit hacienda of

Santa Lucía and its annexed properties, directly to the north of Mexico City, shows that most land transactions instrumental in building the hacienda occurred previous to 1700, and that there were no further acquisition at all after 1737. On the other hand, of the eighty-five conflicts and disputes involving the hacienda in the two centuries between 1576 and 1767, about two-thirds occurred after 1700. Much the same story can be told for the major haciendas of the Guadalajara region, nearly all of which measured the same size in 1800 as they had in 1700.⁴⁰ As I have pointed out above, what occurred during the growth phase of large-scale Mexican agriculture in the latter part of the eighteenth century was a process of internal colonization of estates already established during the preceding centuries, and not the creation of a land-hungry, aggressive commercial agriculture out of whole cloth.

Rural agrarian structure, at the end of the colonial period, demonstrated a more complex distribution of types of production units than just large haciendas and Indian villages. Particularly in the north-central and western-central parts of New Spain – in the Bajío, in Michoacán, and in New Galicia – smallholdings survived in considerable numbers in the countryside on the margins of the large hacienda, often enjoying independent juridical status as individually owned *ranchos*. But also in the valley of Oaxaca, where Indian landholding remained relatively more important in the total land tenure picture than elsewhere, small non-Indian owned properties were numerous, and may even have increased in number, if not in aggregate size, during the eighteenth century.⁴¹ Indeed, such small properties, sandwiched in socio-economically along with small provincial merchants and other rural middlemen between landholding Indian communities and large, commercially oriented estates, served to articulate peasant and capitalist modes of production in important ways.⁴² In some areas renting and sharecropping arrangements abounded, so that even where legal title to agricultural lands had already been preempted by the owners of large estates, effective units of production were more numerous than might be expected. In fact, as has been demonstrated for parts of the Bajío and Michoacán, while hacendados often worked their *demesne* farms, income from rentals and sharecropping formed important parts of overall hacienda revenues, with the terms of such arrangements generally shifting in favor of large landowners towards the close of the colonial period.

Heterogeneity and internal differentiation also characterized economic life within the peasant sector, particularly in landholding Indian villages.

The growing market opportunities and monetarization of the rural economy during the eighteenth century, and especially during its latter half, may have increased wealth differences within indigenous communities, producing strains which ill accorded with the cosmological assumptions upon which communal solidarity was based. Gibson, in his study of the Indians of the valley of Mexico, found wealth accumulation, pretension to noble status, and social-climbing present in village society in an advanced form already in the sixteenth century, despite the tendency for the Spanish conquest to compress and homogenize Indian society. The possibility exists, in fact, that much of the solidarity and hostility with which Indian villages confronted outsiders, particularly with regard to conflicts over land, may have been the artifice of an outward deflection of aggression and strain linked directly to internal social and economic differentiation.⁴³

V. *Labor: The Peonage Puzzle*

If the land tenure situation of New Spain presents a complicated picture during the period after 1750, the condition of rural labor presents one equally complex. There is by now little argument among historians of Mexican agrarian structure that agricultural labor arrangements in most regions of New Spain followed the sequence *encomienda* – *repartimiento* – free wage labor/peonage, as developed by Charles Gibson in his study of the valley of Mexico. Insofar as the growth of commercialized, large-scale agriculture in the late colonial period is concerned, despite the highly variegated labor situation in Mexico, the major variables determining any given labor regimen are clear enough: degree of commercialization, size of potential labor force, and availability of land. For purposes of the present essay, the most important questions to be answered about the late colonial rural labor system are two. First, to what degree was it dominated by the institution of debt peonage, and how widespread and exploitative was the practice? Second, in what way did labor, considered as a component of the agricultural production process, contribute to late colonial agrarian development?

Viewed as a whole, the evidence on debt peonage suggests that where labor was in short supply, either because of a manpower scarcity or because of a strong peasant subsistence sector which offered viable economic alternatives to large numbers of potential rural laborers, peonage could be relatively harsh. Where manpower was plentiful, on the other hand, the logistics of maintaining a permanent estate labor

force might necessitate some degree of debt peonage, but on the whole the institution was likely to be less pervasive and less harsh.⁴⁴ The major study we have for the north in the late colonial period, that of Charles Harris, paints a picture of fairly harsh labor conditions under the regimen of debt peonage: physical coercion of laborers, high debt levels, enforcement of the sanctity of debt, and severe limitation of physical mobility. In late colonial Oaxaca, according to Taylor, debt levels were high and physical coercion on haciendas frequent, but indications regarding limitation of physical mobility are not abundant. In the first case, land in great quantities had been preempted by large landlords and labor was scarce, so that a coercive labor system seemed to make sense in order to assure a steady labor supply. In the second, Indian peasants – the potential labor force – had at least some alternatives to working for wages on haciendas, so that high debt levels functioned at least in part as a means of recruiting and retaining labor. In areas of central Mexico during the late colonial and early national periods, there is much evidence to indicate that although laborers may have been physically abused with some frequency, nonetheless per capita debt levels were not particularly high in terms of what a resident laborer was likely to earn in a given time span; that laborers regularly absconded without liquidating their debts; that haciendas were just as likely to owe back wages to their labor forces as the reverse; and that mobility of laborers was not limited in any great degree.⁴⁵

Much of the most recent research on rural labor during the colonial period tends to the view that debt peonage was neither as widespread nor as harsh as historians had previously believed, subject, of course, to the qualifications stated above regarding regional differences. There are two major reasons for this. In the first place, it has been suggested convincingly by Gibson, and substantiated by others, that debt represented not so much a coercive mechanism on the part of labor – recruiting landowners, as a reflection of a strong bargaining position on the part of rural laborers, growing out of the labor – scarce conditions of the seventeenth century.⁴⁶ Thus, debt levels would logically vary directly with the strength of labor's bargaining power, the major determinant of which would be the availability of labor. Under such conditions, one would expect to see a decline in overall indebtedness when labor became more abundant and a concomitant weakening of the laborers position. This is precisely what happened in many areas in the late colonial period, when population increased relative to the land base of independent peasant farming and the needs of expanding commercial agri-

culture, as in the Guadalajara region in western central Mexico.⁴⁷ The resultant conditions for rural wage labor might indeed be harsh, but as a result of the weakening of debt peonage, not its health. In the second place, many researchers have noted the increasing relative importance of temporary wage labor, drawn in large measure from Indian peasant villages where shortages of land prevailed at the end of the eighteenth century. In many areas such laborers were at a disadvantage compared to resident debt peons, since they enjoyed no perquisites on rural estates, no protection, and sometimes no regular rations as part of their wages.⁴⁸

The preceding discussion provides the rudiments of an answer to the second question regarding the late colonial rural labor system, that of its role in the commercial agricultural expansion of the period. Put simply, the growth of rural population and the static land base of peasant farmers and villages increased the available labor pool during the late colonial years and insured that rural wages did not rise in money terms, thereby effectively depressing real wages. The evidence for such a trend is unequivocal and comes from all over New Spain, and even parts of the north and near north, where labor remained in relatively less abundance.⁴⁹ Cheap labor thus supported the expansion of commercialized large-scale agriculture and largely eliminated the need for technological innovation. Productivity may have remained low, but so did wages, even though labor costs made up a high percentage of overall production costs. These conditions, in the evocative phrase of Charles Harris, created a situation in which "the peon pretended to work and the master pretended to pay him."⁵⁰

VI. *Markets and Regional Development: Stirrings and Shiftings*

If eighteenth-century haciendas were frequently sprawling, underutilized properties with markedly patriarchal social structures, they nonetheless typically demonstrated a high degree of market participation. Sidestepping here the issue of whether such characteristics made the late colonial rural estate capitalist or feudal in nature (or both), we can still assert that the earning of profits through the maximization of their market position seems to have been uppermost in the minds of hacendados. The large-scale commercialization of farming, indeed, went far back into the sixteenth century, as Gibson demonstrated in his study of the precocious non-Indian agriculture of the valley of Mexico. Elsewhere in New Spain the market orientation of the hacienda (or of

labores or other smaller production units) was later in developing due to different demographic rhythms and slower rates of urbanization than in the valley of Mexico. Seen from this perspective, the apparent "feudalization" of much of Mexican agriculture which set in during the seventeenth century in response to population shrinkage and economic decline was simply an adaptive response to prevailing conditions, rather than the acting out of seigneurial ideals on a Mexican *tabula rasa*.⁵¹ When a favorable conjunction of circumstances offered itself in the last century of colonial rule – a mining resurgence, increased availability of investment capital, population growth, and expansion of markets – large-scale agriculture responded appropriately.

The late colonial trade in agricultural products and livestock is difficult to trace with any precision, but it is clear that it could extend both to regional and inter-regional markets, as well as the more familiar trans-oceanic markets for dyestuffs and other rarefied products. Harris has traced the long distance trade in sheep from the Coahuila latifundio of the Sánchez Navarro family; Serrera Contreras that in cattle and other livestock from New Galicia to central Mexico; and Ward Barrett the sugar trade from the Cuernavaca sugar zone to the viceregal capital.⁵² One would normally expect that Mexico City, given its size and preeminence within New Spain, would be the center of a far-flung hinterland and the crystallization point for a developing commercial agriculture, a process recently traced in the work of Kicza and Tutino, and in the earlier studies of Gibson and Florescano. By the same token, one would naturally expect to see mining centers, with their specialized non-agricultural work forces, emerge as important markets for the products of the countryside. What is less well studied, though hardly surprising, is the structure of major intra-regional markets centered on provincial capitals and other cities, which grew considerably, albeit unsteadily, as the pace of urbanization advanced in the period after 1750 or so. Cities such as Guanajuato, Valladolid, San Miguel, Querétaro, and Guadalajara consumed substantial amounts of maize, wheat, and livestock products annually, not to mention the garden crops typically supplied by Indian and other peasant farmers.⁵³ An important provincial urban market tended to function as the central place around which the internal socio-economic integration of an entire region might crystallize, and with it regional political and cultural identity. Furthermore the structure of local market demand tended to have a strong influence on the structure of production and landholding, typically exerting pressure in the direction of production and land concentration. Smaller producers,

among them the Indian farmers of communal villages and other, non-Indian independent peasants, tended to be at a definite disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the bigger urban markets, though they sold surprisingly large quantities of grain in provincial cities and towns, particularly maize. Larger producers enjoyed advantages perhaps out of all proportion to the economic efficiency of their farming, since they commonly were able to exercise control over the market by holding back their produce until prices rose, and interfered with the structure of urban supply through their political power.⁵⁴

Alongside the intra-regional rearrangements occasioned by agricultural expansion in the late colonial period, there also occurred shifts in the economic balance among the various major regions of the country. The nature of this shift in the economic center of gravity of New Spain is not yet clear, but the most notable aspect of it was the emergence of the regions of the near-north and west, particularly the Bajío and parts of New Galicia.⁵⁵ Concomitantly, the earlier settled and more thoroughly integrated regions of Puebla and Oaxaca, to mention the most prominent, fell on somewhat hard times in the late colonial period.⁵⁶ It would indeed be surprising to find that these fundamental shifts in the internal equilibrium of the country were not linked, at least in part, to demographic and agricultural factors. Some possible lines of explanation suggest themselves, though none has yet been thoroughly investigated on a country-wide basis. First, of course, the *arrastre* effect in the silver mining areas of the near-north and west – that is, the growth opportunities for agriculture and other activities created by a prosperous mining economy – must inevitably account for some of the northward shift. Secondly, a relatively greater demographic dynamism is evident in these areas of the country, possibly because of the proportionally lower presence of the Indian ethnic component in the population. Finally, although the Bajío, other parts of the near north, and New Galicia were not themselves frontier areas in the late colonial era, they did offer relatively greater opportunities for internal colonization, a kind of fill-in process, especially in agriculture, in which previously marginal areas were settled more densely, drawn into production, and integrated into local and country-wide markets. Under such conditions, it is probable that the returns on investment in agriculture would be likely to be higher than in older areas with more depleted resources, especially given the technological levels of the period. Thus, the more highly saturated regions of the center, south, and east would tend to lag behind relatively in terms of productivity.

Conclusion: A Chiaroscuro Century

The latter part of the eighteenth century in Mexico, then, was one of contradiction, though as I have tried to point out that contradiction was more rhetorical or aesthetic than real. A considerable degree of economic expansion and prosperity was present, but also an increasing amount of rural proletarianization and impoverishment. As Bryan Roberts has stressed in speaking of modern industrial development in Latin America, the two processes of growth and impoverishment were intimately linked to each other, and the one could not have occurred in the absence of the other.⁵⁷ Gross indicators of agricultural prosperity – rising prices, rising tithe collections, increasing stability of ownership of large estates, rising levels of profits and investment in large-scale agriculture – pointed to economic growth, but signs of rural impoverishment and a fall in living standards for the rural masses in many parts of New Spain attested to how that growth was achieved.⁵⁸ In terms of the two distributional variables set out above – vertical (class/ethnic) and horizontal (geographic) – the period saw an ever-increasing skewing in the social distribution of wealth in favor of large landowners and their allies; a probable transfer of economic resources from the countryside to the city; and a northward shift in the economic center of gravity of New Spain as a whole. What is not clear as yet is the relationship of these developments to the situation of Mexico after Independence. On the whole, the conditions of the country until the later nineteenth century – economic decline and stagnation, slow demographic growth, ruralization, political Balkanization and instability – lend weight to the view that a prolonged crisis had begun under cover of the prosperity of the late colonial era, and continued for the first half-century of the republican period.

At the end of the period under discussion we have the Mexican Wars for Independence. Given the evolution of the Mexican rural economy during the last half-century of colonial rule, it seems impossible to view that prolonged violent episode as a mere political epiphenomenon floating freely on the socio-economic substrate of New Spain. The social redistribution of wealth noted by so many historians of the eighteenth century must surely have played a role in creating pre-conditions for the rural rebellion which was such a prominent component of the wars of Independence. The strains attendant upon changes in agrarian structure in many parts of the country have been noted often. More particularly, the embattled status of the independent, landholding Indian village

and its tendency to assume a hostile posture with regard to outsiders becomes increasingly apparent at the close of the eighteenth century.⁵⁹ It seems probable, then, that secular changes in agrarian structure contributed something to the motive force behind rebellion against the colonial regime. But it must also be noted that agrarian issues – land reform, for example – played very little explicit role in the ideological and programmatic expressions of the rebels. To make the connection between long-term agrarian conditions and revolt, therefore, one must look to intervening variables, and the code of symbolic expression, in order to decipher the relationship between the way rural people thought and the way they lived.

NOTES

1. Lesley B. Simpson, *Many Mexicos*, 4th edition, revised (Berkeley, 1967). More recently, see Colin M. MacLachlan and Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *The Forging of the Cosmic Race: A Reinterpretation of Colonial Mexico* (Berkeley, 1980), and Jaime E. Rodríguez O., "Down From Colonialism: Mexico's Nineteenth-Century Crisis," (Distinguished Faculty Lecture, University of California, Irvine, 1980); and the remarks of David A. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajío: León, 1700–1860* (Cambridge, 1978), pp.174–175. In fairness to Simpson, we should note that he also acknowledged the lack of a significant "trickle effect" from silver-based wealth, particularly; *Many Mexicos*, p.203.
2. When I speak in these pages of agricultural economy, unless otherwise indicated, I include stock raising for economy of expression.
3. See the papers by John Coatsworth and John Te Paske in this volume; and also John H. Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," *AHR*, 83(1978), 80–100; David Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," *HAHR*, 52(1972), 545–579; David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763–1810* (Cambridge, 1971); and Peter J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546–1700* (Cambridge, 1971).
4. For the Guadalajara region, see Eric Van Young, *Hacienda and Market in Eighteenth-Century Mexico: The Rural Economy of the Guadalajara Region, 1675–1820* (Berkeley, 1981); for the Bajío, David A. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*; and for New Spain as a whole, Enrique Florescano, *Estructuras y problemas agrarios de México, 1500–1821* (Mexico City, 1971). The term growth here is to be understood as expansion of a system already in place, and which through a kind of vegetative increase may produce more of the same; by the term development an evolutionary process in which such a system is transformed or fundamentally restructured, so as to give rise to possibilities of greater productivity – a qualitative change. This distinction notwithstanding,

- growth as defined here must entail change at least. An example of this would be the effects of economies of scale in agriculture, even barring any fundamental innovations in productive technology; on this point, see Eric Van Young, "Regional Agrarian Structures and Foreign Commerce in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: A Comment," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, New York, 1979.
5. See Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*; and Eric Van Young, "Urban Market and Hinterland: Guadalajara and its Region in the Eighteenth Century," *HAHR*, 59(1979), 593-635. On the growth of cities in general in colonial Latin America, and the effects of that growth, see Jorge E. Hardoy and Richard P. Schaedel, comps., *Las ciudades de América Latina y sus áreas de influencia a través de la historia* (Buenos Aires, 1975); and David J. Robinson, "Introduction to Themes and Scales," in David J. Robinson, ed., *Social Fabric and Spatial Structure in Colonial Latin America* (Ann Arbor, 1979), pp.1-24. One might also, following Richard Adams' formulations, cast the rural-urban resource transfer in terms of an energy transfer, with the attendant shifts in social power and dominance; see Richard N. Adams, *Energy and Structure: A Theory of Social Power* (Austin, 1975).
 6. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, p.31ff.
 7. On the political significance of the Bourbon Reforms, see Mark A. Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808* (Columbia, Missouri, 1977); on commerce, Marcelo Bitar Letayf, *Economistas españoles del siglo XVIII; sus ideas sobre la libertad del comercio con Indias* (Madrid, 1968); on mining, Brading, *Miners and Merchants*; and for a general overview for New Spain, see Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., *Historia General de México*, 4 vols. (Mexico City, 1976), II, 185-301.
 8. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*.
 9. See John Kicza, "The Great Families of Mexico: Elite Maintenance and Business Practices in Late Colonial Mexico City," *HAHR*, 62(1982), 429-457, and *Business and Society in Late Colonial Mexico City* (Albuquerque, 1983); Richard B. Lindley, *Kinship and Credit in the structure of Guadalajara's Oligarchy, 1800-1830* (Austin, 1983); Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*; and John M. Tutino, "Creole Mexico: Spanish Elites, Haciendas, and Indian Towns, 1750-1810" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Texas, 1976). All these authors, but especially Kicza, point to the prevalence of economic diversification within individual "great families" or clans as an optimizing strategy to avoid the risks inherent in economic specialization.
 10. In part the commercial boom we have been discussing here was only an effect of rising prices - i.e., inflation. If nominal prices were to be corrected, or if intra-imperial and Mexican domestic commerce were to be put in terms of volume of goods alone, the boom would surely be less impressive.
 11. Van Young, *Hacienda and Markets*, p.318; and see also Ramón María Serrera Contreras, *Cultivo y manufactura de lino y cáñamo en Nueva España, 1777-1800* (Seville, 1974).
 12. See the paper by Susan Deans-Smith in this volume; José Jesús Hernández Palomo, *La Renta del pulque en Nueva España, 1663-1810* (Seville, 1979); and on *pulque* haciendas in the valley of Mexico, Tutino, "Creole Mexico."

13. See, for example, Herbert E. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century: Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration* (Austin, 1970; originally published 1915).
14. On the *Consolidación* see, among others, Masae Sugawara H., *La Deuda pública de España y la economía novohispana, 1804-1809* (Mexico City, 1976); Brian R. Hamnett, "The Appropriation of Mexican Church Wealth by the Spanish Bourbon Government: The 'Consolidación de Vales Reales,' 1805-1809," *JLAS*, 1(1969), 85-113; Asunción Lavrin, "The Execution of the Law of Consolidación in New Spain: Economic Aims and Results," *HAHR*, 53(1973), 27-49; and Linda Greenow, *Credit and Socio-economic Change in Colonial Mexico: Loans and Mortgages in Guadalajara, 1720-1820* (Boulder, 1983).
15. José María Queiros, "Memoria de estatuto (1820)," in Enrique Florescano and Isabel Gil, comps., *Descripciones económicas generales de Nueva España, 1784-1817* (Mexico City, 1973), pp. 231-264; Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre el reino de la Nueva España*, edited by Juan A. Ortega y Medina (Mexico City, 1966); and see also Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, p.1-2.
16. Enrique Florescano, "El problema agrario en los últimos años del virreinato," *HM*, 20(1971), 477-510; Brian R. Hamnett, "Obstáculos a la política agraria del despotismo ilustrado," *HM*, 20(1971), 55-75; and Claude Morin, *Michoacán en la Nueva España del siglo XVIII. Crecimiento y desigualdad en una economía colonial* (Mexico City, 1979). Aspects of the anti-latifundium critique were used as a political tool by mid-nineteenth-century liberals for an attack against the church, but not against large landowners generally, since the power-holders as a group continued deeply committed to landlordism. It is also interesting to note how little, comparatively speaking, land reform played a role as an issue in the movement for Independence between 1810 and 1821.
17. Tutino, "Creole Mexico;" Brading *Haciendas and Ranchos* and "La estructura de la producción agrícola en el Bajío de 1700 a 1850," *HM*, 23(1973), 197-237; Van Young, *Haciendas and Market*; Morin, *Michoacán*. These successions and displacements in fact created something of a "moving frontier" situation whose social and economic effects in the countryside have hardly been looked at as yet.
18. On rising land values see David A. Brading, "Hacienda Profits and Tenant Farming in the Mexican Bajío," (unpublished ms., 1972), p.11 and "La estructura de la producción agrícola;" and Brading, *Haciendas y Ranchos*. See also Isabel González Sánchez, *Haciendas y ranchos de Tlaxcala en 1712* (Mexico City, 1969); Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.176-182; and for a somewhat different view, Florescano, *Estructura y problemas*, chap.3 and p.175. On Church lending in agriculture, see François Chevalier, *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda*, translated by Alvin Eustis (Berkeley, 1966), pp.253-262; Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, pp.217-218; William B. Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca* (Stanford, 1972), pp.141-142; Florescano, *Estructuras y problemas*, pp.162-178; Arnold J. Bauer, "The Church and Spanish American Agrarian Structure, 1765-1865," *TA*, 28(1971), 78-98; Michael P. Costeloe, *Church Wealth in Mexico: A Study of the "Juzgado de Capellanías" in the Archbishopric of Mexico, 1800-1856* (Cambridge, 1967); Greenow, *Credit and Socio-Eco-*

- normic Change*; and Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.182 - 191. The original data on Atequiza and El Cabezón were drawn from eighteenth - century notarial records in the Archivo de Instrumentos Públicos, Guadalajara (Mexico), and are cited more completely in Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, chaps. 5 and 11.
19. Kicza, "The Great Families of Mexico" and *Business and Society*; Tutino, "Creole Mexico," Brading, *Miners and Merchants and Haciendas and Ranchos*; Doris M. Ladd, *The Mexican Nobility at Independence, 1780 - 1826* (Austin, 1976); Manuel Romero de Terreros, *El Conde de Regla, creso de la Nueva España* (Mexico City, 1943); and Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*.
 20. Indeed, if any increase in land productivity occurred in the colonial period, it probably took place in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, rather than in the eighteenth; see Sherbune F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, *Essays in Population History: Mexico and the Caribbean*, 3 vols.(Berkeley, 1974 - 1980), II, chap. 2.
 21. Von Humboldt, *Ensayo político*, p.256; Florescano, *Estructuras y problemas*, p.128ff; and on European farming technology, B.H. Slicher Van Bath, *The Agrarian History of Western Europe, 800 - 1850* (London, 1963). On the sugar industry, see Ward Barrett, *The Sugar Hacienda of the Marqueses del Valle* (Minneapolis, 1970), and for examples of innovation in sugar - milling techniques see the request for an exclusive ten - year license to use an improved *trapiche* of his own invention by Coronel Juan Pablo de Piniaga in AGN(M), Tierras, vol. 1421, expediente 5, 1818 (I owe this reference to Jonathan Amith of Yale University); and for a similar case in the Guadalajara region involving a 1730 invention for improved furnaces utilizing bagasse, see Archivo de Instrumentos Públicos, Guadalajara (Mexico), Libros de Gobierno de la Audiencia de Guadalajara, vol. 44, ff. 1170r - 174v, 1730.
 22. For some interesting ideas on this theme as applied to historical and contemporary societies, see Marvin Harris, *Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures* (London, 1978); Adams, *Energy and Structure*; and Richard J. Barnett, *The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity* (New York, 1980).
 23. The water problem in Mexico is one of the most critical issues facing the country today; see Norman Gall, "Can Mexico Pull Through?," *Forbes*, 15 (Aug. 1983), 70 - 79; and also Simpson, *Many Mexicos*, pp.1 - 21, 356.
 24. The base figures for France in 1800 were a total population of about 27 million and an area of 213,000 square miles; for Mexico (excluding the northern zones of New Mexico, Texas, California, etc.), a population of 5,760,440 and an area of 800,000 square miles; see Eric Van Young, "Mexican Rural History Since Chevalier: The Historiography of the Colonial Hacienda," *LARR*, 18(1983), 5 - 6.
 25. On the peasant household economy, see A.V. Chayanov, *The Theory of Peasant Economy*, edited by D. Thorner, R.E.F. Smith, and B. Kerblay (Homewood, Ill., 1966); and on interstitial economic activities see Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, and Morin, *Michoacán*, pp. 290 - 292.
 26. Richard M. Morse, ed., *The Urban Development of Latin America, 1750 - 1920* (Stanford, 1971), p.95; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.29 - 35; John Super, *La vida en Querétaro durante la colonia, 1531 - 1810* (Mexico City, 1983), pp.16 - 17. There were, of course, cities in less economically dynamic regions which remained stable in population, or even shrank

during the period, for example Oaxaca; Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, pp.18-19.

27. Cecilia Andrea Rabel Romero, *San Luis de la Paz: estudio de economía y demografía históricas, 1645-1810*, pp. 56-57; Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, pp. 58-60; Sherbune F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, *The Population of the Mixteca Alta, 1520-1960* (Berkeley, 1968); Van Young, *Haciendas and Markets*, pp.36-39; and on rural-urban migration and overall rates of population growth in New Spain, see MacLachlan and Rodríguez, *The Forging of the Cosmic Race*, pp.286-287. As Brading has pointed out, however, in an excellent and far-ranging general discussion of the population literature of New Spain as a whole, certain regions partially recovered their demographic dynamism after the late colonial stutter, particularly those less developed, or "frontier" areas, the Bajío and New Galicia; Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, p.179.
28. For Oaxaca, see Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, pp.33-34; for the Bajío, Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*; and for Guadalajara, Van Young, *Haciendas and Markets*.
29. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, p.60 and chap.3 generally; David A. Brading and Celia Wu, "Population Growth and Crisis: León, 1720-1810," *JLAS*, 5(1973), 1-36; Elsa Malvido, "Efectos de las epidemias y hambrunas en la población colonial de México (1519-1810)," in Enrique Florescano and Elsa Malvido, comps., *Ensayos sobre la historia de las epidemias en México*, 2 vols.(Mexico City, 1982), I: 179-197.
30. Elsa Malvido, "Cronología de epidemias y crisis agrícolas en la época colonial," in Florescano and Malvido, comps., *Ensayos*, I: 171-178.
31. F. Navarro y Noriega, "Memorias sobre la población del reino de Nueva España," *BSMGE*, 1869 (originally published 1820), cited in Miguel E. Bustamante, "Aspectos históricos y epidemiológicos del hambre en México," p.60, in Florescano and Malvido, comps., *Ensayos*, I, 60.
32. Von Humboldt, cited in MachLachlan and Rodríguez, *The Forging of the Cosmic Race*, p.287.
33. Enrique Florescano, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708-1810)* (Mexico City, 1969). On the 1785-1786 crisis in general, see Enrique Florescano, comp., *Fuentes para la historia de la crisis agrícola en 1785-1786*, 2 vols.(Mexico City, 1981); for the Bajío, Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, chap.8, and Brading and Wu, "Population Growth and Crisis;" for Mexico City, see Donald B. Cooper, *Epidemic Disease in Mexico City, 1761-1813* (Austin, 1965), pp.70-85; and for Guadalajara and its region, Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.94-103, and for a more detailed treatment, Eric Van Young, "Rural Life in Eighteenth-Century Mexico: The Guadalajara Region, 1675-1820," (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1978), pp.174-196.
34. Florescano, *Precios del maíz*, p.124.
35. See, for example, Murdo J. MacLeod, "The Three Horsemen: Drought, Disease, Population and the Difficulties of 1726-1727 in the Guadalajara Region," Southeastern Conference on Latin American Studies, *Annals*, 14 (1983), 33-46; and MacLeod, personal communication.

36. These general statements are based, for the most part, on data from the public record regarding large producers and sellers – tithe figures, granary price series, official reports, etc. What we know less about is the role of true subsistence farming in helping the rural population weather such crisis episodes. It has been suggested, for example, that in harvest crisis, barring a total crop failure (which never occurred as far as we can determine), peasant farmers tended to consume what produce they were able to recover, withdrawing from the market, where they normally earned some cash income from the sale of surpluses. On the other hand, during a really severe episode, such as 1785–86, small peasant producers might not be spared either; see, for example, the evidence on small renters on the Guadalajara city *ejidos* in Van Young, "Rural Life," p.190.
37. Woodrow Borah, *New Spain's Century of Depression* (Berkeley, 1951); Chevalier, *Land and Society*; André Gunder Frank, *Mexican Agriculture, 1521–1630: Transformation of the Mode of Production* (New York, 1979); Florescano, *Estructuras y problemas*; Lesley B. Simpson, *Exploitation of Land in Central Mexico in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1952); and for a general review of the literature on the Mexican colonial hacienda, see Van Young, "Mexican Rural History Since Chevalier."
38. Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*.
39. Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519–1810* (Stanford, 1964), chap.10; Tutino, "Creole Mexico;" Morin, *Michoacán*; Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*; on the Puebla–Tlaxcala region see Enrique Florescano, "Formación y articulación económica de la hacienda en Nueva España," (unpublished ms., 1980). Florescano, among others, has characterized the eighteenth century as a period of aggressive estate expansion in his *Estructuras y problemas*, pp.44, 140–148, 189–190, but subsequently seems to have changed his views; see, for example, "Formación y articulación."
40. Herman W. Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico: Santa Lucía, 1576–1767* (Stanford, 1980), pp.352–369; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, chap.13.
41. For the Bajío, see Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, chap.7; for Michoacán, Morin, *Michoacán*, chap.6; Luis González y González, *Pueblo en vilo: micro-historia de San José de Gracia* (Mexico City, 1968); for New Galicia, see Van Young, "Rural Life," chap.11; and on Oaxaca, Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, chap.4.
42. See Eric Van Young, "Rural Middlemen in Bourbon Mexico: The Guadalajara Countryside in the Eighteenth Century," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., 1982.
43. Gibson, *The Aztecs*, p.153ff; and see the interesting discussion of village solidarity and the outside world in William B. Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (Stanford, 1979), pp.152–170. For a more developed presentation of the internal conflict/deflection hypothesis, see Eric Van Young, "Conflict and Solidarity in Indian Village Life: The Guadalajara Region in the Late Colonial Period," *HAHR*, 64, (1984), 55–79; and for opposing views Tutino, "Creole Mexico," p.7, and Morin, *Michoacán*, pp.292–295.

44. See Van Young, "Mexican Rural History Since Chevalier," and the large number of works cited there; Friedrich Katz, *La servidumbre agraria en México en la época porfiriana* (Mexico City, 1980); Arnold J. Bauer, "Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonaje and Oppression," *HAHR*, 59(1979), 34-63; and the general comments by John M. Tutino, "Life and Labor in North Mexican Haciendas: The Querétaro-San Luis Potosí Region, 1775-1810," in Elsa Cecilia Frost, Michael C. Meyer, and Josefina Z. Vázquez, eds., *El trabajo y los trabajadores en la historia de México* (Mexico City, 1979), pp.356-360.
45. Charles H. Harris, III, *A Mexican Family Empire: The Latifundio of the Sánchez Navarros, 1765-1867* (Austin, 1975), chap.3; Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, pp.143-152; Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*; Gibson, *The Aztecs*, chap.9; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, chap.11; Tutino, "Life and Labor," Morin, *Michoacán*.
46. Gibson, *The Aztecs*, chap.9; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.248 ff. This raises an interesting question regarding the origins of debt peonage in the seventeenth century. Coercion through the enforcement of debt and the limitation of physical mobility on the part of the laborers are said to have arisen from the need to create a stable labor force. If such was the case, then one would not expect to see rising wages during the same period (e.g., Gibson, *The Aztecs*), which would be symptomatic of competition for laborers and more or less free market conditions for the sale of labor. This contradiction has yet to be resolved.
47. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, chap.11.
48. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*; Morin, *Michoacán*; Tutino, "Life and Labor" and "Creole Mexico;" Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*.
49. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.248-261; Morin, *Michoacán*, p.256ff; Gibson, *The Aztecs*, p.251; Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, pp.196-197; Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.67-70.
50. Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, p.78.
51. On the valley of Mexico, see Gibson, *The Aztecs*; and on the seventeenth century, see Borah, *New Spain's Century of Depression*; Chevalier, *Land and Society*; Frank, *Mexican Agriculture*; Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, especially the conclusion; and for general discussions on the debate over "feudalization" in the seventeenth century, see Magnus Mörner, "The Spanish American Hacienda: A Survey of Recent Research and Debate," *HAHR*, 53(1973), 183-216, and Van Young, "Mexican Rural History Since Chevalier."
52. Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*; Ramón María Serrera Contreras, *Guadalupe ganadera: Estudio regional novohispano, 1760-1805* (Seville, 1977), chap.3; and Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, chap.10; Barrett, *Sugar Hacienda*.
53. John E. Kicza, "Consumption and Control: A Mexico City Business Community and the Marketing of Commodities in the Eighteenth Century," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., 1982, and *Business and Society*; Tutino, "Creole Mexico;" Florescano, *Precios del maíz*; Gibson, *The Aztecs*; on the cities of the bishopric of Michoacán, see Morin, *Michoacán*, p.141 ff; on Querétaro,

- Super, *La vida en Querétaro*, pp.51 – 56; and on Guadalajara, Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, chaps.3 – 5.
54. On changes in agrarian structure as response to local urban demand, see especially Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*; on the competitive structure of urban markets, grain speculation, and many related issues, see Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, and Florescano, *Precios del maíz* and *Estructuras y problemas*.
 55. The stimulating collection of essays edited by Ida Altman and James Lockhart, *Provinces of Early Mexico: Variants of Spanish American Regional Evolution* (Los Angeles, 1976), includes much material on a number of individual regions, and some interesting thoughts on regional development as such, but little if anything concerning inter – regional dynamics.
 56. On Oaxaca, see Brian R. Hamnett, *Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico, 1750 – 1821* (Cambridge, 1971). There is as yet surprisingly little published research on the Puebla – Tlaxcala region in the late colonial period. Apparently the area experienced a marked economic decline in the late eighteenth century, the reasons for which are not entirely clear; Juan Carlos Garavaglia, personal communication. Brian Hamnett, in a forthcoming book on the period of Mexican Independence and the early Republic, will deal in detail with the question of regions in New Spain and their relationship to the center and to each other.
 57. MacLachlan and Rodríguez, *The Forging of the Cosmic Race*, pp.286 – 287, recognize this but do not relate the two apparently contradictory trends. See also Rodríguez, "Down from Colonialism;" Bryan Roberts, *Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanization in the Third World* (Beverly Hills, 1978).
 58. For largely impressionistic conclusions on rural living standards, see Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, pp.196 – 197, and Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.268 – 269. It is true, as Brading points out, that the question of autoconsumption among laborers and peasants makes money or real wage levels alone an unreliable indicator of material conditions of well – being. For a somewhat different view of this question for the early post – independence period, see Harry E. Cross, "Debt Peonage Reconsidered: A Case Study in Nineteenth – Century Zacatecas, Mexico," *BHR*, 53(1979), 473 – 495; and "Living Standards in Rural Nineteenth – Century Mexico: Zacatecas, 1820 – 1880," *JLAS*, 10(1978), 1 – 19.
 59. On the situation of villages, see, for example, Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion*; Van Young, "Conflict and Solidarity." For a summary of economic and social conditions in New Spain on the eve of rebellion, see Brian R. Hamnett, "The Economic and Social Dimension of the Revolution of Independence in Mexico, 1800 – 1824," *IAA, N.F.*, 6(1980), 1 – 27; and see also Eric Van Young, "Moving Towards Revolt: Agrarian Origins of the Hidalgo Rebellion in the Guadalajara Region," paper delivered at Social Science Research Council Conference on the Comparative Study of Peasant Revolts in Mexico, New York, 1982.

4. LA SITUACION ECONOMICA EN LAS COMUNIDADES DE LA SIERRA CENTRAL DEL PERU A FINES DE LA EPOCA COLONIAL

ANOTACIONES A BASE DEL ESTUDIO DE LAS COFRADIAS

Albert Meyers

*I. Introducción**

Una de las conclusiones más generalizadas al caracterizar la situación en el Perú a fines de la Colonia es la de destacar el fuerte crecimiento demográfico en combinación con una situación económica en declive, situación que causó mucha inquietud social y dejaba su influencia en las rebeliones indígenas y en los movimientos de liberación nacional. Para el sector minero, en cambio, se ha relativizado esta imagen, constatando que "a partir de 1776, la minería se extendió y no decreció permaneciendo relativamente próspera hasta 1812."¹ La atención evidentemente debe concentrarse en el sector agrícola para el cual se ha hablado generalmente de un estado de crisis, aunque también aquí contamos con juicios recientes que desaconsejan hacer generalizaciones en cuanto a todas las regiones del Virreinato.² El problema a resolver aquí se presenta no sólo en la metodología e interpretación sino también en el difícil acceso o la falta de fuentes. Esto vale por ejemplo para el sector agrícola no comercializado, donde es difícil hacer cálculos relativos al abastecimiento de comestibles y las costumbres alimenticias.

Consecuentemente contamos con más datos concretos calculables y estudios sobre la economía de monoproducción (plantas azucareras, haciendas de ganado) que sobre la agricultura de subsistencia. Por otra parte, la situación de subsistencia de la población a fines de la Colonia es mucho más compleja que al comienzo, incluyendo la necesidad de algunos sectores populares de poder asegurar su sobrevivencia sólo recurriendo a varias fuentes de ingreso y de trabajo, lo que hace aún más difícil la descripción de su modo de reproducción en cifras concretas.

En este sentido, lo que a continuación presentamos debe ser considerado como primer acercamiento al problema, dejando muchas preguntas abiertas. Primeramente se intenta dar una idea de la estructura de

posesión de tierra y ganado hacia mediados del siglo XVIII y de su dinámica hasta el fin de la época colonial. Como caso ejemplar se tratará la cofradía como institución importante en el proceso de transferencia de bienes. La segunda parte del trabajo se ocupará de describir la diferenciación intracomunal e intraregional, las relaciones comerciales y las fuentes adicionales de ingreso, es decir, la economía diversificada que caracteriza al campesinado de la época.³

El valle del Mantaro, ya por la extensión de su superficie de hasta 100 kilómetros de largo y hasta diez kilómetros de ancho, situado a una altura de alrededor de 3,300 metros sobre el mar, se destaca de los otros valles interandinos de la sierra peruana. En sus tierras fértiles hoy se cultivan maíz, cebada, papas, habas, alfalfa y en menor escala trigo y hortalizas. En las vertientes del valle así como en la zona del Mantaro superior (conocida como la Quebrada) sobresalen los pastos, permitiendo, solamente en pequeñas zonas protegidas, el cultivo de plantas. Toda la zona está rodeada por las punas a ambos lados de la cordillera occidental y oriental, que en el norte se abren en una vasta planicie alrededor del lago Junín, la cual se extiende casi hasta el centro minero de Cerro de Pasco. Como pequeño corte en la cordillera oriental se presenta el valle de Tarma con un clima moderado influenciado por la montaña cercana. Administrativamente, la región se divide en cuatro provincias, Yauyos y Huarochirí (la parte occidental), y Tarma y Jauja, el resto, siendo la última con sus tres repartimientos de Hatun Jauja, Lurihuanca y Hananhuanca el centro de nuestro interés.

Considerando los datos demográficos publicados sobre la región, habría que suponer un auge inmenso en el número de habitantes durante y a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII. Según las cifras que presenta Kubler, en 1754 la provincia de Jauja tenía 21,062 habitantes que, según Vollmer, habrían aumentado a 52,286 en el año 1792.⁴ Sin embargo, al revisar la fuente original que data de la época del Virrey Amat en la década de 1750, se observa que se habla explícitamente del número de indios solamente.⁵ Considerando que la cifra de 52,286 para 1792 comprende más de 20,000 españoles y mestizos, se puede suponer que en la década del 1750 el número de habitantes de la provincia de Jauja seguramente era superior a 32,021, cifra que Kubler indica para el año 1628.⁶

Huelga decir, que todas estas cifras deben ser tomadas con precaución por las inexactitudes conocidas en la aplicación de estos censos. Además, por la cercanía a los centros mineros más grandes del virreinato en esta época, se puede partir de la suposición de una cierta movilidad

poblacional. Si se trata entonces de presentar tendencias, me parece más adecuado hablar de un ligero incremento de la población en esta región a fines de la Colonia. En apoyo de esta aseveración también están las cifras de 1813, que indican una población ligeramente aumentada, o sea, de 55.592 personas en la provincia de Jauja.⁷ Esta tendencia coincide con lo que Adams ha observado en la comunidad de Muquiyauyo perteneciente al curato de Huaripampa así como con algunas indicaciones para una parte de los catorce curatos de esta provincia, donde se ha notado incluso un estancamiento o un ligero descenso en la población.⁸

II. Estructura de posesión de tierra y ganado

A. El valle mismo

A fines de la Colonia se podía distinguir entre tres tipos básicos de tenencia de tierras:⁹

1. Tierras de la Corona cedidas a

- indios tributarios
- viudos/viudas y ancianos
- personas solteras
- caciques
- la comunidad

2. Tierras de la Iglesia

- para uso de la Iglesia
- poseídas por las cofradías y

3. Tierra privada, poseída por españoles, criollos, mestizos, etc.

De los documentos de la región que hasta ahora hemos estudiado, es difícil reconstruir la distribución absoluta y proporcional de la tierra según los tipos de propiedad y el acceso del individuo en las comunidades a sus medios principales de producción. De esta manera, en lo siguiente me limito a una descripción general de la situación y a destacar algunas tendencias de cambio dentro de la época aquí tratada.

Correspondiente a las condiciones ecológicas y climáticas de los Andes, se observa una estricta división entre las tierras de sembrío en la planicie y en las vertientes de las cordilleras y los pastos de la parte superior.¹⁰ Según el patrón de aprovechamiento máximo de los pisos ecológicos practicado en la época precolonial, también las quince doctrinas fundadas en el valle del Mantaro en el siglo XVI ejercían el control territorial hasta las cumbres de las dos cordilleras respectivas.¹¹ Todos los sitios poblados en las punas alrededor del valle pertenecían a estas

doctrinas o a las doctrinas de los valles costeros al otro lado de la cordillera occidental en las provincias de Yauyos y Huarochirí ¹².

TABLA I: *Repartición de las tierras en Muquiyauyo en 1742*

Terrenos	Hectáreas	%
Tierras a indios y comunidad	329,5	47,1
Tierras de Cofradía	10,9	1,5
Isla (probablemente comunal)	125,0	17,9
Tierras privadas (españoles, mestizos, caciques, etc.)	234,6	33,5
Total	700,0	100,0

Fuente: Adams, *A Community in the Andes*, p.20.

Obtenemos una idea de la distribución de la tierra a mediados del siglo XVIII a través de las cifras que presenta Adams para la vice-parroquia Muquiyauyo perteneciente al curato de Huaripampa (Tab. I).¹³ Ilustran que alrededor de la mitad corresponde a la comunidad mientras que un quinto del total ya se puede atribuir a gente privada: españoles, mestizos, caciques, forasteros, etc. Con estas reparticiones, la Corona reconocía la costumbre indígena de usufructo común de la tierra, considerándose sucesora del Inca en cuanto al derecho de la propiedad. Correspondiendo a estas atribuciones, se podía fijar una tasa general de tributo generalizada. Se desconoce si había reglas fijas para la distribución y la extensión de los terrenos, pues en 1742 las 114 familias tributarias de Muquiyauyo recibían diez topos (alrededor de dos hectáreas), las cincuenta viudas y ancianos cinco topos y los setenta solteros y solteras cuatro topos cada uno.¹⁴ En una "razón presentada por el cacique alcalde y demás principales" del pueblo de San Martín de Chacas, Conchucos, en el norte de la Intendencia de Tarma, en 1798 se habla de la costumbre de recibir tres topos cada indio.¹⁵

Según las estimaciones, que una hectárea de tierra cultivable sería lo mínimo para asegurar la subsistencia de una familia "normal" (de cuatro a cinco personas), los indios tributarios en Muquiyauyo en esta época vivían relativamente bien en comparación con el caso mencionado para Chacas cincuenta años mas tarde.¹⁶ Las cifras sobre las tierras aparen-

temente privadas dan una idea de la situación de la gente calificada como "no-india" en el pueblo, que según una visita pastoral del año 1760 ascendía al número de ochenta y nueve.¹⁷ Indican que el promedio de tierra por persona era ya más grande (2,5 has.) que en el caso de las familias indias.

TABLA II: *Repartición de las tierras en Muquiyauyo en 1819*

Terrenos	Hectáreas	%
Tierras a indios y comunidad	109,1	15,6
Iglesia y Cofradía	36,4	5,2
Isla (probablemente comunal)	125,0	17,9
Tierras privadas (mestizos, españoles, etc.)	429,5	61,3
Total	700,0	100,0

Fuente: Adams, *A Community in the Andes*, p.21.

Al considerar las cifras que Adams presenta para el año 1819, se puede observar un reforzamiento más grande de esta tendencia (Tab. II).¹⁸ Sólo el 15 por ciento de la tierra perteneciente a la comunidad se atribuye a los indios, mientras que las tierras privadas aumentaron a más del 60 por ciento. Por falta de datos poblacionales del mismo año, es preciso recurrir a las cifras de 1835, que indican una población total de 1100 personas, de las cuales 722 son indios tributarios.¹⁹ El resto, que habrán sido aproximadamente 100 a 150 familias o unidades domésticas, se puede considerar como posible dueño de las 429,5 has. indicadas (Tab. II). Esto, si bien no significa un aumento en el promedio e la relación hombre - tierra comparado con 1742, indica una casi duplicación de la tierra privada a coste de las tierras comunales. Consecuentemente los indios se quejan, que sólo se les había atribuído tres topos de tierra en comparación con diez topos en 1742.²⁰

B. Transferencia de bienes: un ejemplo

Cómo se produjo esta transferencia de tierra? No es éste el lugar para referirme a los muchos intentos de resolver este problema - no siempre con resultados satisfactorios. Más bien quiero destacar el rol de

una institución que hasta el momento ha sido subelevatoria, también en relación al problema que aquí se trata: las cofradías. Esta institución, introducida por los españoles como instrumento de misión de los indios, fue aceptada por éstos y convertida, sobre todo en el primer tiempo de la época colonial, para servir a los indios a mantener sus patrones de vida en un régimen colonial. Esto también incluía el aprovisionamiento de las cofradías con bienes económicos en forma de tierras o ganado para financiar el culto religioso. Ahora bien, se sabe que aun hasta hoy en día el culto religioso de los indios contiene elementos pre-colombinos, y más los tenía en la época colonial. Habría que ver los rituales dentro del ciclo de reproducción, sobre todo de los indios-campesinos. Así, las cofradías ofrecían a los indios la posibilidad de reunirse bajo el pretexto de servir al culto católico sin el control inmediato del cura u otra autoridad, sirviendo a su propia reproducción, por ejemplo, durante las siembras y cosechas en las tierras cofradiales, donde se ofrecían comidas y bebidas durante las faenas, etc.²¹ Para los españoles no existían motivos de sospecha entonces, pues conocían este sistema de la situación en la península, donde las cofradías también poseían extensos terrenos y ganados. Pero pronto advirtieron, que las cofradías se habían convertido en un arma de resistencia y así también lo reconocieron los caciques, que veían una competencia política en la institución de los mayordomos de las cofradías elegidos "libremente." La reacción de la Iglesia, de limitar el número de cofradías a dos en cada pueblo, ya no podía frenar el proceso de proliferación de ellas, que se acentuó en el siglo XVIII. Volviendo al ejemplo de Muquiyauyo, constatamos que las cinco cofradías registradas en 1742 habían aumentado al menos al número de trece a fines de la Colonia. En este período se incorporaron entre ocho y diez pedazos de tierras al sistema cofradial y la extensión de sus tierras se había más que triplicado (Tabs. I y II).²²

La misma tendencia se observa para todo el valle, habiendo crecido el número de cofradías en las catorce doctrinas del partido de Jauja de sesenta y tres en 1750 a por lo menos ochenta y nueve en 1795; y todas tenían como mínimo un pedazo de tierra.²³ En el pueblo de Sicaya, por ejemplo, con 1923 habitantes en el año de 1792, la extensión de las tierras cofradiales llega al monto de 163 hectáreas en 1795.²⁴ Ya que no disponemos de datos comparables para la tierra comunal, como en el caso de Muquiyauyo, tenemos que contentarnos con una comparación en el sector de la ganadería. En el mismo pueblo, el mismo año el ganado lanar comunal era de 4250 cabezas, mientras que el de sólo cinco cofradías superaba esta cifra contando con 4325 animales.²⁵ Cuarenta y

cinco años antes había sido de sólo 1500 cabezas. Este fuerte aumento, sin embargo, no se repite en cada doctrina, como se verificará en la Tabla III. Al contrario, los totales del ganado tanto lanar como vacuno de 1750 a 1795 indican un ligero decrecimiento, cifras que sin embargo deben ser aceptadas con reserva, considerando la variación "natural" en el sector de la ganadería y el margen de errores relativamente alto en el censo del ganado.²⁶ Sin embargo, al comparar con el aumento del número absoluto de las cofradías, se intensifica la impresión de una creciente diferenciación también entre las cofradías.

TABLA III: *Bienes de ganado de las cofradías del Valle del Mantaro (14 doctrinas) en 1750 y 1795*

Doctrina	Lanar		Vacuno	
	1750	1795	1750	1795
Jauja	4200	3500	-	-
Apata	100	1070	70	-
La Concepción	400	1790	11	65
San Gerónimo				
de Tunán	6904	5794	12	95
Huancayo	2000	413	6	90
Sapallanga	6405	-	-	217
Chongos	-	-	60	224
Chupaca	4472	3082	135	210
Sicaya	1500	4325	36	-
Orcotuna	580	527	115	376
Mito	200	600	115	219
Sincos	320	430	186	198
Huari-pampa	-	-	-	-
Comas	-	-	1052	-
Totales	27161	21531	1798	1694

Fuente: Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, Cuadros No. 9 y 10, compilados por el autor.

Antes de profundizar esta constatación volveremos a la pregunta inicial sobre el rol de las cofradías en la disminución de los terrenos comunales y en la privatización de la tierra. Originalmente la Corona y la Iglesia asignaban un pedazo de tierra a cada cofradía para que con sus frutos pagara al cura por sus trabajos cúltricos, además de los utensilios como cera, aceite, paramentos, etc. Una vez establecidas, las

cofradías aprovechaban de rentas y donaciones por parte de los españoles y curacas ricos que vivían en la región, encargando por ejemplo misas después de la muerte del donador. Estas legaciones testamentarias, ya al partir del siglo XVII eran las principales fuentes de crecimiento económico de las cofradías.²⁷ La tierra legada por el curaca podía ser considerada como tierra que correspondía al "común de indios" por lo que se descontaba de los bienes comunales. Los mismos curas más bien ayudaron a convertir a la Iglesia en el mayor terrateniente en el Perú colonial, de manera que "procuran y dan orden cuando van a confesar a los Naturales enfermos a que hagan los testamentos entre ellos, y les dejen, y a las Iglesias y sus santos, sus haciendas, aunque tengan herederos forzosos, y con los indios ladinos, sacristanes, fiscales y otros criados que tienen en las Iglesias envían a hacer prevención, y que lo persuaden a ello..."²⁸

Entre los documentos sobre legaciones de indios, entre ellos también mujeres, sobresalen las que se limitan a ganado, del cual parecen sacar mayor provecho, pues no sólo sirve para financiar el culto al Santo, sino también las fiestas que lo acompañen, sea para corrida de toros, o simplemente para el convite de los cofrades.²⁹ Se puede suponer ya, que al aumentar el ganado de las cofradías, también si era donado por gente no-india, y al no alcanzar los pastos, éstos se extendían a costo de los pastos comunales.³⁰

C. Comunidad, hacienda y cofradía en la puna

Hasta ahora nos hemos referido a la distribución de tierras en el valle mismo. Los pastos de que hemos hecho mención, sin embargo, quedaban en las punas cordilleranas. Las cofradías seguían el mismo patrón de las doctrinas, practicando la combinación de agricultura en el valle con la ganadería en las punas. Pero éstas ya no pertenecían a los indios como antes, sino a hacendados españoles atraídos por las minas abundantes, así como a los caciques más famosos y ricos, sucesores del antiguo señorío huanca.

Estas haciendas y estancias, que se habían instalado aprovechando tanto el "vacío" dejado por la concentración forzosa de los indios en el valle en el curso de la fundación de las reducciones y doctrinas como asimismo el descenso de la población, formaban unidades independientes del valle, aunque oficialmente dependían de él. Tenían sus mayordomos e indios trabajando como pastores y arrieros, sus capillas y cofradías y autoridades políticas. Solamente el cura de la doctrina madre subía a

veces del valle para ejercer su oficio.

A fines de la Colonia el valle estaba no solamente ligado con el centro minero más grande del virreinato, sino también completamente rodeado por un sistema hostil de haciendas. En una visita a los pueblos adyacentes de la quebrada del Mantaro, en 1751, el corregidor de Huarochirí consta que "no tienen ellos por sí absolutamente ni pastos ni tierras de sembrar y para mantener sus mulas, vacas y ganado de Castilla menor los que tienen que ay algunos se valen de los pastos de sus amos los mineros que tienen en abajo de los cerros en quebradas cercanas a los asentos..."³¹ En 1813, finalmente, un observador saca un resumen de la situación: "...que hoy apenas disfrutan los pueblos una tercera parte de la suma total que aparece de lanas, y muy poco que conservan las cofradías, siendo lo demás de haciendas."³²

Se ha escrito mucho sobre los levantamientos como consecuencia o resultado de esta situación. Menos frecuentemente se ha tratado los pleitos y otras luchas por la recuperación de los recursos. Durante todo el siglo XVIII se constata que entre las comunidades del valle, principalmente Mito, Orcotuna y Sicaya, y las de la vertiente oceánica de la cordillera, como Laraos (Yauyos) y Huañec (Huarochirí), hubo conflictos con respecto a los pastos en las punas que dividen las dos regiones. De estas confrontaciones aprovechan los hacendados situados en el intermedio, pactando alternadamente con los partidos según sus conveniencias. En la primera mitad del siglo arrendaban muchos terrenos de las comunidades, lo que hacia fines del siglo aparentemente ya no fue necesario por haber conseguido entretanto títulos de propiedad.³³ En los pleitos se enfrentan de manera alternada comunes de indios entre sí, indios y españoles contra indios y caciques, curas, defendiendo los pastos de cofradías y comunidades, contra los españoles, etc.³⁴

En su famoso artículo sobre la evolución de las comunidades indígenas en la sierra central, Arguedas describe la "integración pacífica de las castas y culturas en el valle del Mantaro."³⁵ Lo explica por la ausencia del latifundio que las diferencia radicalmente de las comunidades indígenas del sur, donde existían sino dos fuerzas casi nítidamente enfrentadas: la comunidad y el hacendado.³⁶

Si bien el valle del Mantaro representa un desarrollo excepcional comparado con otros valles interandinos, no es por la ausencia, sino más bien, me parece, por el enfrentamiento acumulado de tal vez más instituciones que en ninguna otra región de los Andes. La amalgama tan armónica entre indios y españoles que el autor nos describe, nos merece serias dudas. Más bien se podría pintar una imagen de los indios ame-

nazados y diezmados tanto por los mestizos del valle como por los españoles de la puna, o como constata el cura de Mito en 1745: "...se hayan de ausentar y desamparar su pueblo respecto de hallarse sin pastos en donde apacentar sus ganados mayores..."³⁷ A fines del siglo XVIII, la razón entre indios y mestizos en el valle era casi igual y la distinción entre las dos "castas" muy arbitraria.³⁸

III. Diferenciación intracomunal e intraregional

Lo que se ha expresado geográficamente también se puede proyectar a la situación dentro del pueblo. Ya se ha mencionado brevemente la diferenciación creciente y ésta también se refleja en el espectro de las cofradías, que se pueden dividir según la cantidad de sus bienes en cofradías ricas, medianas y pobres.³⁹ Las diferencias se pueden estimar tanto al considerar los bienes en tierras como en ganado.⁴⁰ En las visitas frecuentemente se hace constar cofradías "sin bienes ni venta alguna." Incluso antiguas cofradías como la del Santísimo Sacramento de Sincos se hallan "en muy crecida decadencia," otras como la de Carmen de Jauja se revitalizan por nuevas legaciones, incluyendo una casa, tienda y solar en la esquina de la plaza central.⁴¹

Al evaluar la "jerarquía" dentro de las advocaciones, sin embargo, sobresalen la de Nuestro Amo (Santísimo Sacramento) y la de las Benditas Animas (cofradías de entierro) tanto por sus bienes de tierra como de ganado.⁴² Estas son las más antiguas y generalmente reconocen el principio de la multiétnicidad de sus miembros. Le siguen el gran número de cofradías medianas caracterizadas según la ocupación de sus miembros, ya sea a manera de gremios artesanales o, por ejemplo, cofradías de los indios pastores, etc. Por más que la estructura precolombina hubiera cambiado, se puede constatar que las cofradías o las asociaciones (hermandades, sociedades) en general reflejan la diferenciación socio-económica en las comunidades.

Se conoce bastante bien el rol de los curas, corregidores y caciques, que, aunque de uno u otro modo pueden ser considerados "personas extracomunales," interfieren fuertemente en la vida comunitaria. Sin embargo, los últimos tienen una posición extraordinaria en toda la historia de la región. La razón para ello debe buscarse en los eventos relacionados con la conquista española. Desde los inicios de la Colonia, los curacas huanca aprovecharon de sus privilegios de poder poseer tierra privada (aparentemente por la ayuda a los españoles durante la conquista), para convertirse en los terratenientes más grandes de la región a

finés de la Colonia.⁴³ La dinastía Astocuri Apoalaya tenía sus tierras concentradas en el suroeste de la región, incluyendo las haciendas de Laive e Ingahuasi. También dominaban las cofradías más ricas de Chupaca y Sicaya, pueblos de su residencia, como principales arrendatarios de sus manadas y a veces también como mayordomos, manipulando la administración de ellas. En sus métodos para burlarse de las autoridades españolas podían contar con la solidaridad étnica de los indios financiándoles fiestas pomposas.⁴⁴ Como "recompensa" escondían por muchos años a numerosos tributarios aprovechando de sus tributos.⁴⁵

Los Apoalaya también donaban terrenos a la cofradía prestigiosa del Carmen de Jauja y hacían trabajar a sus indios en el levantamiento de un beaterio para pobres que mantenía esta cofradía.⁴⁶ Esto no sólo da cuenta del afán de los indios nobles de hacer méritos para ser aceptados por la sociedad colonial, sino también de la transferencia regional de bienes y valores. Si bien Jauja no era un gran centro urbano ni menos el centro comercial de valle, allí residían algunos hacendados españoles.⁴⁷

Entre los "pueblos ricos" fuera de Jauja, hay que mencionar San Gerónimo de Tunan, Sicaya y Chupaca como "capitales" de repartimiento que figuran con la mayor cantidad de bienes de cofradías, añadiendo el pueblo de Sapallanga que albergaba un obraje importante.⁴⁸ Estos pueblos también tenían un alto porcentaje de mestizos en 1795.

IV. Polivalencia de ocupación y comercialización en las comunidades

A. La combinación agricultura - minería

Hasta aquí nos hemos concentrado más en los factores internos que influenciaban el desarrollo de la sociedad rural. Al hablar de la diferenciación intraregional, surge la pregunta respecto a los impactos provenientes de los centros fuera de valle. Tarma, la nueva capital después de la creación de la intendencia en 1784, al igual que Jauja carecía de dinámica económica. Esta provenía de dos lugares que políticamente permanecían siendo pueblos: Huancayo y Cerro de Pasco.

Del último y de su gran auge a fines del siglo XVIII ya se ha hablado en la introducción. En las minas del partido de Cerro de Pasco, sobre todo naturalmente en el Cerro mismo, trabajaban en 1799 unos 2470 operarios.⁴⁹ En las de Huarochirí trabajaban 920, en Yauyos 56 y en Castrovirreina (Huancavelica) 231 personas. Todas estas regiones mineras eran vecinas del valle de Jauja. Vale decir, que la región concentraba casi la mitad de todos los trabajadores mineros del virreinato de

entonces. No se sabe cuántos de ellos venían del valle del Mantaro o vivían allí. La mita, aunque recién abolida definitivamente en 1812, ya no se aplicaba en esta época, fuera de algunos reclutamientos forzosos de una cantidad de indios, que se efectuaban en forma rotativa para el "socorro" en las minas, como sucedió por orden del virrey Gil en 1793.⁵⁰

Fisher describe la situación de los mineros dueños de las minas de la siguiente manera: "A pesar de que algunos amasaron fortunas como consecuencia de haber descubierto ricos filones de plata, la mayoría operaba a niveles marginales, con capital insuficiente, y gozaba de una cierta reputación de despilfarrar cuanto dinero ganaba en fiestas o apuestas."⁵¹ En cuanto al capital, dependían de los créditos de comerciantes de Lima o, a fines del siglo, también locales, sin que ésto hubiera llevado a un mejoramiento decisivo de la tecnología minera primitiva.⁵² Si, pese al fracaso de los intentos extranjeros de aportar mejoras tecnológicas (por ejemplo por la "Misión Nordenflicht"), se producía un aumento de producción argentífera, ésto "fue posible gracias a la mejora en el suministro de azogue, sobre todo a partir de 1784."⁵³ Aparentemente los capitalistas de la época se dieron cuenta, que el auge de las minas en la sierra central era sólo un fuego fatuo, que animaba a algunos aventureros; ellos mismos parecen haber estado conscientes, que lo único seguro y continuo en la minería era el interés de la Corona española en obtener el máximo provecho de los productos, que ellos hacían extraer a los indios.

Mientras que los relatos contemporáneos destacan las costumbres de los indios de Pasco de gastar el dinero en borracheras – correspondiendo en ésto a la imagen que se tiene de los mineros (por supuesto, cada grupo a su propia manera) – las indicaciones sobre sus condiciones de vida y su paga son escasas y a veces contradictorias. Sin discutir aquí los datos en detalle, me parece que la queja de los dueños de minas sobre la falta de mano de obra se refiere ante todo al trabajo de los mitayos, a los cuales se recompensaba solamente con pobres víveres que apenas bastaban para su alimentación.⁵⁴ La tecnología típica utilizada aparentemente desde 200 años no había cambiado mucho. Los socavones fueron descritos por viajeros ingleses como *rat-holes* (ratoneras) que carecían de ventilación y de medidas preventivas para la seguridad de los operarios:⁵⁵ Así "se perdieron trescientas vidas en Cerro de Pasco cuando cedió la mina que pasó a ser llamada Matagente."⁵⁶

Las informaciones que presentamos sobre el valle de Jauja indican

que había mano de obra disponible para ser atraída por centros de trabajo que pagaban lo suficiente para el mantenimiento de ellos y de sus familias, sin tener que recurrir a los recursos de la agricultura. Sin embargo, ésto era un caso rarísimo. La relación con la tierra seguía siendo el elemento más estable para garantizarle al indio su subsistencia. Por ello, si era necesario obtener ingresos mediante actividades fuera de la agricultura, convenía llevar los recursos alimenticios móviles (animales) al lugar de trabajo o no dilatar demasiado el tiempo de la separación. Los hacendados y mineros se aprovechaban de esta situación, arrendándoles sus pastos y endeudándoles para así contar con mano de obra permanente.⁵⁷ En los otros casos, al no lograr arrendar tierras contiguas al lugar de trabajo – lo que era raro también – había que organizar el trabajo de tal manera, como para obtener un máximo de ganancia en un mínimo de tiempo y así no perder el derecho como miembro de la comunidad de origen. En esta época comienza la incorporación, a escala amplia, del trabajo asalariado de minas en el ciclo de vida, una característica del sistema de reproducción de los campesinos de la región que perdura hasta hoy día.

Sin embargo, es difícil hacer cálculos exactos del porcentaje de gente que practicaba la combinación agricultura – minería. De los documentos que examinamos de los pueblos en la quebrada del Mantaro (doctrina de Yauli, sitio llamado también Nuevo Potosí), se puede deducir, que casi el total de la población estaba involucrada en trabajos relacionados con la minería o en las haciendas que los rodeaban.⁵⁸ Para el valle del Mantaro mismo, la situación es distinta. Aunque la población es mayor, con un porcentaje considerable de gente sin – o solamente con poca – tierra (indios forasteros, mestizos), dudo que hubiera una gran disposición entre ellos para trabajar como operarios en centros mineros como Cerro de Pasco bajo las condiciones descritas. Era ya demasiado lejos del valle, considerando que en las cordilleras colindantes con los pastos comunales había pequeñas minas que ofrecían la ventaja de practicar la combinación minera – pecuaria que más arriba se caracterizaba. Tampoco creo que al valle de Jauja se pueda aplicar la aseveración de Fisher, que Cerro de Pasco haya ejercido una atracción para los jóvenes de los partidos circundantes por la posibilidad de festejos y borracheras en los fines de semana, pues esta posibilidad también se ofrecía con mucha frecuencia en los pueblos del valle, como atestiguan los calendarios de fiestas de las cofradías.⁵⁹

B. Fiestas, mercados y comercio

Lo que se consumía en tales fiestas constituye un factor económico bastante importante y muchas veces desconsiderado en los análisis económicos. El Intendente de Tarma, en la relación de su visita hecha en 1786, destaca el consumo de tres mil botijas de aguardiente al año, sólo en el mineral de Cerro de Pasco, siendo "dicho licor uno de los más pingües ramos de comercio que se hace ya de la ciudad de Lima y de la de Ica, llegando al extremo de advertirse muchos que con solo sus utilidades han llegado a reportar riquezas considerables."⁶⁰ El Intendente se enorgullece de haber ordenado la reducción de las fiestas tanto en los "minerales" como en los pueblos a dos por año.⁶¹ De igual manera mandaba reducir "las frecuentes corridas de toros, que se tenían todos los años en cada Pueblo del Partido" a cuatro o cinco cada año, las que habría que organizar en Jauja "costeadas por un asentista que la dirige por el lucro de lo que ganase en la mucha concurrencia que tendrá..."⁶² Del dinero ganado en estos festejos exigía crear un fondo para el financiamiento de las obras y servicios públicos que faltaban en Jauja, "pues oy se mira en un estado diametralmente opuesto al que tenía antes, assi por el aseo de sus calles, como por la extructura de las casas..."⁶³

Esta cita bastará para ilustrar la decadencia visible de esta villa. Paulatinamente, Jauja era sustituido como polo de actividad por un pueblo al otro extremo del valle, Huancayo. Este pueblo, en la década de 1730, aparentemente ya tenía una "enorme importancia comercial", organizando grandes ferias.⁶⁴ No se sabe cuándo comenzó a adquirir esta importancia que conserva hasta ahora, pero considerando la concentración poblacional en este rincón del valle (Huancayo, Chongos, Chupaca, Sicaya, Comas, Cochangara), hay que admitir que en 1792 es más de la mitad del partido de Jauja. ¿Cómo puede haber crecido un tal centro comercial en plena zona rural con presumible agricultura de subsistencia?

Al evaluar todas las indicaciones sobre la economía agropecuaria de la región, ya no se puede hablar de subsistencia sin considerar el factor del mercado. La comercialización no sólo dominaba a macro - nivel, sino también en la micro - economía. Según la relación de Gálvez, el partido de Jauja mantenía un comercio considerable con Lima hacia donde se despachaban anualmente 40000 cabezas de ganado lanar, 2000 cerdos "fuera de mucha porción de huebos, manteca y jamones."⁶⁵ A Pasco y Yauli se mandaban granos, harina y semillas. La forma en que se organizó tal comercio está descrita por el mismo autor tratando del

partido vecino de Tarma; relata que "los mineros y hacendados de pan llevar celebran mutuamente sus respectivos contratos, los unos para asegurar el expandio de sus cosechas y los otros para que no les falte en sus yngenios tan preciso socorro..."⁶⁶ No se sabe exactamente de qué manera los hacendados comercializaban la lana de sus ganados, pero parece que al menos una parte se vendía y trabajaba también en el valle.⁶⁷

Las cofradías comercializaban todos sus bienes agropecuarios, cobrando rentas o vendiendo productos ellos mismos. No se sabe lo que hacían con la carne de los 400 a 500 toros que se mataban anualmente en las corridas de sus fiestas.⁶⁸

A pesar de que con la eliminación de los corregidores y el sistema de repartos forzosos de mercaderías se "había anulado una de las pocas instituciones a través de las cuales se obliga a los indios a buscar trabajo asalariado," para los indios, por muchas razones, seguía siendo de vital importancia tener dinero en efectivo.⁶⁹ Entre ellas podemos citar las siguientes:

Primero, lo necesitaban, como dice Gálvez sobre los de Tarma, "para el pago de sus obenciones parroquiales y demás dependencias que contraen."⁷⁰ Pues la situación en 1786 no había variado mucho en comparación con la de 1760, cuando el cacique de Pachachaca lamenta que eran "presionados de curas, corregidores, diezmeros, cobradores más de lo lícito en ganado como primicieros..."⁷¹.

Segundo, se puede suponer que ya no producían todo lo que necesitaban para su uso diario, tanto en alimentos como en otros utensilios de su habitat. Esto vale naturalmente aún con mayor razón para los mestizos. Junto con la reducción de la tierra comunal, también se reducían los cultivos y la necesidad imperiosa de obtener dinero los llevaba a restringir el sembrío de los cultivos tradicionales como la oca, el olluco, la quinoa, para sembrar plantas "comerciables." Estas eran las que también aparecían en las listas de los cultivos de las cofradías: trigo, maíz y alfalfa, y de ellas sólo el maíz es una planta autóctona. La alfalfa era comprada por los tantos arrieros y comerciantes de mulas, el trigo se usaba para hacer pan. Otros productos, como las distintas especies de papas y hortalizas, se vendían a los no - agricultores de la comunidad.

A pesar de esta orientación hacia la comercialización, no se practicaba la irrigación, al menos no en gran escala, por lo que el Intendente ocupa mucho espacio en su relación para argumentar sobre la necesidad de construir un canal de irrigación, "que sin duda doblará la porción de cosechas."⁷² En Muquiyauyo hubo que esperar hasta 1846 para poder

contar con una red de riego.⁷³ Por otra parte, a más tardar en la década de 1780, se utilizó el arado de hierro arrastrado por bueyes, lo que debería haber aumentado la productividad de la tierra.⁷⁴ Se puede decir, de cierto modo, que el grado de comercialización correspondía también al sistema cambiado de tenencia de tierra y a la manera de cooperación agropecuaria correspondiente.

Un capítulo del catálogo de actividades económicas de los indios, mencionado frecuentemente, es el arrieraje. Este, al tener relación con la minería, por razones obvias se concentraba más en los pueblos vecinos de las minas, o sea, la quebrada del valle y la meseta de Junín. En cambio los arrieros de productos se distribuían por toda la región. Arellano, en su análisis de la relación del Intendente de Tarma, sólo ha encontrado evidencias para el arrieraje con productos comerciales a nivel regional e interprovincial, por ejemplo de tejedores o agricultores, o sea, productos de gran escala. Sin embargo supone, que también existía el personaje mercader - productor, indio o mestizo, que operaba a nivel intraregional, como por ejemplo en el valle de Jauja.⁷⁵

Todas estas actividades deben ser vistas dentro de una estrategia de reproducción, en una situación, en la que para muchos miembros de las comunidades la subsistencia basada en un solo tipo de ocupación y de ingreso familiar ya no estaba asegurada. Dentro de esta estrategia, el trabajo en las minas aparentemente se consideraba en último lugar, cuando las demás actividades como comerciante, artesano, arriero, tendero, chichero, etc., ya no prometían el resultado esperado.

V. Conclusiones

Más que en el tratamiento de otros sectores económicos, en el análisis del desarrollo del sector agrario es preciso indicar el punto de vista al hacer juicios generales.

Así, por ejemplo, al hablar de una crisis agrícola en el Perú a fines del siglo XVIII, se podría distinguir, además de la diferenciación regional, al menos entre tres niveles: la extracción de bienes agrícolas por la Corona española, el abastecimiento de la población no agraria y finalmente la subsistencia de los productores agrarios mismos. Es evidente que los tres niveles están interrelacionados, por ejemplo, por el sistema de tributos y del mercado. Sin embargo, al aplicar las "leyes de mercado," puede presentarse la situación, que la crisis en un nivel - por ejemplo por el escaso abastecimiento de la población urbana - signifique prosperidad para el otro al beneficiarse de los altos precios por sus

productos. De igual manera se podría suponer el caso, que la alta tributación por parte del estado colonial desanimara a los productores para abastecer al mercado urbano.

En este trabajo se ha enfocado principalmente el nivel de los productores inmediatos. He preferido no hablar de una crisis general, pues los datos disponibles indican más bien, que en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII al menos no se puede hablar de una productividad agrícola fuertemente decreciente en esta región. Un caso parecido se ha descrito para la ciudad de Lima y sus valles circundantes.⁷⁶ Como hemos visto más arriba, estas dos regiones estaban ligadas económicamente, no sólo por la minería, sino también por los productos agrícolas provenientes de esta región que llegaban a Lima.

Sin embargo, el grupo de productores que principalmente usufructuaba de este comercio interregional, eran, ante todo, los grandes propietarios. Los pequeños agricultores, por razones de rentabilidad, estaban obligados a limitarse al mercado vecino. También aquí se presenta un paralelo con el valle de Lima.⁷⁷ Febres indica como causas de la crisis agrícola, entre otras, el latifundio, las bajas rentas de la tierra y la mentalidad indígena.⁷⁸ Aquí se hace evidente cuan problemático es tratar de dos grupos diferentes de productores sin analizar su situación específica y sus intereses. Es posible que los latifundistas, al orientarse hacia el mercado tanto regional como suprarregional, no se sintieran motivados para invertir a escala tal como para hablar de una explosión del sector agrícola. También es probable, especialmente en el caso de los grandes terratenientes de la nobleza india del valle del Mantaro, que sus intereses no coincidieran con los patrones económicos de la sociedad urbana.

De igual modo, los intereses de los pequeños productores indígenas no consistían originalmente en lo que Febres en estilo etnocéntrico ha caracterizado como "los adelantos de una civilización superior."⁷⁹ El cereal panificable, el arado de hierro, la rueda y el caballo. Viendo que estos elementos estaban vinculados con el sistema de dominación y extracción de la sociedad colonial, preferían el sistema de producción que les garantizaba su propia reproducción, es decir, la manera autóctona de explotar la tierra.

Sin embargo, justamente en este sistema se producían cambios en la época que aquí tratamos, es decir la tierra como base de la reproducción se hacía más y más escasa. Hasta cierto punto, para decirlo así, se podría hablar de una crisis no agrícola, sino de reproducción. Una medida contra esta crisis, además de la lucha violenta y jurídica por la

tierra, fue el aumento de la productividad y la diversificación de actividades económicas. Esta estrategia de los campesinos indígenas fue compartida con los mestizos, que constituían gran parte de la población que aparentemente ya había pasado el punto máximo de crecimiento antes de las décadas finales del siglo XVIII. Es así como las comunidades aprovecharon el auge de las actividades mineras en la región a fines de la Colonia antes de afrontar los conflictos que se presentarían en las primeras décadas de la república.

NOTAS

- Agradezco a los participantes del simposio sobre "Historia económica de México y Perú a fines de la época colonial", Bielefeld 1982, en especial a Friedrich Katz y a Nils Jacobsen por sus comentarios valiosos así como a Harriet Beutling por la corrección del español. Sin embargo, cualquier posible error queda de responsabilidad exclusiva del autor.
- 1. John Fisher, *Minas y mineros en el Perú colonial, 1776 - 1824* (Lima, 1977), p.241.
- 2. Oscar Febres, "La crisis agrícola del Perú en el último tercio del siglo XVIII," *RH*, 27(1964), 102 - 199. Comp. recientemente Marcel Haitin, "Prices, the Lima Market, and the Agricultural Crisis of the Late Eighteenth Century in Peru, Ms (Berkeley, 1982).
- 3. Los datos que a continuación se presentan provienen en su mayoría de un proyecto sobre el rol de las cofradías en la sociedad peruana, en el cual, al menos inicialmente, las preguntas de historia económica estaban en el centro del interés. Además, por razones de cooperación con otros proyectos, su enfoque regional al principio se limitaba al territorio de la actual "Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social Túpac Amaru", cooperativa creada con la Reforma Agraria de 1969, que comprendió la zona del anterior complejo de haciendas de la Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation así como las comunidades colindantes. Sin embargo, en el transcurso del proyecto se fue considerando la documentación sobre los curatos del valle del Mantaro entero, de los cuales, de una u otra manera, dependían algunos lugares de la zona núcleo de investigación. Se agradece a Olinda Celestino, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, su colaboración en este proyecto y a la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Bonn, por su apoyo financiero entre los años 1976 y 1979.
- 4. George Kubler, "The Quechua in the Colonial World," en Julian Steward, ed., *Handbook of South American Indians*, 6 tomos (Washington, 1947, reprint ed. New York, 1963), II, 338, Tabla 2. Günther Vollmer, *Bevölkerungspolitik und Bevölkerungsstruktur im Vizekönigreich Peru zu Ende der Kolonialzeit, 1741 - 1828* (Bad Homburg, 1967), p.256.
- 5. Descripción de todos los pueblos del Virreinato del Perú, sin fecha exacta, AGI, Indiferente General, 1528.

6. Kubler, "The Quechua in the Colonial World," en Steward, *Handbook*, II, 338, Tabla 2.
7. Expediente de la preparatoria de Elecciones en Virtud de la Real Cédula de 23 de mayo del año de 1812..., 1813, AGI, Indiferente General, 1524.
8. Richard Adams, *A Community in the Andes. Problems and Progress in Muquiyauyo*, (Seattle, 1959), p.12. Olinda Celestino, *La economía pastoral de las cofradías y el rol de la nobleza india: el valle del Mantaro en el siglo XVIII*, Universität Bielefeld, Centro de Investigaciones sobre América Latina, Documentos de Trabajo No. 25 (Bielefeld, 1981), pp.11 - 12.
9. Adams, *A Community in the Andes*, p.18.
10. Sobre decir, que la línea superior del sembrío ha cambiado durante la historia según los cambios climáticos y también según las necesidades de la población de sembrar en niveles más altos donde el peligro de perder los productos por las "heladas" era más grande que en las tierras bajas.
11. John V. Murra, "El 'control vertical' de un máximo de pisos ecológicos en la economía de las sociedades andinas," in John V. Murra, ed., *Visita de la provincia de León de Huánuco*, 2 tomos, (Huánuco, 1972), II, 427 - 476. Olinda Celestino y Albert Meyers, *Las cofradías en el Perú: región central*, (Frankfurt, 1981).
12. Las únicas doctrinas fundadas en regiones altas fueron la de Yauli en la zona minera y las de la Pampa de Junín.
13. Adams, *A Community in the Andes*, pp.16 - 20. Las cifras provienen de una repartición de tierras hecha en 1742 por Pedro de Valenzuela y Ríos, un representante del Juzgado de Remensura, Venta y Composición de Tierras de la Audiencia de Lima creado a principios del siglo XVIII; comprenden solamente las tierras en el valle.
14. *Ibid.*, p.17.
15. Autos que promovieron administrativamente y por orden del Superior Gobierno... 1796 - 1802, Foja 41, AGN(P), Derecho Indígena y Encomiendas, Leg. 20, Cuaderno 513.
16. Estimaciones a base del trabajo de campo en la región.
17. Causas de Visitas, Leg. 4, Exp. 55, Autos de Visita de la Doctrina de Huari-pampa... 1760, AAL.
18. Adams, *A Community in the Andes*, p.21.
19. *Ibid.*, p.13.
20. *Ibid.*, p.19.
21. Comp. p.e. Albert Meyers, *Expansión del capitalismo, estrategias de reproducción y estratificación social en el campesinado: dos casos del Valle del Mantaro, Perú*, Universität Bielefeld, Centro de Investigaciones sobre América Latina, Documentos de Trabajo No. 26 (Bielefeld, 1982), pp.11ss.
22. Adams, *A Community in the Andes*, p.56.
23. Olinda Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p.33, Cuadro 11; En Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, Apéndice, Cuadro 27, presentamos sólo las 89 cofradías con indicación de propiedad de tierra. Sin embargo, por la enumeración en las visitas pastorales de cofradías sin bienes, se puede deducir que el número era mucho mayor que 89 y 95, cifra que indica Celestino, *ibid.*
24. Meyers, *Expansión del capitalismo*, Cuadro 3, p.17. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p.11, Cuadro 4.
25. *Ibid.*, p.29.

26. Así se puede decir con cierta seguridad que en el censo de 1795, hecho a nivel de toda la Intendencia, se ocultaron grandes cantidades de bienes de las cofradías por evitar futuros reclamos.
27. Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, pp.136ss.
28. Jean Piel, *Capitalisme agraire au Pérou*, (Paris, 1975), p.236; Documento de 1779 citado por Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, p.156. Compárese también la constatación para Huaripampa, doctrina madre de Muquiyauyo, que "las dichas cofradías todas o las mas tierras de sembradío que forman parte de sus fundaciones son legados hechos por indios de aquellas adjudicaciones que disfrutaban por su clase y cuya pertenencia es propia de la corona así se hallaban desnudas de títulos de justa adquisición...", 1797, AGN(P), Derecho Indígena y Encomiendas, Leg. 20, Cuaderno 513, f.61.
29. En un pleito sobre pastos, la doctrina de Orcotuna menciona a un indio que fue atacado en la puna por un español. El indio había sido "enviado por el común de indios de este pueblo a traer un toro para la fiesta de nuestro amo..." Autos que siguió don Domingo de Cordoba Huacrapauca, Cacique principal del repartimiento de Luriganca..., 1745, AGN(P), Derecho Indígena y Encomiendas, Leg. 11, Cuaderno 270, f.89.
30. Entre los muchos ejemplos de usurpación de los terrenos o bienes en general de los indios a manera de privatización, se menciona un caso en la doctrina de Yauli, donde el visitador eclesiástico se queja de haber encontrado documentos de varias legaciones de más de mil cabezas de ganado; "fundada una cofradía puede tener la dicha Iglesia el alivio del costo del aseyte y censos necesarios a que alcanzan sus frutos..." Autos de la visita de la doctrina de Yauli, s/f. (1760), AAL, Causas de Visitas, Leg. 1, Exp. 28.
31. AGN(P), Derecho Indígena y Encomiendas, Leg. 12, Cuaderno 283, s.f. (1751).
32. Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, p.171.
33. En los documentos abundan las quejas sobre actos violentos por parte de los españoles o sus mayordomos contra los indios en la puna.
34. Para mayores detalles, ver Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, pp.165 - 176.
35. José Maria Arguedas, "Evolución de las comunidades indígenas. El Valle del Mantaro y la ciudad de Huancayo: un caso de fusión de culturas no comprometida por la acción de las instituciones de origen colonial," en José M. Arguedas, *Formación de una cultura nacional indo - americana*, (México, 1975 [1957]), p.87.
36. Ibid., p.93.
37. AGN(P), Documento citado en nota 30, f.88.
38. Comp. Vollmer, *Bevölkerungspolitik und Bevölkerungsstruktur*, p.256.
39. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p.59; distinción hecha a base de los tributos que pagaban para el seminario del Arzobispado de Lima (5 por ciento del total de la renta anual).
40. Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, Apéndice, Cuadro 27: Tierras de cofradías en 1795; Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, pp. 30 - 31, Cuadros 9 y 10.
41. Causa de la Cofradía del Santísimo de Sinos, s/f.(1760), AAL, Sección Cofradías, Leg. 63; Se queja sobre la mala administración de los mayordomos; Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías*, pp.172 - 173.
42. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, pp.39 - 40, Cuadros 15 y 16.

43. Waldemar Espinoza, *Enciclopedia departamental de Junín*, (Huancayo, 1973), I, 230.
44. Para mayores detalles sobre los bienes de los curacas en el valle del Mantaro, véase Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, pp. 15 - 28.
45. El Maestro Fr. Juan de Cuesuraga Zugasti, del Orden de Predicadores..., 1727, AGI, Audiencia de Lima, 488.
46. Olinda Celestino y Albert Meyers, "La dinámica socioeconómica del patrimonio cofradial en el Perú colonial: Jauja en el siglo XVIII," *REAA*, XI (1981), pp. 183 - 206.
47. Espinoza, *Enciclopedia*, p. 231.
48. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p. 36, Cuadro 13.
49. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, pp. 196 - 197, Cuadro 10.
50. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p. 188. "Un primer contingente de cuarenta y cinco hombres llegó de Jauja en junio de 1798 para comenzar un turno de trabajo que debía durar tres meses... Al parecer, algunos desertaron para trabajar por más dinero en otros establecimientos de Cerro de Pasco en condición de operarios libres." *Ibid.*, p. 191.
51. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p. 37.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 37 y *passim*.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
54. Véase Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, cap. 6; Comp. como ejemplo: Autos que siguieron los cabildos y comunidades de la doctrina de Yauli (1752), f. 7: "...averse de agregar a los ingenios de la circunferencia para poder adquirir a costa de inmenso trabajo lo que ni aun es competente para su diaria manutención," AGN(P), Derecho Indígena y Encomiendas, Leg. 12, Cuaderno 288. Referente a la mita en la mina de azogues de Huancavelica, ya desde la mitad del siglo los indios preferían pagar una compensación monetaria; comp. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p. 186, Cuadro 8.
55. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p. 41.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 41 - 42.
57. "Algunos se valen de los pastos de sus amos los mineros." Autos que se tomaron con ocasión de la revisita... de la Doctrina de de Yauli, s/f. (1751), AGN(P), Derecho Indígena y Encomiendas, Leg. 12, Cuaderno 283.
58. Comp. también Celestino y Meyers, *Las cofradías* pp. 163 ss.
59. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p. 195.
60. Informe del Intendente de Tarma don Juan María de Gálvez sobre la visita realizada en la Intendencia de su jurisdicción, 1786, AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Legajo 646, f. 3 v, citado según la transcripción de Carmen Arellano, "Notas sobre el indígena en la Intendencia de Tarma. Una evaluación de la visita de 1786," (Tesis de maestro en Antropología, Bonn, 1981), anexo documental. Gálvez presenta una cantidad de datos importantes aunque generales sobre la situación del indio en esta época, tratando partido por partido, los cuales fueron considerados por Carmen Arellano e interpretados en su tesis de maestro de 1981. Agradezco a la autora por haberme proporcionado un ejemplar. Gálvez había hecho el año anterior una visita al partido de Jauja, cuya relación se conserva en el AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Leg. 763. El informe de 1786 contiene una versión algo modificada y resumida de esta relación. En lo siguiente se citarán los dos informes como Gálvez, Visita de Tarma (1786) y Visita de Jauja (1785). Para la evaluación de una documentación comparable

- del mismo año del sur de Perú, véase Magnus Mörner, "Some Characteristics of Agrarian Structure in the Cuzco Region Towards the End of the Colonial Period," *BELC*, 18(1975), 15 - 29.
61. Gálvez, *Visita de Tarma (1786)*, fs. 4 y 44 - 45.
 62. Gálvez, *Visita de Jauja (1785)*, fs. 7 y 7v.
 63. *Ibid.*, f.8.
 64. Espinoza, *Enciclopedia*, p.225.
 65. Gálvez, *Visita de Tarma (1786)*, fs.26v y 27; Cf. también Mariano Millan de Aguirre, "Descripción de la intendencia de Tarma," *MP*, Tomo VIII, Nos. 258 - 120(1793), 136 - 137. La descripción de Millan en gran parte parece ser una mera copia del informe de Gálvez.
 66. Gálvez, *Visita de Tarma (1786)*, f.5v.
 67. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p.65.
 68. Gálvez, *Visita de Jauja (1785)*, f.7v.
 69. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p.182.
 70. Gálvez, *Visita de Tarma (1786)*, f.5v.
 71. Autos de la Visita de la Doctrina de Yauli, s/f.(1760). Entre las obligaciones por supuesto hay que agregar las causadas por el sistema del reparto de efectos; AAL, Sección Visitas, Leg. 1, Exp. 28.
 72. Gálvez, *Visita de Jauja (1785)*, f.4v.
 73. Marcelo Grondín, *Comunidad andina: explotación calculada. Un estudio sobre la organización comunal de Muquiyauyo, Perú*, (Santo Domingo, 1978), p.70.
 74. *Ibid.*; Grondín se basa en Carlos Samaniego, "Location, Social Differentiation and Peasant Movements in the Central Sierra of Peru," (Tesis doctoral, Manchester, 1974), pp.84 - 85, quien dice que el arado con reja de hierro fue introducido por el "reparto de efectos" y que la introducción del arado arrastrado por bueyes causó un cambio en la estructura del ayllu. Sin embargo se carece de datos exactos tanto sobre la fecha de la introducción como sobre su evolución tecnológica. Parece que no fue una mera copia del arado europeo, pues, por ejemplo, en la "Descripción geográfica de la ciudad y partido de Truxillo" por Joseph Ignacio de Lequenda, *MP*, VIII: 247 - 254 (1793), p.91 se habla de un arado "que aunque no es semejante en figura al que usan los labradores de la península, obra en igualdad."
 75. Arellano, "Notas sobre el indígena," pp.75 ss.
 76. Haitin, "Prices, the Lima Market."
 77. *Ibid.*, p.8.
 78. Febres, "La crisis agrícola," *passim*.
 79. *Ibid.*, p.157.

5. LIVESTOCK COMPLEXES IN LATE COLONIAL PERU AND NEW SPAIN: AN ATTEMPT AT COMPARISON

Nils Jacobsen

In 1817 the Secretary of the Consulado of Veracruz, José Maria Quirós, presented his crude yet novel attempt to calculate the annual value of New Spain's production and services, or in modern terminology the viceroyalty's GNP, for the last years before the outbreak of the Wars of Independence. It is an impressive testimony to the great economic significance of livestock raising during that period. Quirós estimated the value of cattle marketed annually to equal the value of both maize and wheat production. Hogs, so tells us the author, contributed as much to Mexico's GNP as the domestic consumption of sugar and associated products. In all, primary livestock products were estimated to account for more than 56 percent of the viceroyalty's domestically consumed agrarian production and about 30 percent of the total GNP.¹

Even if Quirós' figures were inflated, there can be little doubt that livestock production played a vital role for the economies of Mexico as well as Peru during the half century or so before the close of the colonial era. For the historian, analysis of this economic sector is at once rewarding and difficult because of the multiple functions and correspondingly varied structures of livestock production: It served transport (mules, horses, donkeys, llamas), provided draft power for agriculture and industry (oxen, mules and donkeys), supplied raw materials for a wide range of industries (cattle, sheep, goats and cameloids) and contributed much to food production (cattle, hogs, sheep). This multifunctionality of livestock complexes lends their analysis significance not only in their own right but also because of the strong linkages to other sectors and the consequent diagnostic value livestock production holds for such problems as the evolution of various industries, productivity in the agricultural sector and income distribution, as reflected in dietary patterns.

This paper will attempt to draw out similarities and differences between the structure of production, markets and the conjuncture for livestock goods in Mexico and Peru during the late colonial period. I will suggest that both the ecology and the pre-hispanic settlement and land-use patterns in Mesoamerica and the central Andean region con-

stitute important factors in explaining why by the eighteenth century the social distribution of livestock property differed markedly between the two viceroyalties: In New Spain production units especially of sheep but also of cattle tended to be larger and the role which the Indian peasantry could play in this sector more limited. In late colonial Peru, on the other hand, the Andean peasantry still held a major share of the region's livestock population, and livestock estates of creole or peninsular Spaniards on the average were smaller – both in area and in livestock capital – than those in New Spain. At the same time prevailing technologies for raising sheep, cattle and other domesticated animals remained similarly tradition bound in both viceroyalties. Yet during the eighteenth century the commercialization process and the market structure for livestock products evinced a greater degree of complexity and integration in the northern viceroyalty than in Peru. This at once contributed to and reflected broader divergent developments in the demographic and economic structures of both viceroyalties during the late colonial period.

I. Ecology and Early Colonial Development

Ecological factors and patterns of human settlement and land – use determined a divergent development of livestock populations since the early days of conquest in Mexico and Peru.

Most of Mexico's greatly varying ecological regions offered propitious conditions for livestock. The plains of the central and northern *mesetas* contained large expanses of semi – arid grasslands which without irrigation were not apt for crop agriculture. The lush piedmont of the eastern and western Sierra Madre, falling off to the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, offered rich grazing lands, as for example in the Huasteca and the Pacific slopes of Nueva Galicia. Even parts of the southern highlands, with their steeply sloped valleys and narrow ridges, as the Mixteca Alta and the Oaxaca valley system, offered greater potential for livestock grazing than for crop agriculture. It is ironic that in spite of these favorable habitats, pre – hispanic Mesoamerica counted with very few species of large mammals and the Amerindian cultures knew no other domesticated animals than dogs and fowl. Thus much grassland remained untouched until 1519 and the sedentary Amerindian societies largely limited themselves to crop agriculture in the fertile highland basins, river valleys and tropical lowland areas of central and southern Mexico.² This settlement pattern was to have great significance

for the location and social structure of livestock complexes.

The ecology of the central Andean region placed greater restriction on the spread of newly introduced domesticated animals. The arid Pacific coast offered sufficient vegetation – other than the seasonal verdure of the *lomas*, or piedmont hills – only in the fertile, narrow river valleys. These had been the site of complex irrigation systems for crop agriculture sustaining large sedentary populations. To the east of the Andes the tropical rainforest of the Amazon lowlands without modern veterinary practices were not propitious for livestock raising. The slopes, valleys and high plateaus of the Andes, on the other hand, provided large areas of grassland. Indeed it was here that the only large domesticated animals of pre-hispanic America, the various cameloid species, such as alpacas, llamas and huanacos, were raised. Thus, in contrast to Mesoamerica, no major regions of virgin grassland existed at the moment of the Spanish conquest. The high plains best suited to maintain large herds of animals, such as the Titicaca basin and the plains of Junin, were densely populated with highly stratified sedentary populations, whose agrarian society rested on a regionally differentiated mixed economy of crop cultivation and livestock raising.³

The story of the rapid propagation of nearly all types of European domestic animals in sixteenth century Mexico is well known. During the first half-century after conquest horses and cattle propagated at an unprecedented rate in most ecological zones of the viceroyalty, from the humid Gulf coast to the central plateau and the northern plains, particularly in the area of Durango and Nombre de Dios. By the 1560's literally millions of these animals roamed the virgin grasslands of the colony in a semi-wild state. Sheep, incapable of fending for themselves, followed rather than preceded the advance of colonial settlements. While also spreading rapidly until the mid-sixteenth century in the higher regions of southern and central Mexico as far north as Querétaro and Aguascalientes, they only began to flow into the vast northern plains of Nuevo León and Coahuila since the last decades of the century.⁴ Nearly from the very beginning livestock raising in New Spain was dominated by very large production units. In 1598, for example, Rodrigo de Rio de Losa in one year alone is reported to have marketed 60,000 head of cattle from his Hacienda Santiago near Somberete in distant Mexico City.⁵ Since the 1570's New Spain's livestock populations, especially that of cattle, quite suddenly began to decline due to wasteful and uncontrolled overkilling, rustling and Chichimec raids and, most importantly, a decline in livestock fertility at least in the central and

southern regions.⁶ During the mid-sixteenth century public authorities were only concerned about devastating effects of proliferating herds of cattle, horses and sheep on food crop production and Indian population.⁷ Since the 1570's, however, measures for the protection and regulation of livestock raising concerning such things as slaughter, sheepwalks and limitations of abusive treatment of ranchers by local officials were put into effect.⁸

During the following century livestock raising in New Spain, parallel to the process of hacienda formation, became a more organized enterprise, a certain balance with crop production was reached and the locational pattern of livestock populations which, *grosso modo*, was to prevail until the end of the colonial era was established. Sheep flocks were concentrated east and north of the viceregal capital in a belt stretching from Tlaxcala via Pachuca, Cadereita, Querétaro to San Miguel el Grande and Aguascalientes; and in the far north in Nuevo León and Coahuila, with minor populations in some southern areas as the Mixteca Alta and the Oaxaca valley system. Cattle was spread more evenly throughout much of colonial New Spain, but important concentrations were discernible in modern-day Jalisco, Michoacán, and the Gulf coast north of Veracruz.

Also in the Andean region European livestock species spread rapidly since the 1530's, albeit on a smaller scale than in Mexico.⁹ On the coast the propagation of cattle, hogs, goats and, to a lesser extent, sheep and horses, combined with the reduction of the Indian population to lead to a changed land-use pattern in the fertile irrigated river valleys, which in pre-hispanic times had only hosted limited flocks of llamas for the transport of guano. Now the more marginal lands ceased to be used for crop raising and reverted to grass and carob tree vegetation on which the growing livestock populations fed. While these early coastal herds also primarily belonged to Spanish colonists, they were of very modest size indeed compared with those of New Spain's early colonial cattle barons.¹⁰ With the growing demand for foodstuff in the urban centers of coastal Peru and the opening of markets for products such as sugar, wine and *aguardiente* up and down the Pacific coast from Mexico to Chile, the seventeenth century witnessed a renewed dedication of most Peruvian coastal valley lands to food and commercial crops. From then until quite recently livestock raising was mostly limited to goats and mules in the extreme north, hogs in the immediate vicinity of major urban markets, as well as the maintenance of alfalfa fields for transport and draft animals, which were acquired, together with the cattle and

sheep for meat consumption, either in the Sierra or from Tucumán.¹¹

The introduction of European livestock species in highland Peru had different implications due to the previous existence of large herds of domesticated animals there. Proliferation of cattle and sheep thus in the Andes did not primarily diminish crop fields – the extent to which it did that still requires further analysis –, but rather led to the displacement of cameloid herds, a long-term process which continued at least until the mid-nineteenth century and led to a considerable reduction in the extension of the habitat of alpacas and llamas.¹² Sheep and cattle became numerous on higher valley slopes and puna regions throughout the central Andes between Quito and Potosí, but the greatest numbers were to be found precisely in the areas of the greatest concentration of cameloids, the Titicaca basin.¹³ The early colonial history of livestock raising in the Peruvian Sierra has not been analyzed thoroughly to date. It would seem, however, that the few very large herds known to belong to the one or the other Spanish encomendero remained exceptional. By the last third of the sixteenth century Spanish owners of middling estancias as well as Indian community peasants and their *kurakas* were the preponderant livestock holders in Peru.¹⁴

II. *The Structure of Livestock Production During the Late Colonial Period*

Who were the ranchers in late colonial New Spain and Peru and what was the size of their holdings? In Mexico, creole and peninsular hacendados as well as religious institutions dominated livestock raising. While Indian peasants and their communities as well as mestizo *rancheros* also owned cattle, sheep and mules, in most regions of the vice-royalty they contributed little to the market for livestock and livestock products. Gibson reports that Indian peasants in the valley of Mexico showed no great inclination towards cattle raising and even the *carnicerías* in the Indian towns were supplied with steers from Spanish hacendados.¹⁵ According to the same author, of all large domesticated animals it was sheep which found most acceptance among Indians in the valley. Gibson estimated herds of Indian peasants to range from a few hundred to a few thousand sheep, with *caciques* owning up to 8,000 sheep.¹⁶ Yet while he acknowledges that even these herds "were small in comparison with the large Spanish herds," still they must have been exceptional. Had most Indian peasants in the basins of Mexico and Puebla owned herds of a few hundred to a few thousand animals, they would have been a

considerable factor in the market for sheep and wool and a serious competition for Spanish hacendados, for which we have no evidence.

In the Intendancy of Nueva Galicia, Indian peasants owned small herds of cattle (usually less than ten) and sheep (no more than a few dozen) which provided draft animals, meat, hides and wool for their domestic economy. Only rarely did they market live animals or their products, and if they did, they commissioned owners of large herds about to be driven to market to sell their animals for them.¹⁷ Here *cofradías* held the most important herds of Indian cattle and at times even participated in the long distance cattle drives.¹⁸

In the southern Mexican Intendancy of Oaxaca, Indian commoners held little livestock other than a yoke of oxen in the late colonial period, while sheep and cattle formed the main income of many Indian *cofradías* here just as in Guadalajara.¹⁹ In contrast to central Mexico, *caciques* here maintained a prominent position in the regional livestock complex, as many were able to cling to extensive landholdings until the very end of the colonial period, at times even larger than Spanish private and church haciendas.²⁰ While the estates of convents and orders were nearly exclusively dedicated to livestock raising, private Spanish haciendas followed a mixed farming regime in Oaxaca. But, in any case, livestock herds of church institutions, Spanish hacendados and *caciques* remained relatively small in this southern Intendancy, rarely exceeding 10,000 sheep and 2,000 head of cattle and equines.²¹ This size distribution of livestock herds stands in contrast to the situation in the major ranching areas of central and northern Mexico. While recent research has corrected the concept of a general dominance of large estates in the agrarian structure of eighteenth century New Spain, small haciendas, *ranchos* and *laboríos* seem to have played a much greater role for cereal production than for livestock raising. It is, of course, a simplification to speak of livestock estates or maize and wheat growing estates, since typically haciendas pursued a mixed farming economy with a great variety of possible product mixes. To be sure, on those estates which raised livestock merely as a supplementary product, or just for interior use as draft and transport animals and for meat provisions of the *peones*, herds might only hold a few hundred heads of cattle, as well as a similar number of goats and sheep. But among those haciendas whose primary income potential consisted of livestock, very large units dominated. This was not only true for northern Mexico, where haciendas with over 100,000 sheep, as Santa Catarina in Durango, or the Conde de Aguayo's vast latifundium centered at Patos in Coahuila seem not to

have been rare by the second half of the eighteenth century.²² While these complexes had already been put together by the mid-eighteenth century, it is presently not clear whether there was a general trend towards the agglomeration of vast livestock latifundia in northern Mexico precisely during the last five decades of the colonial era, as suggested by the case of the Sánchez Navarro in Coahuila described by Charles Harris.²³

Also in central and western Mexico large production units dominated the livestock raising industry during the late eighteenth century. This was true of the sheep and goat haciendas of the Jesuit Colegios of Mexico and Puebla. Their famous hacienda complex Santa Lucia, located north of Texcoco, held 128,000 sheep in 1744, with a declining livestock population during the last two decades before the order's expulsion. During these decades it marketed between 5,000 and 20,000 sheep annually besides considerable quantities of wool and tallow.²⁴ As far south as the Mixteca Baja, the Puebla Colegio owned two sheep raising haciendas with livestock capital of about 16,000 and 35,000 heads respectively during the 1760's and a goat ranch near Acatlan with also about 35,000 animals.²⁵ For northern Guanajuato and Aguascalientes we have references to privately owned estates with a livestock capital of about 100,000 sheep during the eighteenth century.²⁶ The large cattle ranches in the Intendancy of Nueva Galicia located in the Ameca valley and in the vicinity of Tepic on the Pacific slopes, seem to have held between 5,000 and 25,000 cows, steers and bulls during the late eighteenth century and were capable of marketing up to 3,000 or 4,000 steers annually.²⁷ While the average livestock hacienda in eighteenth century Mexico of course held less livestock capital, there can be little doubt that such large production units held a predominant position in the commercialization of animals and their products. Serrera Contreras reports that four hacendado families contributed 37 percent of all licensed cattle exports from Nueva Galicia to Nueva España between 1761 and 1800 and that one hacienda, Cienega de Mata, accounted for over 57 percent of legally slaughtered ewes in the *partido* of Aguascalientes between 1767 and 1781.²⁸ According to Eric Van Young, one hacienda, San Clemente, supplied 32 percent of the steers for Guadalajara's *abasto de carne* in 1780/81, with an even higher concentration in the supply of sheep.²⁹

Both the social and size distribution of livestock units was clearly different in late colonial Peru. In the Sierra, the all important region for livestock raising in Peru during this period, Indian commoners,

kurakas, *cofradías* and, to a lesser extent, communities still held a very significant share, in some provinces even the majority, of the livestock capital. Magnus Mörner reports that in 1786 haciendas only held less than 37 percent of sheep in Cuzco's province of Calca, a region primarily dedicated to cereal production.³⁰ Detailed livestock statistics for the important livestock raising province of Azángaro in the Altiplano for the years immediately following Peru's independence (1825 – 1830) show an even stronger position of Indian peasants as owners of livestock: Here they held nearly 60 percent of all sheep and nearly 70 percent of cattle, with the rest belonging to haciendas of creoles, *kurakas*, church institutions and the one or the other corporate community.³¹ While Indian peasants probably held a relatively great share of the livestock population throughout southern Peru, it is quite possible that it was declining as one proceeded further north to provinces as Cajatambo, Huamachuco and Cajamarca, since it appears that even by the late eighteenth century the Indian communal tradition and Indian landholding was considerably weaker in the north than in the south.

It may be that the same geographical differentiation also obtained regarding the *kurakas'* involvement in livestock raising. At least for the southern and central Sierra we know that *kurakas mayores* belonged to the owners of the largest livestock haciendas. The *kuraka* family Astocuri Apolaya, according to Olinda Celestino, was the largest landholder in the province of Jauja in central Peru, owning at least 27,000 sheep and 2,000 bovines as early as 1698.³² The same can be said of *kuraka* Diego Choquehuanca of the Altiplano province of Azángaro who owned eleven livestock estates prior to the Túpac Amaru rebellion.³³ At least for certain areas of Andean Peru we also possess evidence for a considerable involvement of Indian *cofradías*, sometimes as stand-ins for communities, in livestock raising: According to Celestino, the ninety-five *cofradías* of Jauja province in 1795 held 21,531 head of sheep and 1,798 bovines.³⁴

While it is beyond doubt that Indian peasants, *kurakas* and their institutions in Peru played a much grater role as livestock holders than in Mexico, the size distribution of Spanish estates in the Andes is more difficult to ascertain. In the most thorough analysis of a regional agrarian structure in late colonial Andean Peru published to date, Magnus Mörner reports that just after 1700 the largest Jesuit livestock estancia in the bishopric of Cuzco held 32,000 sheep and that a livestock estate in Canas y Canchis with 10,000 sheep and 100 cows had to be considered "muy grande." In that province, a good part of which had a

cold *puna* climate and specialized in livestock raising, no estate held more than 300 cows, admittedly the less important species of livestock compared with sheep.³⁵ The mean livestock capital of the 110 estates in Azángaro province immediately after Independence amounted to 1,155 sheep and forty-seven bovines.³⁶ Large haciendas here held between 5,000 and 10,000 head of livestock.

For the southern Peruvian Sierra there thus emerges a picture of a widely dispersed livestock property with a large share of small flocks controlled by Indian peasants, many livestock estates with only a few thousand sheep and several hundred head of cattle, and at best several dozen relatively large haciendas with 10,000 to 30,000 sheep.

It is possible however that a different structure prevailed in the center and particularly in the northern Peruvian Sierra, although the evidence is scarce. We have already mentioned the large livestock herds owned by the major *kurakas* of Jauja, and it appears as if the enormous livestock estates on the *punas* and high slopes of the Mantaro valley which became so prominent in the twentieth century, had reached a considerable size even by the late colonial period.

For the *corregimiento* of Huamachuco, in the Sierra and *ceja de la selva* of modern La Libertad and Cajamarca departments, Waldemar Espinoza has described a number of enormous estates for the late eighteenth century, which included lands in all climatic zones, from tropical to cold. They could thus produce considerable quantities of crops ranging from sugar, bananas and coca to maize and potatoes. But they also owned huge flocks of sheep with up to 100,000 animals, whose wool was processed in the estates' own *obrajes*. The largest of these estates, as San Pedro de Chuquisongo, Santa Cruz de Carabamba and Chusgón, extended for up to 1,940 square kilometers. Several belonged to the Augustinians in Lima.³⁷ In the global picture of late colonial livestock raising in Peru, the significance of these northern estates should not be exaggerated, however, since the largest concentration of stock was located in the southern highlands.

How can we account for this different social and size distribution of livestock production units both within and between the two viceroyalties? A tentative answer might lie in the interacting influence of regional ecological conditions, pre-hispanic land-use patterns and colonial demographic and settlement patterns on the process of hacienda formation and land distribution. In those areas in which the environment was well suited for livestock raising and where no sedentary Indian peasantry offered any resistance, one might naturally expect the swift entrenchment

of vast Spanish livestock estates, as happened in northern Mexico. But why did there develop such a marked difference in the average size of livestock estates between central Mexico and the southern Peruvian Sierra, both regions of dense population at the moment of conquest? The answer seems to rest in land-use patterns. In central Mexico the European livestock could spread rapidly because the declining indigenous population withdrew to its best agricultural lands, leaving wide areas which could be claimed as *sitios de ganado mayor* or *menor* by Spanish colonists. In the southern Peruvian highlands the very existence of large herds of alpacas and llamas belonging to the *ayllus* placed a limitation on the propagation of European livestock and hence, the possibility of Spaniards to claim pasture lands as *estancias*. Throughout the colonial period the continued importance of extensive livestock raising for much of southern Peru's Indian peasantry, even though marked by a gradual shift from cameloids to sheep and cattle, allowed them to maintain a strong legal claim and an effective control over much of the region's pasture land. Central Mexico's Indian peasantry appreciated this nexus between livestock raising and control over extensive stretches of land, as they attempted to build up communal herds precisely as a means to maintain control over what was becoming pastoral land.³⁸ The hypothesis is further supported by the fact that in the Andes even by the late eighteenth century the extension of the *mancha india* was practically identical with what may be called the *mancha cameloida* both stretching from Huancavelica southward through High Peru.³⁹ In other words, the survival of an Indian community peasantry was most marked precisely where the continuity of Indian livestock raising had been strongest. This would also help to explain the greater predominance of large livestock estates in the northern Peruvian Sierra. With the nearly complete displacement of cameloids from the region's *puna*, peasants became limited to temperate and tropical climate agriculture, while European sheep and cattle conquered the high elevation pastures for their masters.

III. *Technology and Organization of Livestock Complexes*

A striking difference among livestock operations in late colonial Mexico and Peru concerns the application of transhumance for sheep. In the northern viceroyalty hundreds of thousands of sheep and goats each year at the end of the rainy season in October and November were displaced from their *estancias* on the arid plateau to lower more humid winter pastures. From the valley of Mexico, from Querétaro and from

as far north as Durango ranchers moved their flocks over 300 or 400 kilometers to the area around Lake Chapala and western Michoacan where they paid pasturage fees on the *estancias* used only for seasonal occupation. At least during the seventeenth century several hundred thousand sheep from central Mexico were transferred north to Nuevo León and Coahuila at the beginning of the dry season to return southward in March. There were also important sheep displacements from the plateau to both the Gulf and Pacific coasts.⁴⁰ The prevalence of these long-distance sheep movements was one of the key factors explaining why, in all the Spanish Indies, only in Mexico it came to the establishment of the *mesta*, the ranchers' association, to whose regulatory powers it pertained to lay out sheepwalks or *cañadas* and try to minimize conflicts between the owners of the flocks and cattle herds driven to market and the owners of adjoining estates. Ursula Ewald puts the significance of this type of long distance transhumance in perspective, when she says that only such arduous, costly and risky transfers of animals between summer and winter pastures allowed the existence of large sheep and goat herds.⁴¹ The combination of transhumance and long distance marketing also appears to have fostered specialization of New Spain's livestock economy, as the drive of cattle to dry season pastures was often associated with selling the animals to something like a "feed-lot operator," who fattened the young steers before sending them on to distant urban markets. Thomas Calvo has recently shown, how as early as the first third of the seventeenth century the seasonal cattle drives in Nueva Galicia were articulated through a complex chain of intermediaries and credit relations.⁴²

In Peru transhumance was mostly local within one and the same landholding. Here the major way of dealing with seasonal scarcity or fodder consisted in the reservation of special pastures, so called *bofedales* or *ahijaderos*, with a peculiar vegetation, which preserved moisture throughout the year, for feeding during the dry months. This regime was used in the sierra as much for sheep as for cattle.⁴³ While not totally absent, transhumance from the sierra to the piedmont and *lomas* on the Pacific side and to the *ceja de la selva* on the Eastern slopes of the Andes played a minor role.

Concerning the use of additional fodder besides natural pasture, here again one gains the impression that Mexican practices had become more complex than Peruvian ones. On the haciendas of central and western Mexico stubble grazing seems to have been commonplace.⁴⁴ The sowing of alfalfa fields as additional feed for cattle and equines seems to have

increased gradually during the eighteenth century, although New Spain's Jesuits showed great reluctance in this regard. The use of legumes and cereals as fodder found most application for mules and horses as well as for hogs during fattening. But at least the Jesuits also fed their cattle and even sheep with maize in times of scarce pastures.⁴⁵

While there is some evidence for stubble grazing at least in the central region of the Peruvian sierra during the period under consideration, its use was very limited, both because only the viceroyalty's relatively small cattle herds profitted from it and because the major livestock herds were located in the *punas* quite far removed from the Andean valley bottoms dedicated to crop raising.⁴⁶ *Alfalfares* were planted in the more important Andean river valleys and throughout the coast. But again they only benefitted the cattle herds kept for raising draft animals, as well as mules, horses, and the animals being fattened for urban markets, particularly in the vicinity of Lima, as for example in the Chancay valley.⁴⁷ Among cereals and legumes in Peru, only barley attained any importance as forrage during the colonial period, but its use was limited to mules and horses.⁴⁸ In sum, Peru's major livestock populations, especially sheep, but also those cattle herds not specifically maintained to provide draft animals, for all practical purposes had to rely exclusively on natural pastures as fodder. This was certainly true for one of the most important Peruvian livestock regions, the Altiplano, even as late as around 1900.

What very well might be lurking behind the greater willingness of Mexican ranchers to experiment with additional forrages to supplement natural pastures was the growing pressure on pasture resources felt in many parts of central and southern Mexico during the late eighteenth century. According to Ursula Ewald, shortage of pastures perennially plagued the administrators of livestock haciendas belonging to the Jesuits' Colegio Espíritu Santo in Puebla.⁴⁹ Growing demographic pressure in areas as the valley of Mexico, the Bajío and central Nueva Galicia led to what David Brading has called internal colonization. New land was opened up for maize and wheat cultivation and hacendados undertook small irrigation projects. As Guadalajara's population tripled between 1760 and 1803, its foodshed, according to Eric Van Young, moved outward and cattle herds were displaced to more outlying, drier pastures. When in the latter part of the eighteenth century large livestock haciendas, as for example La Erre in Guanajuato, were rented in small parcels to tenant *rancheros*, these were likely to switch emphasis of production to crops.⁵⁰ These developments led to a scarcity of pasture for

livestock in central and southern Mexico and favored the growing use of additional fodder.

For late colonial Peru a tentative appraisal would suggest that in the Sierra, the major livestock producing zone, pastures were not becoming scarce yet. During the 1820's the livestock density on pastures in Azángaro province hovered around 1 to 1.5 units of sheep (*ovejas madres en reducción*) per hectare, with an estimated carrying capacity of about 2 units of sheep per hectare.⁵¹ With population growth just having set in since the second third of the eighteenth century – as compared to New Spain, where this process had been under way since the mid-seventeenth century –, there is also not much evidence for "internal colonization," or any significant effort to extend acreage for crops.⁵² In any case, since Peru's major livestock populations were located in the cold climate puna regions, herds and crops often did not compete for the same land.

Besides competing demands on land resources for food and cash crop production, the other factor influencing the relative scarcity or abundance of pastures or, put more generally, livestock density, was of course the development of the size of livestock populations. Data on this problem are fragmentary at best for both viceroyalties. Several scholars coincide in suggesting declining livestock populations, particularly of cattle on private estates in Nueva Galicia and Oaxaca, as well as on haciendas of the Jesuit Colegios of Mexico and Puebla since the mid-eighteenth century. Only herds of draft animals were increasing, responding to the growing food crop production.⁵³ Indeed it appears that in the more densely populated areas of central, western and southern Mexico the declining size of cattle populations was a direct consequence of the shrinking land resources allotted to pasturage. In the words of Guadalajara's wealthy miner and hacendado Manuel Calixto Cañedo, "...expanding the tillage restricts the livestock dangerously..."⁵⁴ In those parts of Mexico which felt the pressure of a growing population on food production, livestock populations by the mid-eighteenth century apparently were fully exploiting the carrying capacity of available pastures. Any reduction in the size of pastures thus automatically needed to be accompanied by reductions in the size of the herds. This consequence could only have been averted through greater investments in animal husbandry with the aim of achieving higher levels of productivity (increased carrying capacity of pastures, fencing, reduction of livestock mortality). But, as we have seen, internal colonization and capital improvement projects were increasingly channelled away from livestock

raising into the production of wheat, maize and cash crops as *maguey*. The long-term decline in the reproductive rate of sheep, and possibly cattle, reported by Konrad for Santa Lucia during the eighteenth century, may well have been a consequence of overgrazing due to shortages of pasture while at the same time contributing to the stagnation in the size of herds.⁵⁵ Only in the less densely settled areas was it still possible to achieve increased production both of crops and livestock simultaneously.⁵⁶

We may thus ask whether the balance of New Spain's livestock herds shifted increasingly towards the northern plains during the late colonial period. For the early and mid-eighteenth century this seems likely, at least as far as sheep are concerned. The expansion of wool processing in Querétaro's *obrajes* during this period, coinciding with a marked decline of the more southerly earlier manufacturing centers, can be viewed as adaptation to the growing importance of the northern plains as source of raw wool, as Richard Salvucci has suggested.⁵⁷ Yet, if Harris' data on the Sánchez Navarro's livestock operations in Coahuila are representative at all for the northeast, one would have to conclude, that herds there also stagnated since the 1780's. Since the last years of that decade, the Sánchez Navarro's annual lambing crop reached a plateau not to be surpassed before the 1840's. In Nuevo León, Coahuila and Chihuahua a further buildup of herds may have been hampered since the 1770's by the increasing intensity and frequency of Apache raids and a spell of particularly severe droughts (1774-77, 1784-85, 1790 and 1798-1802).⁵⁸ For nearly all regions of New Spain impressionistic evidence points to a stagnation or, in some areas, even a decline of livestock populations since the 1780's, with the one exception of draft animals.

For Peru we also have circumstantial evidence to suggest declining livestock populations at least in the southern Sierra region since 1780. In spite of Magnus Mörner's warning not to exaggerate the economic damage caused by the Túpac Amaru rebellion, I would like to insist on its great impact at least as far as livestock populations are concerned.⁵⁹ There are too many scattered reports about large numbers of sheep and cattle requisitioned by troops on both sides, plundering of estates and surreptitious sales in cities.⁶⁰

• While livestock populations naturally could recover quite fast within a decade or two after such a major depletion, it is my impression that this did not occur between the 1780's and the outbreak of the Wars of Independence in the southern Peruvian sierra for reasons connected to

the depressed market conditions, particularly for sheep. Rather than build up their stocks, hacendados preferred to sell as much as the annual crop allowed on the level of the reduced herds, in order to maintain a standard of consumption which could underwrite their social status.

Production techniques, at least as far as the better documented sheep ranches were concerned, seem to have been similar in both viceroyalties, although the Mexican livestock haciendas tended to be better equipped and evidenced greater care in the execution of major tasks in the annual production cycle, such as lambing, shearing and slaughtering. Sheds, special *corrales* for lambing ewes, copper kettles and other costly equipment for processing the tallow from slaughtered animals, while apparently common in Mexico, were not used in Peru. A meticulous regime of flocks, separated according to age and sex, was conventional practice in Mexican sheep ranches, but in the southern Peruvian sierra had been adopted only on Jesuit *estancias*.⁶¹ In spite of such differences, the scant information on productivity of sheep raising enterprises would suggest similarly low levels for both viceroyalties.⁶² A telling example for the relative backwardness of cattle raising in late colonial Peru appeared in an article in the "Mercurio Peruano" in 1792. A citizen of Ica, concerned about the scarcity of beef in that town, suggested as an utter novelty that instead of slaughtering cows as practiced heretofore, from now on only steers should be slaughtered so that the region's stock might increase.⁶³ In Mexico, on the other hand, the exclusive use of steers for meat production had been commonplace since the late sixteenth century, when it was sanctioned by a viceregal ordinance.⁶⁴

In sum, while ranchers in both viceroyalties used the same type of traditional production technology, Mexican livestock estates tended to be organized more effectively and probably were also more highly capitalized.

IV. *The Structure of Markets and Conjunctures*

With regard to livestock and their products the structure of the late colonial market in Mexico had become highly integrated and complex. Livestock producers from the most distant regions participated in the supply of centers of consumption up to 500 or 600 miles away. The Mexican livestock market had become sufficiently complex for producers to have choices as to which center of consumption presented the most lucrative conditions for sale at any given moment. Cattle producers from Nueva Galicia not only could choose whether they wanted to sell their

steers directly to merchants in Mexico or Puebla holding a contract for those cities' *abasto de carne* or try their luck at one of the annual livestock fairs in Puebla, Tlaxcala or Toluca. Increasingly they also compared the benefits derived from a difficult cattle drive to central Mexico with the conditions prevailing on Guadalajara's own urban market.⁶⁵ Coahuilan sheep ranchers as the Sánchez Navarros could choose between selling their animals to livestock traders as those in San Miguel Allende or directly to the merchants holding Mexico City's *abasto de carne*.⁶⁶

The Peruvian market for livestock products appeared much less integrated. Rather it mostly consisted in a series of isolated relations between one production zone with one center of consumption, usually not more than 100 kilometers distant from each other. This pattern characterized the supply of urban centers on the coast with sheep, hogs and, to a much smaller extent, cattle for meat consumption, as well as the supply of coastal estates with draft animals from livestock raising zones in the adjoining area of the sierra. Highland wool production was processed mostly in local *obrajes* to be found in nearly every *serrano partido* with sizeable sheep flocks between Cajamarca and the Titicaca basin.

Carlos Sempat Assadourian has recently presented a complex model of the "Peruvian space" during the early seventeenth century, in which he posits the precarious integration of a vast region stretching from the Kingdom of Quito to Tucumán, Chile and even Buenos Aires through commercial flows primarily set in motion by the secular expansion of silver production. Clearly Sempat comes to rather different conclusions about the Peruvian market for livestock products during the early seventeenth century than we do for that of the late eighteenth century. He stresses the importance of the long distance trade in tallow and cordobans from Piura and Chile to Lima as well as to Alto Peru's mining centers via Arica, the remittances of leather from Tucumán to Potosí and the large-scale distribution of mules from various parts of the River Plate region throughout Upper and Lower Peru.⁶⁷

Principally two reasons allow us to hold a rather different view of Peru's livestock markets 150 years later. In the first place, Sempat himself stresses that between the late seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries both internal and external processes lead to a disintegration of the "Peruvian space" and the growing escision of vast regions on its rim that gradually reoriented their commercial flows to centers outside of its space. This disintegration was caused first by the crisis of Upper Peru's

silver mining production and, in the course of the eighteenth century, the growing strength of the Atlantic economy, and the pursuant separation of the viceroyalties of Nueva Granada and Rio de la Plata from Peru, a desintegrating process which culminated in the rise of subnational export economies during the nineteenth century. By the late eighteenth century Chile, although still being tied to the commercial circuit dominated by Lima's merchants, had ceased to be a major supplier of livestock products for Peru. The remittances of mules to Upper and Lower Peru from Córdoba and Tucumán via Salta were recovering by the 1790's after a protracted crisis during the mid-eighteenth century. Yet the export of hides, tallow and salted meat from Buenos Aires gained increasing importance for livestock producers even in some of the interior provinces of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires.⁶⁸ At least since its administrative separation from Peru the River Plate formed a distinct economic center of gravity outside the "Peruvian space." In as much as it had pulled Upper Peru into its own network of market relations, it even contributed to the weakening of commodity flows between that old center of silver production and the southern intendancies of Peru. These shifts had a particularly debilitating impact on the commercial circuits for livestock and livestock products, since they had constituted such a conspicuous part of the commodity flows on the axis Lima-Potosí-Buenos Aires.

The second reason for viewing Peru's livestock market as less integrated during the late colonial period than Sempat does for the early seventeenth century rests on the following argument: Long distance trade in livestock and derivated products was only directed towards a few large centers, primarily Lima and the Upper Peruvian mining districts. But most regions and smaller provincial towns were supplied with meat, tallow, hides and wool from nearby livestock growing regions. With not much evidence for agricultural colonization in late colonial Peru, there is correspondingly also no indication that livestock herds were removed to more isolated, less densely populated regions. In contrast to late colonial New Spain, then, livestock raising remained a rather dispersed economic activity in Peru, with short supply lines to most urban markets. The major exception to this predominance of a rather localized pattern of commercialization concerned the mule trade from Tucumán. It was the only branch of the Peruvian livestock business the size and complexity of which surpassed the corresponding Mexican trade in the late colonial period.⁶⁹

As for many other aspects, our information on the size of the Peruvian market for livestock products is very limited until now. If we are to believe statistics from the *Mercurio Peruano* for 1791, which easily might be inflated, the northern Altiplano marketed the largest number of sheep, with 120,000 head being sold in the Intendancy of Cuzco, and at least 100,000 head in the Intendancy of Arequipa, besides large amounts of *chalonas* (dried sheep carcasses), as well as considerable quantities of wool, tallow and other livestock products.⁷⁰ Some of the other livestock trade routes with relatively high volumes of transactions concerned the supply of Lima with 80,000 sheep annually from the Intendancy of Tarma, and the sale of up to 100,000 goats from Piura for the production of soap and cordobans in Lambayeque.⁷¹ The least developed segment of the viceroyalty's livestock trade concerned cattle, as urban beef consumption was minimal and the demand for draft animals remained largely limited to a few hundred coastal and hardly any more highland haciendas, while most of the indigenous peasantry continued to cultivate their land with a digging stick.⁷²

In Mexico, on the other hand, the cattle trade had a large volume, since urban beef consumption was considerable and there existed a great demand for draft animals not only from the estate sector but also from the peasantry in central and southern Mexico. As Horst Pietschmann has shown, in a region like Puebla, the sale of cattle contributed the major share of the *corregidores'* *repartos de bienes* to Indian peasants.⁷³

Two factors probably played a crucial role in accounting for the different structure of the market for livestock products in New Spain and Peru: 1. the demographic structure and the scale of urban centers and 2. transport and transaction costs.

By the late eighteenth century New Spain's central and western regions, from the basins of Puebla, Tlaxcala and Mexico to the Bajío and central Jalisco, contained extended areas with a rapidly growing population density. As we have seen earlier, this development led to a switch from livestock production to crop agriculture. Consequently ranching activities moved to more outlying areas. This tendency towards the separation and distancing of densely populated crop growing regions and livestock raising complexes must have expanded the marketing network for livestock products and created additional demand for draft animals, tallow, hides, etc. in the crop growing regions which could not be met locally any more. At the same time, concomitant to the increas-

ing population density, quite a few cities were growing at a fast rate during the late eighteenth century.⁷⁴ By the 1790's there were six cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants within a radius of 300 kilometers from Mexico City and at least another nine cities of this size further distant from the capital. Together they offered urban markets amounting to more than 400,000 people, of which 270,000 belonged to the cities within the 300 kilometers radius around Mexico City (including the capital's population itself). This represented, for the eighteenth century, a large aggregation of urban demand which favored an extension of trade networks for wool, tallow, live animals and hides and required a complex commercial structure.

In Peru, on the other hand, with a much lower population density than New Spain (obviously excepting the *provincias internas*), during the late eighteenth century no comparable agglomeration of urban demand existed. The eight or nine cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants (four more, if we include Alto Peru) were dispersed widely throughout the whole viceroyalty. The city of this size nearest to Lima (with the possible exception of the mining camp Cerro de Pasco) was Huamanga, at a distance of nearly 600 kilometers from the capital while the second and the third largest cities of the viceroyalty, Cuzco and Arequipa, lay more than 1,000 kilometers from Lima. Mexican secondary cities also tended to be considerably larger than those of Peru.

The second factor helping to explain the difference of the market structure for livestock products between the two viceroyalties concerns transport costs.⁷⁵ To be sure, roads were bad in both New Spain and Peru. Transport consequently could add enormously to the final price of a product in the market place. Yet there is good reason to think that this problem was graver in the Andean region than in Mexico, a distinction suggested by the very physical geography of both regions. One bit of evidence for this assertion comes from the difference in the price of livestock products between areas of production and centers of consumption. Eric Van Young reports that during the second half of the eighteenth century live cattle driven from central Jalisco to Mexico City, a distance of some 600 kilometers, was sold on the average for about twice the price to wholesalers in that city which it was worth in the producing region.⁷⁶ For live sheep the price differential between producing regions as far north as Coahuila and central Mexican markets may have been even smaller.⁷⁷ In Peru the difference in the price of sheep between a major producing area as the Altiplano and the Lima market could apparently reach 200 percent.⁷⁸ As late as the 1860's the price of wool

doubled between the production zone in the northern Altiplano and the wholesale warehouses in Arequipa, a distance of some 350 kilometers.⁷⁹

- Mules appear to have been considerably cheaper in New Spain than in Peru during the late colonial period, a factor which necessarily had a direct impact on transport prices for all types of merchandise, including livestock products.⁸⁰

Although these varying prices and price-differentials are only drawn from scattered and unsystematic price data and need to be interpreted cautiously, they are very suggestive. With transport costs likely to have been considerably higher in Peru than in New Spain, the integration of the market for livestock products and, for that matter, all other merchandise as well, must have been much more tenuous in the Andean region than in the northern viceroyalty. Due to higher transport costs the radius beyond which rural products such as wool, tallow, hides, etc. became prohibitively expensive must have been smaller in Peru than in New Spain. Only those goods which could be shipped by sea, as for example tallow from Peru's north coast, would have escaped this dilemma.

Before concluding this comparison, let us briefly consider the conjuncture for livestock products in the two viceroyalties during the late colonial period. Again the Mexican case has been studied much better than that of Peru. In New Spain the long term constellation shaping the price development for many livestock products during the last fifty or sixty years of the colonial era consisted in the scissor-like cleavage between stagnating or declining livestock populations and simultaneously growing demand for some key products, caused by increasing urban and rural populations, greater use of draft animals in agriculture and the growth in the physical output of mines. All authors coincide that prices for live cattle and beef were rising no later than the 1760's in central and western Mexico.⁸¹ Beef prices in Mexico City, undoubtedly the largest market for cattle as well as sheep to be found anywhere in Latin America during the eighteenth century, even rose steadily since the 1720's. The termination of the *repartos* by *corregidores* in 1786, which halted the sale of draft animals to peasants for a number of years, does not show up as a dip in the price of live cattle in the producing areas. For Oaxaca, Taylor reports essentially stable livestock prices throughout the eighteenth century with short-term upward and downward fluctuations.⁸² There are some indications that sheep prices remained stationary somewhat longer than cattle prices. After a short inflationary movement during the drought years of the mid-1780's, they remained depressed

in the Mexico City market until the mid - 1790's. During the last fifteen years until the outbreak of the insurgent movements, live sheep then brought rapidly rising prices in the Mexico City market. Scattered information on prices for raw wool also suggest a rise only since the last years of the eighteenth century.⁸³

With the important exception of E.Tandeter's and N.Wachtel's recent study on prices in Potosí, we are still forced to make conjectures on the conjuncture for livestock products in late colonial Peru. The study on Potosí suggests rising meat prices (both for beef and *charqui*) between the 1720's and the mid - 1750's, followed by a long period of stagnation turning into decline between the early 1790's and 1804. The following decade saw a doubling of beef prices in Potosí. While the inflection of the price curve was upward for the three decades preceding 1755 and flat or downward during the second half of the century, the mean level of meat prices was twice as high between 1755 and 1790 as between 1721 and 1752.⁸⁴ The steep decline of cattle prices on Peru's central coast between the late seventeenth century and the 1740's, reported by Cushner, if it is not a quirk of a statistically too limited data base, might represent a prolongation of declining price trends observed for Potosí by Tandeter and Wachtel for the period between 1690 and 1721 and does not preclude the possibility of a price recovery on the coast during the following decades.⁸⁵

With growing urban populations in cities as Lima, Arequipa and Cuzco, it is quite possible that beef prices staid at a high level during the last few decades of the century also in Lower Peru, as livestock populations declined. Evidence from Ica for the year 1792 indicates that not only the price of beef but also that of mutton was rising there.⁸⁶ But another market - of greater relative significance in Peru than in Mexico due to the predominance of sheep in that viceroyalty's livestock population - seemed to be collapsing since the 1780's: I am referring to the demand for wool. For just about every region for which we possess information, we hear of a decline in the production of woolens and hence a diminished demand for the raw material. There were multiple causes for this problem ranging from destruction of the installations, to the separation of Alto Peru from the viceroyalty and, most importantly, the growing amount of European textiles entering the colony. It was this last problem which in 1816 Abascal adduced as cause for the ruin of Peru's livestock estancias.⁸⁷

Tandeter and Wachtel found a drastic decline in the price of woolen textiles shipped from Cuzco's *obrajes* to Potosi setting in as early as the

first decade of the eighteenth century, with a precarious stabilization between the 1740's and 1781, and a further slide in the following decade. The short-lived recovery during the renewed wars with great Britain, 1796-1804, was more pronounced for cotton textiles than for woolen *bayetas*.⁸⁸

It is evident then that the secular trend of demand for livestock products did not only vary between the two viceroyalties, but also between different products. For live cattle and beef prices appear to have been considerably higher both in New Spain and in Peru towards the end of the eighteenth century than they had been fifty or a hundred years earlier. But while the Mexican case was characterized by rising prices during the last four decades of the century, in the Andes prices stagnated as early as the 1750's. This suggests a smaller price elasticity for live cattle and beef in late colonial Peru. We may wonder whether we are here encountering a reflection of the greater scarcity of circulating currency in late colonial Peru which forced major groups of consumers of cattle to alter their pattern of consumption and curtail investments in draft animals as early as the 1750's.

For the case of Peru it is also evident that the commercialization of sheep and wool suffered under declining prices and increasing volumes of textile imports from Europe throughout much of the eighteenth century. While it cannot be ruled out that rising wool and sheep prices in New Spain between 1794 and 1808 only represented a brief recovery due to disruptions of the transatlantic trade, it at least appears plausible that the Mexican market for sheep and wool withstood European competition better both due to rapid population growth and modernization in the strongest centers of *obraje* production (Querétaro and, possibly, San Miguel el Grande and Guadalajara). In one important aspect, however, the structure of livestock conjunctures showed no difference between both viceroyalties: They were much less affected by the short-term climatic cycles than agricultural products.⁸⁹

What about the increasing silver production in Bajo Peru? Can we assume, as John Fisher has done, that it stimulated all other economic sectors, including livestock production?⁹⁰ To be sure the *partidos* immediately adjacent to the two most important mining centers with an increasing production, Cerro de Pasco and Hualgayoc, did experience an increasing demand for their livestock. It is interesting to note that in the case of the *partido* of Cajamarca growing demand for sheep and hogs in Hualgayoc led to a discontinuation of the *partido's* trade in these animals with the coastal city of Trujillo, in other words to a further

localization of the livestock trade. But booming silver production did not lead to increased demand for livestock products in other regions outside the immediately adjoining *partidos* either in Cerro de Pasco or in Hualgayoc.⁹¹ The growth of mining also failed to lead to an increased *obraje* production and hence demand for wool even in the very Intendancy of Tarma. In short, the stimulus of the mining centers on Peru's livestock production remained very modest indeed.

Conclusion

In spite of being ruled by the same colonial regime, and in spite of similar systems of social stratification and even comparable levels of technology, the livestock complexes of New Spain and Peru during the final phase of Spanish rule showed important differences concerning the social distribution of the factors of production (land and animals), the structure of commercialization, and the conjunctures for the main products. For the purposes of the comparison we may have overdrawn these differences, but on the limited and uneven basis of presently available data, they appear no less real at that.

Broadly speaking, the Mexican livestock business was characterized by larger units of production dominated by private and corporate Spanish owners, in contrast to a more even distribution of livestock capital in the most important ranching areas of Peru, where Indian peasants and *kurakas* held a major share of cattle and sheep until after independence. The Mexican market for livestock products appeared more integrated and complex than that of the Peruvian viceroyalty, which in some respects appeared to be suffering a process of involution of its commercial circuits since the collapse of High Peru's early seventeenth century mining boom. While the commercial upswing of the Bourbon reform era is reflected in high price levels at least for cattle and derived products in both viceroyalties, the growth in demand in the Andes could not be sustained since the 1750's. In any case, the conjuncture for sheep and wool, of greater relative importance for Peru than for New Spain, was deteriorating in the Andes throughout most of the eighteenth century.

We have sought explanations for these divergent structures and developments primarily in the different ecological and land-use patterns since pre-hispanic times, as well as in the impact of different demographic constellations and transport costs. These lines of arguments, it is hoped, have demonstrated the diagnostic value of changes in the livestock sector for broader developments in the viceregal economies. Conversely,

at least with regard to regional land tenure patterns, the crucial importance of different social distributions of the livestock capital to other subsystems of the economy is evident.

By the end of the colonial period, no later than 1783, to be precise, Peru's livestock industry had entered into a long-term crisis from which it was not to recover before about 1860. The Mexican case is more puzzling. While demand for livestock products grew right up to the outbreak of the struggle for independence, the producers seem to have failed to increase output correspondingly. The stagnation of livestock populations suggests that New Spain's ranchers were enjoying the strengthening conjuncture without reinvesting their growing returns. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, the seeds for the post-colonial decline thus also seems to have been laid for Mexico's livestock industry.

NOTES

1. Enrique Florescano and Isabel Gil, eds., *Descripciones económicas generales de Nueva España, 1784-1817. Fuentes para la historia económica de México*, 2 vols. (México, D.F., 1973), I:261.
2. D.J. Fox, "Mexico," in Harold Blakemore and Clifford Smith, eds., *Latin America, Geographical Perspectives* (London, 1971), pp.31-36 and 45-46; Nathan L. Whetten, *Rural Mexico* (Chicago, 1948), pp.3-20; François Chevalier, *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico, The Great Hacienda* (Berkeley, 1963), pp.8-15.
3. Clifford T. Smith, "The Central Andes," in Blakemore and Smith (eds.), *Latin America*, pp.263-275.
4. For the early history of livestock raising in New Spain see Chevalier, *Land and Society*, especially pp.84-114; William H. Dusenberry, *The Mexican Mesta, The Administration of Ranching in Colonial Mexico* (Urbana, Ill., 1963), passim; Alfred Crosby, Jr., *The Columbian Exchange, Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*, 2nd ed. (Westport, Conn., 1975), pp.82-83, 85-87, 92-93; José Miranda, "Notas sobre la introducción de la mesta en la Nueva España" in same author, *Vida colonial y albores de la independencia* (Mexico, 1972), pp.153-182; Richard J. Morrissey, "The Northward Expansion of Cattle Ranching in New Spain, 1550-1600," *AH*, 25(1951), 115-121; this author stresses the crucial role of livestock dispersion for the early Spanish control over vast territories in Mexico, as well as the new character of the livestock complex in colonial America; for an opposing view, stressing Spanish medieval continuities see Charles Bishko, "The Peninsular Background for Latin American Cattle Ranching," *HAHR*, 32(1952), 491-515; see also José Matesanz, "Introducción de la ganadería en Nueva España, 1521-1535," *HM*, 14(1964-65), 533-566.

5. Chevalier, *Land and Society*, p.154; Donald Brand, "The Early History of the Range Cattle Industry in Northern Mexico", *AH*, 35 (1961), 134.
6. Chevalier, *Land and Society*, pp.102-104; Ramón María Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera, estudio regional novohispano, 1760-1805*, Publicaciones de Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, No. CCXLI (Sevilla, 1977), pp.89-90; Dusenberry, *The Mexican Mesta*, p.134.
7. Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule, a History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519-1810* (Stanford, Ca., 1964), p.280; William B. Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca* (Stanford, Ca., 1972), pp.15-16; Chevalier, *Land and Society*, pp.95-102.
8. *Ibid.*, p.104-105; Dusenberry, *The Mexican Mesta*, pp.138-139.
9. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange*, pp.91-94.
10. For llama herds on the coast during the prehispanic period see John V. Murra, *Formaciones económicas y políticas del mundo andino* (Lima, 1975), p.119; concerning coastal livestock raising during early colonial period see Robert G. Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change, The Emergence of the Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), pp.56-64; Manuel Burga, *De la encomienda a la hacienda capitalista; el valle de Jequetepeque del siglo XVI al XX* (Lima, 1976), pp.89-96.
11. *Ibid.*, p.113; Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change*, p.58.
12. As early as 1567 there was concern about an apparently rapid diminution of cameloid herds; see Juan de Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú (1567)*, Travaux de l'Institut Français d'Etudes Andines, Tome XI (Paris, Lima, 1967), p.90.
13. By the mid-seventeenth century sheep and cattle were cheaper in the Collao than in any other part of Peruvian vicerealty; see Bernabé Cobo, *Historia del nuevo mundo*, ed. Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, 4 vols. (Sevilla, 1891), II:360 and 366.
14. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange*, p.94; Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change*, p.58.
15. Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule*, p.346.
16. *Ibid.*, p.345; in the late colonial period Indian communities may at times have shifted from maintaining sheep herds on their communal land to renting it out to neighboring hacendados; see *ibid.*, p.212.
17. Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, p.324; Eric Van Young, *Hacienda and Market in Eighteenth Century Mexico, The Rural Economy of the Guadalajara Region, 1675-1820* (Berkeley, 1981), pp.202 and 287-289.
18. Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp.349, pp.359-381.
19. Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, pp.81-82, 169.
20. *Ibid.*, pp.47 and 65.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 47 and 129.
22. François Chevalier, "The North Mexican Hacienda: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century," in Archibald R. Lewis and Thomas F. McGann, eds., *The New World Looks at its History* (Austin, 1963), p.98; Charles H. Harris III, *A Mexican Family Empire, The Latifundio of the Sánchez Navarros, 1756-1867* (Austin, 1975), pp.8 and 27.
23. *Ibid.*, passim (esp. pp.3-27).
24. James Riley, *Hacendados jesuitas en México. El Colegio Máximo de San Pedro y San Pablo, 1685-1767* (Mexico, 1976), pp.190-196.

25. Ursula Ewald, *Estudios sobre la hacienda colonial en México, las propiedades rurales del Colegio Espíritu Santo en Puebla* (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp.121 – 124.
26. Examples are the "Hacienda de la Erre" of the Mariscales de Castilla near Dolores in Guanajuato; see David A. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajío, León 1700 – 1860* (Cambridge, 1978), pp.32 – 32 and the Hacienda – Mayorazgo Cienega de Mata of the Rincón Gallardo family in Aguascalientes; see Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp.314 – 315.
27. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.202 – 210; Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp. 121 – 141.
28. Ibid., pp.123 and 314 – 315.
29. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.49.
30. Magnus Mörner, "Continuidad y cambio en una provincia del Cuzco: Calca y Lares desde los años 1680 hasta los 1790," *HC*, 9(1975), 102; while the haciendas' share of cattle and equines was huge, their total number were rather small.
31. José Domingo Choquehuanca, *Ensayo de estadística completa de los ramos económico – políticos de la provincia de Azángaro en el departamento de Puno de la República Peruana, contados desde 1825 hasta 1829 inclusive* (Lima, 1833), pp.13 – 55.
32. Olinda Celestino, *La economía pastoral de las cofradías y el rol de la nobleza India: el valle del Mantaro en el siglo XVIII*, Universität Bielefeld, Universitätsforschung Lateinamerikaforschung, Arbeitspapier No. 25 (November 1981), pp.20 and 28.
33. Nils Jacobsen, "Landtenure and Society in the Peruvian Altiplano: Azángaro Province, 1770 – 1920", (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1982), chapter III.
34. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, pp.30 – 33.
35. Magnus Mörner, *Perfil de la sociedad rural del Cuzco a fines de la colonia* (Lima, 1978), p.72.
36. Choquehuanca, *Ensayo de estadística*, pp.15 – 53.
37. Waldemar Espinoza Soriano, "Geografía histórica de Huamachuco," *HC*, 5 (1971), 37 – 54. The only two livestock estates existing in the cold climate province of Cajatambo, at the northwestern end of the Intendancy of Tarma, held the considerable capital of 30,000 and 10,000 sheep in the early 1790's; see J.C., "Descripción sucinta de la provincia ó partido de Cajatambo, en que se trata por incidencia de la decadencia de las minas y de las causas de la despoblación del reyno," *MP*, Tomo V, Nos. 162 and 163 (1792), 198.
38. Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule*, p.540, note 33.
39. Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p.8, affirms that in the Mantaro valley European livestock had replaced cameloids "casi en forma total" by the late eighteenth century. The central Peruvian sierra would present a somewhat difficult intermediate case in the correlation of Indian livestock holding and the extension of estates.
40. Dusenberry, *The Mexican Mesta*, pp.91 – 116; Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp.291 – 296; Ewald, *Estudios*, pp.126 – 133.
41. Ibid., p.12; Herman Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico, Santa Lucia, 1576 – 1767* (Stanford, 1980), p.85.

42. Thomas Calvo, "Le pré-capitalisme aux champs: un étrange seigneur de troupeaux mexicain," *CAL*, 24(1981), 167-183.
43. As example for the importance of *ahijaderos* for the economic operation of late colonial livestock estancias in the sierra see the appraisal of the former Jesuit estancia Llallagua, anexo Titiri in the *partido* of Azángaro in 1771, published in Pablo Macera, *Mapas coloniales de haciendas Cuzqueñas* (Lima, 1968), p.29.
44. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.222; Ewald, *Estudios*, p.147.
45. Ibid.; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.222.
46. Mariano Millan de Aguirre, "Descripción de la intendencia de Tarma," *MP*, Tomo VIII, Nos. 258-260 (1793), 128; Celestino, *La economía pastoral*, p.51.
47. Alonso Carrio de la Vandra, *El lazarillo de los ciegos caminantes* (1773), ed. Emilio Carillo (Barcelona, 1973), p.24; Pablo Macera, *Instrucciones para el manejo de las haciendas jesuitas del Perú (siglos XVII-XVIII)*, Nueva Cronica Vol. II, Fasc. 2 (Lima, 1966), p.34. Mörner, *Perfil de la sociedad rural*, p.73; Laureano Bedeybz(!), "Carta y rasgo remitidos a la sociedad sobre el contenido del Mercurio numero 177," *MP*, Tomo VI, No. 206 (1792), 275; this letter concerns cattle raising in Ica.
48. Emilio Romero, *Perú: una nueva geografía*, 2 vols.(Lima, about 1972), II:221.
49. Ewald, *Estudios*, p.148.
50. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, pp.33-34, pp. 64-65; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.201; Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda*, pp.88, 105 and 197-214 demonstrates the effects of both peasant resistance against extensions of estate pastures and shifting emphasis from livestock to food and cash crops for the stagnation and even decline of Santa Lucia's livestock operations since the mid-eighteenth century.
51. Jacobsen, "Landtenure and Society", Appendix II.
52. Only Jean Piel speaks for the late eighteenth century of a "véritable essor agricole lié à l'augmentation de la production, de la population et des échanges," essentially basing his judgement on evidence from one Indian community in the central sierra, Santa Lucia de Pacaros; see his *Capitalisme agraire au Pérou*, Vol.I.: *Originalité de la société agraire peruvienne au XIX siècle* (Paris, 1975), p.227.
53. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.207-208; Sierra Contreras, *Guadalupe ganadera*, p.320; Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, p.16.
54. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.213.
55. Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda*, pp.181-182 and 196.
56. Claude Morin, "Sentido y alcance del siglo XVIII en América Latina: el caso del centro-oeste mexicano," in Enrique Florescano, ed., *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América Latina (1500-1975)*, (Mexico, 1979), p.161.
57. Richard Salvucci, "Industrial Organization and Economic Geography: The Textile Manufactories in New Spain, 1690-1810", paper presented at the conference on "Historia económica de Hispanoamérica a fines del período colonial: México y Perú, 1760-1810", Bielefeld, September 1982.
58. Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.31-41.

59. For Mörner's critique see his *Perfil de la sociedad*, pp.126 – 128.
60. Jacobsen, "Landtenure and Society", Chapter III; in 1792 a correspondent from Ica reported that the scarcity of livestock brought to that town from the adjoining Sierra province of Castrovirreina had begun just twelve years ago, i.e. in 1780; see Bedeybz, "Carta y rasgo remitido", 275.
61. Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.32 – 33; Ewald, *Estudios*, pp.129 – 133; "advertencias para que se gobiernan por ellas el mayordomo de estas estancias (Ayuni y Camara)...," September 26, 1702, in Macera, *Mapas coloniales*, pp.84 – 90.
62. Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda*, p.183, reports 1.74 pounds of wool per sheep annually during the first third of the eighteenth century; for the large estancia Chusgón, in the northern sierra, province of Huamachuco, Espinoza Soriano, "Geografía histórica," p.37, has found average wool production of 1.5 to 2 pounds annually per sheep for 1759; the mortality of lambs immediately after birth was extremely high in both vicerealties; see Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.33 ff; Macera, *Mapas coloniales*, p.76.
63. "Proyecto económico sobre el aumento del ganado vacuno," *MP*, Tomo VI, No. 177 (1792), 26 – 30.
64. Dusenberry, *The Mexican Mesta*, p.135.
65. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.193 – 207; Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp.95 – 96 and 104.
66. Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.79 – 87.
67. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial; mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima, 1982), pp.179 – 189.
68. Tulio Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y guerra; formación de una elite dirigente en la Argentina criolla* (Buenos Aires, 1972), pp.18 – 21.
69. For a comparative treatment of the mule trades between Guadalajara and Mexico and Salta and Lima, see Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp.197 – 206.
70. Cephalio, "Dissertación histórica y política sobre el comercio del Perú," *MP*, Tomo I (1791), Tables 1 and 2, between pp. 228 – 229. Stock statistics for the three principal livestock raising provinces of the Intendancy of Puno between 1807 and the 1820's indicate sheep populations between 100,000 and 300,000 head per province, so that an annual extraction of at least 400,000 head suggested by the 1791 trade statistics seem much too high; see Jacobsen, "Landtenure and Society", Chapter III.
71. Millan de Aguirre, "Descripción", pp.113 and 137; Joseph Ignacio de Lequanda, "Descripción geográfica del partido de Piura," *MP*, Tomo VIII, Nos. 263 – 270 (1793), 225 – 226.
72. On Lima's extremely scarce consumption of beef during the 1740's see Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, *Relación histórica del viaje á la América meridional*, 2 vols.(Madrid, 1748 [reprint ed. Madrid, 1978]), II: 134.
73. Horst Pietschmann, "Der Repartimiento – Handel der Distriktsbeamten im Raum Puebla im 18. Jahrhundert", *JLA*, 10(1973), 236 – 250.
74. I am grateful to Guy Thomson for suggesting the importance of different scales of urbanization for the market structure to me; my argument here owes much to Eric van Young, who was the first to systematically analyze shifts in late colonial Mexico's agrarian production as a consequence of demographic developments.

75. I would like to thank John Coatsworth for pointing out the importance of transport and transaction costs for explaining different structures of markets for livestock products to me.
76. Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, p.203.
77. Compare price quotations for the 1790's and early 1800's in Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.81-87; Quirós, "Idea de la riqueza," pp.239-241; for sheep values on a Jesuit hacienda close to Mexico City in 1764 see Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda*, p.179.
78. Partido de Lampa de la provincia é Intendencia de la ciudad de Puno, estado que manifiesta en primer lugar el numero de pueblos y habitantes clasificados, y en segundo lugar los valores de todos los frutos, y efectos de agricultura, de industria y minerales que ha producido este partido en todo el año de 18 [sic!] distinguido por el numero peso ó medida de cada clase, Lampa, May 23, 1808, BNP, Sala de Investigaciones, Manuscript Collection; Tadeo Haenke, *Descripción del Perú*, (Lima, 1901), pp.18-19.
79. Jacobsen, "Landtenure and Society," p.112.
80. Quirós, "Idea de la riqueza", p.242 quotes a mean price of fifteen pesos for early nineteenth century New Spain; under the system of *repartos de bienes*, *corregidores* sold mules in Peru for twenty-five to sixty pesos between 1754 and 1783, depending on the distance from livestock raising centers; see Jürgen Golte, *Repartos y rebeliones, Túpac Amaru y las contradicciones de la economía colonial*, (Lima, 1980), p.87; even after the end of the *repartos*, in the mid-1790's a mule de calesa in Lima still sold for sixty pesos; see Haenke, *Descripción*, pp.18-19.
81. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, pp.85-87; Van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.45-49.
82. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos*, pp.86-87; van Young, *Hacienda and Market*, pp.45-48; Serrera Contreras, *Guadalajara ganadera*, pp.87-88; Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant*, pp.130-131; Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.80-92; Maria Eugenia Romero and Erendira Villamar, "Producción y mercado: San José Acolman y Anexas, 1788-1798," in Enrique Semo, ed., *Siete ensayos sobre la hacienda mexicana, 1780-1880* (Mexico, 1977), p.168; on declining cattle sales to peasants after the abolition of *repartos*, see Pietschmann, "Repartimiento-Handel," p.241; on Mexico City as livestock market see Pedro Alonso O'Crouly, *A Description of the Kingdom of New Spain* (n.p.; 1972), p.30; Alejandro de Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre el reino de la Nueva España*, Juan Ortega, ed.(Mexico,1966), pp.132-133.
83. Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire*, pp.82-90; Romero and Villamar, "Producción y mercado", p.168.
84. Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, *Precios y producción agraria, Potosí y Charcas en el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires, 1983), pp.76, 82-83.
85. Nicolas Cushner, *Lords of the Land, Sugar, Wine and Jesuit Estates of Coastal Peru, 1600-1767* (Albany, 1980), p.72.
86. "Proyecto economico", p.27.
87. José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, *Memoria de Gobierno*, 2 Vols.(Sevilla, 1944), I: 219; for regional reports of declining obraje production see Ignacio de Castro, "Relación del Cuzco," in *Colección documental de la independencia del Perú* Tomo II, *La rebelión de Túpac Amaru*, Vol. 1, *Antecedentes*, (Lima, 1971), p.213; Möerner, *Perfil de la sociedad*, pp.85-87; Millan de

- Aguirre, "Descripción," pp.133 - 134; J.C., "Descripción sucinta de la provincia i partido de Caxatambo," *MP*, Tomo V, nos. 162 - 163 (1792), 191; Espinoza, "Geografía histórica," p.7.
88. Tandeter and Wachtel, *Precios y producción*, pp.23 - 30; see also Brooke Larson's contribution on Cochabamba's cotton conjuncture during the 1790's in this volume; it would seem that the growing difficulties of the Huamanga *obrajes* in marketing their woolen textiles in Alto Peru since the 1770's, described by Miriam Salas in this volume, only represent the tail - end of the worsening long - term conjuncture.
 89. Elias Trabulse, coordinator, *Fluctuaciones económicas en Oaxaca durante el siglo XVIII* (Mexico, 1979), p.47; Tandeter and Wachtel, *Precios y producción*, p.76.
 90. See John Fisher's contribution to this volume; see also Carlos Sempat Assadourian, Heraclio Bonilla, Antonio Mitre and Tristan Platt, *Minería y espacio económico en los Andes, siglos XVI - XX* (Lima, 1980), pp.24 - 25.
 91. Joseph Ignacio de Lequanda, "Descripción geográfica del partido de Caxamarca," *MP*, Tomo X, Nos. 333 - 338 (1794), 185, 192 and 210; Millan de Aguirre, "Descripción," pp.134 - 135.

COMMENTARY

Friedrich Katz

Comparative studies between the Andean region and Mexico have interested historians, anthropologists and economists for a long time. The two regions have enough in common to make a comparison viable, and sufficiently striking differences to make it fascinating. Both regions constituted the only great empires of pre-hispanic America. Both were based on a juxta-position of powerful emperors and a large nobility at the top and communal organizations at the bottom (though not at the rock bottom) of society. Both ruling groups of these empires, the Incas in the Andean region and the Aztecs in Mexico, only emerged about a century before the coming of the Spaniards. Both of these powerful empires crumbled under the assault of only a few hundred Spaniards.

Nevertheless, both empires also manifested profound differences. The Inca empire was far more integrated than that of the Aztecs. In fact many Mexicanists refuse to label the territory ruled by the cities of the triple alliance, Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan, an empire at all. The Incas attempted to garrison their empire, sent administrators to all the regions under their control and carried out extensive resettlement of populations. Attempts were made to set up a common religion, a common ideology and Quechua was to be the common language of the whole empire. At the same time the Inca empire attempted to preempt the redistribution of wealth by absorbing the surplus that the local population produced and redistributing it in part to the Inca nobility, in part to the subject population. No comparable structure emerged in Mexico. The Aztecs sent garrisons only to border regions, did not attempt to homogenize the religion, the language and the culture of the regions they ruled nor did they seek to administer them from their capital. The Aztecs did absorb a large part of the surplus that the common people produced but they did so only with the aim of supporting the cities of the triple alliance. Redistribution of goods was largely carried out by trade in Mexico while the state assumed that function in Peru.

Differences within the two empires existed not only at the top but at the bottom of society as well. The village community seems to have been far more widespread and above all more egalitarian in Peru than it was in Mexico. There were no periodic redistributions of land within the

community in Mexico as there were in Peru, nor was the Mexican community (i.e. the *calpulli*) obligated to care for widows and orphans and the poor as the Peruvian community (i.e. the *ayllu*) did. The result of these social and economic differences as well as the ecological variations (there was more intensive agriculture in pre-Columbian Peru than in Mexico and the inhabitants of the Andean region, unlike those of Mexico, practiced livestock raising before the Spaniards came) was that Mexico in contrast to the Andean region was affected by periodic famines which produced a large degree of mortality.

As a consequence of these differences, large segments of the subjects of the Aztec Empire considered it as tyranny that had very little legitimacy. In Peru, by contrast, the Incas seemed to have been much more profoundly embedded among the population. The results of these differences in legitimacy could be clearly seen during the conquest and afterwards. In Mexico, Hernan Cortes rode the crest of a popular uprising against the Aztecs. No similar popular revolt supported the Spanish conquest of Peru. The myth of a golden Aztec past has never existed in Mexico nor has it had any relevance to later uprisings. In Peru, by contrast, every major social upheaval until today was linked to the belief in an age of justice and glory during the Inca period.

A further factor of insecurity of the Aztec empire in contrast to its Andean counterpart was the existence of a large hostile frontier on its borders. The nomadic and semi-nomadic inhabitants of northern Mexico constituted a far greater threat to the stability of Aztec, or for that matter all, central Mexican rulers that had preceded them, than the closest Andean equivalent to this frontier: the inhabitants of the Amazon jungle.

Did these differences continue into the Spanish colonial period or did Spain succeed in homogenizing both regions and creating a similar type of entity? The Spaniards certainly attempted to do so. They introduced the same religion, the same ideology, the same institutions, and frequently the same people were in charge first of one, then of the other region. Both regions, the Viceroyalty of New Spain and the Viceroyalty of Peru, became the mainstays of Spanish colonial rule in the Americas. Similar crops and techniques were introduced in both regions. Both were affected by a similar catastrophe: massive Indian mortality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In both the population decline was reversed by the eighteenth century and in the latter years of Spanish colonial rule both the Andean region and Mexico underwent the greatest

popular uprisings in the history of the Spanish empire.

The three essays by Nils Jacobsen, Eric Van Young and Albert Meyers clearly show the new and old type of similarities and differences that emerged in the two regions during the colonial period and above all at its end.

Nils Jacobsen compares both the reception and the effects of livestock raising in both regions. Both Eric Van Young and Albert Meyers deal with a similar subject, the social changes and the crisis in the countryside of Mexico and Peru at the end of the colonial period. One difficulty of a comparative nature that the latter two papers have is the fact that while Eric Van Young deals with the whole of New Spain, Albert Meyers only concentrates on a limited region of Peru, the Mantaro valley which is not necessarily typical of the whole of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Nevertheless, all three papers do make it possible to assess some of the main similarities and differences between the two regions.

Nils Jacobsen's fundamental thesis, which I fully agree with, is that in Peru livestock raising at least to a degree was absorbed into the Indian economy. In New Spain by contrast it remained outside the Indian economy and to a large degree began to disrupt it. Some of the fundamental reasons for this discrepancy that Nils Jacobsen lists are very convincing: the fact that Indians in Peru had raised livestock prior to the conquest made it much easier for them to do the same afterwards. Another fact of an ecological nature that Jacobsen cites, namely that in many of the stock raising regions agriculture could only be practiced to a limited degree and thus was not displaced by the new livestock industry is also very clear and convincing. What I feel Mr. Jacobsen should have insisted on more is to show that both Indian communities and the Indian nobility were far more powerful in Peru than in Mexico. The reasons for this discrepancy had to do with a number of factors both historical and ecological. In historical terms the Incaic *ayllu* seems to have been both more widespread and above all far more structured and pervasive (with its profound care for orphans, widows, those who could not work, etc.) in the pre-hispanic period than the Aztec *calpulli* where these social functions do not seem to have existed. Another difference was that in Mexico the center of Spanish settlement was identical with the center of Aztec rule: the Valley of Mexico. In Peru, by contrast, the Spaniards tended to settle above all in the coastal regions and in the mining region of Potosí and less so in the Cuzco region of the southern highlands, the old center of Inca power. As a result, the Inca nobility retained a far greater measure of control than the Aztec nobility did. Its

power was also strengthened by the fact that in linguistic and cultural terms, the Incas had achieved a far greater degree of homogeneity on the eve of the conquest than the Aztecs had. As a result, the Quechua language was far more widespread in Peru than Nahuatl was in Mexico and the legitimacy of Inca rule was far more recognized. Not only the tradition of cattle raising but the greater power of this Inca nobility and of the village community in Peru allowed it to play a greater role in such an important and at times decisive part of the economy as livestock raising. In Mexico by contrast, this even more important segment of the economy became a non-Indian domain and as a result not only the Indian communities but the Indian nobility in most parts of the country (with conspicuous exceptions such as in Oaxaca) became marginalized in economic and social terms. This in turn would help to explain the far smaller role that both Indian communities and Indian nobles played in the major social upheavals in New Spain in comparison to Peru.

Another difference between the two regions that Nils Jacobsen stresses is that livestock raising caused much more profound economic and social changes in Mexico than in Peru. One reason is simple and obvious, livestock had not existed in pre-Columbian Mexico as it had in pre-Columbian Peru. Perhaps even more important though is the fact which Jacobsen also mentions, that in Mexico in contrast to Peru, thanks to livestock raising, immense new territories, i.e. the northern part of Mexico that had only been inhabited by nomadic Indians before, were now settled. This in turn profoundly transformed the whole character of Mexico and accentuated its differences with Peru. Northern Mexico constituted a freer and more modern segment of the country's society: Nothing similar to northern Mexico developed in Peru. While its impact during the colonial period was limited, during the nineteenth and above all early twentieth centuries, Mexico's northern frontier would become a center of modernization as well as a center of social revolution that in the years 1910-1920 would overwhelm all of Mexico and leave its profound imprint on the whole of society. The Revolution of 1910-1920 whose influence on Mexico can still be felt and which propelled Mexico into a development not only different from that of Peru but from all of Latin America was inconceivable without the livestock raising that first helped to populate the frontier where all victorious armies in 1910-1920 originated.

In spite of the profound social economic differences between the Andean region and Mexico, both suffered from a crisis similar in many respects in the last years of Spanish colonial rule.

With respect to New Spain, Eric Van Young aptly characterizes this period with the words "growth without development." There was growth of agriculture, industrial and mining production. There was the general demographic increase and the population of the cities rose at a far more rapid pace than that of Mexico as a whole. Nevertheless, the living standards of the mass of the population fell. In contrast to other authors, Van Young does not attribute this evolution primarily to the Bourbon reforms, but to a combination of demographic increase and limited access both to land for cultivation and to pasture lands. As a result, peasants were forced to sell their labor at increasingly cheaper rates and to migrate to the cities whose population increased dramatically. This in turn led to an increasing demand which stimulated agricultural production on the larger estates. As the estates found *demesne* agriculture to be more productive than share cropping, more peasants were displaced and the living standard decreased even more. As a result the death rate increased and the growth of population, though not stopped, diminished significantly in the last years of Spanish rule in New Spain. Van Young does not dismiss the Bourbon reforms altogether but he considers them as secondary to the combination of demographic increase and insufficient land which in turn led to a transfer of wealth from the peasants to the landowners, and from the countryside to the cities. The Bourbon reforms may on the one hand have stimulated some aspects of mining production which created a larger market for agricultural production. On the other hand, they may very well have slowed economic development by increasing taxation and the transfer of revenues from New Spain.

Did similar developments occur in the Andean region? Albert Meyers' description of the evolution of the Mantaro Valley definitely shows that a series of developments were common to both the Viceroyalty of New Spain and that of Peru: an increase of an agricultural population owning insufficient lands of their own to subsist. In the Mantaro valley, it was above all the control of pastoral lands by the large estates that produced increasing shortages and lack of land among the peasants of the region.

As in New Spain mining production as well as production of commercial crops on large estates increased. As in New Spain overall economic activity seems to have increased in the Mantaro valley and in the viceroyalty of Peru as a whole. Unlike Eric Van Young, Albert Meyers does not attempt to assess to what degree these tendencies were due to the Bourbon reforms, and to what degree population increase and ensuing impoverishment of the poorest segments of the rural community

were responsible for many of these developments.

A comparison between Eric Van Young's and Albert Meyers' papers indicates several areas of contrast between Mexico and Peru, i.e. at least between New Spain and the Mantaro valley that are worth exploring further: In contrast to Van Young, Meyers never speaks of famines in his region. Does this indicate that the pre-hispanic contrast between Mexico and Peru subsisted into the colonial period and that for a number of ecological and perhaps social reasons famines could be far more easily avoided there than in Mexico?

Meyers coincides with Van Young's assertion for New Spain that forms of forced labor were receding in the eighteenth century because of the increase in population. There was a sharp decrease in debt peonage in Mexico and of the *mita* in Peru. Nevertheless, Peruvian miners seemed to have had more difficulties than Mexican miners (except in the more inaccessible frontier regions) to attract free labor. Meyers does not see the main cause of this in a lack of landless laborers (such as existed in the sixteenth and perhaps in seventeenth centuries), but rather in the low salaries paid by the miners. He implies that many mines were run by small marginal operators who may not have had the capital to pay these wages. Why was this the case at a time when the Spanish state was attempting to revive mining by every means at its disposal? What viable alternatives did the landless laborers who did not work in the mines have to find their sustenance?

One fascinating contrast between late colonial New Spain and late colonial Peru concerns land expropriations. I fully agree with Van Young's statement that massive land expropriations took place in New Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when most of the Indian population had died, and not on the eve of Independence. Meyers seems to indicate that something very different occurred in Peru. Here in the last years of Spanish rule, *cofradías* on the one hand and land-owners of the other seem to have confiscated a very large amount of Indian lands. One explanation, for which I have found no evidence up to now, might be that Indian mortality was smaller in Peru than it was in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Mexico. As a result more Indians would have remained on their land. A second explanation, which may make more sense is that less Spaniards emigrated into the densely settled Indian regions of highland Peru than they did into the core areas of highland Mexico. As a result, Indian communities and nobles retained more of their land. With increasing commercialization and land values rising in the eighteenth century, incentives to expropriate Indian lands

may now have increased.

One obvious difference between New Spain and Peru on the eve of Independence was the fact that at the beginning of the nineteenth century a major popular uprising, the Tupac Amaru revolt, had already occurred in Peru and been crushed, while the great lower class revolt in Mexico, the Hidalgo revolt, had not yet taken place. Did the crushing of the Indian revolt in Peru mean that the landowners now felt strong enough to appropriate the lands of the vanquished? This would lead to another set of interesting comparisons between Mexico and Peru for the defeat of the Hidalgo and Morelos revolts in Mexico did not lead, at least in the short run, to any massive attack on Indian property rights. The contrast is all the more interesting since the Mexican state that assumed power shortly after the defeat of Hidalgo and Morelos was far less committed to maintaining the integrity of Indian lands than the Spanish state that still retained power in Peru for about forty years after the end of Tupac Amaru revolt. The contrast might conversely be due to the fact that the weak Mexican state that followed independence simply did not have the kind of power that the Spanish state in Peru still possessed to crush peasant resistance against expropriation. Above all, the newly created Mexican state did not have the authority and means to create the kind of order that was necessary in order to allow and encourage the type of economic boom that made land expropriations worthwhile in an economic sense in the first place.

These are just a few of the comparative problems for which these excellent papers have laid the basis and which I feel require a large amount of additional research.

IV. THE ARTESANAL AND MANUFACTURING SECTOR

6. THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY OF COCHABAMBA, 1770 - 1810: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS OF GROWTH

Brooke Larson

Though it would be trite to describe eighteenth century Cochabamba as a region of paradoxes, there is perhaps no other way to account for the contradictions and discrepancies of so many European reports on the region. Reliable and astute colonial observers like the Intendants Francisco de Viedma, Francisco Paula Sanz and the Czech naturalist Tadeo Haenke at times seemed to view local society through stereopticons that rarely brought the two images into sharp focus.¹ After touring the valleys, European observers would often admire the "opulent haciendas of maize and wheat" and "excellent pastures that nourish multitudes of sheep," while lamenting the region's cash-hungry hacendados. Viedma, for example, described in detail Cochabamba's craft industries and bustling peasant markets. Yet he characterized the peasants and urban plebe as chronically idle and slothful. And while he invariably noted the strong acculturative forces at work in the largest "mestizo province" of Alto Peru, he warned against the "indigenization" of colonial customs and language, as Quechua increasingly "contaminated" the speech of the creoles. And, finally, the very statistics on trade and prices that Viedma compiled in the 1780's and 1790's seemed to contradict his own generalizations about the region's alleged over-abundance of wheat and maize in most agricultural years as well as his assumption that Cochabamba exported little grain or cotton cloth to the markets of the Altiplano.²

To be sure, eighteenth century Cochabamba did not "fit" the dominant Andean mold - if indeed there was one. It was neither an Indian region, like the neighboring province of Chayanta where hacendados never displaced nor marginalized Indian village society; nor was it an intensive monocultural zone like the nearby coca-producing province of

Chulumani.³ Since the sixteenth century the cereal haciendas had become the dominant agrarian structure, originally producing for the silver mines of Potosí and, to a lesser extent, Oruro. By the eighteenth century the regional economy had experienced something of an economic involution, as landowners' commercial profits were pinched by the long-term contraction in demand for their foodcrops at the highland mines and as the hacendados faced growing competition from peasant smallholders. The proliferation of small-scale wheat, maize and potato cultivators who (crop yields permitting or scarcity dictating) regularly participated in the product and labor markets were, of course, internally differentiated. And a narrow layer of peasant producers managed to prosper and accumulate; but their meager gains rarely spelled peasant proprietorship and freedom from rent.

In fact, material conditions probably deteriorated for most valley peasants over the course of the eighteenth century, as colonial authorities imposed new burdens and liens on the peasant household. To wit, the rural population of Cochabamba supported one of the largest (in absolute terms) legal yearly *repartos* (or forced distribution of merchandise) between 1754 and 1780.⁴ And after the Bourbons systematized tribute collection in the late 1770's, they levied tax (at six pesos, two reales – one of the stiffest rates in Alto Peru) on the *forasteros* of the province.⁵ In addition, rapidly growing population in the valley of Cliza and other parts of the region placed more pressure on productive resources and swelled the ranks of the impoverished and rootless. These "structural factors" placed a downward pressure on many peasant households and cut into the thin margin of social insurance most families relied upon in their struggle against the endemic uncertainties of agrarian life, where normally grain harvests could double and halve from one year to the next.

I. Agrarian Origins of Industry

How did peasants on valley haciendas shape their economic lives to guarantee themselves a stable livelihood from one year to the next? Despite all the liens that the state, the church and individual landlords placed on the surplus product of peasant labor, peasants who inhabited hacienda lands in the central valleys were commercially oriented whenever nature afforded them an abundant or good harvest. The smallholders of Cochabamba were notorious for their commercial activities and networks of *ferias* which provided the mechanism for the distribution

of food crops, seeds, and manufactured goods throughout most of the region.⁶ But while small-scale peasant marketing certainly undermined landlord monopoly, farming alone usually offered little chance for most households to radically improve their standard of living. This was especially so as population pressure increased in the late eighteenth century in the central valley and agricultural prices throughout Alto Peru tended to stagnate during the latter part of the eighteenth century, according to a preliminary study of commodity prices over the course of this century.⁷ Out of the countervailing forces of population pressure and local commercial opportunity, many peasants began to diversify their economic activities and turn to petty crafts and trade. Capital-poor and land-short, country people channelled their labor ("the idle hands" for which local authorities had such contempt) into industry.⁸ Alongside *producción parcelaria* in the central valleys arose multifarious cottage industries: *chicha* making (in Cliza and the Cercado), lumber and carpentry (in Sacaba), soap, glass-blowing and gunpowder workshops (in Cliza) and, most importantly, cotton textiles (in Quillacollo and the Cercado).⁹

Cochabamba's primitive cotton textile industry developed late, during the second half of the eighteenth century. Unlike the production of woollens which predominated in the western provinces of the Altiplano, cotton manufacturing in the valleys was a dispersed, cottage industry that sprang up in the towns of Cochabamba, Tarata, and Quillacollo and the surrounding countryside.¹⁰ It did not entirely displace textile manufacturing in *obrajes*, where rural laborers were engaged as spinners and weavers under deplorable conditions, at the command of their landlord or employer who owned the looms and other instruments of production. On many haciendas peasants were forced to spin and weave, as well as to cultivate their lord's lands. In the 1780's, the male tenants of the hacienda Caporaya in the Calliri river valley, for example, had to sentence their wives to the workshops of the hacienda where they turned wool and cotton into yarn and wove cloth, all as part of their labor rent.¹¹

But on most haciendas, including Caporaya, peasants wove *bayetas* and other rustic woollen cloth, under orders of their landlord, mainly for home consumption. Cochabamba had few commercial *obrajes* in the late eighteenth century, and as a result, the region imported from distant provinces most of its rustic woollen cloth.

A sample of one fifth of the colonial goods that entered the province in various years between 1777 and 1808, which were taxed and regis-

tered in the royal *alcabala* accounts, reveals that rustic cloth destined for peasant consumption was the principal item of import.¹² Various types of *bayeta* generated almost 30 percent of the tax value of the total number (1,313) of goods sampled. Rustic clothing imports added another 12 percent of the tax value, so that cheap woolen cloth and clothing for peasant consumers represented almost half of the value of all taxable merchandise that entered the province. *Obrajes* and workshops in the highland provinces of La Paz and north of Lake Titicaca, especially around Cuzco, supplied the Cochabamba valleys with most of its woolen imports.¹³ Thus, while the cost of cotton textile production was generally higher than spinning and weaving woolen cloth, especially where there was no local supply of raw cotton, the competition from the small workshops (*chorillos*) and *obrajes* of the highlands compelled the artisans of Cochabamba to turn to *tocuyo* production.¹⁴

Tocuyo was the cloth of the laboring poor. It was a rustic, undyed cotton textile that Indians and mestizos used.¹⁵ The Intendant of the city of Arequipa, another center of *tocuyo* manufacture, explained in his *Memorias* "that the *plebe* wears *tocuyo* cloth as undergarments."¹⁶ *Tocuyos* were considerably cheaper than the dyed cotton cloth of Quito, and after 1780 local rustic cotton cloth edged the famous quiteño textiles out of the market.¹⁷ But the crude and plain cloth never spontaneously replaced the finer cottons and woolen textiles imported from Europe. The prosperous consumers in the valleys continued to purchase European cloth in abundance, "draining the province of scarce money," Intendant Francisco de Viedma complained in 1788.¹⁸ Cochabamba's *tocuyeros* sent some of their product to distant markets, but stiff competition from European textile manufacturers restricted their markets to the local ones. Local producers were even more hard put to overcome the logistics of transit time, weight, bulk and profitability entailed in long-distance, overland trade once Spain opened Spanish ports in 1778, including the great port of Barcelona, for direct trade with Buenos Aires. The Crown's "free trade" policy and state subsidies for Spanish textile manufacturing stimulated the rapid growth of cotton cloth production in the metropolis. In only a decade (1775 to 1784), the production of cotton textiles in Spain increased threefold, and Barcelona became a major cloth supplier to the Viceroyalty of La Plata.¹⁹ Furthermore, the *tocuyeros* of Cochabamba confronted British contraband traders who introduced cheap, mass-produced cotton textiles from the factories of Manchester and the rustic calicoes from India.²⁰ The relatively late development of the textile industry in Cochabamba, its primitive nature, the crude quality of the

cloth, and the difficulty of procuring raw cotton from distant sources of supply created formidable obstacles which (without drastic disruption of international trade) neither enterprising artisans nor shrewd merchants in Cochabamba could hope to overcome.²¹ Under "normal" circumstances, then, the textile industry of Cochabamba was oriented toward the consumption of the laboring classes, both urban and rural, and subject to the constraints of a narrow market.

Contemporary sources defy precise estimate of the number of people who were engaged in cloth production and marketing in Cochabamba. In 1788 Viedma mentioned that 500 *cholos* and *mestizos* occupied themselves in cloth manufacturing in the parish of Quillacollo.²² But a plethora of small workshops also peppered the parishes of the Cercado and Tarata. Many years later, in 1804, Juan Carillo de Albornoz made reference to some 3,000 *tocuyo* weavers in the province.²³ The number of women and children engaged in spinning, dyeing and marketing *tocuyos* probably trebled that estimate, so that perhaps eight or ten thousand people were involved in one or another stage of production or distribution during peak output. This may well be a conservative estimate. In his 1827 report on potential market and investment opportunities in Bolivia, the British envoy John Barclay Pentland estimated that as many as 20,000 people in the province fashioned raw cotton into *tocuyos* during the 1790's.²⁴ In any event, we can say with reasonable certainty that Cochabamba far surpassed the province of Arequipa, its closest competitor, in the volume of *tocuyo* production in this period. The Intendant Barriga reported in the late 1780's that in the town environs of Arequipa weavers produced at least 124,000 *varas* of cloth each year.²⁵ This output hardly compared to the 300,000 *varas* of cloth that merchants in Cochabamba dispatched to distant marketplaces in the same period.²⁶ And that estimate apparently excludes the bulk of the cloth destined for local consumption. Cochabamba was probably the largest producer of *tocuyos* in the Andes. Tadeo Haenke, the Czech naturalist who resided in Cochabamba for many years, apparently thought as much: "...the Province of Cochabamba ... consumes [as much cotton] in its looms as all the other [provinces] combined."²⁷

For all the growth and promise of the textile industry in Cochabamba, curiously little information was left to us about the industrial organization of *tocuyo* production. Haenke often referred to the primitive conditions under which people worked. "As I mentioned earlier," he wrote in 1799, "one finds industry in these towns in its first infancy ... The utensils, instruments, and some of the looms are poorly constructed

and lack the use of those [English] machines that facilitate and abbreviate the different tasks".²⁸ The power looms and other machinery that would have speeded up and standardized cloth production in Cochabamba was, of course, turning the cities of Manchester and Belfast into textile workshops of the world and launching England's Industrial Revolution.

But in these Andean pockets of commercial textile production, non-capitalist social relations predominated. The labor process was divided essentially into three phases: the preparatory work of cleaning and plying and spinning cotton; weaving cloth on the treadle looms; and stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. In many cases this last process was eliminated, and unbleached, undyed *tocuyos* were sold and used. A rudimentary division of labor existed, as workers engaged in one or another of the stages of production. Women and children performed what Haenke called the "auxiliary tasks" of cleaning, spinning the wool, and stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. These tasks were more time consuming, and female spinners generally outnumbered male weavers by more than three to one.²⁹

At first, spinning and weaving was subsidiary to their work on the land. Peasants sometimes turned to artisanal activities when farmwork slackened. But I suspect that as opportunities for commercial gain increased, particularly in the 1790's, a population of professional weavers sprang up in the towns and loosely associated themselves in craft guilds.³⁰ As the demand for yarn increased, women also allocated less time to agricultural chores. This was particularly so because short-fibered cotton was more cumbersome than wool to manipulate. It required more labor and concentration to align the fibers and turn cotton into yarn than to spin wool. Unlike Andean women of the highlands who spun wool as they watched over their herds, the cotton spinners of Cochabamba could not easily combine spinning and shepherding. Demand for cotton yarn must have drawn peasant women off the land into their huts and to the river banks where they cleaned the cotton or stretched the fabric to be dyed with imported indigo.³¹ Thus, while rural people initially turned to handicrafts to supplement and complement agricultural activities, as one of the few economic strategies available to peasants unwilling to emigrate to eastern plantations or other parts, the prospects or possibility of earning their subsistence entirely from craft production impelled some people to devote themselves entirely to their trade. At a certain point, certainly in the year 1799 when Haenke wrote his report on the province's industry, "inferior classes of people [were] able to earn the better part of their subsistence from this industry."³²

For the moment, at least, some peasants had managed to diversify their household economy in ways that presaged the diverse, complementary commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities of the valley smallholders of Cochabamba in the mid-twentieth century.³³

The expansion of textile production was not exclusively the consequence of spontaneous peasant economic diversification into artisan activities, however. Large numbers of smallholders shifted their productive efforts towards industry probably because merchants provided incentives (or exported pressures) for them to do so. Particularly in the 1790's, when political and economic circumstances changed radically as we shall see shortly, merchants and enterprising landlords probably deployed credit devices to stimulate textile production and increase their control over the distribution of woven cloth. Yet the material records leave few traces of a fullscale putting-out system in operation, except for an occasional notarial entry showing a merchant seeking repayment from a *tocuyo* spinner who had accumulated a debt to the claimant.³⁴

The relatively minor role that Cochabamba's merchants played in the organization of textile production contrasts sharply with the dominance of merchant capital in cotton textiles in the Puebla region of Mexico during the late colonial period. As G.P.C. Thomson discusses in his article in this volume, merchant capital virtually controlled the cotton cloth industry in Puebla throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Though "...merchants' interest in the [Mexican] industry fluctuated, ... even in the worst periods of recession ... merchant capital can be found fomenting cotton agriculture, financing the transportation and distribution of raw cotton, financing weavers' production, and marketing their products."³⁵ Puebla's textile industry was older, more capitalized and vertically integrated, and more highly specialized than the *tocuyo* industry in the southern Andes in the same period. Indeed, Puebla's merchants and artisans in the early eighteenth century already had staked out a corner of the textile market in that colony by orienting production around a specialized, high-quality garment, the *rebozo*, which benefitted from silk weaving techniques known to local artisans, who learned to apply them to cotton weaving. Puebla's looms produced a product that was marketable far beyond the boundaries of the regional economy. Set against the entrenched, specialized industry of Puebla, textile manufacturing in Cochabamba appeared to be a precarious industry still fairly atomized among an artisanry which had strong ties to the land. Merchant capital never exercised the same degree of control over *tocuyo* production in Cochabamba that it had achieved in

the Puebla industry by the early eighteenth century. Even when commercial conditions changed for the better in the late 1790's, Cochabamba's merchants failed to capture control of the industry or alter its structure of production in any enduring way.

II. War and the Textile Bonanza

Although Viedma was a Physiocrat at heart, he never doubted the importance of developing Cochabamba's industry. One of his pet charity projects, in fact, was the resurrection of a wool textile factory in the old, abandoned *obraje* of Hulinicate located in the Sacaba valley. It was to be state-run and financed (through a provincial tax on *chicha* consumption) and designed to employ poor and marginally productive members of society. Like the Indians of the jungle ex-mission villages, these industrial workers were to learn the "arts" of spinning and weaving.³⁶ Yet, however laudatory his proposal for this *obra pía* and his plan to provide employment for the humble classes, Viedma was unwilling to challenge Spain's restrictions on industrial growth in the colonies, even as the tide of Spanish trade in textiles to the Viceroyalty of La Plata grew heavier in the 1780's.³⁷ After 1778, European textiles and the calicoes of the East Indies stiffened the competition that itinerant peddlars of inferior *tocuyo* cloth inevitably faced in distant marketplaces. It was not until war temporarily halted that transatlantic trade flow that Viedma and a few local investors seriously considered local industry as a solution to the chronic problems of idleness, under-employment, and capital shortage.

Cochabamba experienced an extraordinary manufacturing bonanza between 1796 and 1802, when trade between Europe and the southern Atlantic ports collapsed as a result of war and the breakdown of Spanish military control of the La Plata river basin. In 1796, after Britain declared war on Spain, the superior British navy moved into the mouth of La Plata and sealed off the port of Buenos Aires from the outside world. Sudden economic isolation in the midst of Spain's imperial crisis afforded a tremendous stimulus to the Viceroyalty's fledgling industries.³⁸ Across the pampas, in Chile and Alto Perú, urban consumers of all social classes now turned inward to local sources of supply for their cotton, woolen and linen textiles.³⁹ Those regions like Cochabamba, Córdoba, Tucumán, and Arequipa which already possessed a local industrial base, however primitive in organization, had a new lease on their economic lives.⁴⁰ The event of war and its side effects provided

more incentive, theoretically at least, for peasant households to diversify their economic activities, local merchants to invest more capital in long-distance trade in cloth, and established artisans to put more spinning wheels and treadle looms into use. But whether strong and sudden market incentive had a more profound and lasting effect, either upon the internal reorganization of textile production into capitalist or semi-capitalist enterprises or upon the regional class structure, is an entirely separate question that merits comparative research on specific regional economies. The textile bonanza of Cochabamba is a case study of rapid industrial growth in the absence of any real transformation in social productive relations.

After 1796, Cochabamba became one of the main suppliers of rustic cotton textiles to cities throughout the Viceroyalty of La Plata. In his 1788 report, Viedma had estimated that cloth worth 60,000 pesos left Cochabamba for "outside provinces" (excluding the eastern districts of Mizque, etc., which absorbed about 15,000 pesos worth of *tocuyo*). In 1798, Pedro Canals, the provincial treasurer, stated that registered *tocuyo* exports for the year 1797 had been valued at 88,085 pesos (at the unit price of two reales per *vara*, the same unit price Viedma recorded in 1793).⁴¹ This represented a 47 percent increase over the 1793 estimates. The treasurer further estimated that in the first three months of 1798, *tocuyo* exports were worth 46,156 pesos. This was more than three times the *tocuyo* exported in a three-month period in 1793. Increasingly, *tocuyo* was in demand in distant markets. In 1799, the registry of the Alcaldia of Buenos Aires listed merchants importing large amounts of *tocuyo* from Cochabamba.⁴²

The increasing demand for *tocuyo* beyond the boundaries of the province was reflected in the gradual increase in its local price. In the 1780's it rarely sold for more than one and a half real; in 1793 its price was two reales. By 1799, a *vara* of *tocuyo* usually sold for two and a half reales. In Buenos Aires in 1798, the price was sometimes as high as three and a half reales.⁴³ Under the stimulus of external demand more looms were employed in cotton textile production. The opening of the markets at Potosí and Buenos Aires for *tocuyo* cloth during a period when less silver was drained out of the Viceroyalty by Spanish and British merchants seemed to offer the solution to Cochabamba's economic anemia. England's belligerency had ostensibly created favorable trade conditions which would channel currency to the province and trigger an economic boom for spinners, weavers and merchants in Cochabamba. It soon became clear, however, that the windfall profits many

had hoped would enrich them overnight were not to be realized unless new supplies of raw cotton were found.

The overnight boom in *tocuyo* production made the region increasingly dependent on the raw cotton produced in the Peruvian coastal area around Moquegua and in the vicinity of Arequipa. Viedma estimated that in 1788 Cochabamba imported about 11,000 *arrobos* of cotton at two pesos, four reales per *arropa*.⁴⁴ In 1798 he reported that the province annually consumed about 30,000 *arrobos* of cotton. The best quality cotton came from the coast and cost as much as six pesos in 1798.⁴⁵

Cochabamba's dependence on imported cotton concerned Viedma and other officials and merchants who saw that much of the income from *tocuyo* only left the province in the pockets of cotton traders. In 1798, Viedma reported that 180,000 pesos flowed out of the region to Arequipa and the coast.⁴⁶ It was the cotton planters of coastal Peru who seemed to be reaping the greatest profits from the *tocuyo* boom. Viedma petitioned the Viceroy and king for permission to cultivate cotton in Santa Cruz.

Perhaps the greatest exponent of local cotton production was the naturalist, Tadeo Haenke. His famous 1799 essay (published in the *Telégrafo Mercantil* of Buenos Aires in 1801) explained the benefits of growing cotton in Cochabamba's semitropical frontiers. He urged the Crown to allow the province to break its economic dependence on coastal Peru by becoming self-sufficient in cotton. He estimated that the province alone consumed 30 to 40,000 *arrobos* of cotton each year, not to mention the cotton needed for *tocuyos* the region exported. Haenke made a strong case.

[This cotton] is the fuel for the *tocuyo* trade which not only brings considerable benefits to this city; it also provides employment for the inferior class of people who earn the better part of their living from this industry... The *tocuyos* of Cochabamba are so inferior and backward that they are comparable to cotton cloth from Asia. During the present war, *tocuyos* have been the only resource of these interior provinces. With the end of communication with Europe and the complete lack of [Spanish, English and Asian] textiles, many individuals would have found themselves naked had it not been for Cochabamba's *tocuyos*. In consideration of all the circumstances of these colonies and of the moral character of their inhabitants, it is not only useful, but necessary, to foment the cultivation of cotton in every way possible and to develop the cotton textile industry which presently is in its infancy.⁴⁷

Haenke went on to enumerate the reasons why the Crown should permit the large-scale production of cotton and *tocuyo* in Cochabamba. His main argument was that Spain's own textile industry would not be harmed by his proposal. High transport costs and royal taxes on the export of raw cotton to Spain and more taxes on imported Spanish textiles made the cloth a relatively high priced item of consumption; its market in Cochabamba was consequently restricted to the upper class. Haenke argued that other European nations, namely England, realized the benefits accruing to the metropolitan country of having abundant supplies of raw cotton produced in its overseas colonies, in North America and India. The cotton produced in India was woven into cheap calicoes, some of which was exported by the Philippine Company to the Spanish colonies. Furthermore, Haenke argued, the textile factories in Spain could not meet the needs of all the Spanish colonies, whose population was rising steadily. Only the growth of manufactories in the colonies would begin to meet the needs of the poor for cheap cloth.⁴⁸

The naturalist offered one further argument for royal sponsorship of local cotton cultivation and *tocuyo* manufacturing. He expounded on the need to develop a manufacturing sector to absorb the growing population of landless mestizos and cholos in Cochabamba. Outside of agriculture, he said, there was no industry to absorb the growing population of underemployed peasants and laboring poor and the large floating mass of vagrants. The growth of a rustic textile industry, Haenke argued, would absorb a vast number of the region's poor. Like the neo-mercantilists of his day, Haenke believed that a healthy economy depended on the employment of its population in industry or specialized agriculture. He appealed to the Crown to consider the benefits accruing to the state with the citizens of "these kingdoms" industrious and usefully employed.⁴⁹ This was to be the great panacea for the indolence and economic stagnation which Viedma had publicly deplored in his 1788 report.

The great campaign for local cotton cultivation and development of the *tocuyo* industry - a campaign that probably peaked in 1801 with the publication of Haenke's essay - seemed to have burned itself out by 1804. The British lifted their blockade in 1802. By 1804 and 1805 royal income from *alcabalas* levied on imported European goods increased sharply.⁵⁰

This probably indicated the entry into the province of large quantities of Spanish goods, particularly textiles. Whether they were actually sold in those years cannot be determined. But this is indirect evidence of the contraction of Cochabamba's export trade in *tocuyos*.

As the new decade opened, the inspired and optimistic economic proposals of Viedma and Haenke probably seemed futile to most observer. A new sense of realism seemed to pervade. The few proposals for economic reform written after 1802 were far less innovative than the earlier schemes. One of the longest reports was written in 1804 by creole merchant and administrator (a *regidor* of the local Cabildo), Juan Carrillo de Albornoz.⁵¹ He wrote of the European competition which had silenced many of the region's 3,000 looms. But Carrillo de Albornoz did not even consider the issue of establishing cotton plantations in the eastern lowlands. His proposal centered around the need to impose tighter regulations on the quality of *tocuyo* woven in Cochabamba. It was as if the vision of Cochabamba's progressive administrators had dimmed after the repeated opposition they had encountered not only from the Crown, but from the Audiencia of La Plata as well. With the end of the blockade, the industry seemed doomed. Carrillo de Albornoz's proposal to improve and standardize the quality of *tocuyo* cloth by regulating the size and number of combs in the looms was less the aim of an enlightened administrator than the medieval remedy offered by a myopic merchant who hated to see his profits from *tocuyo* exports dwindle in the face of European competition.⁵² Stricter regulation over the local guild of *tocuyo* weavers was a conservative measure that threatened neither the Crown, nor the Audiencia of La Plata nor the entrenched planter class on the Peruvian coast. On the other hand, his proposal to restrict cloth production to those weavers who met municipal regulations presumably would improve the quality of the finished cloth and raise *tocuyo* prices.

The proposal of Carrillo de Albornoz reflected his class biases. For the wholesale merchant, like Carrillo de Albornoz, who wanted a commodity that continued to be marketable in Potosí and Buenos Aires after the blockade was lifted, a price rise of several reales would probably make little difference. But for the weaver and petty trader who depended on the mass consumption of local Indians and mestizos for their returns, tighter guild regulations and standardized production could spell ruin. When the plan came before the Consulado of Buenos Aires in 1806, the ministers came down on the side of the merchants by approving measures to restrict and control *tocuyo* production.⁵³ Yet, despite these new measures, most administrators and merchants realized that the *tocuyo* industry and merchants would wither and turn inward once again to supply the local plebe.⁵⁴ The new age of prosperity, an age that Viedma and Haenke hoped would rival early colonial times when

Cochabamba nourished the silver mining towns with grains, was not to be realized.

Conclusions

Who were the beneficiaries of this brief expansion in *tocuyo* exports? Was there any perceptible shift in wealth distribution as a result of the boom? According to rough contemporary estimates, about 1,000 weavers joined the ranks of the *tocuyo* producers during the boom. There was more employment or semi-employment in this industry because of the flourishing export trade. If there were approximately 3,000 weavers in Cochabamba by 1800 and most were mestizos or cholos, as Haenke reported, then about seven percent of the total mixed blood population (as estimated by Viedma in 1788) was engaged in *tocuyo* weaving alone.⁵⁵ Most profits, however, were generated in the distributive rather than productive process, in the long-distance, wholesale trade in *tocuyo*. It is difficult to calculate the average rate of return from the wholesale export of *tocuyo* to Potosí or Buenos Aires. But it was undoubtedly less than 50 percent. During the campaign to get royal consent to cultivate cotton in the Intendancy of Cochabamba, local officials argued that the lower cost of locally grown cotton would allow merchants to realize a net profit of 50 percent on the sale of *tocuyo* in Buenos Aires (at the current market price of three and one-half reales per *vara*). Officials arrived at this estimate simply because the market price in Buenos Aires was about 75 percent higher than in the local market.⁵⁶

The profits from this trade accrued mostly to a small group of merchants who monopolized control over the carriage trade. The serious shortage of pack animals in the Cochabamba province since the 1780's threw long-distance trade into the hands of wealthy merchants and landowners who owned mule trains or commissioned muleteers to bulk and carry the cloth to those markets. In 1801, several sub-delegates registered complaints with the Consulado about the monopolistic cloth merchants. Even when they agreed to carry cargoes for other traders and artisans, they charged freight prices far in excess of the stipulated rates and they demanded cash advances.⁵⁷ This situation virtually excluded all but a few wholesalers from participating directly in the long-distance *tocuyo* trade. Few artisans, if any, were in a position to experience bootstrap mobility or to turn their workshops into small factories employing wage workers.

If the profits of the *tocuyo* boom accrued to but a handful of local merchants and thus further concentrated wealth within the elite, who precisely were these merchants? Notarial books and wills show that the sons of large landowners who held property themselves made large investments in *tocuyo* exports to Buenos Aires and other cities. Cochabamba's largest *tocuyo* wholesalers were not only large landowners; their prestige and power also rested on high positions in the local militia or political office. Francisco García Claros, for example, was a large *tocuyo* exporter and held the position of Royal Receptor of Alcabalas; Juan José Eras y Gandarillas, a large merchant who inherited rich maize land (*maicas*) on the outskirts of Cochabamba and who owned haciendas in Quillacollo in 1808; Francisco Ventura Valiente, probably the largest *tocuyo* merchant, was a lieutenant in the militia; and Juan Carrillo de Albornoz, a large *tocuyo* exporter and the advocate of guild regulations, was a perpetual member of the Cabildo. Those who reaped the profits from the trade were clearly not merchants moving up the social ladder. They were well-established, respected members of landed society who exercised power in the province. These merchants occupied the upper stratum of provincial society which managed to hold on to its landed properties. They composed part of the landed elite which speculated in tithes, bonded one another, and married endogamously. It was this small group of merchants in the last years of the colonial period who were the only substantial money lenders aside from the monasteries. What little wealth they accumulated from the textile bonanza was probably sunk into usurious ventures, land, and tithes. Few merchants were willing to invest mercantile capital in cash-crop agriculture in the eastern lowlands, as Viedma had hoped they would. Nor were the merchants interested in revolutionizing the textile industry. The windfall profits from *tocuyo* exports seemed only to tie them more tightly into the local rentier economy.

Thus, the great *tocuyo* export boom of 1796-1802 did not signal the beginning of a transition towards capitalist enterprises in the region. Merchants did not plough their new-found wealth into the productive process, altering either the forces or relations of production. Despite their financial capacity and the new political climate in which Haenke wrote his famous tract on the benefits of industry, the moneyed middlemen remained locked in their old ways, unwilling to diversify their investments or restructure the textile industry. This is certainly not surprising, given the opportunities and constraints they faced, particularly the fluctuation in market demand for *tocuyos* in distant cities. Indeed, they

seemed only too aware of the evanescence of the lucrative, long-distance trade in *tocuyos*. Beneficiaries of an artificial situation, that undermined the very principles upon which the colonial regime rested and that would end the moment the British interlopers were expelled, the merchants had little incentive to establish the kind of factories that Haenke prescribed. Furthermore, the progressive, pro-industry forces in the region ran up against resolute opposition from the Viceroy and the Audiencia to their efforts to promote cotton plantations in the semi-tropical lowlands of Mizque and Santa Cruz. Raw material costs and the difficulties of procuring cotton from coastal traders on a steady basis placed a dead weight on industrial expansion, apart from the shifting winds of the market.

If the textile bonanza marked the *failed* transition to nascent capitalist development in this Andean region, it must have left an indelible imprint on the political consciousness of many people in the region. Artisans and merchants alike witnessed the spectacular commercial opportunities afforded by the naval blockade. For one ephemeral moment the provincial elite saw some of the barriers to regional economic growth begin to crumble. The "chronic idleness" of Cochabamba's sub-altern classes seemed to evaporate before their eyes, as peasants and urban artisans turned their energy into spinning and weaving as never before. And for the first time, a few members of the elite capitalized on the rustic cottons. The ideological implications of their collective experience could not have been lost on even the most staunch royalists. It is surely no coincidence, moreover, that following Independence the merchants and artisans of Cochabamba collectively were the young nation's strongest advocates of protectionism against the onslaught of British traders.

NOTES

1. See Francisco de Viedma, *Descripción geográfica y estadística de la provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra* (Cochabamba, 1969); Francisco Paula Sanz, *Descripción de la provincia de Cochabamba*, 21. September 1783, RAH, Colección Mata Linares, 9/1725; Tadeo Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón, y el fomento de sus fábricas en esta América" (1799), *Telégrafo Mercantil*, II:36 (1801), ff.289-295.
2. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.77 and passim; Paula Sanz, *Descripción de la provincia*, ff.2-3.
3. See Tristan Platt's study of Chayanta, *El estado boliviano y el ayllu andino: Tierra y tributo en el Norte de Potosí* (Lima, 1982) and Herbert Klein's

- "Hacienda and Free Community in Eighteenth Century Alto Peru: A Demographic Study of the Aymara Population of the Districts of Chulumani and Pacajes in 1786," *JLAS*, 7:2(1975), 193 - 220.
4. After 1754 the corregidor of Cochabamba was authorized to distribute throughout the region merchandise worth a total of 186,675 pesos. This legal *repartimiento* constituted about 3 percent of the total value of legal *repartos* in Peru. In absolute terms, only the provinces of Sicasica and Tarma absorbed more legal *repartos*. For an overview of the regional distribution of *repartos* see Jürgen Golte, *Repartos y rebeliones: Túpac Amaru y las contradicciones del sistema colonial* (Lima, 1980), pp.96 - 97. See also A. Moreno Cebrian, *El corregidor de indios y la economía peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1977).
 5. The Crown assessed most *forasteros* of the Altiplano provinces 5 pesos, or less. On the other hand, *forasteros* who inhabited the fertile valleys of the province of La Plata paid higher rates than even the *forasteros* of Cochabamba. AGN(P), IX, Justicia, 31, 3, 4, Legajo 7; AGN(P), III, Padrones, 17, 6, 1, 17, 10, 2 and 18, 2, 1. See also Nicolas Sánchez Albornoz, *Indios y tributos en el Alto Peru* (Lima, 1978).
 6. See my article "Rural Rhythms of Class Conflict in Eighteenth Century Cochabamba," *HAHR*, 60:3(1980), 407 - 430.
 7. Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, *Precios y producción agraria. Potosí y Charcas en el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires, n.d. [1983]).
 8. For a discussion of similar processes of household diversification in parts of Europe during the early modern period, see B.H. Slicher Van Bath, *The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500 - 1850* (London, 1963), p.217.
 9. See Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, especially pp.66 - 67, 75 - 77, and 166 - 168. An interesting description of a local gunpowder factory came to the attention of the Consulado of Buenos Aires, when it ordered gunpowder to be sent to the militias of Buenos Aires to protect that port city from the English. The primitive factory in Cochabamba produced only inferior powder used in mine blasting. AGN(P), Interior, IX, 5, 9, 1, no. 2075, 1808.
 10. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.47.
 11. Expediente por el Yndígena Esteban Pablo contra su padron Manuel Almarás de la hacienda Caporaya, 1795, AHMC, Legajo 1273.
 12. The sample consisted of one entry out of every five listed in the royal *Libros de Alcabalas* for the following two-years periods: 1777 - 1778, 1782 - 83, 1787 - 88, 1792 - 93, 1797 - 98, 1802 - 03, and 1807 - 08. During those years the accounts were kept in good order, and taxes were collected with reasonable regularity. For more discussion, see my dissertation "Economic Decline and Social Change in an Agrarian Hinterland: Cochabamba in the Late Colonial Period" (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1978), pp.234 - 240.
 13. The *alcabala* entries generally listed the region of origin, though sometimes only the last toll station was mentioned. On Cuzco's exports of textiles in the late eighteenth century, see Maximiliano Moscoso, "Apuntes para la historia de la industria textil en el Cuzco colonial," *RU*, vols. 51 - 52, nos. 122 - 125 (1962 - 1963), 67 - 94, and Magnus Mörner, "En torno a las haciendas en la región del Cuzco desde el siglo XVIII," in E. Florescano, ed., *Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones en América Latina* (Mexico City, 1975), pp.355 - 357.

14. On the comparative costs of wool and cotton textile production, see Hans Pohl, "Algunas consideraciones sobre el desarrollo de la industria hispanoamericana - especialmente textil - durante el siglo XVII," *AEA*, 28(1971), p.13.
15. Memoria de don Juan Carrillo de Albornoz, 15 Abril 1804, AGN(P), IX, Interior, 30, 7, 5, Legajo 56, Exp. 6.
16. P. Victor M. Barriga, *Memorias para la historia de Arequipa*, Tomo I: 1786 - 1791 (Arequipa, 1941) p.53.
17. Viedma listed the price of quiteño cloth as 3 pesos per vara; *tocuyos* commanded 2 reales per vara in 1788. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.147 and 137, respectively.
18. *Ibid.*, p.47.
19. James C. LaForce, Jr., *The Development of the Spanish Textile Industry, 1750 - 1800* (Berkeley, 1965), p.15.
20. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," p.293.
21. See below, pp.160ff.
22. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.67.
23. Source cited in note 14.
24. John Barclay Pentland, Report on the Bolivian Republic (1827), Great Britain Foreign Office, 61/12, f.176.
25. Barriga, *Memorias*, p.53.
26. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.137, 139, 140 - 141.
27. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," f.291.
28. *Ibid.*, f.293.
29. *Ibid.*, and Pentland, Report, f.176.
30. See below, p.164.
31. I am grateful to Elaine Zorn for educating me about the intricacies of weaving and spinning techniques. For a retrospective description of women spinning and cleaning cotton along the banks of the Rocha River in the Calacala district outside the city of Cochabamba in the late colonial period, see Federico Blanco, *Diccionario geográfico de la República de Bolivia* (La Paz, 1901).
32. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," f.291.
33. See Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dandler, "Diversificación, complementación, y proceso de trabajo de la economía familiar en el desarrollo regional de Cochabamba." (La Paz, 1980), Mimeographed.
34. Autos por el Regidor de Cane...contra Maria Vargas, 1804, AHMC, Legajo 1213.
35. G. Thomson, "The Cotton Textile Industry in Puebla During the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in this volume.
36. Viedma proposed the economic rejuvenation of ex-Jesuit missions in the tropical selva of Mojos and the lowland and plains of Chiquitos, east of the town of Santa Cruz. *Descripción geográfica*, pp.167 and 173 ff.
37. On the other hand, Viedma and other authorities argued that "popular industry" would not compete with Spanish metropolitan interests, but, on the contrary, would strengthen imperial interests by stimulating the economy of the colonies and employing masses of indolent people. *Descripción geográfica*, pp.166.
38. David Brading mentions the effects of British interference in the transatlantic trade on Mexico's cloth industry in the same period, in his "El mercantilismo ibérico y el crecimiento económico en la América Latina del siglo XVIII," in

- E. Florescano, ed., *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América Latina (1500-1975)* (Mexico City, 1979), p.312. A comparative analysis of the effects of the breakdown of international trade on local textile industries has still to be written.
39. On the impact of the blockade of Buenos Aires on the growth of the vice-royalty's industries see Pedro Santos Martínez, *Las industrias durante el Virreinato, 1776-1810* (Buenos Aires, 1969), chapter 2. See also José María Mariluz Urquijo, "Noticias sobre las industrias del Virreinato del Rio de La Plata en la época del Marqués de Aviles (1799-1810)," *RHAA*, 1-2 (1956-57), 85-118.
 40. See Carlos Sempat Assadourian, "El sector exportador de una economía regional del interior argentino. Córdoba, 1800-1860. Esquema cuantitativo y formas de producción," *NA*, 1(1978), 57-104, especially 79-88.
 41. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.137, 139, 140-141. Canals to Consulado, 16 april 1798, AGI, Charcas, Leg. 436.
 42. This information was kindly provided me by Susan Socolow. *Tocuyo* imports from Cochabamba were supposed to be registered and taxed. Such records are found in the AGN(P), Alcaldía, 1799.
 43. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.137; Canals to Consulado, 16 April 1798, AGI, Charcas, Leg. 436, and Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," ff.289-295.
 44. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.145.
 45. Viedma to Consulado, 3 April 1798, AGI, Charcas, Leg. 436.
 46. *Ibid.*; in 1827 Pentland reported that in the golden age of *tocuyos* traders from the coast sold bales of cotton to Cochabamba merchants in the towns of Paria and Tapacarí. *Report on the Bolivian Republic*, f.180 v.
 47. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," ff.291-293.
 48. *Ibid.*, ff.291-292.
 49. *Ibid.*, ff.293-294.
 50. AGN(P), XIII, Cajas reales, Cochabamba, 1777-1809. For a complete list of the *legajos* and yearly amount of taxes, see Appendix 14 of my unpublished dissertation, "Economic Decline and Agrarian Change," p.447.
 51. Report is cited in note 15.
 52. Carrillo de Albornoz, in fact was one of Cochabamba's wealthiest merchants.
 53. Santos Martínez, *Las industrias*, p.43.
 54. Indeed, by the early 1800's many local producers were most concerned about the British threat to flood the market with cheap cotton cloth from Manchester's factories and the calicoes from East India. On the short-term impact of British competition on Cochabamba's *tocuyo* industry, see Pentland, *Report on the Bolivian Republic*, f. 176 ff.
 55. Viedma's 1788 population estimates, according to his *Descripción geográfica*, were as follows:

Indians	56,890	(46%)
Mestizos	39,171	(31%)
Cholos	2,883	(2%)
Whites	20,089	(16%)
Blacks, Mulattoes	6,212	(5%)
	125,245	(100%)

56. It was argued that the price differential (3 1/2 reales in Buenos Aires, compared to 2 reales in the city of Cochabamba) would more than compensate for long-distance transport costs. Plan que propone don José Gómez Merino, (n.d. [early 1790's]), RAH, Colección Mata Linares, 9/1667, f.86.
57. Subdelegados to Consulado, 15 February 1801, AGN(P), IX, Consulado, 4, 6, 4, Tomo 14.

7. THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PUEBLA DURING THE EIGHTEENTH AND EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Guy Thomson

From the mid-sixteenth century until quite recently textiles have been the main industry of Puebla. Very broadly, there have been three overlapping stages in the organizational development of the textile industry. The first, the manufacture of fine woolen broad-cloth, was established by immigrant Spanish weavers soon after the foundation of the city in 1532. This *obraje*-based industry, concentrating all the processes of manufacture under one roof, enjoyed a century of growth and prosperity but entered a decline from the 1630's in part due to the prohibition on inter-colonial trade - Peru had been the city's principal market -, but chiefly due to the northward movement of wool production giving a cost advantage to the *obrajeros* of Mexico City and the towns of the Bajío to the northwest. The Puebla and Tlaxcala *obraje* woolen industry did not disappear, surviving at a greatly diminished level into the age of the modern factory, producing rough and inferior cloth.

The second stage, which is the subject of this paper, was the growth of the home-based cotton textile industry, with spinning in the hand of Indian, often rural households, and weaving controlled by Spanish or occasionally mestizo weavers, backed by merchant capital, competing with and partially supplanting traditional Indian rural cotton weaving. This industry had its origin in Puebla during the late seventeenth century when the silk weavers' guild fostered a cohort of Spanish and mestizo cotton weavers under its jurisdiction. Over the eighteenth century the industry grew rapidly in size, extending to most of the towns and villages of the central region of the province and beyond to the cities of Antequera, Mexico, Valladolid and Guadalajara. By the time of the Napoleonic wars, which for several years blocked the supply of European textiles to the markets of Spanish America, Creole weavers were able to supply the Mexican market with plain unbleached cotton cloth (*manta*), ordinary to very fine silk cotton shawls (*rebozos*) and, as a result of the irregular supply of Catalan cotton prints, Mexican weavers had begun to produce these too.

The third stage in the industry's development arose from the crisis in cotton spinning and weaving brought about by the collapse of the Spanish mercantile system that had sustained the industry and by increasing competition from East Indian printed cloth and British factory yarn from the early 1800's. From the early 1830's, Mexican merchants chose to follow the British by introducing spinning machinery which by 1842 had largely replaced home spinning and yarn imports, giving the home weaver a reprieve until the 1890's when factory weaving replaced the home loom.

This paper examines the second stage in the organizational development of the industry. At first an explanation is offered for why the Puebla region provided a favourable context for the early development of the industry – it wasn't until the second half of the eighteenth century that creole cotton weaving grew significantly beyond the province. The second part of the paper examines in some detail the commercial and productive structure of the industry. Finally, home-based cotton weaving and spinning is seen within the broader context of the late colonial economy, the crisis it underwent after 1800 and the changes which followed Independence in 1821.

I.

The Puebla region has an ancient history of cotton cloth manufacture; the Indian cities of Cholula, Huejotzingo and Tlaxcala, among others, possessed thriving cotton textile industries at the time of the conquest.¹ Spanish encouragement to the silk industry and cochineal production during the sixteenth century was therefore a response to an existing manufacturing tradition. Indian population collapse, however, undermined both the indigenous cotton and the Spanish silk weaving industries while uncontrolled sheep and cattle grazing destroyed the cacti upon which the cochineal industry depended. By the mid-seventeenth century Indian cotton weaving was confined to the regions where cotton was grown in the *tierra caliente* and to certain remote and mountainous areas where a weaving specialization had survived, such as the Misteca Alta of Oaxaca. There appears to have been no direct link between the indigenous, possibly extinct, cotton manufacture of the region and the Spanish-mestizo industry which emerged in the city of Puebla towards the end of the seventeenth century. The circumstances of the origin of "creole" cotton textiles in Puebla remain mysterious.

Jan Bazant, in "La evolución de la industria textil poblana," still the only study of Puebla's cotton industry, asks the question, "¿Como y por que se transformó un trabajo temporal de la mujer campesina e indígena en un trabajo permanente del hombre urbano y aparentemente mestizo?," drawing attention to what must be one of the most significant developments in colonial Mexican history:² the emergence of specialised, differentiated and commercialised cotton textile industry for mass consumption, in which the interests and activities of Spanish merchants, Spanish and mestizo weavers and Indian caners and spinners became closely intertwined. Why should this development have occurred in Puebla at least fifty years earlier than in other provincial capitals? How relevant to the case of Puebla are the demographic and economic arguments used to explain "proto-industrialisation" in parts of northern and central Europe? Does the Mexican pattern perhaps more resemble the growth over the same period of East Indian cotton textile production in response to the commercial stimulus of European trading companies? How important were ethnic and cultural factors in determining the hierarchy that emerged in the industry and in influencing its pattern of development? What direct influence, if any, existed between the new cotton industry and the decline of *obraje* woolen manufacture, or, between American cotton manufacture and its emerging Spanish peninsular counterpart?

Bazant offers four explanations for the early growth of the industry in Puebla, all of which are useful pointers but don't go far enough.³ He argues that the decline of the woolen industry left a large, unemployed urban proletariat available for the labour intensive work of cotton manufacture. Little evidence has been found, however, of any direct link either commercially or in the labour force between the decline of woolens and the growth of cottons. By the early eighteenth century the *obraje* labour force in Puebla was composed almost entirely of free or enslaved negroes, *mulatos* or *pardos* who were prohibited by guild ordinance from cotton or silk weaving.⁴ This, it appears, blocked their admission to the art, for in 1768, of the 184 cotton weavers serving in the urban militia, 155 were Spanish, twenty were mestizo and only nine were pardo, although they were well represented in other crafts, particularly wool weaving.⁵ In any case, the decline of the woolen industry in itself would not have left a sufficiently numerous labour force for the far greater labour demands of the cotton industry. There were more compelling demographic reasons, shortly to be suggested, why Puebla offered a suitable environment for the growth of the cotton industry.

Bazant puts forward a second explanation for the growth of cotton weaving in Puebla which, while pointing at an important feature of the industry – the predominance of Spanish and mestizo weavers over Indians and other castes –, does not adequately explain why this was so. He observes that cotton weaving in Puebla originally fell under the jurisdiction of the silk weavers' guild, the *Gremio del Arte Mayor de la Seda*, arguing that this gave cotton weaving a respectability which it otherwise would have lacked, having hitherto been shunned for being an Indian art.

It seems, however, that as cotton weaving increased, very few weavers joined the silk weavers' guild which remained Puebla's most restrictive and exclusive guild over the eighteenth century, only admitting to its ranks silk – cotton shawl (*rebozo*) makers examined in the intricacies of silk spinning, dyeing and weaving.⁶ The *rebozo* weavers grew to form a separate caste within the weaving artisanate as shall be shown later in the paper. The cotton weavers remained until the end of the eighteenth century marginal to the guild system. Only towards the end of the 1790's did they establish their own guild, independent of the silk weavers, when competition from other provinces of Mexico for the first time made it necessary to restrict production to those examined in the art.⁷ Spanish and mestizo weavers were undoubtedly concerned for the respectability of the art, particularly with regard to the exclusion of African racial mixtures, but few weavers could harbour any illusions about the economic status of an art which was subject to such great instability and was so subordinate to merchant control and which, except during short periods of boom accompanying Atlantic war, barely kept a cotton weaving family at the level of subsistence. The disproportionate representation of weavers in the urban militia regiment and their massive participation in both the royalist and insurgent armies during the Wars of Independence seems to confirm this last point. During this period in Puebla being a soldier and a cotton weaver were almost synonymous. Notwithstanding their poverty, cotton weavers were nevertheless far freer than woolen workers within the *obraje* system, which, despite continuous regulation and inspection, continued to be regarded in the popular imagination as prisons. The cotton weaver owned his loom, bought his yarn – generally on credit – and employed his own apprentices. He was oppressed only by poverty and this fact perhaps more than any other explains both the origins and the growth of the industry in Puebla.

Bazant mentions two more reasons for the early development of Puebla's cottons. The first is Puebla's geographical location on the two principal trade axes of southeastern Mexico for access to the cotton growing areas of Veracruz and Oaxaca and to the markets of the interior. The other is that in Veracruz "the Spaniards of Puebla had good relations," pinpointing the commercial nexus which was so instrumental in establishing and sustaining the industry over the eighteenth century and eventually in transforming it during the nineteenth century.⁸ Over the eighteenth century, for reasons which require closer examination, it suited merchants to have cloth production concentrated in a central place on the Altiplano rather than in the Indian settlements of the *tierra caliente* or in the inaccessible mountain districts of the Sierra Madre Oriental. There is a clear circumstantial relation between the decline of the cotton *manta* industry of the Misteca Alta, the only remaining area of pre-conquest volume cloth production for an external market, the general decline of *repartimiento* trade in that area, and the growth of mercantile involvement in cotton and other industries in the cities and towns of the Altiplano.⁹

What made the cities and towns of the Altiplano an attractive focus for investment and what drew artisans and merchants to Puebla considerably earlier than to the capitals of other provinces? Studies of proto-industrialisation in Europe have laid stress upon how demographic factors combined with the inadequacy of the agricultural subsistence base, compelled families to engage in domestic manufacturing for the market. Particular emphasis has been placed upon "the demographic peculiarity of manufacturing families: their high fertility, often in conditions of dire and unrelieved poverty, marking the end of the Malthusian balance, the collapse of the checks and preventions which had once maintained the traditional peasant village in a state of relative equilibrium and structural stability."¹⁰ Regrettably there has been no work done on the history of the family in eighteenth century Mexico, although there exists a sufficient number of parish demographic studies for the valley of Puebla to suggest tentatively some relation between relative rates of population growth between ethnic groups, favouring Spaniards and mestizos over Indians, a numerical imbalance between Indian men and Indian women, and patterns of out-migration that would have been conducive to the development of domestic manufacturing.¹¹

The cotton textile industry took root in the region over a period when both the Indian and non-Indian population of the city and province was growing rapidly after well over a century of the near demographic

collapse of Indian society. Between 1650 and 1735 Günter Vollmer has shown that, as result of declining mortality and fewer epidemics combined with accessibility to land and cheapness of food, the Indian population of the central region of the province increased steadily, doubling between 1700 and 1735.¹² The Spanish and mestizo population certainly matched, perhaps even exceeded this rate, the city of Puebla at the end of the seventeenth century having a population of between 70 and 100,000, rivalling Mexico in size.¹³ The great epidemic of 1736–37 interrupted this pattern of Indian population recovery, demographers arguing that the impact of this epidemic could still be detected in the demographic structure at the end of the century, since, for reasons which are still not clear, adult Indian males suffered a disproportionately high mortality. The municipality of Puebla lost over half of its population over the decade of the 1730's not recovering to its former size until the late 1840's.¹⁴ The neighbouring city of Cholula lost two thirds (16,926) of its population in 1737 while in the same year the parish of Santa Inés Zacatelco, thirty miles to the north, lost two fifths of its adult population.¹⁵ Thereafter, between 1737 and 1810, the Indian population of the parishes studied remained stagnant or in decline as a result of the demographic imbalance left by the 1737 epidemic and the much more frequent occurrence of epidemic disease experienced between 1737 and 1850 than over the period 1650 to 1735. Demographic studies show that although the Indian population retained the higher level of fertility, which had been responsible for its recovery before 1735, high mortality in the frequent epidemics and high rates of male migration from villages and towns to haciendas and cities within and beyond the region, combined to keep the Indian population of Puebla's villages and towns, as well as that of the city itself, stagnant or in decline between 1737 and 1810.¹⁶

The picture for the non-Indian population was different. The Spanish and mestizo population grew steadily over the eighteenth century, most notably in Indian villages and towns where previously it had been only weakly represented. Santa Inés Zacatelco, a village in which cotton textiles became firmly implanted over the century as an *empresa española*, had in 1724 a non-Indian population of only 142 persons in twenty-one households, among a sea of Indians numbering 6,700 souls. Furthermore this non-Indian population was characterised by impermanence and great mobility, as though, as Claude Morin suggests, "se siente incómoda en una comunidad indígena demográficamente agresiva."

By 1795 however, the picture, although not reversed, was very different. Among a smaller number of Indians than there had been in 1724, the non-Indian population now stood at 569, occupying 100 households. The greater fertility of the non-Indian population is revealed in the parish records of Santa Inés between 1783 and 1821, when the relation of non-Indian births over deaths was 225:100 while for the Indians it was only 108:100. Non-Indian households were significantly larger than Indian households, and village households larger than hacienda households.¹⁷ Finally, the 1790 census shows that villages with significant numbers of non-Indians employed in manufacturing and services, such as Santa Ana Chiautempan, Naticitas and Martín Texmelucan, had substantially positive rates of immigration in contrast to agricultural districts where rates of emigration for all ethnic categories were high.¹⁸

Why should these changing population patterns have proved so conducive to the growth of domestic manufactures, particularly cotton textiles, over the eighteenth century? To answer this question, more needs to be said about the wider economic circumstances confronting the city of Puebla and its surrounding agricultural regions. Over the second half of the seventeenth century and the first three decades of the eighteenth centuries, running against all the population trends was a marked decline in the traditional sources of Puebla's agricultural, commercial and industrial wealth. Puebla's cereal agriculture, the first in New Spain to become fully commercialised and geared to an extra-regional market, entered an eighteenth century of stagnation, punctuated by short periods of windfall demand from Crown purveyance orders of wheat flour for the Caribbean fleet and garrisons, alternating with periods of depression.¹⁹ Moreover, the interior market for Puebla's wheat flour in Mexico City and the mining cities beyond had been lost to the Bajío by the early eighteenth century. Regional demand by itself was inadequate to maintain a large hacienda sector, Puebla's commercial agriculture becoming a byword for bankruptcy over the century. The decline of the other traditional export staple, woolen cloth, has already been mentioned and when placed alongside the commercial decline of the city as a result of the monopoly exercised by Mexico City merchants over the import-export trade, the closure of Puebla's silver mint and the transfer of the administration of the mercury monopoly to the viceregal capital, the desperation of Puebla's economic predicament by the 1740's can be appreciated.²⁰

The Franciscan friar Juan Villa Sánchez observed and recorded with great accuracy the crisis that beset the city of Puebla in the 1740's. He

remarked that the city, now abandoned by its merchants and woolen clothiers, had become locked in the clutches of a body of *rentiers* who farmed the *alcabala*, Crown monopolies and revenues of the municipal government, noticing that the tax yield had risen in inverse proportion to the visible economic decline of the city: The collector of *alcabalas* was taxing all and sundry, even Indian dealers in palm mats and baskets, legally exempt from sales tax. Merchants and shopkeepers were leaving the city "to where the *alcabala* is more benign." He described a city of widows and of young girls, unable to find spouses, driven to the spinning wheel. The streets teemed with ragged beggars, women abandoned to their fate, artisans desperate to sell their wares and petty criminals everywhere so that "no estén seguras las tiendas de los mercaderes de que las quemen, que no estén libres las casas que las asalten, los conventos de las religiosas de que los escalen..." In 1744 a tax placed on spinning wheels so provoked the population of the *barrios* of the city that the spinners deposited their wheels in the security of the parish churches as the poor came by the thousands to the main square, the occasion perhaps indicating the limits of the "rentability" of the city.²¹

There were two principal responses to the region's economic decline. One was migration, all the parish studies confirming this pattern for Indian and non-Indian population alike. People migrated to Mexico City, where the *barrio de los poblanos* was well populated by the 1740's and brimming over by the end of the century, and to the economically more dynamic provinces to the northeast, particularly Guadalajara and Guanajuato.²² The other response can be observed in the growth of the secondary and tertiary sectors, particularly in cotton textiles and mule transport. Here the Spanish and mestizo population succeeded in gaining a substantial advantage in terms of ownership, employment and income over the Indian population. This was a result of Indian demographic vulnerability from the 1730's onwards, the penetration of non-Indians into Indian towns and villages, the reorientation of local merchant capital from agriculture and foreign trade into domestic manufactures, transport and inter-regional exchange, the introduction of European technology, particularly the Castilian loom and the spinning wheel, and the occasional use of discriminatory guild legislation. The case of the Tlaxcala cotton weavers guild, which during the 1770's attempted quite illegally to stamp out Indian cotton weaving, illustrates this last point.²³ The 1791 census reveals the extent of Spanish and mestizo advance not only in the provincial capital and the larger towns of the province such as Tlaxcala, Huejotzingo, Tepeaca, San Andrés Chalchicomula, but in the smaller

villages as well. The census reveals a remarkably small percentage of the rural and small-town Spanish and mestizo population involved in agriculture and a high degree of occupational differentiation, with a concentration of employment in work related to transport and communications – blacksmiths, muleteers, carters, cart-makers, tanners and saddlers – and textiles, cotton weaving having become the chief occupation in many areas.²⁴

A third response to economic crisis might have been expected: a drift into small-scale farming with the fragmentation of estates into smaller holdings, as a result of the commercial decline of hacienda agriculture. This did not happen. Instead, a rigid agrarian structure, based upon large estates occupying the best land, very few *ranchos* and the Indian and labouring population residing in Indian communities lacking adequate land, remained almost unchanged over the eighteenth century. Why the absence of significant agrarian change? It seems that the intermediate Spanish and mestizo population, which might have been expected to turn to small farming, were deterred from doing so firstly by the economic hazards which plagued commercial agriculture: low prices and the scarcity and elusiveness of the Indian labour force, and, secondly, by the inescapable fact that Indians despite their demographic instability, still made up by far the majority of the region's population, fully occupying the *pegujalero* (small-scale peasant producer for the market) category. There is little evidence of significant subdivision of great estates before the Wars of Independence although multiple rental agreements, largely among Indian resident peons, were not uncommon in Tlaxcala as the century came to a close.²⁵

It seems therefore that the Spanish and mestizo population that stood between the small patrician class of hacienda owners, merchants, clergy and bureaucrats and the mass of impoverished Indians, if they chose to remain in the region, instead of bidding for land, settled in the capital and smaller towns as artisans, muleteers or petty merchants. The cotton textile industry therefore proved to be particularly well suited to the peculiarities of the region, merchant capital and enterprise linking an independent and culturally distinct creole artisanate to a dependent Indian labour force, providing a solution to the problem of subsistence of this growing Spanish and mestizo population and of the demographically fertile yet disease-ravaged Indian population. The structure of this industry must now be examined more closely.

II.

There is no better description of the structure of the cotton industry, from the cotton field to the merchant's counter, than that of Juan Villa Sanchez in the early 1740's:

"A los tejidos de algodón ministra ingente porción de cargas de este fruto que viene a esta ciudad de la costa del Sur y jurisdicciones de Teutila, Cosamaloapan, Tuxtla y otras; sirve al comercio en greña, a los encomenderos que lo reciben, a los muchos tenderos que lo menudean, y de aquí pasa a las manos de la gente más miserable; es la última apelación de la pobreza el hilado de algodón; es el mesquino socorredor, especialmente de pobres doncellas y viudas, que puestas de sol a sol a la rueda de un torno, que es el de su corta fortuna en aquel diuturno trabajo, logran escasamente el estipendio, más para enfermar que para matar el hambre; es el signo evidente, es la demostración palpable de la mucha pobreza que hay en La Puebla, no se pasa por calle alguna donde no se oiga el repique general (no de fiesta, sino de gran trabajo) de los bastones o cañas con que azotan al algodón; y las onzas que hilará una pobre mujer en el día le vendrán a rendir el precio de un real de plata. De estas miserables manos pasa a la de los tejedores, o de mantas que suplen el lienzo para camisas, o de paños de reboso o del que llaman chapaneco para forros y otros semejantes: también es cortísimo y no correspondiente al trabajo la ganancia de este oficio. De estos pasan los géneros a los comerciantes, que remiten muchas porciones de ellos a tierra adentro y otras partes para provisión de varias ciudades, pueblos y haciendas."²⁶

Since it was the greater degree of commercialization which distinguished the growing urban cotton industry from its Indian counterpart, it is appropriate that the role of merchants and merchant capital be examined first. The ladder of commercial activity between the cotton growing regions of Veracruz and Oaxaca and the market for Puebla's cloth in the *tierra adentro* was a complex and changing one but, for the sake of simplicity, it possessed, very broadly, the four levels which Villa Sanchez observed: 1) Cotton merchants in the growing districts, known as *aviadores de algodón*; 2) Raw and spun cotton dealers and regraters in the city of Puebla and the weaving districts of the central valley, known as *algodoneros* or *regatones de algodón*; 3) Wholesale dealers in finished cotton cloth, *mercaderes* or *almaceneros de ropa de tierra*, who dispatched it to the fourth stage; 4) the fairs, small retailers and hacienda and mine stores of the interior.

A. *Aviadores de Algodón*

These were merchants in Puebla or in towns closer to the cotton growing areas who invested in cotton agriculture through *repartimientos* or more directly by advancing *avíos* in cash or manufactured goods to cotton growers at annual cotton fairs. Little money changed hands, as raw cotton was exchanged for soap, cocoa, wine, aguardiente, bread, biscuits, maize, finished cloth and, occasionally, silver reales.²⁷ Many of these products were manufactured in Puebla. The long-term effect of encouraging specialization in the *tierra caliente*, and of the mechanisms used to achieve it, was to render these sparse populations increasingly dependent upon manufactured goods from the Altiplano cities. Humboldt noted that the Indians of the vanilla and quinine producing districts of Veracruz received in exchange "con particularidad telas de algodón fabricadas en la Puebla..."²⁸ The *subdelegado* of Tlacotalpam noted at the same time that Indian women bought European or highland cloth having "olvidado la costumbre que tenían de aprender a tejer algodón para ... su antiguo traje ... y vestidos de sus maridos. Solo las viejas saben hacerlo, y hablar el Mexicano, que ignoran las otras y los hombres."²⁹

Aviadores received commercial backing from and often were agents for the large import-export merchants of Puebla, Oaxaca and Veracruz. Veracruzano merchants in particular, over the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, became a key factor in setting the pace of activity in Puebla's cotton textile industry. These merchants were geographically well placed to monitor and respond swiftly to the dramatic fluctuations effecting New Spain's external sector caused by Anglo-Spanish and Franco-Spanish wars and by changing commercial legislation with its generally unanticipated consequences (the *asientos*, the *flotas*, the *registros*, the exemptions from *alcabala* to encourage the importation of slaves and tropical agriculture, particularly cotton for Catalan manufacturers, etc.).

From the early 1740's, with foreign trade interrupted by the War of Austrian succession (1739-48), Veracruzano merchants became increasingly interested in fomenting cotton agriculture for the expanding Altiplano industry now protected from competition from European manufactures.³⁰ With peace restored, the demand from Spain's own expanding cotton industry made sustained investment in cotton agriculture profitable. During the 1790's merchants became involved more directly in cotton farming as the external sector became increasingly

unstable during the Napoleonic wars, as demand and cotton prices rose and as labour scarcity and the introduction of ginning machinery made it necessary to supervise production more closely.³¹ Other Veracruzano merchants moved inland to settle in Puebla where wartime trade could be conducted to greater advantage. Tiburcio Uriarte, José Alday, Pablo Escandón, Manuel Olaguibel and Juan Luis Palacios became large dealers in raw cotton and local cotton manufactures while continuing to import goods when the opportunity arose.³² During the Wars of Independence this migration of merchants inland continued, forging close commercial ties between Veracruz and Puebla which became crucial in underscoring the survival and revival of Puebla's cotton manufactures during the 1820's and 30's. The case of Estevan de Antuñano is the best known example of this pattern. He was the son of Spanish merchants of Veracruz and moved to Puebla to establish an imported cloth business in 1816. During the 1820's he reconstructed agriculture and trade in cotton while establishing his own gins at Tlacotalpam and a small spinning factory in the city of Puebla. In the early 1830's he borrowed money from the Veracruz merchant Paso y Troncoso to invest in Mexico's first operational modern cotton spinning factory.³³

B. Algodoneros and Regatones de Algodón

These were dealers who bought raw cotton from the merchants and muleteers who transported the unstripped, seed-bearing fibre from the lowlands, selling it in turn to the spinners or to weavers who managed their own spinning. Spinners and caners paid cash for the raw cotton, generally in very small amounts sufficient for a day's work, selling it back to the *algodoneros*, to weavers or to cloth merchants. Spinning in Cholula during the 1790's earned less than the individual's subsistence. "Es tan poco lo que ganan, que no pueden alimentarse; tres cuartillas emplean en algodón y después de ocupar todo el día en preparando e hilarlo, no les queda mas utilidad que otras tres."³⁴ As mentioned, some weavers managed their own cotton preparation and spinning but most relied heavily on credit either from the *algodonero* or, more likely, from the retailer or wholesaler of the finished cloth. As the eighteenth century proceeded, *algodoneros* and regraters increased their control over the raw and spun cotton business much to the disgust of some of the more established Spanish and mestizo guild cotton weavers who hitherto had managed this stage of the business.³⁵

However the once well established "patrician" guild weavers might have resented their loss of control over spinning and access to raw materials, the poorer unexamined weavers must generally have benefitted firstly as a result of the undermining of the authority of guild officers and masters and secondly as a result of the more regular employment which this concentration of mercantile wealth no doubt provided, particularly once the business had reached such a considerable size by the 1790's that monopoly would have been impossible.³⁶ An incident in 1795 reveals the close vigilance which *algodoneros* kept on each others activities. Don Rafael Parra and Doña Ignacia Alatraste purchased raw cotton from Don José Mones, *algodonero*, which they judged to be of inferior quality not commensurate with its price, therefore deducting 161 pesos from their account, a decision supported by *almaceneros*, witnesses to the case.³⁷ These were years of great prosperity as Estevan de Antuña later recorded. "For the war in 1797, the weavers were dressed in fine cloth and velvet, gold and silver buckles and buttons, and the spinning women with skirts of muselin at 5 pesos the yard..."³⁸ Records for cotton entering the city during the last three months of 1799 show that the *algodoneros* were joined in these years by some of the principal *almaceneros* of the city, who, turning away from the depressed import trade, invested in the flourishing cotton industry: Tiburcio Uriarte, Joaquim Haro y Portillo, Dionisio Fernandez Pérez etc.³⁹

The role of the *algodonero* was a crucial, albeit disreputable one: linking the two principal agents of production – the weaver and the spinner –, and linking the capital of the province with the towns and villages where much of the weaving and most of the spinning was done. Competition from the turn of the nineteenth century brought *algodoneros*, hitherto confined to supplying the weaver with raw materials, into marketing their products. Manuel Flon, in his survey of the city's commerce in 1803, makes no distinction between the two functions in the twenty-eight *almacenes de ropa de tierra* he counted in the city that year.⁴⁰ The next logical stage in the commercial development of the industry would have been the mechanization of spinning, but there appears to have been no serious contemplation of this option with the renewed onslaught from imports after the Peace of Amiens, reducing the number of cotton dealers to eighteen by 1807, a reduction of ten from 1803.

Why was there apparently no consideration of the mechanization of spinning in Puebla when the technical know-how, the capital and even official encouragement were all in evidence? Merchants in Mexico and

Celaya had, after all, introduced mechanical deseeding and carding devices in the early 1770's.⁴¹ Puebla's cotton guild, opposed to mechanical spinning, claimed that the great reputation of Puebla's *rebozos* and *manta* was in part due to the caning of the cotton by the spinners which these devices replaced.⁴² Furthermore, when mechanically ginned cotton was sent up to Puebla from Veracruz in 1807, it proved to be unsuitable for the city's spinning wheels which responded better to caned cotton with its fibre more intact.⁴³ Had transformation of the preparing (ginning) stage of production not been interrupted by the Wars of Independence, then the mechanization of spinning would almost certainly have proceeded apace. But so unstable and unpredictable was the external sector over the first thirty years of the century that investment in the cotton growing regions remained sporadic. In these circumstances, the advantages of the traditional system of production, involving very limited fixed capital investment and the employment of a flexible and subsistence (largely female) labour force were obvious. So the unstable economic conditions and general poverty which had nurtured the early growth of the industry during the first half of the eighteenth century, also account for its survival in a traditional form over the first thirty years of the nineteenth century.

C. Mercaderes and Almaceneros de Ropa de Tierra

Unlike the woolen clothiers of Puebla of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries who often managed both the wool supply and the marketing sides to their businesses to markets as far distant as Peru, few cotton weavers possessed the capital, enjoyed the contacts or could afford the delay in payment which long distance trade involved.⁴⁴ The marketing of Puebla's cottons in the more remote parts of the province and beyond was therefore managed by wholesale merchants.

Villa Sanchez in the 1740's records how the mercers of the city were almost all outsiders (*ultrones*), who did not know the city. "Se ven andar los oficiales rogando con ellas por todas las tiendas y por todos los mesones, porque no hay que esperar que se vengán a su casa a buscarlas."⁴⁵ Over the second half of the eighteenth century the trade in Puebla's *ropa de tierra* became a much less improvised affair than this statement suggests. The merchants who grew to specialise in *ropa criolla* settled in and around the *mesones* to the northeast of the *plaza mayor*, where the dealers and muleteers would stay en route to the *tierra adentro*, the Calle de Mesones itself becoming the centre of the trade, a

street dubbed the "Calle de la Bolsa de Londres" at the turn of the century when Puebla's cottons reached the peak of their colonial development.⁴⁶

These merchants through their ability to advance credit to weavers, extended their influence beyond the weaving *barrios* of the city to the entire central region of the province over the middle and later decades of the eighteenth century. The pattern of growing merchant influence and declining independence of weavers is very similar to what occurred in India over the same period.⁴⁷ In neither India or Mexico were merchants interested in establishing a putting-out system and in Mexico, as in India, the weaver never entirely lost his independence. There was nothing legally to prevent him from receiving cash advances from several merchants or from selling to whom he pleased, since he continued to own his loom and his raw materials even if they were acquired on credit. In practice, however, as the forthcoming discussion of the inventory of Carlos Chavez's *almacén de ropa de tierra* reveals, cotton cloth paid for in advance of manufacture belonged to the merchant, not to the weaver. And, if the experience of the cotton weavers' guild of Tlaxcala is representative of the general plight of the more independent and "patrician" caste of creole weavers, then this group suffered a considerable loss of authority, since guild ordinances were everywhere being disregarded. At the same time its economic status declined, since merchants appropriated the economic control which the creole weavers once exercised over unexamined weavers and the cotton spinners. The records of the Tlaxcala guild's litigation between 1744 and 1790 reveal vividly the erosion of the guild officers' and cotton masters' legal authority and economic influence. They had once been able to live well from their own work and from marketing the finished goods of unexamined and Indian weavers from the outlying small towns. By the 1790's, however, wholesale merchants "from the cities of Mexico, Puebla, Huejotzingo, and other areas, (are buying) woven goods in such quantities that even individuals who have shops in these towns and have supplied the officials in [Tlaxcala] cannot find any."⁴⁸

The chief market for Puebla's cloth was in the provinces north and west of the valley of Mexico, referred to in Puebla as the *tierra adentro*. Chihuahua and Coahuila consumed Puebla's *manta* and cotton shawls before the Wars of Independence shattered the commercial structure which had made such long-distance trade possible.⁴⁹ Guadalajara had developed its own *manta* production by this time, though it still imported

TABLE I: *The Impact of War Upon 'Exports' From Puebla and Imports From Spain, 1785 - 1812*

Periods of war and per - mission for 'neutrals' to trade	Year	Entry of Puebla cloth to Mexico City customs (tercios = 175 lbs.) (1)	Entry of European cloth to Mexico City customs (tercios) (2)	Puebla Flour from Veracruz to Antilles (tercios) (3)	Export of Mexican Ham, Lard, Soap and Tallow from Veracruz (pesos) (4)	Import of Spanish Soap, Ham, Lard and Tallow to Veracruz (pesos) (5)
Peace	1785	4384	12800	-	-	-
	1786	4013	8258	5286	-	-
	1787	4732	6662	4861	-	-
	1788	4811	7872	12714	-	-
	1789 (no fig.)		6244	9635	-	-
	1790	4879	8015	14616	-	-
	1791	5206	8270	17787	-	-
	1792	6158	7315	11610	-	-
War with France	1793	6046	6420	29505	-	-
	1794	6426	5477	19585	-	-
	1795	6938	5019	13833	-	-
Peace	1796	6917	6571	35665	-	-
	1797	6980	2188	(no fig.)	-	-
Neutral	1798	6576	1624	(no fig.)	-	-
Trade and	1799	7517	3323	(no fig.)	-	-
War with	1800	7097	2942	(no fig.)	-	-
GB	1801	7626	2725	(no fig.)	-	-
Peace	1802	5672	9446	22858	163004	3165
	1803	6334	12842	19660	127717	6019
War	1804	6482	6433	26371	119158	4088
w Neutral	1805	6401	3358	3968	20391	10650
i Trade	1806	(no fig.)	(no fig.)	2669	106351	4728
t	1807	(no fig.)	(no fig.)	5574	101059	(no fig.)
h						
GB	1808	(no fig.)	(no fig.)	21073	110390	(no fig.)
French	1809	4768	5120	26724	196858	(no fig.)
Invasion	1810 (Jan - June; 6 months)					
	1452		3388	16033	153280	11160
Mexican Wars of	1810 (Aug, Sept, Nov, Dec)					
	1786		1455			
Indepen - dence	1811 (March - July; 5 months)					
	603		2413	9701	55830	22806
	1812 (no fig.)		(no fig.)	1558	22028	42397

Sources:

- (1) & (2) Figures for 1785 - 1805: *Gaceta de México*, Vols. I - XIII.
 Figures for 1809 - 1811: *Correo Semanario Político Mercantil*,
 Vol. 1 p.16, 35, 78, 110, 149 - 50;
 Vol. 2 p.45, 79 - 80, 108, 138 - 39, 178, 223, 295;
 Vol. 3 p.106 - 7, 149, 180, 328, 402.
 (3) Figures for 1786 - 1796: *Gaceta de México*, Vols. II - VIII;
 Figures for 1802 - 1812: Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, *Comercio exterior de México* (1853), (Mexico, 1967).
 (4) & (5) Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, *Comercio exterior de México* (1853), (Mexico, 1967).

large quantities of Puebla's *rebozos* (in 1803, 12,910 dozen valued at 119,490 pesos).⁵⁰ Records of *ropa de tierra* from Puebla passing through Mexico City's customs house between 1785 and 1811 (see Table I) reveal a steady increase in volume over the 1780's and 90's, clearly substituting European cloth between 1797 and 1802 (when Puebla's weavers were reported to be imitating even the finest European cloth), levelling off after Amiens and slipping back to the level of the 1780's by the end of the decade. Mexico City customs house reports for the years 1809 – 11 show that very little of Puebla's cloth was consumed in Mexico City (see Table II), probably because the capital had acquired its own

TABLE II: *Cloth and Raw Cotton Entering Mexico City Customs House, 1809*

(all in tercios = approx. 175 lbs.)	Euro – pean cloth	Puebla cloth	Chi – nese cloth	Queré – taro cloth	Cloth from other towns	Raw Cotton
Consumed within city	4282	114	206		1029	12614
Passed through to other markets	829	4680	–	525	772	1193
Total	5111	4794	206	2326		13807

Source: *Correo Semanario Político Mercantil*, Vols I & II.

cotton textile industry competing with Puebla's since the 1760's. Most of Puebla's cloth went to provincial tailors and store keepers in the towns, villages and haciendas of the interior (scrutiny of the *avíos* advanced to agricultural labourers in these regions would doubtless reveal a proportion of goods manufactured in Puebla). The inventory of Carlos Chavez's dry goods and cloth warehouse – a specialist in *rebozos* – reveals credit to 360 individuals in over fifty towns, villages and haciendas stretching from Tabasco in the southeast to León, Lagos and Silao in the Bajío, varying in size from two pesos, the value of yarn supplied to Maestro Vargas, weaver of Puebla, to 6,000 pesos, the value of metal goods and textiles supplied to a merchant resident in the fair town of

Lagos in Guanajuato. These credits were valued at 94,891 pesos while his debts to fifty-five import houses, cotton merchants, brokers, storekeepers and the customs amounted to 115,486 pesos 3 reales. A favourable balance of 8,224 pesos resulted when his stock, various pawned items, thirty-two lengths of manta still on the loom but already paid for in advance and 2,600 head of cattle received from the *tierradentro* were taken into account. Apart from coin, principal item of exchange in the cloth trade with the interior was cattle, particularly mules and horses, arriving at Puebla's *ejidos* in November and December, attracting buyers from all over the southeast from as far as Guatemala.⁵¹

There appears to have been no exclusive specialization in dealing in *ropa de tierra*. Inventories for a wide range of dealers reveal merchants who, purporting to specialise in European goods, at the same time held quantities of local manufactures, as well as *almacenes de ropa de tierra* which kept European goods in stock.⁵² A mercer's degree of specialization would depend upon the kind of specialization of the wholesale warehouse with which he held credit, or the kind of direct involvement he might have with local producers. The inventory of a mercer's shop operated by two men in partnership illustrates this point (see Table III).

This inventory illustrates well the complementarity existing between the trade in imported goods and dealing in *ropa de tierra*, and, given the instability of the export sector, it would have been imprudent for a mercer to concentrate exclusively on either branch of trade.

When the prolonged commercial crisis accompanying the Wars of Independence gradually receded, wholesalers and retailers of *ropa de tierra* significantly show a higher survival rate. Of the eighteen wholesalers and retailers of *ropa de tierra* active in the city in 1807, seven were still in trade in 1820. Of the thirty-four dealers in European cloth resident in 1807, only nine remained in 1820.⁵³ Both bodies, of course, had suffered greatly from the collapse of the colonial credit and mercantile structure, the disruption this caused in the market of the *tierradentro* and from contraband imports undercutting domestic manufactures in price.

It was the failure of the external sector to recover even to its uneasy pre-war equilibrium that finally persuaded both merchants dealing in imported goods and those still trading in domestic manufactures to seek a more permanent and, so they hoped, a more stable outlet for their investment in the mechanization and transformation of cotton preparation and spinning. Once this movement was underway by the mid-1830's there was very little space left for the *algodonero* or the spinner, and

TABLE III: *Tienda de Ropa, Calle de Mercaderes, Puebla, Belong-
ing to the Company Formed Between José Maria Infante
and José Joaquim Cortes for Two Years in July 1829*

ASSETS			
Silks	383	pesos	7 reales
Woolens (Europeans)	82		
Cottons	1,419		7/8
<i>Ropa de Tierra</i> (Cotton cloth from Sultepec)	2,959		1
<i>Prendas</i>	5		3 1/4
Debts of Indians through <i>Repartimiento</i>	602		1 4 granos
	5,706	pesos	7 1/8
LIABILITIES			
Debts owed to three mercers, dealers in European goods (José Antonio Cardoso, José Manuel Lara and Francisco Javier Manzano) and rent.	2,113	pesos	5 3/4
Cash	230	pesos	4 reales
Cortes' investment	2,000	pesos	

Source: ANP Not. No.7, 1829 f. 357.

many mercers and *almaceneros* saw their liquidity vanish as they wrestled with the problems of introducing and operating profitably the new technology. Where the trade in domestic cotton did not change significantly over the period of the mechanization of spinning was at its two extremes, namely those merchants financing cotton agriculture and dealing in scarce cotton for the new factories and those wholesale warehouses dealing principally in imported goods but prepared also to stock local manufactures. Both groups became the usurious creditors to the new industry.⁵⁴ The handloom weaver survived the entire period of decline and transformation, providing indeed its vital productive force, though with his independence much reduced now that spinning was fully mechanised and yarn only available at the factory counter.

D. Weaving

The focus so far has been on the commercial activities surrounding the productive work of spinners and weavers. The impression given is perhaps of a large number of people, struggling to subsist, who were the passive instruments of mercantile calculation, largely for the merchant's benefit. Closer examination of guild proceedings, census returns, mortgage loans and wills reveals, however, that weavers were far from being an undifferentiated and impoverished mass.

In the depressed years of the early 1830's, before the wave of investment in modern spinning factories had brought about the recovery of the weaving artisanate, contemporaries tended to exaggerate the degree of prosperity of the late colonial weaver. This was often deliberate propaganda put out by protectionists to persuade governments that by protecting Mexican industry a prosperous and stable social order would be restored. Alternatively it was designed to convince underemployed and impoverished weavers of the virtues of the mechanization of spinning, guaranteed to restore them to their past prosperity. Francisco Javier de la Peña, in his annotations to his reedition of Villa Sanchez' *Puebla Sagrada y Profana* in 1835 places the weaver firmly among the merchant class as a beneficiary of the late colonial cotton boom. The industry had divided the city's population into two classes, the first containing "la escarmenadora, azatadora e hilandera ... quienes ... ganaban de tres a cinco reales diarios, sin dejar atender a sus labores domésticas," and the second, "al oficial, al comerciante, al encomendero, al arriero, etc. ... quienes llegaron a juntar capitales de diez, veinte, treinta y cuarenta mil pesos." De la Peña then describes the tastes and lifestyle of the latter group, singling out two artisans whom he knew well. The description has the precision of an inventory (and may be usefully compared to the inventory of Dn. José García Aragón, *rebozo* weaver, in Table IV):

"...yo conocí a dos maestros, uno sombrerero llamado Don Manuel Cadena y otro tejedor de lienzo de algodón Don José Aguilar, con toquillas de onzas de oro en los sombreros, botones de las mismas y escudos en sus vestuarios, sillas de montar magníficas, con fustes guarnecidos de plata maciza, y el ruedo de higas de las anqueras de la propia: sus mujeres estaban ricamente adornadas, y rivalizaban con las señoras de primera clase,... sus casas eran espaciosas y muy curiosamente adornadas: en las salas había hermosas arañas de plata, y no pocos utensilios de servicio, siendo tan común el uso de este metal, que en algunas accesorias de oficiales honrados, se le daba agua a la persona decente que la pedía en el 'jarro de plata'..."⁵⁵

Such men were clearly in the minority within a corps of weavers numbering perhaps 2,500 at the turn of the nineteenth century.⁵⁶ But did they represent a significant portion of the weaving population and was the gap in wealth and status which separated them from the mass of weavers one of substance or of degree?

In terms of the ethnic identification of weavers, indicated by what they told the censor in 1791, this was very much a hispano-mestizo occupation. In the main weaving *Barrio de San Francisco*, of the few non-Spanish or mestizo weavers, most were *indios caciques* from Tlaxcala, which says little, as most Indians from Tlaxcala appear as *caciques*.⁵⁷ In the preambles to the census returns of the main weaving towns of the valley made in 1792, and also in the short description of these towns made by Manuel Flon in 1803 in all except Cholula, weaving appears to have been explicitly the occupation of *gente de razón*, Indians being occupied in other crafts or in agriculture.

But while the possession of a loom and working indoors might have permitted a small-town Spaniard or mestizo to become differentiated from the surrounding Indian population, for most of its practitioners, cotton weaving offered only the barest subsistence. The censors' phrases in the preambles bear this out: "Lo pasan miseramente en la fatiga de sus telares;" "cuyos miserios productos se sirven pocas tiendas;" "muy corta utilidad para la carestía de materiales;" "la gente de razón que no ejerce algún oficio subsiste con el hilado de algodón," and so forth. There is evidence that weavers in these towns were worse off than their counterparts in the capital. During the 1780's and early 90's, when production in the city of Puebla was expanding fast, the neighbouring town of Cholula's industry was in full decline. Of the 300 looms active there in 1784, only 200 remained in 1791 and of those "no se emplean todos por falta de auxilios." (In 1804 Flon reported that production in Cholula had recovered substantially with encouragement from Puebla's *almaceneros*.) Tlaxcala's weavers in 1791 were obliged to carry their cloth the twenty miles to Puebla where they received a paltry seven reales for their three days of labour in weaving a piece of cloth, surely accounting for why migration to Puebla from that area was so common. Huejotzingo's weavers in 1802 had to sacrifice one real for each piece of *manta* they produced, as commission charged by Puebla's *almaceneros*, who marketed the town's cloth in the interior.⁵⁸

Weavers in the capital, while they might have been better placed for access to credit and in closer touch with markets than their small-town counterparts, felt the pinch just as much when the demand dropped, as

TABLE IV: *Inventory of the Estate of Don José García de Aragón, Cotton Cloth Weaver, at his Death (1781)*

ASSETS	ps.	rls.	gr.
<i>One Story House</i> in Calle de la Puerta del Costado de la Iglesia de Ntra. Sra. de la Merced	1,896	0	0
<i>Furniture:</i> 1 Painted Dais, 12 Chairs, 12 Stools, 1 Glass-topped Table, 4 Cedar Boxes, 1 Wardrobe, 1 Carpet, 8 Paintings of Saints, 1 Statue of Ntra. Sra. del Refugio, 4 Mirrors, 3 Pairs of Candlesticks, 6 Canvases with Images of Saints, 1 Green Bed with embroidered and gilded Headboard, 1 Folding Screen, 3 Toys, Assortment of Venetian and Puebla Glass, China and Talavera Plates, Jars, Flasks and Tankards.	171	0	0
<i>Clothes:</i> 1 Poncho for Outside, 1 Cloth Cape with Velvet Interior, 1 Camlet cloak, 1 Old Cloth Cloak, 2 Black Velvet Suits, 1 Camlet Waistcoat, 1 Old Mantle.	86	0	0
<i>Gold and Silver:</i> 7 Silver Spoons, 1 Silver Jug and 1 Silver Knife, 2 Strings of Pearls, 1 Pair of Gold Barrings, 1 Pair of Gold Earrings with Diamonds.	119	5	6
<i>Other Valuables:</i> 1 Shot Gun, 2 Pistols, 1 Sword, 2 Saddles, 4 Fine red Baize Hats (Militia), Brass Instruments.	71	7	6
<i>Dyer's Shop:</i>	1,781	2	6
of which: 990 lbs. of Indigo Dye	(1,640	4	0)
Calderons	(90	6	6)
32 Jars of Odd Dyes	(40	0	0)
<i>Looms and Cottons:</i>	85	0	6
of which: 2 Looms with 2 Heddles and 2 Redinas	(20	0	0)
Warping Frame, Wooden Stand and Trestles	(2	0	0)
7 Heddles with their Beams	(1	0	0)
Cotton on First Loom (7 lbs. 9 oz.)	(8	3	6)
Cotton on Second Loom (5 lbs.)	(5	5	5)
18 lbs. 12 oz. of Blue Cotton on Spindles	(18	6	0)
12 lbs. of Blue Cotton in Bundles	(12	6	0)
8 lbs. of White Cotton	(7	4	0)
<i>Cash:</i> Reales, plus 325 ps. 5 rls. 3 grs., value of 49 arrobas of cocoa de Guayaquil	1,326	4	0
<i>Owed</i> from those supplying the dye shop and money advanced to Spinners	169	1	0
<i>Debts</i> of Grandmother and Grandsons, suspended	(824	4	0)
	5,707	4	6
Funeral, Debts, and other Costs	1,079	6	6
LIQUID	4,627	6	0

Source: ANP, Miscellaneous Judicial.

TABLE V: *Textile Employment in the Barrios de Santa Cruz, San Francisco, San Marcos and San Sebastian, Puebla de los Angeles 1791*

Occupation (Male)	Spanish	Mestizo	Mulatto	Indian	Total
Weaver	323	264	26	71	684
Carder	1	3	4	79	87
Spinner	3	8	5	52	65
Silk Spinning/ Weaving	3	—	—	—	3
Printing/Dyeing	5	13	1	13	32
Other Textiles (Hemp, Blankets, Ribbons, etc.)	6	7	—	11	24
TOTAL (19.1 percent of labour force)	341	295	36	226	898

Source: AAP, Padrones, Vols. 128–129.

it did very sharply after peace was signed with Britain in 1801. The frantic activity of the cotton weavers' guild in 1803 was but one of the consequences of the sudden renewal of imports after five years of almost unprecedented protection afforded by the war. The guild officers expressed concern about the "total desarreglo en que se halla el Gremio de Texedores e Hilanderas de Algodón," and proceeded with a general inspection of the art throughout the entire city. What they found was an almost Darwinian struggle between and within the different levels of the cotton trade described above. Starting at the base of the production pyramid, spinners were inserting pieces of damp bread and cardboard in their skeins of spun yarn, defrauding weavers and *algodoneros*; the *algodoneros* in turn were giving short measure to the spinners by using worn wooden weights; weavers were bypassing the *algodoneros* and going out to "las garitas y aun fuera de ellas, a encontrar los Indios, y otras personas de razon, para comprarles allí a menos precio sus hilados;" many unexamined officials had set up looms in their own houses, "algunos en crecido numero;" other unexamined officials "están protexidos y fomentados por maestros del Arte, y otros por comerciantes;" many weavers were making cloth which was "enteramente viciado;" this cloth was being sold illegally on the edge of the city. The guild officials agreed

with the Council's *Fiel Ejecutoria* that general application of the harsh statutory penalties would provoke an uprising and chose instead to administer stern punishments only to two weavers. José Aguilar, an unexamined weaver, working two looms with his two sons, had them confiscated and burnt in the main square. Pablo Carmona, unexamined official and weaver of faulty cloth, had his two looms confiscated and was ordered to work with a master of the art until ready for examination.⁵⁹ (Pablo Carmona, after the abolition of the guild in 1813, was to represent the city's cotton weavers on the *Junta de Artesanos* established by the council in 1821.)⁶⁰ These were the last official proceedings of the cotton weavers' guild, as far as is known, all guilds being finally abolished ten years later by decree of the Cortes.

The proceedings of the guild in 1803 reveal the desire of certain masters of the art to reduce and control production in a period of recession following a boom when guild controls had been thrown to the wind. The depression itself, however, proved to be much more effective than the half-hearted enforcement of guild ordinances in slimming the industry down. These were years of almost unprecedented migration from Puebla to Mexico City, Carlos Aguirre noticing two important cycles of population expulsion, 1801-4 and 1806-10. Among those swelling the numbers of the *barrio de los poblanos* in Mexico City, textile workers predominated.⁶¹

Many weavers, however, remained in Puebla, despite the deepening of the economic crisis during the Wars of Independence. Weavers represented the dominant occupational category in both the 1822 and the 1830 census returns, although they were a smaller proportion of the labour force than in 1791.⁶² The case of one weaver who remained will be briefly examined to give us a better idea about the hierarchy which existed within the weaving profession and the factors determining it.

In 1791 Don Francisco Armenta was fifteen years old and already working for his father in a substantial two storey house in the Barrio Alto de San Francisco. In that year the Armenta household was composed as follows:

The Armenta Family, 1791, Barrio Alto, Puebla.

Don Juan Antonio Armenta, Español, Tejedor,	60	years
Doña Maria Casiana Gonzalez, Española,	40	"
with seven children:		
Da. Maria de la Luz Armenta	18	"
Dn. Francisco, Tejedor	15	"

Da. Maria Faustina	13	"
Dn. Thadeo	8	"
Da. Maria de la Luz	4	"
Dn. José Mariano	2	"
One infant		
Two servants:		
Francisco Tepechichino, Indio cacique de Tlaxcala	15	"
José Manuel Carvallo, Español	17	"

The Armentas were well established in the *barrio*. There were four other branches of the family living nearby, all of them with at least one of their members engaged in weaving.⁶³

In 1835, while Francisco Javier de la Peña was lamenting the decline of Puebla's cottons, which he put down partly to the bad faith and poor workmanship of the city's weavers losing them the trust of merchants, he is reminded of Don Francisco Armenta who "está fabricando en el día excelentes cordoncillos, listados, manteles y servilletas, y paños de algodón y seda de superior calidad; sus esfuerzos son muy loables y dignos de aprecio."⁶⁴ In 1833 Armenta employed twelve *oficiales* in his workshop. Inventories of commercial establishments in the 1830's and 40's list *rebozos Armenta*, valued at ten pesos each while ordinary cotton *rebozos* were worth only nine pesos a dozen!⁶⁵

This case grants us some insight into what permitted differentiation within the weaving artisanate: extensive family ties, scale of production and value and quality of the finished product. *Rebozo* manufacture was therefore one way in which a weaver might increase his income and social status, and since both guild ordinance and the skilled nature of the art required that the *rebozo* weaver both spin and dye his own yarn, *rebozo* weaving appears to have been less exposed to mercantile control than ordinary *manta* production.

Bazant mistakenly implies that the *rebozo* was not, like the *manta*, "the object of mass production."⁶⁶ Yet it seems clear that by the end of the colonial period *rebozo* manufacture had become a bulk industry as shown in Puebla's exports of this textile to Guadalajara. Also much of the large volume of *ropa de tierra* passing through Mexico's customs house, would have consisted of *rebozos*, given that *manta* manufacture by this time had proliferated throughout southern, central and north-west - central Mexico.⁶⁷ *Rebozos* were also sent from Puebla to Guayaquil and Peru before Independence. The unit of production of *rebozos* had grown in size by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a trend evident in other industries, particularly hat-making, tanning and soap manufacture. This trend continued in the manufacture of cotton shawls

throughout the nineteenth century. In 1852 there were twenty-three *rebozerias* with 193 looms, employing 413 *oficiales*, not including the masters. The largest belonged to Cayetano Aguilar and employed 132 *oficiales* on twenty-three looms; the smallest was owned by José de la Luz Alvarado and had three looms employing seven *oficiales*.⁶⁸

The masters of *rebozo* weaving were not the only relatively wealthy weavers in Puebla. *Manta* was also being concentrated in larger and larger units by the 1800's and the merchants and weavers who controlled these *obradores* were able to generate the volume of production necessary to yield a surplus and to afford a higher level of consumption for themselves than was possible from the labour of a solitary *manta* weaver on a single loom. Master cotton weavers working their own looms in their homes earned only two to three reales a day in 1823, *oficiales* earned one real, cotton spinners half a real. A master glass maker, however, owner of his own factory, earned thirty-two reales; a master potter, also a factory owner, earned sixteen reales and master hat-maker José Cadena, employer of twenty-two *oficiales*, earned twenty-eight and one half reales a day.⁶⁹

The picture, then, is of a city containing a prosperous body of weavers and masters of other trades who constituted a privileged and prosperous artisanal aristocracy. Individual craftsmen could achieve such a status due to a variety of circumstances, among which the following seem especially important: their control of guild offices; their expertise and specialization; their ability to control the entire process of production; their ability to control the production of other artisans; concentration of labour into larger production units, or possession of real estate and the attending ability to raise mortgage loans. Such prosperous weavers and other master craftsmen were much better equipped to weather periods of recession and crisis than the mass of their fellow artisans with whom they competed, and who lived much closer to the level of subsistence. From the evidence of daily income for the abortive income tax of 1823, the gap between these two sections of the artisanate appears to have been very wide and the proportion of rich to poor very small indeed.⁷⁰ 1823 was, it should be said, a year of severe economic crisis, but then so were many years of the long period discussed in this paper.

III. Conclusion

Historians looking for pointers in the structure and performance of colonial industry that might indicate a potential for "transformation" or

"sustained growth" are almost unanimous in rating the chances of New Spain's manufacturing industry rather low. Diego López y Rosado sees in the home-based manufacturing, examined in this paper, an obsolete production process, "which failed due to the competition of Indian manufacture, the control of raw materials by merchants and too high prices; lack of direct contact between the weaver and the consumer; lack of capital, and, principally, by the appearance of the *obraje* or 'embrion of the modern factory.'" ⁷¹ Jorge Angulo and Roberto Sandoval show how misleading Luis Chavez Orozco's "modern factory" label is for the *obraje*, stressing the more traditional "rural" character of Querétaro's *obrajes* at the end of the colonial period. ⁷² In Puebla, of course, the *obraje*, although the dominant form of production during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the woolen industry, was much diminished by the early eighteenth century, though it survived in a state of low equilibrium (four to five establishments with six to ten looms) through to the end of the period studied (1850). By the beginning of the nineteenth century Puebla's *obrajes* were no longer "closed" work houses but employed free wage labour. This transition probably had occurred over the first half of the eighteenth century. Their owners were not averse to technical transformation, Puebla's first steel looms being introduced by a Catalan, Francis Puig, into his *obraje* in the early 1820's. ⁷³ The technical transformation of wool spinning accompanied the revolution in cotton spinning during the 1830's, receiving some resistance, not from merchants but from artisans who destroyed the machinery of the first wool spinning mill to be established in Tlaxcala. ⁷⁴

The *obraje* form of production was not used in Puebla's cotton manufacturing because of the great volume of labour involved, its availability and cheapness. Over much of the eighteenth century expansion of production appears to have taken the form which Angulo and Sandoval argue was the principal feature of growth in colonial workshop manufacturing, the multiplication of small units of production. From the late eighteenth century, however, there are clear signs of concentration of production in larger units, fomented by merchant financiers and dominant cotton masters. This trend was greatly accelerated after the slump in the industry over the 1810's and 20's. By the late 1840's, although many one to two loom workshops remained, there were several large weaving shops with between twenty and 100 looms. ⁷⁵

Diego López Rosado accepts Lobato Lopez's conclusion that workshop manufacturing was "systematically denied all credit from the clergy and merchants, the bankers of the colony." ⁷⁶ It has been shown, how-

ever, that the injection of merchant capital at all levels of the cotton industry was of its very essence. True, merchants' interest in the industry fluctuated, but even in the worst periods of recession, such as the early 1820's, merchant capital can be found fomenting cotton agriculture, financing transportation and distribution of raw cotton, financing weavers' production and marketing their products.⁷⁷ And the more established and propertied artisans borrowed freely on the "mortgage market" from convent and merchant alike, particularly in periods of instability, when cash was short or when sudden demand for their products was felt.⁷⁸

Many authors concur with the idea that the legal, administrative, political, even the ideological environment for colonial industry was a hostile one. Jan Bazant argues in the conclusion to his "Evolución de la industria textil poblana" that what was inhibiting the transformation of the industry was not lack of enterprise, which he argues Puebla's artisans possessed in abundance, but, rather, the Spanish cultural and ideological environment - "cierto concepto hacia la vida en general y la economía y la sociedad en particular." This ill-defined inhibition he feels restrained both colonial and metropolitan industrial transformation. Political independence, he argues, removed this impediment: "La rapidez con que cunde la revolución industrial de México después de la Independencia, se debe en parte también a la desaparición de las inhibiciones inherentes al dominio español como español, no como colonial."⁷⁹ John Coatsworth, in a more recent interpretation of the same period, also grants prominence to administrative, political and cultural inhibitions, related to the nature of the colonial state. "The interventionist and pervasively arbitrary nature of the institutional environment ... favoured those with political influence, [while] small enterprise ... was forced to operate in a permanent state of clandestinity always at the margin of the law, at the mercy of petty officials, never secure from arbitrary acts and never protected against the rights of those more powerful ... This system of government made 'free' enterprise impossible."⁸⁰

The evidence from Puebla over the eighteenth century suggests that Coatsworth's and Bazant's arguments are more applicable to the first half of the century than to the second. The prohibition of trade with Peru, officious *obraje* inspections, over-zealous exaction of the *alcabala*, contemporaries argued, had caused Puebla's economic decline, though, almost certainly, these simply hastened a process which had other causes.⁸¹ Over the second half of the eighteenth century, however, trade liberalization and specific incentives greatly improved the admin-

istrative environment for trade and manufacturing. Measures designed to encourage the Catalan cotton textile industry – the prohibition on Asian cotton and silk imports, the removal of the *alcabala* on raw cotton, the prohibition of cotton cloth imports from other European countries – all redounded to Puebla's favour, particularly in time of war when Atlantic trade was interrupted.⁸² At the same time the granting of licenses for neutral powers to trade with New Spain in 1804 brought the first bulk imports of ordinary cottons onto the Mexican market, and gave Puebla's cotton merchants and weavers a foretaste of the increased competition they would face after Independence.⁸³

The principal obstacles to the further growth, development and transformation of the manufacturing industry in Mexico at the beginning of nineteenth century had very little to do with "Spanishness," "attitudes to life," Leviathan – like colonial states or tyrannous and interventionist petty officials. Nor was the putative unwillingness of merchants to involve themselves more directly in manufacturing processes a significant cause of the absence of technical and organizational strides in the cotton industry before Independence. These advances came sure enough, when the time was ripe, in the mid – 1830's, largely financed and executed by merchants.

Three factors may be held principally responsible for restraining the growth and development of Puebla's cotton textile industry, and Mexico's industry generally, in the first years of the nineteenth century – and again, in the 1850's, after a renewed period of growth during the later 1830's and 40's. Briefly, these factors were silver, war and physical and human geography. 1. Silver, Mexico's principal export and the chief attraction for merchant capital, had a profound impact upon manufacturing production. Fluctuation in the level of mining production, coinage and in the degree of silver retention, influenced by war, had a direct effect upon demand for manufactures. The accumulation of coin in periods of interruption to Atlantic trade undoubtedly spurred manufacturing growth, but renewed exports of silver when peace was signed deepened the trough in demand for domestic manufactures facing the renewal of imports. Scarcity of medium and debasement of coinage after Independence deterred imports, protecting domestic manufactures and making the investment boom in mechanised industry of the late 1830's and early 40's possible, but the recovery of silver mining production after the American War caused merchant capital once more to desert industry. 2. It will have become evident from this paper, that war was more than a merely incidental factor affecting Mexican manufacturing.

The growth of the cotton textile industry in Mexico during the eighteenth century owed much to the frequent interruption of trans-Atlantic trade caused by war. Had peace prevailed, Catalan industrialisation would have surged ahead much earlier, the Mexican market would have been more directly exposed to competition from its products, and the higher price and wage level in Mexico – the result of the "mining constitution of the country" – would have greatly restrained the capacity of expansion of creole-mestizo manufacturing in the cities. Raw cotton would have been drawn off into exports, rather than being sent on expensive mule-backs inland. 3. Finally, complex geographical and socio-cultural facts of Mexican life greatly limited the rate at which manufacturing production might expand. These were the fragmentation of the national market caused by great distance between many of the principal areas of population and high overland transport costs (accentuated after Independence by the steady demonetization of the economy); the limitation of the range and depth of the market due to the existence of a large and impoverished Indian peasantry; finally, erratic and limited demand even in the principal market areas, the provincial capitals, mining towns and haciendas, a consequence of the general poverty and low level of consumption of the mass of the labouring or vagabond population.

These then are three reasons which help to explain why Mexican manufacturing did not grow, develop, transform itself and reproduce its social relations in other areas of economy and society in the way that industrialisation performed these functions in other societies. Mexican industry over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was characterised by a very unstable growth pattern – periods of rapid growth, followed by periods of slump, explained, for the late colonial period, by a most unstable external sector; by the introduction of technological and organizational advances in a very piecemeal way so that traditional forms of production, existed side by side with modern techniques and organization; by a declining rather than growing degree of regional specialization – even after factory production was introduced during the 1830's, each region sought its own paper mill, iron foundry and textile mills. Finally, Mexican industry failed to transform, even to significantly modify, the essentially export-import orientation of the country's dominant commercial and financial interests; a result of the impact of international demand for Mexican minerals, particularly silver.⁸⁴

NOTES

1. Alberto Ruiz y Sandoval, *El Algodón en México* (Mexico, 1884), p.37.
2. Jan Bazant, "Evolución de la industria textil poblana (1554 - 1845)," *HM*, 13(1964), 495.
3. *Ibid.*, pp.493 - 501.
4. AAP, Gremios, Vol. 224, pp.176 - 225 and ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous, 1710.
5. AAP, Militar, Vol. 87.
6. AAP, Gremios, Vol. 234, p.168; ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous, 1776.
7. AGN(M), Industria y Comercio, Vol. 7, pp.2 - 280.
8. Bazant, "Evolución de la industria textil", p.501.
9. The decline of Villa Alta's cotton mantle industry, resulting from the reform of *repartimiento* trade, and the growth of the cotton textile industry in the city of Antequera (Oaxaca) are described by Brian Hamnett, *Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico, 1750 - 1821* (Cambridge, 1971), pp.76 - 77, 130, 187.
10. Frank Perlin, "Proto - Industrialization and Pre - Colonial South Asia," *PP*, 98(1983), 37 and see also Peter Kriedte et.al., *Industrialization before Industrialization, Rural Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism* (Cambridge, 1981).
11. Claude Morin, *Santa Inés Zacatelco (1646 - 1812). Contribución a la demografía histórica del México colonial* (Mexico, 1973); Thomas Calvo, *Acatzingo, demografía de una parroquia Mexicana* (Mexico, 1973) and Elsa Malvido "Factores de despoblación y de reposición de la población de Cholula (1641 - 1810)," *HM*, 23(1973), 52 - 110.
12. Günter Vollmer, "La evolución cuantitativa de la población indígena en la region de Puebla (1750 - 1810)," *HM*, 23(1973), 46 - 47.
13. Fr. Juan Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana (1746)*, ed. Francisco Javier de la Peña (Puebla, 1967), p.65.
14. Malvido, "Factores de población."
15. *Ibid.*, pp.73 - 79. Morin, *Santa Inés Zacatelco*, p.57.
16. *Ibid.*, pp.60 - 61 and Vollmer, "La evolución," p.46.
17. Morin, *Santa Inés Zacatelco*, p.65.
18. Wolfgang Trautmann, *Las transformaciones en el paisaje cultural de Tlaxcala durante la época colonial* (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp.104 - 107.
19. Reinhard Liehr, *Ayuntamiento y oligarquía en Puebla, 1787 - 1810* (Mexico, 1976), I, 13 - 23 and G.P.C. Thomson, "Economy and Society in Puebla de los Angeles, 1800 - 50," (D.Phil. Diss., Oxford, 1978), pp.20 - 39.
20. Hugo Leicht, *Las calles de Puebla* (Puebla, 1967), p.5.
21. Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, pp.69 - 90 and Eugenio Aguareles, "Una conmoción popular en el México virreinal," *AEA*, 7(1950), 125 - 161.
22. Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, p.75; Alejandra Moreno Toscano and Carlos Aguirre "Migraciones hacia la ciudad de México en el siglo XIX: Perspectivas de investigación," in Alejandra Moreno Toscano, ed., *Investigaciones sobre la historia de la ciudad de México* (Mexico, 1974), Vol.I, pp.18 - 19.
23. AAP, Gremios, Vol. 234, pp.233 - 238.

24. Thomson, "Economy and Society", p.175 - 176.
25. Trautmann, *Las transformaciones*, pp.188 - 189.
26. Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, pp.71 - 72.
27. AGN(M), Industria y comercio, Vol. 1., fs.360 - 361, 375 - 378, 381.
28. Alexander von Humboldt, quoted in Diego López y Rosado, *Historia y pensamiento económico de México*, 4 vols.(Mexico, 1969 - 70), IV, 262.
29. BL, Add. Ms. 17, 576, 44, f. 197.
30. Enrique Florescano and Luis Chavez Orozco, *Agricultura y industria textil de Veracruz; siglo XIX* (Jalapa, 1965), p.117.
31. AGN(M), Reales Cédulas, Vol.159, Exp.200, f.330, Florescano and Chavez Orozco, *Agricultura y industria textil*, p.244 and Liehr, *Ayuntamiento y oligarquía*, pp.45 - 46.
32. José Antonio Guemes, Real Aduana de Puebla, to Intendant (records of merchant dealing in raw cotton between Puebla and Veracruz), April 20, 1800, AJP; for Juan Luis Palacios, "riquísimo comerciante español de lienzo de algodón," see Francisco Javier de la Peña, Introduction to Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, p.100.
33. For biographical details of Estevan de Antuñano see Bazant, "Evolución de la industria textil," p.508 - 509; Miguel A. Quintana, *Estevan de Antuñano, fundador de la industria de México*, 2 vols.(Mexico, 1957) and Thomson, "Economy and Society", pp.237, 313, 324.
34. Luis Chavez Orozco, *El crédito agrícola en el partido de Cholula de la Intendencia de Puebla en 1790. Por Don Manuel de Flon* (Mexico, 1955), p.VI.
35. The ordinances of the silk and cotton weavers guild forbade the regrating of raw and spun cotton and restricted the sale of both to the main square. But judging from the frequency of guild litigation against regrating from the 1750's through to the 1780's, there was little the guild could do about the growth of this trade. For guild action against regraters: AAP, Gremios, Vol.234, pp.76 - 78, 200 - 201, and, ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous, 1744, 1758, 1768, 1781, 1887.
36. An impression of the very considerable volume of the *algodonería* trade by 1794 may be gained from the Intendant Manuel de Flon's instructions to the council in that year that the hanging of raw and spun cotton in front of the twenty - seven *algodonerías* in the four streets to the north of the *plaza mayor* be prohibited, for "impiden el tránsito de las Gentes que se van a sus negocios, obligándolos a ir por medio de la calle con la incomodidad y perjuicios de que les atropellan y salpican de todos los coches y cargadores y sufren otros daños consiguientes." May 20, 1794, ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous.
37. Rafael Parra and Ignacia Alatríste vs. José Mones, Jan. 9, 1795, ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous.
38. Estevan de Antuñano, *Ampliación, aclaración y corrección a los principales puntos del manifiesto sobre el algodón manufacturado y en greña* (Puebla, 1833, repr. ed. Mexico, 1955), p.72.
39. Aduana to Intendant, April 20, 1800, AJP.
40. *El Jornal de Veracruz*, Vol.I (March - June 1806), 129 - 228.
41. *Gaceta de Literatura* (1792) (Puebla, 1830 edit.), pp.89 - 95 and 138 - 140.
42. AAP, Gremios de Artesanos, Vol.234, ff.214 - 216.
43. Florescano and Chavez Orozco, *Agricultura y industria textil*, p.244.

44. See Guadalupe Albi Romero, "La sociedad de Puebla de los Angeles en el siglo XVI," *JLA*, (1970), 17 - 145, and Thomson, "Economy and Society," pp.126 - 147.
45. Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, p.87.
46. De la Peña, Introduction to Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, p.147, and, for location of "caxones de ropa de tierra" in 1820 see AAP, Militar, Vol.119, Exp.1319.
47. K.N. Chaudhuri, "The Structure of the Indian Textile Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *IESHR*, XI (1974), 131 - 181.
48. David Szewczyk, ed., *The Viceroyalty of New Spain and Early Independent Mexico, A Guide to the Manuscripts of the Rosenbach Museum and Library* (Philadelphia, 1980), p.88.
49. José Augustin Escudero, who set up Chihuahua's first modern textile factory, recalled in 1831 how the northern provinces, before civil war intervened in 1812, were supplied with textiles from Puebla. See *Registro Oficial*, Vol.4 (Jan. - April 1831), p.35. For Puebla goods in Coahuila see Charles Harris, *A Mexican Family Empire* (Austin, 1975), pp.97 and 108.
50. Provincia de Guadalajara, Estado que manifiesta los frutos y efectos de agricultura, industria y comercio (1803), BL, Mss. ADD, 17, 557.
51. Balance de las existencias en la casa de Carlos Chabez..., Nov. de 1831, ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous.
52. Thomson, "Economy and Society," pp.444 - 471, for wholesale, retail and market commerce.
53. Consulado de Puebla, AGN(M), Consulados, Vol.463, Exp.3, and AAP, Militar, Vol.119, Exp.1319.
54. G.P.C. Thomson, "Protectionism and Industrialisation in Mexico 1821 - 54: the Case of Puebla," in Colin Lewis and Christopher Abel, eds., *Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State; The Political Economy of the External Connection From Independence to the Present* (London, 1985), pp.125 - 46.
55. De la Peña, Introduction to Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, p.146.
56. *El Jornal de Veracruz*, Vol.I (March - June 1806), pp.129 - 228.
57. Padrón del Curato de la Santa Cruz, AAP, Padrones, Vol.128, Exp.1390.
58. AGN(M), Padrones, Vols.22, 27, 38 and *El Jornal de Veracruz*, Vol.I (1806), pp.129 - 228.
59. AAP, Gremios, Vol.234, fs.268 - 278.
60. AAP, Gremios, Vol.209, fs.1 - 3 (Feb. 6, 1821).
61. Moreno Toscano and Aguirre, "Migraciones hacia la ciudad de Mexico," pp.16 - 20.
62. Thomson, "Economy and Society," p.478.
63. AAP, Padrones, Vol.128, Exp.1390, f.6v.
64. De la Peña, Introduction to Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana*, p.154.
65. Tienda de Ropa de Tierra, Santiago Sarabia, 1847, and "El Emporio Poblano," Tienda de Ropa de Tierra, Manuel Rangel, 1850, both ANP, Judicial Miscellaneous.
66. Bazant, "Evolución de la industria textil," p.499.
67. Estevan de Antuñano, "El manifiesto de algodón (1833)," in Miguel Quintana, *Estevan de Antuñano*, I, 31.

68. Thomson, "Economy and Society", pp.105 - 120 for *tocineria*, pp.339 - 430 for other industries and Juan del Valle, *Guia de Forasteros* (Puebla, 1852), pp.181 - 182 for *rebozos*.
69. AAP, Padrones, Vol.133.
70. Thomson, "Economy and Society," p.486 .
71. Diego López y Rosado, *Historia y pensamiento económico*, II, 69 - 70.
72. Jorge Angulo and Roberto Sandoval, "Los trabajadores industriales de Nueva España, 1750 - 1810," in Enrique Florescano, ed., *La clase obrera en la historia de México*, (Mexico, 1980), I, 173 - 238.
73. Thomson, "Economy and Society," p.389.
74. Ibid., p.333.
75. Ibid., p.489.
76. Ernesto Lobato Lopez, *El crédito en México* (Mexico, 1945), p.74.
77. The municipal archive in the city of Tlaxcala contains several bundles Customs documents for the early 1820's. *Guías* for raw cotton being transported by mule from Veracruz through *algodonerías* in Puebla to weavers in small towns and villages of Tlaxcala, show some of the principal merchants of the region to be involved in the trade at a time when "officially" the region's cotton industry was declared to be dead.
78. Thomson, "Economy and Society," pp.384 - 392.
79. Bazant, "La evolución de la industria textil," p.507.
80. John Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth - Century Mexico," *AHR*, 83(1978), 94.
81. Villa Sanchez, *Puebla sagrada y profana* , p.87.
82. Thomson, "Economy and Society," p.166.
83. Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, *Comercio exterior de Méjico desde la conquista hasta hoy [1853]* (Mexico, 1967), see tables 19 and 21 for cotton imports.
84. The ideas in this final paragraphs are pursued at some length in Thomson, "Protectionism and Industrialisation."

8. LOS OBRAJES HUAMANGUINOS Y SUS INTERCONEXIONES CON OTROS SECTORES ECONOMICOS EN EL CENTRO - SUR PERUANO A FINES DEL SIGLO XVIII

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Los obrajes son las unidades productivas, tal vez, más desconocidas de las que surgieron en la colonia.* Sobre ellos se han levantado algunos supuestos que hoy pretendemos corregir. Uno de ellos es la creencia de que los obrajes funcionaron como verdaderas "islas" gracias a su autosuficiencia en insumos productivos como de consumo. Por lo cual se supone no habrían tenido gran significación en la vida interna de las regiones donde fueron asentados. Tipificándoselos, en forma genérica, como "estancia lanar - obraje textil." Sin embargo, nosotros creemos que la realidad fue otra. De allí que el propósito del presente trabajo sea presentar cuales fueron las verdaderas relaciones que los obrajes establecieron con su región a través del estudio de sus necesidades de mano de obra y de medios de producción, y la posterior comercialización de sus manufacturas acabadas. Esta en sí estará determinada por la producción y otros factores concomitantes como la estructura de la propiedad, el ambiente geográfico donde fueron instalados, y el servicio que éstos prestaban a la estructura social dominante.

Su influencia no se limitó a las zonas donde fueron instalados. Los obrajes huamanguinos tuvieron la cualidad de integrar económicamente a diferentes regiones, pues establecieron relaciones comerciales dentro y fuera de la región para suplir las carencias habidas en la suya que de ninguna manera se podía declarar económicamente independiente al no gozar de solidez individual. Por lo que, no podían aislarles, sino más bien participar de las relaciones e intercambios interregionales ya habidos y crear nuevos movimientos y redes comerciales de acuerdo a sus propias necesidades. El crecimiento y crisis de las manufacturas huamanguinas se nutrieron de estos contactos. Por tanto, la referencia a ellos se hará obligatoria en el presente trabajo.

I. Geografía de la producción textil en Huamanga

Los centros manufactureros de la provincia de Huamanga estuvieron localizados en cuatro de los céntricos barrios de la ciudad de Huamanga, en los valles de los alrededores de aquélla, como en

Huamanguilla y Pacaicasa, en la provincia de Vilcashuamán y en Huanta.¹ Pero, los centros artesanales de la ciudad de Huamanga, algunos de los valles de los alrededores y los de la provincia de Huanta, en realidad no fueron obrajes en el verdadero sentido de la palabra, aun cuando sus propietarios insistían en bautizarlos de tales, como el de la Colpa en Huanta. Pues, al leer sus inventarios constatamos que no tenían batán, principal elemento de diferenciación entre obrajes y los llamados chorrillos. Asimismo, carecían de las instalaciones precisas, materiales y de la mano de obra suficiente constituyendo en realidad tejedurías de carácter doméstico o centros artesanales montados por los conquistadores. Lo mismo sucedía con los que se instalaron en el seno de la misma ciudad, porque como nos lo hacen saber constantemente sus libros de Cabildo, el agua elemento vital para darles movimiento a los batanes escaseaba y apenas llegaba a satisfacer las necesidades de la población; por tal motivo aun hoy las industrias no pueden progresar allí.

Los obrajes más importantes de la región durante el período colonial estuvieron localizados en la provincia de Vilcashuamán. Estos habían sido erigidos en los años setenta del siglo XVI, por los "encomenderos - vecinos y cabildantes:" Antonio de Oré, que fundó el de Canaria y luego el de Chincheros; Hernán Guillén de Mendoza que erigió el de Cacamarca, y finalmente el de Pomacocha fundado por el Arcediano D. Francisco de Oré, hijo del primero.² En la zona hubieron otros obrajes como el de Cochapata, pero los primeros fueron los más representativos y los que lograron sobrevivir durante los tres siglos de vida del virreinato peruano.

Vilcashuamán, ubicada en la región Quechua, entre los 2972 y 3200 metros sobre el nivel del mar, es zona montañosa. Donde la mayoría de sus pueblos no tuvieron otras posibilidades de asentamiento que en las faldas de los cerros, que limitó sus posibilidades de expansión tanto en terrenos cultivables como para vivienda. A lo que se sumó la escases del agua, que se agravaba por el hecho de ser en algunos sectores salobre.³

Dadas estas características, y a pesar de que su clima era bastante templado y propicio para que crecieran en ella la más variada gama de alimentos, y como para que en algunos de sus parajes, los menos calientes, pastearan gran número de cabezas de ganado, las limitaciones del terreno lo impidieron.⁴ Por lo que, los encomenderos no encontraron en esta provincia ningún recurso que se destaque por su abundancia y/o por su posibilidad de convertirse en dinero en el mercado. Otra conse-

cuencia era que los naturales no pudiesen cumplir muchas veces con toda la cuota del tributo en especie a que tenían obligación y que no tuviesen como pagar la parte del tributo en dinero que les correspondía. Dada esta situación adversa los encomenderos, haciendo uso de su gran espíritu empresarial inicial y de sus extensos privilegios como miembros de la élite de la sociedad huamanguina, optaron por la fundación de obrajes. Donde capturaron inteligentemente la excelencia textil de los "mit-maquana" que poblaban la provincia, y donde además los naturales de la región pudieran pagar su tributo en dinero con su trabajo.⁵ Empeño, en el que se vieron, aún más motivados por el descubrimiento de las cercanas minas de Huancavelica y Castrovirreyna que actuarían como futuros mercados de sus productos.

En la fundación de estos centros manufactureros contribuyeron también aquellas mismas condiciones ambientales tan adversas para el desarrollo de la agricultura y ganadería, pero que, en el caso de los obrajes se tornaban ventajosas: En primer lugar, su topografía, que al ser extremadamente montañosa favorecía la formación de fuertes caídas de aguas que se estrellaban en las "hondanadas", en los "pozos" donde los obrajes se fundaron, con cuya fuerza motriz se movían las pesadas ruedas de los batanes y molinos. Y, en segundo lugar, su clima templado, porque para el trabajo que se desarrollaba en estos centros manufactureros, ya sea, en una mayor proporción, en posiciones inertes o desplegando una gran actividad, el clima no podía ser extremadamente frío que los agarrotase, no caluroso que los agotase. Sin embargo, estas mismas condiciones ambientales hicieron que la lana, principal materia para su funcionamiento, escasease. Por eso se planificó de ir las a rescatar, como en los tiempos pre-hispánicos, a las punas y mesetas regionales e interregionales, bajo diversas formas de intercambio.

En esas regiones donde abundaban los ganados, no pudieron surgir los obrajes, por su topografía generalmente plana que no favorece la formación de caídas de aguas para los batanes. De la misma forma que su clima extremadamente frío impedía su surgimiento. Sin embargo, la producción textil no estuvo ausente de estos lugares y se especializaron en la producción de telas burdas. A la vez se convirtieron en abastecedores de otras zonas, entre ellas Vilcashuamán, gracias a sus excedentes laneros. Así, como también de esta misma materia prima semiclaborada, bajo la forma de *maquipuskas* o hilazas.

II. Estructura de la propiedad

Los tres grandes complejos manufactureros en los que principalmente basaremos nuestro estudio – Chincheros, Pomacocha y Cacamarca – discurrieron por una larga existencia que se remontaba a los años setenta del siglo XVI en que fueron fundados por miembros de la élite huamanguina. Estos al haber capturado el poder y la riqueza de la ciudad fueron consecuentemente los únicos hombres capaces de montar todo tipo de negocios. Les imprimirán en su transitar una técnica consecuente con sus ideas la misma que será acogida por sus descendientes, y por lo tanto, marcará el desenvolvimiento de la vida de los obrajes.

Sus fundadores, con las rentas que les generaron sus múltiples empresas, se dedicaron a emular a los nobles castellanos. Este padrón involucraba, además de la adquisición de algún título, la realización de una vida citadina llena de suntuosidad y placidez, y el servicio a Dios dentro de la "república de españoles." Esto les exigía la fundación de centros religiosos, actitud que originó su descalabro como grupo dominante. Luego del esfuerzo inicial, para alcanzar lo que se proponían, adoptaron una actitud pasiva frente a sus empresas, como si esa coyuntura inicial que ellos como grupo generaron se fuese a mantener en forma inalterable y su futuro les estuviese asegurado de por vida para ellos y sus hijos. Ello, la expiración de las vidas en que se les sancionó el disfrute de las encomiendas, la extensa prole de que cada una de estas familias se llenó y la llegada de Toledo que atacó cada uno de sus privilegios, hicieron que estas familias caigan en un gradual empobrecimiento pese a que se tomaron algunas medidas para socorrerlas, como la creación de pensiones en sus ex – encomiendas.⁶

Los herederos continuaron con la misma política de sus padres en la dirección de sus empresas, haciendo limitadas inversiones en su funcionamiento y sobre todo pretendiendo hacer descansar todo el proceso productivo en los indios como en el pasado. A tales pretensiones se oponían la aguda despoblación que afectó a Huamanga, la pérdida de las encomiendas y la participación de la mano de obra indígena de mayor número de personas.⁷ Para afrontar la situación el obraje de Chincheros optó por completar la yanaconización iniciada por su fundador Antonio de Oré.⁸ A partir de ese instante tanto los trabajadores como los directores del obraje no tuvieron mas nexo con las comunidades que el pago del tributo, situación que imposibilitó el que esta unidad de producción continuó descargando sobre ellas los más variados gastos tanto en el sostenimiento de la masa trabajadora como en el aporte de determinados

insumos necesarios para el proceso productivo y finalmente en la construcción y/o reconstrucción de sus instalaciones.⁹ Continuando los herederos con la costumbre de no invertir mucho en sus propiedades, imposibilitados por su declinación como grupo social, o impulsados por sus deseos de obtener una renta segura sin mayores trabajos, el obraje de Chincheros fue arrendado durante el siglo XVII a diferentes personas por cifras muy inferiores a los 5600 pesos alcanzados en el siglo XVI.¹⁰

Los obrajes de Cacamarca y Pomacocha se verían igualmente afectados por la despoblación que se presentó en la región en el siglo XVII. Como consecuencia el obraje de Cacamarca recibirá, alrededor de los años treinta de ese siglo, tan solo seis trabajadores de los 120 a que estaba acostumbrado, y el segundo, el de Pomacocha, habituado a trabajar con gente voluntaria, quedaría prácticamente paralizado. La despoblación y la defenestración de la antigua élite de la sociedad de Huamanga, involucraron a los obrajes en una severa crisis que se prolongaría hasta las últimas décadas del siglo XVII.

La decadencia se produjo, porque los obrajes no contaban con la mano de obra necesaria, que llevó a sus dueños a considerar que sus predios estaban extenuados. Las consecuencias de este descuido eran la degradación física de los mismos por la falta de inversiones, la ausencia de jurisdicción de los nuevos administradores sobre las comunidades y todos los beneficios que para ellos podía acerrar, a sí como el fraccionamiento en que algunos habían sido sometidos por disputas familiares. Esta crisis, cuyas causas serían esencialmente de carácter social y político, se produjo en una época que podría ser considerada como coyunturalmente favorable para el funcionamiento y desarrollo de los obrajes, al encontrarse las plazas mineras sino en su máximo esplendor del siglo XVI, sí en auge y en una situación bastante positiva para los mercaderes y cuando, como nos lo hace saber Pierre Chaunu, la administración española tenía enormes dificultades para organizar el servicio de Indias en su área monopolística.¹¹ Desde 1610 el número de buques de la carrera de Indias fue descendiendo regularmente hasta alcanzar el mínimo tonelaje en 1640.

A fines del siglo XVII los obrajes de Cacamarca y Pomacocha ya pertenecían a órdenes religiosas por sendos donativos que les fueron efectuados. El primero pertenecía a las monjas Carmelitas del Convento de Santa Teresa, por donación que les hizo el Tesorero D. Juan de la Maza a quien los herederos de D. Hernán Guillén de Mendoza se lo vendieron a mediados del siglo XVII, y el segundo a las Clarisas que luego de su fundación por Antonio de Oré recibió cuantiosos donativos

que las convirtieron en las dueñas de más de la mitad de las propiedades de Huamanga. Estas instituciones ensayaron entre darlos en administración a curas para que los administraran por ellas o arrendarlos. Situación en la que continuaron con una variante en el estilo que la constituyó el de Cacamarca, que se decidió en 1685 cederlo en arrendamiento enfiteútico por cien años al Noviciado de Lima por 4000 ps. aun bastante bajos en comparación a los que alcanzó el obraje de Chincheros en el siglo XVI, y más aun, si tenemos en cuenta sus importantes instalaciones. Pero su mano de obra escaseaba. Al comienzos el obraje de Chincheros, luego de una vida bastante inestable en el siglo XVII, fue vendido a la familia de la Vega y Cruzat, que formaba parte del nuevo grupo de poder instalado en la ciudad. Su cabeza, el General D. Joseph Manuel de la Vega y Cruzat tenía activa participación en la dirección de la ciudad a través del Cabildo.¹² De este modo volvía a la dirección de los obrajes por lo menos en este caso el antiguo molde ya apreciado en el siglo XVI: poder político vs. posesión de la riqueza.

Gracias al gran poder económico, político y religioso que las instituciones religiosas habían logrado en la sociedad, alcanzaron en aquellos años de tan aguda crisis poblacional cédulas que les permitieron contar con la mano de obra de los indios Condes de Pacamarca. A base de estos privilegios los yanaconizaron siguiendo el ejemplo de los directores del de Chincheros en lo que encontraron el respaldo de la Corona que los reservó de cualquier otro servicio.¹³ El cambio de propietarios pasivos a activos que, además, les inyectaron capital, la pervivencia en importancia de los centros mineros a donde acudían, la yanaconización de los trabajadores que les permitió a estos centros productivos lograr una continuidad en sus requerimientos de mano de obra especializada, junto con otros sistemas laborales que surgieron del pasado y nuevos que se inauguraron, coadyudaron para que los obrajes de Vilcashuamán alcanzaran un repunte inusitado. Este "despegue" que tiene lugar entre fines del siglo XVII y mediados del siglo XVIII, se produce cuando las plazas mineras de Potosí y Oruro, que habían reemplazado a Huancavelica, acusaban una secular línea descendente en su producción argentífera y un descenso paralelo de su población. No obstante, todavía eran bastante atractivos para los productores y en especial para los vilcashuamanguinos, pues sus manufacturas alcanzaron los más altos precios de su existencia.

Dentro de una nueva coyuntura, a fines del siglo XVIII, el obraje de Chincheros tuvo que cambiar de dueños, cuando los que lo poseían cayeron en los mismos vicios que sus dueños primigenios, quienes ante

su colapso se vieron forzados a venderlo al Marqués de Feria. El obraje de Pomacocha continuaba en poder de las Clarisas, que proseguían cediéndolo en arrendamiento. Y, el de Cacamarca, que era de las Carmelitas, pero sujeto a un arrendamiento enfiteútico en favor de los Jesuitas, pasó a manos de la Dirección de Temporalidades a partir del año 1767, cuando aquéllos fueron expulsados, hasta que cumplían los 100 años estipulados por el contrato. Aparentemente, el cambio de propietarios en este último nos haría encontrar fácilmente en ello las razones de su descalabro. Pero hurgando más allá y viendo la situación en conjunto de los obrajes, veremos que en estos momentos las causas de su crisis no se encontrarían como en las primeras décadas del siglo XVII en la propiedad, sino en la coyuntura económica por la que atravezaba la región.

III. Estructura de la producción

Los obrajes de Huamanga asentados en la provincia de Vilcashuamán, continuaban siendo a fines del siglo XVIII unidades de producción de tipo mixto, característica que se había acentuado, por sus mayores necesidades tanto de insumos productivos como de consumo. Sus propiedades anexas se incrementaron ampliamente, en base a importantes inversiones que sus nuevos poseedores hicieron en ellas. El obraje de Pomacocha contaba con las haciendas anexas de Chami y Champacancha; el de Chincheros con las de Llocolla, Pacamarca y Ucuscha; y el de Cacamarca con San Joseph de Queques, Astania y la Colpa que aunque en realidad se dedicaba a la producción de otro producto altamente comercializable como el azúcar, era considerada hacienda anexa al obraje seguramente porque para la producción de sus aproximadamente 300 panes anuales no se necesitaban de mayores insumos ni de trabajadores.

Así, a los obrajes podríamos dividirlos en cuatro claros sectores: uno dedicado al abastecimiento alimenticio de los trabajadores; otro a la elaboración de artículos destinados al mercado; un tercero destinado al acarreo de los insumos necesarios para el proceso productivo y de los resultados de éste al mercado, aunque los administradores lo involucraban en el sector anterior; y yo, finalmente, me atrevo a nombrar otro constituido por las capillas que se erigieron en todos los obrajes, y que, a pesar de los fuertes gastos que generaron, constituían un importante mecanismo de sujeción de los trabajadores. Todos en conjunto conformaban la estructura de producción de estos núcleos productivos.

1. Sector de la subsistencia

Los requerimientos de mano de obra de los obrajes eran menores que los de las minas, pero mucho mayores que los de las estancias ganaderas, agrícolas y plantaciones de caña en los Andes. El volúmen de la población trabajadora ya no giraba alrededor de los 500 como en el siglo XVI, ahora se ubicaba entre los 200 y 300 personas. Estas cifras envolvían a los controladores de la producción, administrador, mayordomos de las haciendas anexas, capellán, etc.; los yanaconas y sus familias; los trabajadores alquilas estacionales; los mozos blancos y mestizos; y los presos destinados a los obrajes como castigo. Debemos señalar, que fuera de sus instalaciones en los pueblos aledaños y en el Collao había buen número de personas que en sus casas trabajaban para los obrajes de Vilcashuamán elaborándoles *maquipuskas* o hilazas, aun cuando su subsistencia no dependía del obraje. Sería interesante descubrir cuantas personas se empeñaban en estos trabajos y que tiempo les exigía el envío anual de estas *maquipuskas* a los obrajes. Sus altos valores pagados exclusivamente en dinero les servían a estos hiladores al igual que a los alquilas para pagar el tributo o los repartos de mercaderías que les hacían los corregidores. Por lo que esta contribución de los pueblos para con los obrajes era netamente compulsiva. Sin embargo, para los corregidores los obrajes se constituyeron en una segura fuente generadora de sus ingresos. Los arrieros sería otro grupo que desde fuera trabajaría activamente en el desarrollo de los obrajes.

A pesar de que a los controladores de la producción sus salarios les fueron tazados en pesos, muchas veces se les daba a cambio de ellos los frutos que salían de las haciendas anexas y del obraje mismo en precios que excedían a los del mercado y en este sentido su situación era equiparable a la de los trabajadores indios, y los alejaba del administrador. A los yanás la mayor parte de su salario se les pagaba con especies a excepción del tributo, obenciones, diezmo, misas y uno que otro peso que los trabajadores recibían directamente cuando tenían a su cargo las tres o cuatro fiestas que se celebraban en los obrajes anualmente, aunque en realidad estos pesos junto a los otros rápidamente revertían a la economía española. Sus sueldos se les completaban con lotes de tierra que se repartían a los jefes de familia, quienes destinaban a ellos parte de los cereales que recibían como semilla. No obstante todo ello, los yanás vivían prácticamente al nivel de subsistencia. A los presos se les mantenía en las condiciones pesimas. A los trabajadores alquilas, que generalmente se les pagaba en vales para el corregidor, una parte de su

sueldo, destinada a mantenerlos durante su estancia en el obraje o haciendas, se les pagaba en especies.

Se acostumbró, por tanto, que toda la producción de las haciendas anexas estuviera destinada al pago de sueldo y al pasto diario de la plana administrativa. Aun cuando muchas veces su producción fuese mayor a lo necesitado, se prefería almacenarla que venderla con el fin de prever una posible escasez en el año siguiente. Esta política se derivaba de las cíclicas sequías, a veces excesiva abundancia de aguas o plagas de langostas que azotaban la provincia cuya escasa tecnificación hacía que la producción dependiese ampliamente de la naturaleza. Solamente bajo la presión de los negativos fenómenos naturales y ante la necesidad de completar los volúmenes de alimentos necesarios para la subsistencia de sus trabajadores, los administradores acudían al mercado para abastecerse de los alimentos necesarios, ya sea por dinero o el trueque de aquellos por telas. Los obrajes a diferencia de las minas no generaron en este sector grandes efectos de arrastre económico ni regional ni inter-regional, porque se buscó producir la más variada gama de alimentos, con el fin de evitar al máximo todo contacto con los mercados que les significasen desembolsos monetarios. Sólo la sequía, inundaciones o plagas, y la necesidad de productos accesorios los frenaban en su empeño.

La producción agropecuaria en las haciendas anexas estuvo organizada y determinada por los hábitos de dieta de la población trabajadora. La mayor atención la ponían en la producción del elemento base de la alimentación, es decir, el grano constituyendo la base de la dieta de los yanas y sus familias y de los demás trabajadores inferiores, que los consumían por su alto valor calórico. El trigo, en el siglo XVIII, había dejado de ser consumido en forma exclusiva por los españoles y los indígenas habían asimilado ya su consumo. Las cosechas de este cereal eran compartidas tanto por los controladores de la producción como por los trabajadores. Las cosechas del trigo eran tan solo un poco inferiores a las del maíz que continuaba siendo el principal pilar de la dieta de los naturales, sin que después de tan largos años de convivencia con el indígena los criollos y españoles hayan aceptado en su mesa a este alimento. La cebada, si bien se cultivaba, no era consumida por ninguno de los dos grupos; ésta se destinaba a la alimentación de los caballos y mulas y sólo se recurría a ella como alimento de humanos cuando los otros cereales escaseaban. La dieta de los trabajadores era completada con muy escasa carne de vacuno fresca la que se les repartía con ocasión de las fiestas, que coincidían con las épocas de cosechas cuando igualmente se les repartía abundantemente los cereales. En este punto la diferen-

ciación social se hacía nuevamente presente, porque el gasto de carne fresca de vacuno y de carnero que para los naturales se limitaba a los días de fiesta, en la mesa diaria de la plana administrativa no faltaba y ocasionalmente se la reemplazaba por la más apreciada carne de ave. A los indígenas su porción de carne se les completaba con cecinas elaboradas en las mismas estancias, las que generalmente se les repartían acompañadas de papas, ají y sal. Estos dos últimos productos eran de procedencia foránea. El ají se compraba en Cocharcas o Huamanga y la sal procedía de las salinas de los pueblos del obispado de Huamanga. El cebo, que obtenían de la matanza de las reses y carneros, también se aprovechaba en el reparto para sus funciones religiosas en porciones tales que era para lo único que alcanzaba. También se usaba en el alumbrado de las oficinas de los obrajes. Este reparto se completaba con algo de cera de Piura que se adquiría en Lima o en Huamanga. Los productos lácteos procedentes de sus estancias eran ampliamente utilizados en la alimentación de uno y otro grupo, constituyendo para el indígena otro importante rubro para su dieta. Las frutas y hortalizas que también se cosechaban en sus huertos se les repartía escasamente. El uso de azúcar tomó diferentes rumbos en cada uno de los obrajes. Curiosamente en el de Chincheros donde no se producía se la intercambiaba por telas para repartirla, o, por último, se la compraba. Pero en el de Cacamarca, donde sí se la elaboraba, se repartía a los indios solamente los residuos de su producción bajo la forma de mieles, alfeñiques y guarapos, para que los volúmenes comercializables de las arrobas de azúcar no disminuyan y se utilizasen racionalmente aquéllos con poco valor adquisitivo en el mercado.

Era en las fiestas religiosas, cuando se repartía a uno y otro grupo los vinos y aguardientes de uso tan generalizado, que necesariamente tenían que comprar, ya sea en Ica, Palpa, Huamanga o Cocharcas. La coca, como producto alucinógeno y reparador de energías, repartida frecuentemente a los obrajeros durante el siglo XVI, había desaparecido de los repartos.

Asimismo, todos los trabajadores estaban obligados a hacerse cargo de una parte de los tejidos manufacturados en los obrajes. Con los mismos, que se les pagaba a los maestros especializados en determinados oficios, como: tejeros, purgadores del azúcar, albañiles, carpinteros, etc. que ocasionalmente llegaban a estos centros productivos. Las frazadas sólo se repartían a los indios que como mayordomos tenían a su cargo las festividades, para que con ellas pudieran comprar toros y otros menesteres para sus fiestas. El sistema de funcionamiento de los obrajes

apoyaba o más bien incentivaba este tipo de dispendio porque los trabajadores con el afán de obtener lo necesario para éstas se convertían en seguros agentes de ventas de sus productos. A éstos del mismo modo se les repartía ruanas, bretañas, cintas, etc. importadas para sus disfraces, con lo cual todo este sistema de reparto, dio lugar a un folklore tan particular en cada una de las regiones.

Por tanto, el sueldo de la mayor parte de los trabajadores incluía su subsistencia que se les pagaba en especies sobrevaloradas. Los productos del obraje y los que se compraban se les cargaba por regla general al doble de su precio puesto en el mercado. Para los trabajadores yanas, gentes desarraigadas de sus comunidades por completo, incluía, además, un pedazo de tierra de cuyo uso podían disfrutar sólo mientras su trabajo en la unidad de producción fuese activo, sin que la causal de su inactividad sea el encontrarse en la categoría de impedido en cuyo caso el disfrute continuaba. Si para el personal directivo el resto de su salario que no era cubierto por especies se les pagaba en dinero libre de todo gravamen, para los yanas éste estaba destinado a pagas fiscales y eclesiásticas que se les habían impuesto en forma obligatoria y compulsiva y una muy pequeña fracción para solventar las fiestas religiosas, sistema con el que el dinero retornaba rápidamente a la economía de los españoles y también algunas especies que se les repartía exprofesamente. El trabajo en los obrajes quedaría reducido a un sistema general de trabajo compulsivo donde la presión económica y extra-económica lo hicieron posible. Por último, por este sistema salarial que se seguía en los obrajes, éstos necesitaron estar íntimamente interconectados a la agricultura y ganadería para poder subsistir.

2. Sector de la producción

Si hemos visto que con los insumos de consumo las interrelaciones con el mercado regional fueron casi nulas con los insumos de producción sucederá todo lo contrario, y a medida que pasaron los años fueron creciendo dado que buscaban de mejorar la calidad de sus tejidos. Así, las telas que se fabricaban en el siglo XVI, como el sayal, cordellate y las jergas de factura bastante ordinaria, en el siglo XVIII los obrajes de Vilcashuamán ya no producían las dos primeras y se había llegado hasta a desconocer su técnica de fabricación. Estas telas se habían reducido a la producción casera y Jauja se había especializado en ellas. Los obrajes de Huamanga habían reemplazado esos géneros por bayetas, pañetes y continuaban fabricando la jerga como salida a las lanas de deshecho que

a todo obraje llegaban.

En Vilcashuamán, pese a que existían rebaños de ganados de todo tipo y de propiedad tanto de indios como de españoles, no se cubrían todas las necesidades de lana de los obrajes porque los hatos de ganados no sobrepasarían las 2000 cabezas, necesitando los obrajes de muchísimas más, como más adelante veremos. Los obrajes desde el siglo XVI, como una respuesta racional frente a las perspectivas que la naturaleza les brindaba, se organizaron como verdaderos complejos productivos donde se yuxtapuso la agricultura y la ganadería al servicio de la actividad principal de la unidad, la fabricación de telas. Esta predominaba sobre los otros sectores por estar destinada su producción al mercado citadino y extraregional. En los primeros años de su existencia los dueños de los obrajes destinaron los cereales y frutos de sus sementeras a satisfacer los salarios de los trabajadores y a enviar sus cereales y los procedentes del tributo a las punas de los alrededores, carentes de ellos por sus mismas condiciones ambientales, a rescatar lanas.¹⁴ Así Parinacochas, Chocorvos, Vilcancho, Cangallo, Onqoy, Pacomarca, Castrovirreyna y Huancavelica se convirtieron en sus principales abastecedoras.¹⁵

A fines del siglo XVI, este ventajoso sistema de intercambio fue reemplazado por otro que les traería mayores beneficios, por el que se hacían llevar la lana hasta el mismo obraje por mercaderes españoles o indios. A estas les pagarían meses después con tejidos elaborados con su propia lana y con el escasamente recompensado trabajo de los indios. Mientras el proceso productivo duraba, los cereales podían ser comercializados en el mercado de la ciudad.¹⁶ Y, al reducirse a muy poco la inversión de sus poseedores en este sistema de cambio, sus ganancias podían ser mayores.

Sin embargo, luego de producirse la aguda crisis poblacional en la región, y habiéndose optado por la yanaconización en la mayor parte de los obrajes y con la abolición del tributo en especies, la inversión en los insumos de producción tendrá que crecer necesariamente. Porque los granos y frutos que salían de sus sementeras estarán destinadas a partir de este momento a satisfacer la subsistencia de sus trabajadores.

Por ello, la lana en una tercera y larga etapa tendrá que ser adquirida generalmente a cambio de dinero, aun cuando el pago fuese a plazos. Son muy raros los casos en que hayamos encontrado el trueque como medio de transacción; éste sólo renacerá en la aguda crisis desatada en los últimos años del siglo XVIII. Desconocemos por qué motivo exacto las punas de los alrededores de Huamanga fueron dejadas de lado

y se fue a rescatar lanas a regiones muchísimo más apartadas, convirtiéndose en sus principales abastecedoras las mesetas de Bombón y el Collao. La zona de influencia de la primera alcanzaba toda la provincia de Lima, un poco más al norte, y hasta Ayacucho por el sur. La del Collao abastecía los obrajes del centro-sur peruano incluida Huamanga, Cuzco, Arequipa y el mismo Puno.

Las lanas del Collao eran tipificadas por los obrajeros como las mejores; las preferían porque las lanas de Bombón eran más grasientas. Por lo tanto, mermaban mucho más y, además, porque estas generalmente venían mezcladas con piedras, paja, y otras "porquerías" con lo que el valor de la arroba de lana subía al mismo ritmo que el de la merma. Pero no solamente por ello eran menos apreciados las lanas de la Sierra central, sino porque sus dueños la cotizaban a precios más altos que la del Collao. El arrieraje, por otro lado, a pesar de que las distancias eran más cortas costaba, igualmente, más. A lo que se sumaba la reticencia de los arrieros, a transitar esa ruta a la que habían bautizado de "camino tormentoso." Por ello, y a pesar de que las lanas blancas del Collao les irrogaban mayores gastos en el teñido, pues se tenía que gastar más tintes, salarios, lejías y leñas que dependía de la existencia constante de alfalfa para las mulas chamiseras, en el balance general se preferían.

Si apreciamos los Cuadros Números I y II, corroboraremos todo lo dicho. Para el obraje de Cacamarca la principal zona abastecedora era la del Collao y los mayores volúmenes de lana que entraban eran de la lana blanca sobre la negra. Los años donde más merma se produjo fueron el 1767 que no puede ser considerado normal porque ese año se produjo la transferencia de la propiedad de los Jesuitas a Temporalidades, y las lanas que se encontraron estaban picadas y podridas. Igualmente, en el año 1774 la merma fue grande, a pesar de que toda la lana fue del Collao. Ello se debió a que el obraje ese año tuvo dos administradores, cada uno de los cuales le imprimió un rumbo diferente. En los años 1771 y 1780-83 la mayor cantidad de la lana procedía de Jauja y la merma fue realmente considerable. Ahora bien - ¿por qué se rescataba lana de Jauja no obstante que se conocía su desventaja? Estas son al respecto las palabras de un administrador de este obraje, Manuel Ruiz de Ochoa, vertidas en el año 1782: "...la mala calidad de la que dentro de Jauja y este es otro perjuicio que sufre la administración ... pues lavada merma mas de un 100 por ciento quando las del Collao la mas de ellas un 20 por ciento menos..." Aun cuando la merma de la lana de Jauja ni la de Callao alcanzaban esos porcentajes como hemos

probado, los administradores eran conscientes del perjuicio que significaba para ellos el adquirir la primera. Sin embargo, las condiciones atmosféricas y políticas los obligaban a acudir a ella sin la cual la manufactura no podía andar. Así, los años 1771 y 1780-83 fueron coincidentemente años de sequía, a lo que se sumaría a partir del año 1781 la revolución de Túpac Amaru que imposibilitó toda la comunicación con el sur.

Las sequías tenían una incidencia negativa en el abastecimiento normal de las lanas para los obrajes, porque éste corría a cargo de las recuas de mulas de los arrieros que eran habilitadas por los administradores de los obrajes en los últimos meses del año anterior a iniciarse el proceso productivo, para que puedan salir a rescatarlas, una vez que hubiesen efectuado sus siembras. El camino lo recorrían en los últimos y primeros meses del año, pues buscaban completar el circuito en la estación de lluvias, que cubría la ruta de pastos, imprescindibles para avituallar a las mulas que desde el siglo XVII habían reemplazado a las llamas. La escasez de lluvias y consecuentemente de pastos ocasionaban el enflaquecimiento y muerte de las recuas, quedándose las cargas tiradas por el camino, lo que perjudicaba la normal marcha del proceso productivo. Las lluvias tampoco eran una bendición total, pues las torrenceras con su furia desbarrancaban a animales, peones y carga. No obstante, era preferible viajar en época de lluvias. La experiencia se lo demostraron a los administradores y las cifras nos lo demuestran a nosotros, cuando vemos que las mermas en los viajes de rescates de lanas, sólo alcanzaban una media de 2.2 por ciento, sobre el total de recibos.

Para los obrajes vilcashuamanguinos las mesetas señaladas eran sus principales abastecedoras, aunque los obrajes de Chincheros y Poma-cocha, todavía acudían a las punas de los alrededores porque contaban con menos recuas de mulas propias, y tentaban la utilización de sus exiguos ganados laneros para completar los volúmenes de lanas que necesitaban para su producción. Sin embargo, lo máximo que pudieron conseguir fueron diez arrobas, mientras que el obraje de Cacamarca que contaba con alrededor de 600 cabezas, jamás se tomó la molestia de usar un gramo. Para obtener 1000 arrobas de lana en esa época se necesitaba trasquilar aproximadamente 17000 cabezas de ovejas, lo que, además, nos demuestra los bajísimos rendimientos de los animales que eran de tipo "churro," y a que el fino merino no ingresó al Perú. Aun así, estos rendimientos no eran tan bajos como los de Cajamarca donde la esquila de 23700 rendía sólo 529 arrobas.¹⁷ Por ello pensamos que

deben haber existido muchos obrajes en el espacio del virreinato peruano que necesitaron abastecerse de arrobas de lanas extras si querían hacer crecer su producción, y por lo tanto promovieron en su consumo de lana relaciones comerciales o interregionales, como en el caso de los de Vilcashuamán, aun cuando se encerrase en el mismo complejo la producción de la lana y su manufactura. Las grandes necesidades de lanas de los obrajes quedan ejemplificadas en el Cuadro No. I.

Mientras se esperaba la llegada de las lanas, se efectuaban las siembras tanto en las haciendas anexas como en las parcelas de los yanás. Asimismo, se aprovechaba el tiempo para "calzar" todos los utensilios del obraje como del trapiche (si lo tuvieran) y de las herramientas de las haciendas anexas. Es aquí, donde intervienen el acero de corconilla de Milán, el fierro platina y el bergayón de Viscaya, el estaño y el cobre. Los tres primeros venían de Europa vía Lima - Huamanga y el cobre de producción interna lo compraban a los indios Querobamba de Oruro y otros.

De las cardas que anualmente se debían renovar, solamente se importaba el hilo de fierro para hacerlas aquí. Lo mismo pasó, con los herrajes que se necesitaban para habilitar las recuas de las mulas chamiceras o de carga.

Una vez ingresadas las lanas, inmediatamente se lavaban. Las mermas que se producían en este sentido eran bastante cuantiosas y alcanzaban una media del 45.4 por ciento sobre el total, lo que casi duplicaba su precio. En la formación de su precio se debía tener en cuenta ello, así como la poca cantidad de mano de obra que se necesitaba para su explotación, y también los escasos insumos que requerían a diferencia de lo que sucedía con los obrajes. Finalmente creemos que la idea de una sobreabundancia debe ser dejado de lado, pues su abundancia en un lapso de tiempo determinado no debemos extenderla en forma genérica y simplista a todo el virreinato.

Luego del lavado, cardado y hilado de las lanas venía el tejido de las telas. Con las hilazas de los alrededores o del Collao, que eran más finas y consistentes, se preparaba la urdiembre y con las arrobas de lana en bruto se hilaban las tramas en los tornos que eran menos perfectas.

Los volúmenes de telas tejidas en el obraje de Cacamarca entre 1767, que sólo engloba el trabajo de tres meses, y 1785 oscilaron entre 51335 y 2480 varas en el penúltimo año del ciclo, aunque no está demás señalar que en 1756 su producción alcanzó las 70177 varas. El de Chincheros entre 1777 y 1799 produjo en su momento más alto 28940 varas para descender a fabricar en el último año del ciclo tan solo 1536,

mientras que el obraje de Pomacocha en 1769 bordeaba las 30000 varas.¹⁸ Estos volúmenes de producción de los obrajes de Vilcashuamán, en un periodo que puede ser considerado de declive, se verían engrosados por buen número de centros artesanales medianos y pequeños y por las telas de lana y algodón de factura casera. Por lo tanto, creemos que a la luz de las cifras, se debe reconsiderar todas las apreciaciones y especulaciones que sobre la producción de los obrajes del virreinato se han hecho hasta el momento. Esto vale en especial para la zona de Vilcashuamán a la que los historiadores económicos, cuando tangencialmente se refieren al tema, la obvían o simplemente la consideran poco significativa por el hecho de carecer de lanas.¹⁹

Según nosotros hemos observado en el obraje de Cacamarca no todas las telas que se tejían se beneficiaban y teñían totalmente, quedándose un buen volumen en la condición de "xergas." Así del total del ingreso conformado por las tejidas del año y las existencias de los años anteriores sólo se teñía un 42.9 por ciento.²⁰ La etapa del teñido era de las más costosas y pesadas. Las telas de los telares pasaban al batán para ser desengrasadas y tupidas, apelmadas con tierra alcalina, colpas blancas y negras, disueltas en agua caliente y orín, para finalmente pasar a lavarlas y teñirlas. El abastecimiento de colpas a los obrajes era un negocio exclusivo de los pueblos de indios Quilla, Colca y otros, a cambio casi exclusivamente de dinero, aunque en épocas de crisis no les importara recibir por ellas telas. La magnitud de las necesidades de colpa eran bastantes considerables.

De toda la masa de telas beneficiadas del año, sólo un 6.0 por ciento, constituido por las piezas de jergas, no se teñían. Eran las bayetas y los pañetes los únicos que recibían tal baño. Los materiales con respecto al siglo XVI se habían enriquecido, pues el uso del añil y del brasil, que en ese primer siglo no se utilizaron, era corriente. Estos venían por las dos "costas." Lima monopolizaba la venta del que venía por el Pacífico, y los de la otra costa fluían libremente por el sur. Sus precios eran bastantes elevados, muchas veces escaseaban y esta escasez ocasionaba un alza desmedida, por lo que, se buscaba tener una buena cantidad de existencias para asegurar la continuidad de la producción.

El obraje de Chincheros utilizó además del brasil el magno, producto regional cosechado por los naturales. La tara, otro producto regional, también se empleó y en mayor proporción que cualquier otro colorante por su baratura. Los obrajes se abastecían de ella a través de los indios de Huanta, Viñaca y de los arrieros que por su cuenta también la compraban en los pueblos de indios de los alrededores y luego la vendían a

los obrajes junto con la sal.

En base a estos tintes los obrajes de Vilcashuamán alcanzaron gran variedad de colores llegándose a lograr ocho tonalidades por año. Muchas veces, se dieron el lujo de florear sus telas para conseguir mejores precios y ventas. Los administradores tenían muy en cuenta los gustos de cada una de las plazas a las que iban dirigidas sus telas, de acuerdo a los que preparaban exprofesamente las remesas.

Los obrajes, como hemos visto, fueron grandes consumidores de insumos de producción y en este caso el arrastre económico regional o interregional es bastante significativo. Estancias laneras dependieron de ellos y de los chorrillos, exclusivamente, en su marcha. Muchos pueblos de indios estaban supeditados al abastecimiento de diversos insumos que les pudieran hacer, para pagar sus tributos, repartos y otras cargas civiles y religiosas, así como para generarse algunos ingresos extras. No debemos dejar de mencionar aquí que, por otro lado, los obrajes fueron las más importantes unidades de producción de la provincia de Vilcashuamán y a donde acudían la mayor masa reclutada entre la población para satisfacer el tributo. Este y el resto de exacciones que les fueron impuestas a los indios por los españoles los obligaron a participar en la creación y desarrollo del mercado interno.

Creemos que con este breve panorama del proceso productivo hemos demostrado los grandes esfuerzos que los obrajes tenían que hacer para abastecerse de las materias primas y semielaboradas necesarias. Un autoabastecimiento total era imposible por la variada gama de productos que precisaban, no igualada por ningún otro tipo de unidad de producción. Ellos se abrieron a la economía regional e interregional, abarcaron zonas vastísimas para lo que montaron la infraestructura de transporte imprescindible, de la cual al decir de los administradores dependía la vida de ellos. Las regiones a donde acudían con sus recuas, las desconcertaron para sí, tanto como las de los alrededores que fueron importantes abastecedoras de ellos. Sin embargo, sus extensas relaciones regionales internas no los librarían de sus necesidades de productos extra-virreinales. Los obrajes desde el siglo XVI fueron creadores de circuitos comerciales y del mercado interno y los que nutrían de la mercancía dinero a las provincias, al ser las minas sus más importantes plazas.

3. *De la comercialización*

Las telas fabricadas en los obrajes de Huamanga tenían como destino principal el mercado, seguido por la necesidad de cubrir los sueldos de sus trabajadores y una débil utilización en implementos como costales, prensa, etc.

En la economía colonial dada la estrechez del mercado y la poca vinculación entre una región y otra, así como por el elevado grado de autosuficiencia de las economías campesinas, el productor obrajero tenía que organizar y llevar a cabo diferentes labores de comercialización. Esto era necesario tanto para abastecerse de insumos como para la venta de sus productos. Para cumplir con esta última función, los obrajes debían tener sus propios "factores" en las plazas mineras y ciudades, enviar sus peones a las ferias, contar con sus propias recuas de mulas o tomarlas en alquiler, lo que les irrogaba fuertes gastos, y, finalmente, preocuparse por conseguir compradores dentro de la gran competencia que se produjo entre los mismos obrajes, entre éstos y los chorrillos, y entre los dos últimos y las telas europeas, aunque la presión de éstas fuese más leve.

La producción de los obrajes de Vilcashuamán se mantuvo más o menos estable desde las últimas décadas del siglo XVII hasta las postrimerías del siglo XVIII en que comenzó a decaer. Su crecimiento se debió al gran aliciente que para ellos representaron los mercados de Potosí, pero sobre todo el de Oruro, los mercados regionales y el de los corregidores. Las plazas mineras desde los años ochenta del siglo XVII fueron su principal impulso. Pese a que ellas ya no estaban en pleno auge, los productos de los obrajes alcanzaron precios bastante altos que no se alejarían mucho de los buscados paños de Quito. Pero a medida que la crisis minera se fue acentuando, el declive de los obrajes la acompañó. Potosí en el periodo que estudiamos había sido completamente abandonada como plaza, porque ésta en 1776 ya no era la sombra de lo que había sido. Su población había disminuido en un 80 por ciento con respecto a los días gloriosos del siglo XVII.²¹ Lo mismo sucedía en Oruro. Por ello las ropas tanto del Cuzco como las de Huamanga no podían tener rápido expendio "...asi por lo calamitoso del tiempo como por la cortedad del lugar, y su deplorable constitución y atraso del mineral y comercio..."²² Por ello el precio de las varas de telas había descendido a menos de la mitad de lo que se vendía a principios del siglo.

En el siglo XVIII el libre comercio, el contrabando y las importaciones de los productos especialmente manufacturados se dejaron sentir en

todo el virreinato, pero evidenciándose en primer lugar en las regiones mineras. Muchos autores encontraron en este ingreso de ropas del otro lado del Atlántico la razón de la decadencia de las manufacturas locales. Sin embargo, la situación exige un análisis más profundo que involucre las relaciones regionales internas. Al revisar las cuentas de los factores de obrajes en Oruro, vemos que la mayor parte de la ropa salida de ellas estuvo destinada a la masa trabajadora. Los principales compradores de ropa al por mayor en las plazas mineras eran corregidores, gobernadores, hacendados, etc. para repartirla o darla a los indios en parte de pago de sus sueldos. La ropa europea tenía precios inalcanzables para el trabajador indio. Aunque si la abundancia de textiles importados los obligaba a bajar, ésta en cadena forzaba a la ropa peruana a descender. En el ahora corto mercado de los minerales la principal competencia para las telas de los obrajes la constituyeron, no los géneros europeos, sino la ropa de los chorrillos y de factura casera esencialmente por su baratura, pues costaban menos de la mitad de los ya bajísimos precios de telas de los obrajes. Como el testimonio de un enterado en la venta de ropa de obrajes, vertido en el año 1777, lo corroborará: "...no es dudable que el estado en que se hallan las cosas de veinte años a esta parte por lo que ha bajado el precio de la ropa de los obrajes a causa de los muchos chorrillos que se han erigido en todas partes no tiene cuenta el laboreo de estos..."²³

Esta competencia se produjo porque aquí no existieron gremios como en Europa que agrupen a los diferentes productores para protegerse contra la aparición de nuevos centros manufactureros que al inundar el mercado con grandes volúmenes de telas ocasionaran la caída de los precios y por tanto de su beneficio social. Por el contrario, todos los productores actuaban como verdaderas islas que se hacían la competencia unos a otros lo que impedía la formación de un precio de monopolio como en el mundo feudal.²⁴

En el siglo XVI, evidentemente, hubo un monopolio del mercado ejercido por el grupo encomendero. Pero las cosas fueron cambiando con el paso de los años, especialmente, para la producción textil. Si bien en el sector de bienes alimenticios continuaron siendo los terratenientes los principales abastecedores del mercado al habérseles cercenado cada vez más la propiedad sobre la tierra a las comunidades, en el campo textil el monopolio pudo ser roto por la aparición de tejidos de fabricación casera, comunal o de los chorrillos. Esto fue factible por la habilidad generalizada de los indígenas en el tejido, porque para ejecutarla en las condiciones en que se llevaron a cabo, no se necesitaba de grandes

espacios de terreno, ni de mayores bienes de capital. Más bien utilizaron en la producción la lana de sus carneros de la tierra que los obrajes, como ya hemos visto, no emplearon y tintes vegetales que abundaban en la región. Materias primas, que al no tener salida y/o valor en el mercado fueron racionalmente utilizados por ellos. El uso de estos materiales y el coste del trabajo familiar o comunal que no lo tomaban en cuenta al momento de formular el precio, hicieron que sus productos sean sustancialmente más baratos.

Si la producción de uno de estos centros podía ser cincuenta o más veces menor que la de un obraje, y por lo tanto, no representar individualmente mayor peligro, sí lo eran, porque en realidad éstos brotaron por todas partes y el volumen sumado de todos es el que ocasionó el descalabro de los obrajes. A lo que se añadió la supresión de los repartos de los corregidores, la contracción del mercado minero y las cíclicas crisis agrícolas, como la que se dejó sentir el año de 1780 y que se agudizó en el de 1783.

¿Cuál fue la reacción de los obrajes frente a esta situación? En primer lugar, la marcha de los obrajes continuó a ritmo normal. La producción de estos centros manufactureros le llevó largamente la delantera al consumo, lo que acarreó la generación de grandes existencias, que se acumularon año tras año. No existía una adecuada relación entre la oferta y la demanda, había un predominio de la primera sobre la segunda, porque el productor continuaba fabricando para un cliente desconocido. No se estudió o se quiso ignorar la marcha del mercado persistiéndose en fabricar sin antes asegurarse la venta de toda la producción. Y al no frenarse la utilización en algún porcentaje de las fuerzas productivas, que hubiese sido lo sensato, se ocasionó el abarrotamiento de los almacenes con sus mercancías.

El hecho de que guardarán sus productos en los almacenes no obedecía a que los quisiesen proteger de la caída de precios, sino a que no podían vender ni siquiera a los bajos precios existentes, porque otros productores los tenían aún más baratos. Aquí no funcionaba el mercado del vendedor sino el del comprador.

Aun viviendo dentro de esta severa crisis de fines del siglo XVIII, se mantuvo el ritmo productivo acostumbrado. Posteriormente, para aminorar los obstáculos se pretendió, primero, mejorar la calidad y encontrar nuevos compradores y luego, disminuir bruscamente la producción.

En el Cuadro No. IV vemos que la principal plaza para el obraje de Cacamarca la constituía el mercado de Oruro con una media de 37.4

por ciento sobre el total de las ventas. Pero todo lo que se remitía no se vendía inmediatamente sino años después y todas las ventas que se lograban hacer eran en plazos. En consecuencia los stocks de mercaderías de este obraje en Oruro eran muy altos ya en 1767. Sin embargo, se persistió en el envío, porque se estaba acostumbrando a tenerla como principal mercado. Se creyó en un primer momento, que la causa estaría en el cambio de administración de la de los jesuitas a la de Temporalidades. Por ello se buscó seguir la misma técnica empleada por ellos y se mantuvo a todo el personal especializado o se trató de mejorar éste. Se ensayaron mejoras en la calidad y variedad de los tintes, en el enfurtido y en el grosor de las telas. De la misma forma se buscó tratar de imitar los paños de Quito que a la sazón ya no llegaban a Huamanga. Pero la necesidad de importantes inversiones de capital en telares, lisos, y gente especializada frenó los arrestos en Cacamarca. No así en Chincheros, donde se ejecutó el proyecto pero sin que se hubiera alcanzado los resultados esperados.

Por lo pronto, si observamos detenidamente el Cuadro No. III, vemos que a partir de 1775 hay una tendencia a utilizar insumos de mejor calidad. En el caso de los tintes se reemplazó a la tara que hasta ese momento se utilizaba proporcionalmente más, por un mayor uso del añil y brasil, cuyos costos eran mucho más elevados que el de la primera. Empero, paralelamente hay un descenso en la utilización de enjebes. ¿Por qué se produjo esto? ¿Para compensar los gastos o por que la técnica les indicaba que a mayor tintura las telas necesitaban menos enjebes?

Paralelamente, se persistió en continuar con la producción a ritmo normal y hasta acelerado, no obstante los grandes stocks que existían en las tiendas de sus factores y al interior del mismo obraje, que con el correr de los años se harán más voluminosos. Había una sobreproducción que no es característica del momento sino que acompañó la producción de los obrajes desde el siglo XVI, aunque en este momento había alcanzado dimensiones insospechadas.²⁵ Dentro de esta coyuntura hubo un administrador que, deseando hacer producir la maquinaria constantemente, salvando todos los imponderables, no encontró otra salida que echar mano de los colchones de la casa para que la producción no se paralice.²⁶

Sincrónicamente, desde los burócratas de Temporalidades en Lima, pasando por sus delegados en Huamanga hasta el administrador y mayordomo, se preocuparon por encontrar otros mercados que reemplazasen las plazas mineras, y lo primero en lo que se detuvo su mira fué

en los corregidores. Si nosotros vemos Cuadro No. IV, notaremos que a partir del año 1776 hay una clara variación del rumbo, se va dejando de lado Oruro y se vende más a los corregidores de los alrededores o zonas más distantes. En el afán por venderles se les llevaba la ropa hasta el lugar donde se iba a efectuar el reparto.

Para capturar este mercado se buscó influir en los nombramientos de estas autoridades con el fin de que recaigan en gente allegada, pero sobre todo que le deba favores, y así lograr un mayor expendio. En caso contrario, desde el preciso momento en que recibían sus cargos en Lima, se les acosaba para demostrarles las bondades de sus productos, se les hacía ofrecimientos o regalos, y por último se les amenazaba con sanciones de tipo social, político y religioso: "...si el provisto corregidor de Anadaguaylas ... aspira a un *buen nombre* y *salvación* deve coger ropa de Cacamarca..."²⁷ Pero en esta carrera no se encontraba sólo el obraje de Cacamarca sino todos los de la región que se declararon una guerra a muerte, que no cejaba hasta el momento mismo de poner en manos del corregidor las telas. Aquí también los chorrillos y la producción casera les jugarían una mala pasada a los obrajes, porque los corregidores la preferían por sus bajos precios sin importarles su mala calidad ni el rechazo de los naturales de la región que preferían la de Cacamarca, por ser más durable. Para los corregidores esto no constituía una cualidad sino un defecto, ya que los repartos de telas no podían ser continuos, con lo que sus márgenes de ganancia se reducían por partida doble, por volumen y por diferencia de precios. Los repartos de tejidos en las zonas productoras no estaban ausentes como se piensa. En la provincia de Vilcashuamán se acostumbraba a repartir 16000 varas de ropa que correspondía a un reparto per cápita de 2.7 varas.²⁸ Aun cuando esta provincia era obrajera, no toda su gente trabajaba en obrajes, y por tanto el reparto se les podía efectuar sin dañar los intereses de las unidades de producción.

A partir del año de 1781 los mercados mineros y los corregidores dejarán de tener toda significación para los obrajes de la región. A la decadencia de los minerales de Oruro se sumó, a raíz de la rebelión de Túpac Amaru, el corte de toda comunicación con las provincias del sur - este, "tierras de arriba" como se las denominaban en Huamanga, y, como su consecuencia la supresión del reparto mercantil de los corregidores. Por lo tanto, la búsqueda de nuevos mercados se tornó obsesiva. Se optó por Lima, a donde se remitió un considerable volumen. En lo que quisiéramos destacar es que casi inmediatamente a su llegada toda la

ropa se vendió. Por eso nos preguntamos – ¿cuáles fueron los motivos, aparte de lo dificultoso del camino, para que no se ensayará antes con este mercado? ¿Es qué se prefirió primero agotar toda posibilidad regional que aminorarse los costos del transporte? ¿O es qué antes las telas huamanguinas no tuvieron posibilidad de venderse allí al encontrarse colmado el mercado limeño por las telas quiteñas, y sólo a partir de los años setenta en que dejaron de llegar, el campo quedó libre para éstas? Las respuestas quedan aún por esclarecerse. Sin embargo, sabemos que Huamanga y sus alrededores también reemplazaron a los antiguos mercados. Como podemos observar a través del Cuadro No. IV, la masa de telas vendidas en ella, a partir de ese año, sería mayor.

Agravada la situación desde el año de 1780, el obraje de Cacamarca para hacer frente a los bajos precios que obtenía por sus productos y las pocas posibilidades de venderlos en el comprimido mercado, optó por hacer menos inversiones de capital en los insumos de producción, sin un cambio parecido en los de consumo. Del mismo modo hizo descender sus volúmenes de producción.²⁹ Si la utilización de los tintes continuó más o menos pareja, se debió a los stocks almacenados de los años anteriores. Pero la *maquipuska* que anualmente se compraba, a partir de este año fue completamente dejada de lado. Con esta medida el ahorro anual sería de cerca de mil pesos. Obviamente la calidad de las telas bajó.

En 1785 el obraje de Cacamarca retornará a sus antiguas dueñas, las Monjas Carmelitas, y afrontaría nuevos problemas como la inestabilidad por la transmisión del mando, despojo de las haciendas anexas que fueron de los Jesuitas y otros. Mientras tanto, los de Chincheros y Pomacocha seguirían con su marcha a trompicones, con la esperanza de encontrar salidas a sus productos. El de Chincheros, que en 1777 producía 28940 varas, fue bajando su producción gradualmente hasta el año 1799, en que sólo produjo 1536 varas, que en su casi totalidad estuvieron destinadas a solventar los gastos de los trabajadores.

El Cuadro No. IV nos muestra igualmente que el mercado interno de la región era bastante débil, pero que se mantuvo más o menos estable y constante para los obrajes de Cacamarca, Chincheros y Pomacocha. Este estuvo representado por la ciudad de Huamanga y sus alrededores, y las ferias de Cocharcas y Chapi. El impacto de importaciones de manufacturas europeas en los pueblos rurales de la provincia de Huamanga no se había dejado sentir ni en la última década del siglo XVIII. Las apariciones de estas manufacturas eran muy esporádicas y débiles, mientras que los paños de Quito habían dejado el campo libre a las de fabricación regional. Las ferias regionales, de creación religiosa

que derivarían hacia las prácticas mercantiles aprovechando la concentración de la gente, eran importantes mercados de compra-venta de los productos regionales, como también eran las ventanas de ingreso a la región de los importados. Sin embargo, sus altos precios con respecto a los regionales los tornaban accesibles sólo a determinados estratos de la sociedad y no así para la masa indígena. Los volúmenes de telas expendidos en el mercado interno fueron menores a los enviados a Oruro y vendidos a los corregidores. Pero su real importancia sólo la podremos medir hasta que conozcamos cuál de los dos sectores aportaban más en su sostenimiento con auxilios pecuniarios rápidos derivados de las mayores o menores ventas a plazos o al contado en cada uno.

NOTAS

- * Este artículo está basado en fuentes consultadas en los siguientes archivos: Archivo General de la Nación, Lima, Archivo Departamental de Ayacucho y Sala de Investigaciones de la Biblioteca Nacional, Lima. Originalmente preparado para la conferencia de Bielefeld, mientras tanto ha sido publicado en la *Revista del Archivo Nacional* (Lima, 1985).
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- 2. ADA, Protocolo No. 43 (1672 - 1673).
- 3. Miriam Salas de Coloma, *De los obrajes de Canaria y Chincheros a las comunidades indígenas de Vilcashuamán, siglo XVI* (Lima, 1979), pp.22 - 23.
- 4. *Ibid.*, p.28.
- 5. *Ibid.*, cap.I y pp.133 - 134.
- 6. *Ibid.*, cap.II.
- 7. *Ibid.*, p.144.
- 8. *Ibid.*, pp.69 - 70.
- 9. *Ibid.*, pp.72 - 81, 108 - 111.
- 10. *Ibid.*, pp.57.
- 11. John Fisher, *Minas y mineros en el Perú colonial, 1776 - 1824* (Lima, 1977), pp.26 - 31; Carlos Assadourian, *El sistema económico colonial: Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima, 1982), pp.121 - 122.
- 12. ADA, Aramburu, Protocolo No. 9 ff., 98r - 198v.
- 13. AGN(P), Derecho indígena (1729), leg. 14, cuad. 238, 248.
- 14. Salas, *De los obrajes de Canaria y Chincheros*, p.86.

15. Ibid., pp.86 - 88.
16. Ibid., pp.90 - 95.
17. Silva Santisteban, *Los obrajes en el virreinato del Perú*, p.118.
18. Ver Cuadro No. III.
19. Assadourian, *El sistema económico colonial*, p.205; Jürgen Golte, *Repartos y rebeliones: Túpac Amaru y las contradicciones de la economía colonial* (Lima, 1980), p.65.
20. Ver Cuadro No. III.
21. Fisher, *Minas y mineros*, p.34.
22. D. Juan Antonio Gonzales de Quiroga, Factor en Oruro, al Director General de Temporalidades en Lima. Oruro, Junio 10 de 1771, AGN(P), Temporalidades (1776 - 77), leg. 286.
23. D. Manuel Ruíz de Ochoa, administrador de Cacamarca, al Director de Temporalidades en Lima. Cacamarca, Junio 28 de 1777, AGN(P), Temporalidades (1776 - 77), leg. 286.
24. Witold Kula, *Teoría económica del sistema feudal* (Buenos Aires, 1974), p.89.
25. Miriam Salas, "El obraje de Chincheros".(Tesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima, 1976), p.195.
26. D. Cayetano Ruíz de Ochoa, administrador del obraje de Cacamarca, al Director de Temporalidades en Lima. Cacamarca, Diciembre 30 de 1772, AGN(P), Temporalidades (1776 - 77), leg. 286.
27. D. Cayetano Ruíz de Ochoa al Director de Temps. en Lima, Cacamarca, Setiembre 10 de 1776.
28. Golte, *Repartos y rebeliones*, pp.88 - 89.
29. Ver Cuadro No. III.

ANEXO: TABLAS OBRAJES DE CACAMARCA I - IV

CUADRO I: *Lanas, Aprovechamiento*

R E G I O N E S A B A S T E C E D O R A S								
Huancavelica			Jauja			Collao		
Año	Blanca a lb.	Negra a lb.	%	Blanca a lb.	Negra a lb.	%	Blanca a lb.	%
1767	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	831.00	100.0
1768	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	2293.21	100.0
1769	-	-	0.0	200.00	1436.23	38.8	2580.00	61.1
1770	150.00	-	4.6	-	200.00	6.2	2862.00	89.1
		(10.00)			(7.00)		(326.00)	
1771	-	80.00	2.2	98.00	1095.10	29.5	2390.00	68.2
1772	-	-	0.0	1500.00	650.00	43.2	2820.00	56.7
				(20.00)			(465.00)	
1773	-	-	0.0	324.00	479.00	20.0	2815.00	79.9
	(4.13)				(11.00)		(17.19)	
1774	75.12	-	3.1	-	189.00	7.9	2212.17	88.8
							(27.00)	
1775	75.00	75.00	5.0	-	450.00	11.6	2352.00	79.8
1776	-	-	0.0	-	400.00	11.6	3040.00	88.3
1777	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	2079.00	100.0
							(500.00)	
1778	-	-	0.0	-	400.00	9.1	3470.00	90.8
1779	-	-	0.0	-	300.00	11.2	2372.00	88.7
1780	-	-	0.0	-	600.00	17.9	2379.00	82.0
1781	-	-	0.0	1800.00	300.00	78.4	*577.00	21.5
1782	-	-	0.0	2400.00	1000.00	100.0	-	0.0
1783	-	-	0.0	638.00	1327.00	100.0	-	0.0
1784	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	0.0
1785	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	0.0
Media			0.9			28.8		70.3

Fuentes: ADA; AGN(P); BNP;
 Datos en parentesis: Miriam Salas.

...sigue CUADRO I: *Lanas, Aprovechamiento*

T O T A L E S							
I n g r e s o				C a l i d a d e s			
Envío a lb.	Ingreso a lb.	Merma a lb.	%	Blanca a lb.	%	Negra a lb.	%
1767	-	-	-	831.00	100.0	-	0.0
1768	2293.21	2293.21	-	2293.21	100.0	-	0.0
1769	4216.23	4216.23	-	2780.00	65.9	1436.23	34.1
1770	3212.00	3212.00	-	3012.00	93.8	200.00	6.2
1771	4066.10	3723.10	343.00	2548.00	68.4	1175.10	31.6
1772	4970.00	4970.00	-	4320.00	86.9	650.00	13.1
1773	4103.00	3618.00	485.00	3139.00	86.8	479.00	13.2
1774	2510.06	2477.04	33.02	2288.04	92.4	189.00	7.6
1775	2979.00	2952.00	27.00	2427.00	82.2	525.00	17.8
1776	3440.00	3440.00	-	3040.00	88.4	400.00	11.6
1777	2079.00	2079.00	-	2079.00	100.0	-	0.0
1778	4370.00	3870.00	500.00	3470.00	89.7	400.00	10.3
1779	2672.00	2672.00	-	2372.00	88.8	300.00	11.2
1780	3339.00	3339.00	-	2739.00	82.0	600.00	18.0
1781	2677.00	2677.00	-	2372.00	88.8	300.00	11.2
1782	3400.00	3400.00	-	2400.00	70.6	1000.00	29.4
1783	1975.24	1965.20	14.04	638.00	32.5	1327.20	67.5
1784	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1785	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Media			2.2		83.4		16.6

CUADRO III: *Telas tejidas: Volúmenes de Producción y Existencias*

Año	C A R G O				TOTAL	D E S C A R G O			
	Tejidas del año		Existentes			Utilizadas (teñidas)		S a l d o	
	varas	%	varas	%		varas	%	varas	%
1767	16089	30.7	36220	69.2	52309	8723	16.6	43586	83.3
1768	45815	51.2	43586	48.7	89401	52810	59.0	36591	40.9
1769	45700	55.5	36591	44.4	82291	50679	61.5	31612	38.4
1770	34577	52.2	31612	47.7	66189	50009	75.5	16180	24.4
1771	48460	74.9	16180	25.0	64640	45526	70.4	19144	29.5
1772	51335	72.8	19114	27.1	70449	38009	53.9	32440	46.0
1773	43480	57.2	32440	42.7	75920	32900	43.3	43020	56.6
1774	37131	46.3	43020	53.6	80151	17807	22.2	62344	77.7
1775	42160	40.3	62344	59.6	104504	41689	39.8	62815	60.1
1776	47540	43.0	62815	56.9	110355	50770	45.8	59585	53.9
1777	51188	46.2	59585	53.7	110773	31000	27.9	79773	72.0
1778	41780	34.3	79773	65.6	121553	51555	42.4	69998	57.5
1779	41480	37.2	69998	62.7	111478	55953	50.1	55525	49.8
1780	41080	42.5	55525	57.4	96605	35745	37.0	60860	62.9
1781	24040	28.3	60640	71.6	84680	22040	26.0	62640	73.9
1782	15734	20.0	62640	79.9	78374	16800	21.4	61574	78.5
1783	15480	20.0	61574	79.9	77054	24838	32.2	52216	67.7
1784	2480	4.5	52216	95.4	54696	37159	67.9	17537	32.0
1785	2800	13.7	17537	86.2	20337	4815	23.6	15522	76.3
Media		40.5		59.3			42.9		56.9

Fuentes: ADA; AGN(P); BNP.

CUADRO IV: Telas Teñidas y Beneficiadas: Mercados

Año	Total Mercados			P l a z a s			Lima			Cocharas			F e r r i a s			Chapi			Corregidores			Ninamba (Tempe)		
	varas	varas	%	varas	%	varas	varas	%	varas	varas	%	varas	varas	%	varas	%	varas	%	varas	varas	%	varas	%	varas
1767	2480	1878	75.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	602	24.2	602
1768	21488	4835	22.5	10466	48.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	903	4.2	903
1769	44756	2342	5.2	40000	89.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	1414	3.1	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1000	2.2	1000
1770	49043	1583	3.2	40020	81.6	-	0.0	-	0.0	5940	12.1	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1500	3.0	1500
1771	47081	1244	2.6	30326	64.4	-	0.0	-	0.0	2010	4.2	2000	4.2	2000	4.2	10001	21.2	1500	3.1	10001	21.2	1500	3.1	1500
1772	34163	4180	12.2	26083	76.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	2400	7.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1500	4.3	1500
1773	35637	6070	17.0	15700	44.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	2300	6.4	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	3560	9.9	3560
1774	11735	2817	24.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	17.0	1430	12.1	9988	33.9	1500	12.7	1500	12.7	9988	33.9	1500	12.7	1500
1775	32444	3578	11.0	25541	78.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	6.1	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1325	4.0	1325
1776	29950	4194	14.0	11756	39.2	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	5.6	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1777	36304	5431	14.9	11873	32.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	5.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	5.5	2000
1778	43317	1235	2.8	15562	35.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	4.6	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1779	19567	11342	57.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1780	30216	4005	13.2	11987	39.6	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	6.6	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1781	5752	3752	65.2	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	34.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1782	31884	10435	32.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	6.2	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1783	26215	10284	39.2	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	15913	60.7	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1784	17587	15387	87.4	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	2000	12.5	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
1785	29475	1557	5.2	24076	81.6	3842	13.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
Media		26.6		37.4		7.0			6.9		0.8								17.5			3.8		

Fuentes: ADA; AGN(P); BNP.

COMMENTARY

John H. Coatsworth

These three papers demonstrate the fragility and backwardness of Latin America's textile business in the late colonial era. In Peru, the manufactories (*obrajes*) of Huamanga employed debt peons (*yanaconas*) to produce rough woolens with backward implements for a market that depended on forced sales to unwilling consumers by corrupt officials. In Bolivia, the Cochabamba boom in cottage cottons relied on wartime conditions to open markets that would otherwise have found better quality products at lower prices from foreign suppliers. In Mexico, the woolen industry virtually disappeared over the course of the eighteenth century, while the revival of cotton textile production in Puebla depended on poverty, rather than technological advance, and nearly succumbed to peace and free trade well before Independence.

The case of the Huamanga *obrajes*, ably sketched by Salas, may be the most depressing of all. The decline of the industry in the seventeenth century provided ample opportunity for closing these enterprises once and for all. Data are lacking on the dimensions of the eighteenth century revival before the 1760's, but the importance of bloc sales to the *corregidores* (which Salas' data may underestimate, since a portion of the market sales may also have gone to these officials) brought the boom to an end when the Túpac Amaru revolt forced the abolition of the *repartimientos*. In Mexico, where forced sales were less common, the woolen industry died a natural death much earlier, as Salvucci's recent study has shown.¹

The cotton boom in Cochabamba, by contrast, did not depend on official favor. Indeed, as Larson shows, colonial governments could not be persuaded to help the industry at all. Permission to grow cotton in the area, to free the industry depended at least as much on government decisions taken in Madrid, for it boomed only when Spain blundered into war with Britain in 1796. Unlike Huamanga, however, *tocuyo* production remained a cottage industry that purchased inputs, hired labor, borrowed capital, and sold products in competitive markets without the aid of political controls and coercion.

Taken together, these two case studies demonstrate the hopeless malaise of Andean industry. Neither official favor, nor market forces

proved sufficient to stimulate the development of an enduring industrial base. Primitive technology produced goods of inferior quality and higher cost than foreign competitors. Woolens could even be displaced by decently made domestic cotton cloth, as Salas points out. Cochabamba cotton cloth had difficulty competing with imports from Quito, let alone Britain. Together, these studies highlight the fate of marginal industries in the more backward regions of Spanish America.

The case of Mexico is more complicated. As Thomson's superb case study shows, Puebla's cotton textile production lasted longer, developed a more complex division of labor, and produced goods of higher quality than Huamanga or Cochabamba. Although cotton production declined when peace broke out in the 1810's, and declined further during the first decades of Independence, it did not disappear. Factory production began to displace artisans as early as the 1830's and boomed during the Porfirian era. In Peru, the first cotton factories were not set up in Lima until the 1850's, and quickly went bankrupt when the government abandoned protectionist tariffs.² Puebla's advantages over Huamanga and Cochabamba merit more extended discussion.

Although Thomson cites the limitations of the market for Puebla's cottons as a factor in its unsteady growth and late colonial decline, Mexico's market appears to have been far larger and much more stable than in the two Andean cases. At least part of the reason for this contrast may lie in the different levels of productivity of the two regions. While precise data for Peru are lacking, qualitative evidence suggests that per capita product was substantially lower in the Andes than in Mexico in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Andean textile industries thus faced a much smaller market, consisting mainly of urban laborers earning cash incomes until forced sales (Huamanga) and war (Cochabamba) created temporary booms. In Mexico, on the other hand, Puebla marketed its products throughout the colony to a more numerous clientele and the industry's success promoted textile development in competing centers like Querétaro, Guadalajara and Mexico City. In short, the greater productivity of the Mexican economy and the consequent higher per capita income of its population, helped to stimulate a larger and more stable industry.³

It is also possible that Puebla's cotton textile industry made more productive use of its resources. Unfortunately, none of these studies present sufficient data for measuring industry productivity. Thus, it is impossible to compare them to each other or to the European textile industries of the same period. While both Larson and Thomson may be

on solid ground when they cite foreign competition as a critical variable in determining the success or failure of the industries they study, a quantitative test of this proposition could produce interesting results. Neither study provides a detailed analysis of the cost structure of cotton production. The conventional inference – that backward technology was at fault (and thus shortage of capital or entrepreneurial unreason) – does not, however, explain much. Walker's brilliant study of the Miraflores factory in the 1840's and 1850's demonstrated that the high price and uncertain supply of cotton (and political conflicts over import prohibitions on the raw material) were mainly to blame for this pioneering failure in Mexico.⁴

While none of these papers depart radically from conventional accounts of the failure of industry in colonial Latin America, together they assault a number of commonly – held beliefs about the causes of that failure. Most interesting in this regard is Larson's perceptive analysis of the Cochabamba case. Cotton production in this area expanded dramatically after 1796. No lack of capital, manpower, equipment or even raw material impeded the expansion. Government support was lacking, but then so was government interference. In the case of Puebla Thomson's study demonstrates a similar elasticity. Opportunities to expand production found avid entrepreneurs, abundant capital, and a plentiful supply of labor. Even in Huamanga, the owners of the *obrajes* managed to increase production rapidly, within fixed limits at each installation, beginning in the 1760's. All this suggests that some of the constraints on industrial growth, alleged in the literature, especially lack of capital, entrepreneurship, managerial skill and labor, need to be substantially revised.

Thomson offers an interesting alternative model to explain the failure of the Puebla industries to continue growing after the war years. He follows other analysts in linking textile production to factors affecting the competitiveness of Puebla's industry in the face of foreign competition. In periods when silver exports increased the colony's capacity to import and when peace facilitated foreign trade, Puebla's production fell. When silver production declined or international war prevented its export and simultaneously impeded imports, Puebla grew. In this, Puebla shared with Cochabamba an inability to face British competition (though the Cochabamba industry was much less durable).

Thomson adds two other elements to the model: physical and human geography. The physical geography of Mexico impeded trade and fragmented markets by making long – distance commerce costly. By human

geography Thomson means the poverty of the mass of the population. These two factors operated as constants to depress the general level of the economy and therefore of Puebla's production possibilities. Here, too, Mexico's fate was shared by that of the Andean colonies, though it appears that transport costs and general poverty were greater in the Andes (and industry, therefore, more fragile and backward).

Thus to explain the relative backwardness of the Puebla cotton industry Thomson cites two constants that put a ceiling on expansion possibilities and two variables that explain fluctuations over the short term in the industry's fortunes. The relationship between Thomson's two constants is problematical, however, because transport costs contributed to the low level of productivity of the economy, and thus to the poverty of the population. That is, human geography derived in part from physical geography. But geography alone cannot explain the relative backwardness of the economies of colonial Latin America. And the problem is not solved, of course, by adding foreign competition. A full theory would need to explain why Spanish colonial industries were vulnerable to foreign competition in the first place, why Manchester led the industrial revolution, not Puebla. Geography (human or physical) is a start, but it is not sufficient. Perhaps, although Thomson rejects the notion explicitly, the archaic institutional framework of colony and mother country alike can add a critical element to the analysis.

Thomson argues persuasively that Puebla's textile production was favored, rather than harmed, by the policies of the colonial state in the eighteenth century. Prohibitions on the import of Asian cotton and silk, the removal of the *alcabala* on raw cotton, and the prohibition on the import of cotton cloth from other European countries helped to protect the Puebla industry, though they simultaneously encouraged competition from Catalan cottons. Thomson offers no measure of Puebla's net benefits from these policies, so it is possible, if unlikely, that Puebla's gains were more than offset by those of Catalonia (indeed, that was the objective of the policies). But the only evidence Thomson cites of state intervention in the industry that did not encourage output involved the arrest of a few weavers for violating guild rules that usually went unenforced.

On the other hand, since his argument depends so critically on the assumption that narrow consumer markets retarded the industry, Thomson now needs to examine more fully the relationship between poverty and the full range of public policies before passing final judgment on the importance of the state in impeding industrial growth. The

Bourbon state, for example, used colonial revenues to promote the mining industry in a period of rising marginal costs. The effect was to drain resources from other sectors of the economy to keep mining output rising.⁵ And the effect, Thomson says, of high silver production in peacetime was to favor foreign competition and depress Puebla. Suppose the viceregal government had ended subsidies to the mining industry and used fiscal revenues to improve the deplorable condition of the colony's highway network instead of exporting the surpluses to subsidize Spanish rule in the Caribbean and the Philippines. Thomson's analysis suggests that such policies would have encouraged cotton textile production. If the colonial state systematically distorted resource allocation, as I believe it did, and in so doing diminished productivity and thus depressed incomes in its colonial possessions, then one need not find police smashing looms to conclude that industrial development suffered as a result.⁶ After Independence, as Walker has shown, "what might have in other circumstances marked the birth of a Mexican [industrial] bourgeoisie resulted stillborn - the *empresarios* and their enterprises were caught up and strangled by the contradictions of an enduring superstructure that refused to be superceded."⁷

In all three cases, these studies emphasize the technological backwardness of colonial industry. Production methods in Huamanga and Cochabamba scarcely changed over the eighteenth century (although the Cacamarca *obrajes* abortive attempt in the 1760's to increase the quality of its product is suggestive), while cotton ginning lost out to traditional carding in Puebla because ginned cotton was less suited to the backward spinning techniques of the industry. In short, new methods remained either untried or rejected in all three cases.

This technological backwardness of these three textile industries, especially in contrast to the British, continental and North American cotton textile industries, deserves a final comment. None of the three operated at, or even near, contemporary world technical standards. The most advanced of the three was the Puebla industry, but the changes wrought there involved organization rather than technique, as Thomson points out. Puebla rejected mechanically ginned cotton at a time when the continental industries used nothing else. Mechanized spinning had replaced cottage and hand work in Europe and the United States decades before Antuñano created Mexico's first spinning factory in the 1820's. By the time he did, the New England mills had already adopted the power loom and mechanized weaving, a development that did not occur in Mexico until the 1840's (and did not become widespread and

successful, according to Thomson, until the 1890's). In short, the most advanced of the three industries studied here operated at roughly two decades to a half century behind the world standard.⁸ The reasons for this technical backwardness require investigation separate from the analysis of the rate of growth in production. Increases in output without technological advance do not make for successful industrializations. The reverse is also true: despite their presumed advantages, both in costs and in the quality of output, most of the early factories established in Mexico in the 1830's and 1840's went bankrupt. Importing new technologies did not guarantee success.

Nonetheless, the continuity in the location of textile production in the Puebla region from the era of cottage spinning and hand looms to the factory installations of the late nineteenth century suggests a major difference between this industry and that of the Andean cases. The Huamanga and Cochabamba industries were marginal operations that could only flourish in the artificial hot houses created by forced sales and international war. The Puebla industry, however, was more than that. Thomson does not make the standard infant industry argument in his account of Puebla, and quite rightly. Infant industries in the modern era are those that require protection both to increase output and to achieve technological parity with foreign competitors. Puebla's output rose in wartime and mining depression (inadvertant protection, to be sure), but technological advances failed to materialize. This case, then, resembles more the European phase of "proto-industrialization," characterized mainly by organizational rather than technological change, than it does the infant industry phase of modern factory development where technological advances march hand in hand with increases in output. The history of textile industry development in Mexico thus suggests points of comparison and contrast with the European experience that would richly reward the historian, though such an effort would require a separate study of quite different scope. The three studies in this volume, by suggesting comparisons across regions within Latin America, contribute in important ways to advancing prospects for broader work.

NOTES

1. Richard J. Salvucci, "Enterprises and Economic Development in Eighteenth-Century Mexico: The Case of the Obrajes" (Unpub. dissertation, Princeton University, 1982).

2. See Paul Gootenberg, "The Social Origins of Protectionism and Free Trade in Nineteenth-Century Lima," *JLAS*, 14:2(1982), 329-358.
3. Two indicators that support this comparison are mining output and fiscal revenues. See the essays by Coatsworth, Fisher and TePaske in this volume.
4. David W. Walker, "Kinship, Business and Politics: The Martínez de Río Family in Mexico, 1824-1864" (Unpub. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1981), chap. 6.
5. See my essay on the Mexican mining industry above, pp.26-45.
6. See John H. Coatsworth, "The Limits of Colonial Absolutism: The State in Eighteenth-Century Mexico," in Karen Spalding, ed., *Essays in the Political, Economic and Social History of Colonial Latin America* (Newark, Delaware, 1982), pp.25-51.
7. Walker, "Kinship, Business and Politics," p.287.
8. For a detailed account of the development and application of new techniques in textile production, see Walter English, *The Textile Industry: An Account of the Early Inventions of Spinning, Weaving, and Knitting Machines* (London, 1969).

V. COMMERCE

9. IMPERIAL POLICY TOWARDS THE PORT OF VERACRUZ, 1788-1808: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MADRID, CADIZ AND HAVANA INTERESTS

Jacques A. Barbier

Charles IV's commercial policy towards the port of Veracruz is well known. Indeed, historians interested in the matter are peculiarly well served as they have available Javier Ortiz de la Tabla's *Comercio exterior de Veracruz, 1788-1821: crisis de dependencia*.¹ That work provides both a general outline and most particulars of the subject in the form of a successful narrative account. Thanks to it, our understanding is soundly based. The facts being well established, however, we can now aspire to go beyond the political events themselves and study the hidden dynamics of policy formation.

In what follows, I contend that policy towards the port of Veracruz was shaped by the divergent economic interests of three non-Mexican cities: Madrid, Cádiz and Havana. My objectives are firstly, to define the nature of Havana's problems, and point to Veracruz's potential role in solving them; secondly, to give an overview of late eighteenth century commercial policy formation, and indicate that it was characterized by an attempt to reconcile the needs of central and coastal Spain; and thirdly, to provide a new analysis of Havana-Veracruz trade in the closing years of the colonial era, an analysis based on the interplay of the three centers indicated. The central thrust of the argument is that contradictions inherent to imperial financial and commercial policy were brought to the fore by prolonged warfare, and that the inevitable consequence was a growing incoherence between the two elements, an incoherence conducive to English and American economic penetration.

I.

Havana's penetration of the Veracruz market was a contentious issue during all of Charles IV's reign. The Cuban port's ambition has been rightly seen as the natural result of economic growth. Thus Ortiz de la

Tabla notes:

La libertad de comercio de 1765 acrecentó el tráfico marítimo de la isla; la guerra de independencia de las Trece Colonias lo aumentó aún más; la rebelión negra de Santo Domingo en 1791, la creación de la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de la Habana en 1793 y la del Consulado en 1794, las mejoras técnicas y los grandes capitales invertidos en la agricultura fueron las causas principales del auge económico cubano, cuya eclosión comercial daría como resultado el intento de ganar el mercado veracruzano...²

The crucial link between development of export-oriented agriculture and demands for commercial intercourse with Mexico was coinage. To pay for slaves, machinery, packing supplies, and foodstuff Cuba needed a constant inflow of foreign earnings and outside capital. In addition, the highly commercialized agriculture of the island required an adequate supply of circulating medium.³

As is well known, colonies which specialized in agricultural exports always had difficulties keeping enough coinage in circulation. This latter phenomenon accounts for Anglo-American experiments with paper currency, the French West Indies practice of accepting coins by tale and not weight, and the debased *plata macuquina* of the Spanish Indies. In Cuba, however, as its metropole would not allow it a legal "provincial" coinage, the problems of media of internal and external exchange tended to be one and the same. Further, given the pro-species bias of Spanish monetary police, it seemed to Cubans that the only viable solution was to find some means of keeping Mexican silver pesos flowing smoothly through the island's economy.

Havana was by far the most important Cuban port. Its customs receipts and trade balances can be used to characterize the colony's overall experience with overseas commerce in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. What such data reveals is that the ebb and flow of this trade was highly responsive to the stimulation of reform and war, and that the island was wont to suffer from a balance of trade deficit.

The former point is easily demonstrated by the 1765-1804 receipts of the Havana customs houses (see Table I). The years of peace which followed the 1765 proclamation of *comercio libre* (with its reduced tax rates), saw a steady increase in average yearly government revenues from this source. This phenomenon, of course, was but a reflection of the dramatic rise in the volume of sea-borne trade. The most dynamic

performances, however, were turned in years of revolution and war. Spanish participation in the War of American Independence boosted revenues and trade to unprecedented levels. These soon subsided to lower values, albeit they remained above those of pre-war years. The time of troubles unleashed by the onset of the French Revolution, however, allowed Cuban commerce to resume its vibrant growth. The crisis in Saint Domingue stimulated Cuban production and drove customs receipts upwards to the levels previously reached during the American war. This rise in trade and revenue continued, although at a slower tempo, during Spain's war against revolutionary France (1793-1795). The most impressive growth, however, came with the start of Charles IV's war with Great Britain (1796-1802), after which revenue volumes subsided once again, although at a higher plateau than heretofore. And in all of this, trade deficits were endemic, even in peacetime.

TABLE I: *Demonstración de los rendimientos efectivos que ha producido la administración general de rentas de mar (de la Habana) ... desde 1765 ... hasta 1804, inclusive (en pesos fuertes).*

Years	Totals	Yearly Averages
1765 - 1769	1,510,477	302,095
1770 - 1774	1,708,536	341,707
1775 - 1779	2,130,124	426,024
1780 - 1784	3,330,433	666,086
1785 - 1789	2,485,730	497,146
1790 - 1792	2,012,837	670,946
1793 - 1797	3,738,617	747,723
1798 - 1801	6,839,840	1,367,968
1802 - 1804	2,441,587	813,862

Source: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1686.

As rising customs receipts resulted from higher volumes of trade, so were the latter a reflection of increased production of such goods as sugar and tobacco. Increased production of tropical goods, however, could only be achieved through substantial investments in machinery, works and, most particularly, slaves. The rhythm of Cuban importation of blacks, boosted by the proclamation of *comercio libre de negros* in 1789, is a significant indicator of this investment (see Table II). As is obvious, although trade in general responded positively to wartime

conditions, the slave trade reacted negatively. This is perhaps because slave ships were more restricted as to sources of supply and sailing routes, and thus far less able to respond than other vessels to the hazards of war. In any event, major investments in manpower took place in peacetime. These soaked up profits and savings, leaving Havana relatively naked in the face of the immense balance of trade deficit which came with any war time boom in commerce.

TABLE II: *Slave Arrivals in Cuba, According to Alexander von Humboldt, 1790 - 1807*

Year	Number of Slaves	Year	Number of Slaves
1790	2,534	1799	4,919
1791	8,498	1800	4,145
1792	8,528	1801	1,659
1793	3,777	1802	13,832
1794	4,164	1803	9,671
1795	5,832	1804	8,923
1796	5,711	1805	4,999
1797	4,452	1806	4,395
1798	2,001	1807	2,565

Source: Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre la isla de Cuba* (Habana, 1960), pp.205 - 206; as found in Herbert S. Klein, *The Middle Passage* (Princeton, 1978), p.214.

The year 1805 may be taken as characteristic of the performance of Cuban external trade under war conditions (see Table III). As may be seen, Cuba suffered from an extraordinary deficit situation. Foreigners, and particularly North Americans, greatly profitted from a situation where they were able to send to Cuba twice the value of the goods which they received in return. This produced a net outflow of coins from the island, which helped to pay for the United States' trade deficits but produced a shortage of coinage in Cuba.⁴

Cuba's monetary problems were not inherently different from those of other colonies whose economy was based on export-oriented agriculture. Elsewhere I studied the case of Venezuela.⁵ There, the same difficulties arose, although complicated by the Crown's export of treasury surpluses (in the form of specie) towards the peninsula. Trade with

Veracruz and with foreign colonies helped somewhat to replenish Caracas' coinage supplies, albeit inadequately by the late eighteenth century. In Venezuela, the essential challenge was to find some means of reconciling the state's thirst for funds with the economy's need for a circulating medium. That challenge was temporarily met thanks to ingenious bills of exchange transactions. Until the Crown's fiscal problems became all-consuming, a coalition of business interests was able to work out reasonable compromises with reform-minded administrators, arrangements which allowed the colony to enjoy an adequate circulating medium.

TABLE III: *Balance of Trade for Havana, 1805 (in Pesos Fuertes)*

	Imports	Exports	Total	Balance
Metropolitan Spain	515,204	34,037	549,241	481,167
Spanish Colonies	723,868	620,508	1,344,376	103,360
Foreign Ports	10,541,138	4,452,472	14,993,610	6,088,666
	11,780,210	5,107,017	16,887,227	6,673,193

Source: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1687.

Some of the solutions adopted for Caracas were also applicable to Havana. As it did on various occasions in Venezuela, the Crown strove to take out its Cuban profits in kind – in this case, in tobacco. There is also evidence that the eastern end of the island shipped cattle to French Saint Domingue, and Veracruz was a significant trading partner. For both Venezuela and Cuba, however, Veracruz was an open port only for ships carrying colonial products.⁶ Neither was to be allowed to become an entrepôt for European goods destined for the Mexican market. How then was Cuba to obtain or retain needed specie? As noted, Havana, like Venezuela was granted limited access to foreign colonies (and to the United States, which continued to be treated like a foreign colony), and officials promoted the export to Mexico of one of its natural products (in this case, wax). In fact, the government went so far as to encourage the island to import silver from places other than Veracruz.⁷ Despite such palliatives, however, the Crown's true solution was entirely different, but quite direct. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the Cuban economy in these years was the continuous inflow of Mexican funds to

pay for the expenses of the *plaza, apostadero*, fortification programme, army and navy units temporarily stationed in Havana, and other official activities. To this one must add monies destined for the United States and *situados* for outlying Gulf and Caribbean locations, funds which were routed through Havana but not always sent onward in the form of cash. Havana may have wished to earn its specie through trade. Government silver, however, was undoubtedly of some consolation and served to reduce the port's need for full access to the Veracruz market.

The problem with this solution, of course, was that it placed Havana at the very nexus of the inner contradiction which threatened, in time of war, to vitiate the central thrust of the Bourbon reformist effort: the belief that both trade and treasure could be obtained from the colonies. To grasp this fact, however, one must first examine the nature of the peninsular interests served by the reforms of Charles III and Charles IV.

II.

As I have had occasion to argue, two distinct coalitions of interests dominated colonial policy – making in the late eighteenth century: the Court and peninsular cadres on the one hand, the entrepreneurial elites of Cádiz and the Spanish coast on the other.⁸ The Court had an innate thirst for treasure shipments, the coast an inherent need for trade. In the time of Charles III (1759–1788), fiscal and economic reforms combined to satisfy both groups. The existing literature, however, tends to take the Crown's need for specie for granted, but to closely scrutinize its novel economic policies. In consequence, the reforms which touched the interests of Cádiz and the coast are well understood. Those that relate directly to the fiscal interests of Madrid remain obscure.

For Cádiz and coastal Spain, the principal thrust of colonial policy had to be the development of the Indies trade. Ultimately, policy makers were to favour economic growth in the Spanish periphery: stimulating metropolitan productive and finishing operations by opening American markets; lowering peninsular costs and increasing re-export volume by boosting the output of colonial mining, ranching and agriculture; and, lastly, keeping at home the profits of trade and transport.

As is well known, of course, monopolists of the Consulado of Cádiz, the middlemen between European manufacturers and Spanish American consumers, fought reform tenaciously. It must be understood, however,

that their loss was not necessarily that of their city. Trade reforms did not cripple Cádiz, which continued to dominate colonial trade.⁹ In part, this was due to the moderation of Charles III who saw to it that *comercio libre* was imposed only gradually. From 1765 to 1777 the new policy was applied only in Caribbean zones marginal to the Cádiz trade. Other areas remained subject to the traditional register ships (*navíos de registro*) and convoys (*flotas*).¹⁰ Therafter, more homogenous laws were enacted, but the crucial Veracruz market was still exempted from the general regulation of 1778.¹¹ Special tonnage restrictions preserved some of the existing guarantees up to 1789. Lastly, even after the removal of quantitative limitations, exceptional rules regarding the Veracruz inter-colonial trade continued to restrict competition.¹² Overall, it must be granted that Cádiz merchants were given ample time to adjust to trade reform. By the start of the reign of Charles IV, therefore, coastal Spain was united in defense of its exclusive access to colonial ports. The Court's concern with patriation of specie was, for the coast, a source of mixed feelings; for although it kept the state solvent at the expense of someone else, it also caused unease as the source of these surpluses was often monopolized items of trade.

The paramount aims of the Court were the security of the state and the extension of its services. To meet these objectives a healthy level of Crown revenues was imperative, but none was prepared to sacrifice Old Regime privileges to fiscal needs. The obvious solution was to obtain external funds: colonial treasure and taxes on the Indies trade. The Crown understood, of course, that efficient administration was more likely to be effective than predatory policies. Thus, a compromise between bureaucratic and business objectives could be achieved. The difficulty, however, was that behind the concerns of the Court lay the interests of Madrid and much of central Spain. Indeed, a disproportionate share of state income was spent in the capital, and that expenditure in turn generated a significant proportion of economic activities in central Spain.¹³ This situation ensured that, in times of trouble, when difficult choices had to be made between trade and treasury, the struggle over Crown policy would be between central and peripheral Spain, between two different modes of economic life.

As I have already shown elsewhere, during the reign of Charles IV, the Crown was increasingly driven to sacrifice its economic goals to its financial ones.¹⁴ This was no free choice, of course. It resulted from a fiscal situation which had been steadily worsening ever since the War of American Independence.¹⁵ In any event, sacrifice of "economic" to

"financial" goals really meant the sacrifice of the coast to Madrid's awesome need for government expenditure. Indeed, for a command economy such as that of central Spain, government solvency was the very lifeblood of agriculture, trade and manufacturing.

III.

What does this type of analysis reveal about the evolution of policy towards Havana – Veracruz trade? I believe that, here again, one sees the gradual dissolution of the entente which made the reforms of Charles III possible. As long as that entente was in place, and to the degree possible, Havana had to be denied access to Veracruz. As the entente broke down, however, and as the Crown became more intent upon the objective of patriating American funds, Cádiz's demand that Havana not become an entrepôt became less and less compelling. Further, as the government became serious about monopolizing treasure for Madrid, it had to try to cut Cuba's links with the Mexican treasury. This, of course, would have deepened Havana's coinage problems, unless compensation was offered in the form of broadened access to Veracruz.

The chronology is suggestive. The years following the death of Charles III saw the completion of the reform process.¹⁶ A *Real Decreto* of February 28, 1789 removed all tonnage restriction on Mexican and Venezuelan trade, allowed half of the goods carried to be foreign and reduced duties by 10 percent for ships carrying only national products. The order signified the extension of *comercio libre* to Mexico and Venezuela. On the other hand a *Real Ordenanza* of August 16, 1790 forbade trans-shipping of European products to Veracruz via Havana, and another of March 12, 1791 insisted that, unlike other ships of *comercio libre*, those going to Veracruz might not make stopovers in other colonial ports (those of Venezuela excepted). Cádiz objected to all such intermediate stops, but was given satisfaction only as regards the Mexican port.¹⁷ What the Crown was indicating by these measures was that it was not prepared to treat Veracruz and Havana entirely in the same way as other ports. The trade of Veracruz was too valuable, Havana too well-placed to undermine mercantilist expectations. In short, the growth of Havana as a colonial center could not, in the government's view, be based on the role of the entrepôt. It had to be founded on its traditional military function and on its growing vocation as a sugar center. This latter possibility, in fact, particularly appealed to the men in command in Madrid, who showered the island and other

Caribbean regions with beneficial legislation. Foreign iron machinery was allowed to enter duty free, the rules for the black slave trade were liberalized, and the commerce of the *puertos menores* largely freed of fiscal obstacles. Most significantly, at the behest of Cuban lobbyist Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Havana was conceded special liberties for its trade in cotton, coffee, indigo, sugar, *aguardiente* and slaves, the decisions being taken in full Council of State, with the King presiding.¹⁸

Despite such a favorable predisposition, with the start of war with France in 1793 another set of Crown reservations about Havana began to come to the fore – the fear that Cuba was going to absorb funds needed in the peninsula. In a secret order the Viceroy of New Spain was instructed to be careful about sending money to Cuba to sustain its naval forces, as this should be done "con la mayor economía por ser las atenciones de Europa mas urgente."¹⁹ Similarly, fearful that Havana would retain funds found aboard Spanish bound warships which stopped in Cuban waters, Madrid ordered the intendant "que con ningún motivo no pretexto detenga los caudales que lleguen a aquel puerto."²⁰ The Viceroy of New Spain Count of Revillagigedo, however, had already foreseen the new circumstances. Sending the frigate "Minerva" to Spain with cash, he gave its captain very clear orders:

prevengo a Vmd. con la mayor estrechez que es posible evite el llegar a la Habana con motivo de reponer agua, ... pero en caso de que esto no pueda verificarse no se detendra en aquel puerto mas que el tiempo preciso para ejecutarlo; advirtiendo a Vmd. que aun en el caso de recibir alguna orden del señor comandante general (de marina) de aquel puerto para entrar y permanecer en el, continúe sin embargo su viaje a España.²¹

The Cuban authorities, however, held a *junta de generales* when the "Minerva" came into port, quashed the viceregal orders, and took off the 3,000,000 *pesos fuertes* which the ship carried. Despite concerns over having to share funds with Havana, however, Madrid continued to grant ever more extensive commercial privileges to the port city.²²

As these developments were taking place, the growth of Cuban ties to the U.S. market made Havana's trade with Mexico all the more problematical. In part, the development of such ties was due to the Spanish government itself, which ordered its diplomatic agents to ship foodstuffs on American ships to its various Caribbean bases, although the initiative shown by local officials in interpreting royal orders was more generally to blame. With peace all such contacts were banned by R.O. of January 21, 1796. On October 6, 1796, however, Spain

embarked on the first of two consecutive wars with Great Britain. The Spanish defeat at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (February 14, 1797) guaranteed the effectiveness of the British blockade and Havana soon was thrown open to neutral ships, by local action, long before the Crown agreed to the neutral flag trade as a general principle. In fact, of course, the Consulado of Havana asked for this wartime measure in September of 1796, the month before war was declared.²³ At about the same time, Havana interests resumed their pressure for full access to the Veracruz market. Both of these phenomena have been well documented and need not be reviewed here. It is essential to understand, however, that the two are causally related. Indeed, as indicated above, as the receipts of Havana customs indicate, the port's trade boomed in wartime along with the exports of the island's agriculture. With greater economic activity came a heightened need for circulating medium. Access to Veracruz became ever more important, particularly as the heretofore dependable Mexican *situado* became increasingly sporadic.

As we know, Madrid resisted Havana's pressure all through the first British war. With the coming of peace, however, the situation did not return to normal for the Crown was not prepared to resume its generous support, from Mexican sources, of the Cuban treasury. As the Intendant of Havana was informed by Minister of Finances Miguel Cayetano Soler:

Ya es tiempo que aquella isla tan fertil tribute lo necesario para subsistir sin necesidad de situado, sino que lo proporcione a los parages contiguos y deje sobrantes capaces de compensar a la metrópoli.²⁴

As Soler's commercial policy was based on a return to full mercantilistic rigor, of course, the Havana treasury was hardly likely to measure up to his expectations.

With the resumption of war with Great Britain in late 1804, Havana faced difficulties once more which could best be resolved by Mexican silver. By April of 1806 Cuban interests were able to induce officials of the ministry of finance to prepare orders opening Veracruz to the *Habaneros*. Miguel Cayetano Soler refused to sign them, however.²⁵ The deadlock was only broken when interim Intendant Rafael Gomez Roubaud complained in August 1806 directly to Godoy, the steadfast champion of Cuban interests, who supported the intendant's request for Havana - Veracruz trade.²⁶ It is significant that the intendant's petition was exclusively directed at solving Havana's balance of trade deficit. Gomez Roubaud, with the trade statistics of 1805 in hand, pointed par-

ticularly to the 6,088,666 *pesos fuertes* of deficit with foreign ports (see Table III). He insisted that only access to Veracruz would bring silver back into Havana, a city in which the ordinary circulating medium seems to have become Portuguese gold coins – a most peculiar circumstance for a Spanish colony. It is a dossier started with this letter that produced the R.O. of May 10, 1807, allowing the re-export from Havana to Veracruz of European goods.²⁷

In conclusion, what is one to make of the affair? I believe that the Bourbon reformer's policy towards the port of Veracruz was designed to boost the economy of coastal Spain even as it was meant to safeguard the flow of funds on which that of the Madrid region was based. This double-edged policy limited the economic growth of Cuba, as it did not allow an adequate flow of coinage to the island. As the interests of Central Spain slowly gained primacy, however, those of Cádiz and the coast could then be sacrificed. The moment of truth was delayed by ideologues such as Soler, but by 1807 there was no longer any reason to prevent Havana from serving as an Anglo-American conduit to Mexico. The commercial policy characteristic of the Bourbon Reforms was no more.

NOTES

1. Javier Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz, 1778 – 1821: crisis de dependencia* (Sevilla, 1978).
2. Ibid., p.169.
3. Ibid., pp.170 – 172.
4. Jaques A. Barbier, "Venezuelan 'Libranzas', 1788 – 1807: From Economic Nostrum to Fiscal Imperative," *TA*, 37(1981), 457 – 478.
5. See Javier Cuenca Esteban, "The Changing Role and Significance of United States Trade with Spanish America and the Philippine Islands, 1780 – 1819," in Jaques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds., *The North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760 – 1819* (Manchester, 1983).
6. A slight exception was allowed for ships sailing from Spain to Veracruz via Venezuela, but even so European goods were not put on board in La Guayra or Maracaybo.
7. Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz*, p.176.
8. See, Jaques A. Barbier, "Silver, North American Penetration and the Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760 – 1800," in Barbier and Kuethe, eds., *The North American Role*.
9. John R. Fisher, "Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy, 1778 – 1796," *JLAS*, 13(1981), 33; and Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Statistics of Spain's Colonial Trade," *HAHR*, 61(1981), 398 – 401.

10. C.H. Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York, 1947), pp.319 – 320, briefly describes the 1765 – 1789 evolution of trade legislation.
11. Bibiano Torres Ramirez and Javier Ortiz de la Tabla, eds., *Reglamento y aranceles reales para el comercio libre de España a Indias de 12 de octubre de 1778* (Seville, 1978), p.4.
12. Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz*, pp.167 – 223, which recounts the obstacles placed in the way of the Havana – Veracruz trade.
13. For an analysis of the role of Madrid in the economy of central Spain, see David R. Ringrose, "Perspectives on the Economy of Eighteenth Century Spain," *HI*, 1(1973), 59 – 101.
14. Jaques A. Barbier, "Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: the Dilemma of Charles IV's Spain," *JLAS*, 12(1980), 21 – 37.
15. Jaques A. Barbier and Herbert S. Klein, "Revolutionary Wars and Public Finances: The Madrid Treasury, 1784 – 1807," *JEH*, 41(1981), 315 – 339. For other views of Madrid's finances in these years see José Patricio Merino Navarro, "La hacienda de Carlos IV," *HPE*, 69(1981), 139 – 182; and Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Ingresos netos del estado español, 1788 – 1820," *HPE*, 69(1981), 183 – 228.
16. Jaques A. Barbier, "The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787 – 1792," *HAHR*, 57(1977), 51 – 68.
17. AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2316.
18. AGI: R.D. of February 28, 1789, Ultramar, leg. 719; R.C. of February 28, 1789, Indiferente, leg. 13; R.O. of October 9, 1789, Santo Domingo, leg. 2189; minutes of Council of State meeting of October 29, 1792, Santo Domingo, leg. 1484; R.D. of November 22, 1792, Indiferente, leg. 663.
19. R.O. of February 20, 1794, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 197.
20. R.O. of February 19, 1794, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1977.
21. Junta de generales of May 3, 1793, AGI, Cuba, leg. 1457.
22. AGI: Indiferente, leg. 2823, R.O. of May 19, 1793, on tobacco for the slave trade; Consulado, libro 95, February 8, 1794, on triangular trade; Mexico, leg. 1565, Branciforte to Gardóqui, September 30, 1794, on reexport of sugar from Spain; Indiferente, leg. 665, R.O. of March 26, 1796, on all foreign tools; Mexico, leg. 3110, O'Neil to Gardóqui, June 8, 1795 and Santa Fe, leg. 644, Ezpeleta a Gardóqui, May 19, 1795, both on aguardiente trade.
23. Consulado of Havana to Gardóqui, September 29, 1796, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2191.
24. R.O. of May 13, 1802, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 195.
25. Minuta of R.O. of April 24, 1806, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 200. According to a note: "estas ordenes no tuvieron curso porque S.E. no quiso firmarlas."
26. Gomez Roubaud to Godoy, August 6, 1806, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2513.
27. Gomez Roubaud to Godoy, August 6, 1806, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2513 and Gomez Roubaud to Soler, November 30, 1807, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1688. Even as it is, the order only allows the re-export of goods "que desde esta peninsula se hayan introducidos," but that restriction was easily evaded. See also Gomez Roubaud to Soler, October 26, 1807, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1688.

10. ARISTOCRACIA EN VILO: LOS MERCADERES DE LIMA EN EL SIGLO XVIII

Alberto Flores Galindo*

"...para el bien del Estado y del Comercio
que hoy es el alma del Universo"¹

I. Lima y la Mar del Sur

Durante la primera mitad del siglo XVIII, el monopolio comercial hizo del Callao el único "puerto mayor" en la Mar del Sur y de Lima casi la única metrópoli en Sudamérica. Puerto y ciudad estaban en definitiva unidos y ambos se constituyeron en un centro de acopio y redistribución mercantil. Esta imagen fue recogida, tiempo después, por Jorge Juan y Antonio de Ulloa:

Luego que el comercio del Perú se restituye a Lima, después de haber concluido sus compras en Portobello, todos generalmente abren sus tiendas y ponen almacenes para empezar las ventas, y suplir a los que bajan de las provincias interiores y de toda la sierra a emplear su corto caudal.²

Desde que la economía peruana se reestructuró después de la prolongada depresión que recorrió casi todo el siglo XVII, su estructura pareció reposar en dos pilares: de un lado, los intercambios marítimos, teniendo como escenario el Pacífico, desde Panamá hasta el Cabo de Hornos, y, de otro lado, el vasto espacio andino. Un territorio evidentemente dilatado, casi podríamos decir desmesurado, para una ciudad que bordea los 50000 habitantes, pero imprescindible de organizar, porque sólo la unión de escenarios tan diversos – como Valparaíso, Lima o Potosí – podría compensar la debilidad del mercado interior y superar esas rémoras que eran la persistencia de la economía natural y la escasa división del trabajo. Edificar un mercado interno colonial fue el desafío que debieron afrontar los comerciantes limeños.³

El monopolio comercial convirtió a Lima en la sede de un poderoso grupo de comerciantes, vinculados a familias de la aristocracia metropolitana o a casas mercantiles españolas, que se dedicaron a las actividades de importación – exportación de mercaderías. Inicialmente fueron, para utilizar un término de la época, "cargadores." Un ejemplo sería José

María Enrile, quien había iniciado su giro comercial en Cádiz, desde donde estableció posteriormente sólidos intereses con el comercio limeño, como importador de telas.⁴ Otros, como los Querejazu, se afincaron definitivamente en Lima, aunque teniendo ramificaciones de sus empresas en localidades tan distantes como La Paz, mientras que los Condes de Casa Jijón prefirieron mantenerse en la península, en Cádiz, desde donde podían controlar mejor sus intereses y negocios tanto en Lima como en Quito.⁵ Los Condes de San Isidro siguieron en posesión de haciendas y casas en Santander, lejano respaldo para sus actividades limeñas.⁶ Los Sancho Dávila no olvidaron que descendían de los Marqueses de Velarde, en San Román. Antonio y José Matías de Elizalde fueron dueños de la casa solar de Echeverría (Navarra). En 1770, 10 por ciento de los testamentos limeños son dictados por nacidos en España; en 1810 aumentan a 14 por ciento.⁷ Entre los cincuenta personajes de la "clase alta" limeña que figuran más adelante (Tabla IV), quince nacieron en la península. De hecho, un funcionamiento eficaz de los negocios exigía contar con relaciones personales o de parentesco en Cádiz o cualquier otra localidad española. Sin negar la importancia de ese puerto sureño, los nuevos comerciantes, como el conjunto de la clase alta peruana, crecieron también al compás de las migraciones procedentes del país vasco-navarro: de allí vendrían, entre muchos otros, los hermanos mencionados líneas atrás, Antonio y José Matías Elizalde, los Castañeda, Ramírez de Arellano, Izcue, Mendiburu, Ferrer, Abadía, Larreta... En Lima tuvo su centro de operaciones la compañía Sobrinos de Aguevere y Lostra.⁸ Entre los testamentos de 1770 y 1810, como lugares de nacimiento figuran Navarra, Santander, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, junto con Cádiz, Sevilla y Cataluña. Todo esto fue expresión de un movimiento migratorio más vasto: de los pasajeros que pasan al Perú entre 1787 y 1814, 70 por ciento vienen de las provincias norteñas de España y 46 por ciento eran vascos. En los negocios, dos factores decisivos para la formación de empresas fueron las alianzas familiares y la procedencia común (los paisanos). A la postre, el comercio limeño acabó bajo control de estos migrantes de primera o segunda generación, que consiguieron imponerse a las familias criollas e incluso a linajes tan antiguos como los Aliaga, descendientes de los primeros fundadores de la ciudad.⁹

El intercambio de metales preciosos de las minas peruanas por productos manufacturados europeos sería continuado mediante el desarrollo del comercio intercolonial. La relativa autosuficiencia del espacio americano — subrayada, entre otros, por Carlos Sempat Assadourian — terminó por conferir cierta independencia económica a las colonias y por

acicatear el tráfico mercantil entre ellas. Dentro de este contexto debemos entender las relaciones entre Lima y el Reino de Chile.

Chile fue una colonia tardía. Todavía en el siglo XVIII era una zona de frontera, pero entonces el nuevo territorio se había expandido desde los fértiles valles centrales tanto hacia el norte, donde la minería conquistó tierras al desierto, como hacia el sur, donde a pesar de los araucanos se pudo desarrollar una importante actividad ganadera. El motor para la incorporación de estas "tierras nuevas" persistía en la región central de Valparaíso y Santiago, donde, de acuerdo con Vicuña Mackenna, el trigo pasaba a tener el rol hegemónico que antes tuvieron el cebo o los metales preciosos. Aunque el nuevo cultivo desempeñaría un papel decisivo en la expansión del mercado interior chileno, su propagación fue un efecto inducido por la demanda de una economía más poderosa: en otro lugar nos hemos referido a los cambios en el paisaje agrario de la costa peruana y el impulso creciente al intercambio de azúcar por trigo.¹⁰

Este comercio intercolonial permitió la hegemonía de los mercaderes limeños en el Pacífico. En efecto, ocurre que ese tráfico mercantil sólo podía organizarse a partir de un núcleo poderoso de comerciantes. Se trataba de productos difíciles de transportar, que por su cantidad y peso requerían de naves de gran calado. Esta limitación se acentuaba teniendo en cuenta que la distancia entre Callao y Valparaíso no era nada despreciable y sólo podía navegarse durante seis meses del año. En invierno, los riesgos de naufragio aumentaban. Estos desde luego, no desaparecían en las otras estaciones ni en otras rutas, por lo que no son raros los casos de comerciantes que perdían sus naves y mercaderías.¹¹ En los préstamos marítimos el interés comercial tenía la justificación suficiente para duplicarse de 6 a 12 por ciento. Algo similar acontecía con los seguros, que durante las guerras de la independencia ascenderían hasta 15 por ciento.¹² Superar cualquier riesgo exigía un costoso mantenimiento de las embarcaciones y algunos propietarios – "navieros," para volver a utilizar un término dieciochesco – terminaban por disponer de pequeñas flotas privadas, como fue el caso de Juan Miguel de Castañeda con sus naves "Teresa," "El Aguilar" y "Serena"; el de Francisco de Izcue con las embarcaciones "Grampuz," "Carmen" y "Nancy"; o el de Miguel de Mendiburu, dueño de las fragatas "Begoña," "Santa Bárbara" y del bergantín "Perla".¹³

El comercio peruano – chileno exigió el desarrollo de una numerosa flota mercante en el Pacífico. Tanto ésto como la construcción y mantenimiento de barcos de gran calado (navíos y fragatas), garantizaron que

esos intercambios se volvieron coto privado de los grandes comerciantes limeños. Si bien las ganancias no eran despreciables, los costos en las operaciones reservaron a una minoría el ejercicio del gran comercio. Entre 1812 y 1818 – poco antes del declive definitivo – en el Callao pudieron contarse ochenta y uno fragatas, setenta y seis bergantines, trece goletas, dieziseis paquebotes y otras dieziocho embarcaciones menores. Años antes, en 1789, un recuento de la flota surta en la Mar del Sur proporcionó estas cifras: ocho navíos, once fragatas, catorce paquebotes; treinta y tres en total, de los cuales, según el *Mercurio Peruano*, veintinueve pertenecían a empresarios limeños, dos a navieros de Guayaquil y dos a chilenos; desde luego, estas cuatro últimas embarcaciones eran las de menor calado, aptas para el tráfico de cabotaje, de un puerto a otro, pero inútiles para transportar un cargamento demasiado pesado. Otra fuente señala que el tráfico entre Perú y Chile era realizado específicamente por veintiun navíos y fragatas limeños. En 1790 anclaron en el Callao veintisiete navíos procedentes del sur: dieziocho venían de Valparaíso, siete de Concepción y dos de ambos puertos.¹⁴

Casi todas las embarcaciones salían por las mismas fechas del Callao: "Por lo regular salen de este puerto en una misma temporada, con sólo la diferencia de días; y su regreso es con igual diferencia."¹⁵ Los navieros limeños lograron compatibilizar sus intereses estando todos agremiados en el Tribunal del Consulado, "la columna del estado y el apoyo más firme y recomendable de los gobiernos," en el interior del cual formaban un grupo específico.¹⁶ A los mencionados líneas atrás, podemos añadir al Conde de Torre Velarde, el Conde de San Isidro, la Condesa de Vista Florida, el Conde de Santa Ana, Félix Colmenares, Vicente de Larriva, Domingo de Larrea, Ortiz de Foronda, etc. Todos ellos consiguieron imponer precios tanto en Lima como Santiago. Aquí está el origen de una prolongada rivalidad entre esas dos ciudades, reconocida incluso por el cabildo limeño: "Siempre reclama Chile del reprobado arbitrio en que los Navieros de Lima se coaligan estudiosamente en detener sus buques, para estrechar a los cosecheros y comprar el trigo al precio que les sugiere su voluntariedad..."¹⁷ Tiempo después, una versión similar sería esgrimada por el historiador chileno Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, quien en su historia de Valparaíso recurrió a comparar la cohesión de los comerciantes limeños con "una sola mano," de manera que a Chile terminaría llegando e imponiéndose, en definitiva, un único comprador.¹⁸ Pero, al margen de las exageraciones, consecuencias de la escasa simpatía que congregaron los comerciantes tanto

en Lima como en Santiago, lo cierto es que se trataba de un sistema monopólico que terminó por reducir a Chile a la condición de una subcolonia peruana. Se formaron, en el transcurso, algunas "compañías," como la de Elizalde y Larreta (1792). Hemos indicado en otro lugar que estas empresas mantuvieron un carácter familiar.

El control sobre los barcos fue acompañado con la edificación de grandes bodegas en el puerto del Callao, donde los comerciantes podían almacenar y conservar sus mercaderías. La abundancia permitía, al mismo tiempo, controlar los flujos de ida y venida de los barcos. En 1782, por ejemplo, los navieros se resisten a partir, esperando que el Cabildo decreta una alza en el precio del pan.¹⁹ Al igual que Domingo Ramírez de Arellano, muchos otros comerciantes fueron también propietarios de bodegas que terminaron emplazadas en la localidad de Bellavista, casi a mitad de camino entre Lima y el puerto. Allí se instaló una fundición, indispensable para la reparación de los barcos, y un hospital consagrado al cuidado de los tripulantes.

Los barcos, en conclusión, fueron el instrumento para el dominio de Lima sobre Chile. Siempre fueron construidos en América, al norte del Callao, en el puerto de Guayaquil, donde funcionaba el mayor astillero de toda la Mar del Sur. Guayaquil disponía de una rada adecuada para la construcción de naves de gran calado, además de contar con todos los insumos necesarios: maderas, brea, tela de los obrajes de Quito para las velas, etc. El astillero contaba entre 250 y 320 operarios.²⁰

Pero Guayaquil no sólo fue, en definitiva, el astillero de Lima. Era también el puerto de ingreso hacia Quito, y del espacio formado entre esta ciudad y ese puerto se importaban maderas para las construcciones urbanas, cacao, telas y tejidos procedentes de los obrajes quiteños. A su vez, desde el Perú se internaba en esos territorios azúcar y vinos. Lima seguía oficiando, hasta 1778, como centro redistribuidor de mercancías. Por eso, de Chile, además de trigo, se prosiguió importando el cebo para las velas de la ciudad, que, a su vez, se reexportaba a Quito. A veces, Santiago desempeñaba también la función de intermediario con otros espacios coloniales. Occurría con la yerba del Paraguay, por entonces de gran consumo en Lima, que venía por tierra desde Buenos Aires. Es así como el intercambio de azúcar por trigo permitió dinamizar algunas actividades manufactureras (el astillero, al lado de la construcción, es la industria clásica de las sociedades precapitalistas) y, además, articular una dilatada cadena de intercambios. El Tribunal del Consulado de Lima, cuya Junta General tenía 200 miembros, se convirtió, con este sustento, en la mayor corporación empresarial de la época. En 1815, sus

capitales fueron calculados en cerca de 5.000.000 de pesos, muy por encima de los que podía disponer la Caja de Censos, la Renta de Tabacos e, incluso, la Caja Real o la Casa de Moneda.²¹ En 1791 fueron censados en Lima 393 comerciantes.²²

Los protocolos notariales permiten aproximarnos a las condiciones materiales (deudas, préstamos, capitales, esclavos, propiedades, etc.) de un sector de la población. Es evidente que estaba más predispuesto para un inventario o para testar quien tenía algún bien o algo que dejar a sus descendientes. Pero este juicio puede matizarse teniendo en cuenta que, en 1770, sobre 230 casos fichados, catorce son hijos naturales, 50 por ciento no saben firmar, 13 por ciento se declaran pobres, 62 por ciento no poseen ni siquiera un esclavo. Los testamentos confirman el rol hegemónico de los comerciantes, quienes, al parecer, concentraban el escaso capital dinero circulante. Las mayores fortunas legadas en 1770 (ver Tabla I) corresponden a mercaderes. Excepción hecha de un curaca, un religioso, un pobre (?) y otro que no indica oficio, los catorce testadores que dejan dinero en efectivo son comerciantes. Las cantidades van desde los 2.000 pesos hasta los 60.000 pesos. En 1810, de veintitres testamentos en los que se deja dinero, seis son de comerciantes. En términos absolutos han disminuido, aunque la proporción se mantiene.

TABLA I: *Testamentos, Lima, 1770*

Capital/dinero en efectivo		Frecuencia y origen social
	50 pesos	1 (curaca)
	215	1 (sin esp.)
	800	1 (pobre)
Entre	2.500 - 3.000	3 (2 comerciantes y 1 religioso)
	4.500	1 (comerciante)
	6.000	1 (")
	7.000	1 (")
	12.000	1 (")
	22.000	1 (")
	27.000	1 (")
	43.500	1 (")
	60.000	1 (")

Fuente: AGN, Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos, 1770.

Pero las fortunas alcanzan niveles inferiores a cuarenta años antes: desde 113 pesos hasta un extremo solitario de 63.056 pesos. Para dibujar con mayor claridad las dimensiones de estas riquezas monetarias, debemos considerar que 60.000 pesos equivalían aproximadamente a 120 esclavos.

El esplendor mercantil tuvo también otras expresiones mensurables. Las enumeraremos brevemente: (a) Se incrementaron las alcabalas y el almojarifazgo. (b) En general, las rentas de la Caja Real de Lima aumentan hasta la década de 1770. (c) Entre 1760 y 1795 se duplican las acuñaciones monetarias en marcos de plata. En los anexos incluimos las cifras correspondientes a las emisiones de oro y plata hechas en la Casa de Moneda en Lima. La curva ascendente, que podría trazarse hasta fines del siglo XVIII, refleja de muchas maneras el aumento en los intercambios y la consiguiente demanda de una moneda que, por su alto valor, era apta no para el pequeño comercio sino para las grandes transacciones, esas que iniciaron el apogeo fugaz de los mercaderes limeños.²³

Finalmente se produjo un cambio en la fisonomía misma de la ciudad. Lima se extendió llegando a las 400 hectáreas. Se elevaron nuevas construcciones, como la plaza de toros (1768) o el Paseo de Aguas (1773). Aparecieron los primeros cafés, empezando por el llamado del Comercio: en total sumarían siete, signos de una vida urbana que se renovaba. Obviamente, el hecho más importante fue la reconstrucción de casi toda la ciudad, arrasada por el terremoto de 1746. Las antiguas construcciones de piedra y ladrillo fueron reemplazadas por las nuevas, hechas de un material menos apreciado socialmente – caña de Guayaquil, barro y adobe – pero más resistente a los movimientos sísmicos. A pesar de la catástrofe de 1746, con el consiguiente descenso demográfico en esa década, la población de Lima consiguió recuperarse, no obstante que, como veremos, persistían frecuentes epidemias.²⁴

TABLA II: *La Población de Lima, 1746 – 1820*

año	1746	1755	1791	1812	1820
población	60.000	54.000	52.627	63.900	64.000

Fuente: AGI, Indiferente General, 1527;
Córdoba y Urrutia, *Estadísticas...*, (Lima, 1839), I, 33.

II. *El Mercado Interior*

La moneda – escasas acuñaciones y de muy alto valor – traslucía una profunda grieta en la estructura económica colonial: la coexistencia del gran comercio con las áreas de economía natural. En Guayaquil se tiene que permutar géneros de Castilla, vinos y aguardientes por madera y cacao. Este último producto en ocasiones termina sustituyendo a la moneda, como ocurre en Chiloé con los jamones y en algunos parajes de la sierra con la coca. En Tarapacá no queda otro recurso que la venta "al fiado:" "La provincia estaba, como lo está hoy, y ha estado siempre sujeta a venderse muy poco al contado y casi todo al fiado," aunque en este caso se trata más de crear dependencias que de compensar la ausencia de moneda.²⁵ Se podría argumentar que en los ejemplos mencionados estamos ante territorios distantes de Lima, pero casos similares se repiten en los tambos de los valles próximos a la capital y entre los documentos contables del comerciante Ramírez de Arellano hemos encontrado, por ejemplo, el recibo de venta de un esclavo pagado en zurrone de yerba del Paraguay, otro producto que, por su demanda y escasez, terminaba siendo una especie de moneda natural.²⁶

Los comerciantes advirtieron, desde luego, todos los inconvenientes y dificultades que se podían derivar de un mercado sumamente estrecho. La proximidad entre Lima y el mar facilitaba los intercambios con la península y los espacios coloniales vecinos, pero una vez que las mercaderías arribaban al puerto comenzaba el problema más difícil: cómo introducir las en el interior de un espacio que, aunque vasto, ofrecía múltiples obstáculos para la comunicación.

De Lima partían diversas rutas. Primero hacia el norte, bordeando el mar y recorriendo los poblados costeros, como Chancay, Huacho, en dirección a Trujillo; ruta difícil cuando en los meses de verano crecía la descarga de los ríos arrasando con los improvisados caminos o destruyendo los puentes, como casi todos los años ocurría en Santa o Jequetepeque. Entonces había que ampararse en la navegación caletera, con la ayuda de buenas radas y puertos, como el de Huanchaco. Una situación similar se repetía en la costa sur donde incluso era preferible recurrir al mar para transportar desde Pisco a Lima las botijas de aguardiente, sorteando así los peligros del desierto. Pero más al sur la costa se tornaba escarpada, con puertos tan deficientes como el de Quilca, de manera que, prácticamente, esos territorios permanecían cerrados al intercambio marítimo hasta Arica. Desde allí a su vez salían por lo menos tres rutas: una hacia la región minera de Tarapacá, otra en dirección a la ciudad de

Arequipa y de allí al Cuzco y, finalmente, la que llevaba a La Paz y Potosí. El poblado vecino de Tacna, contando con las facilidades de un valle fértil, se convirtió en sede de "un gremio de arrieros de mucha consideración" y en sus alrededores se podían ver pastando hasta 5000 mulas.²⁷

Desde la propia Lima salían otras tres rutas que, ascendiendo la cordillera, se internaban en el abrupto espacio andino: por el valle de Lurigancho y de allí a Canta, donde un abra de la cordillera permitía el acceso a Cerro de Pasco; otra ruta remontaba el curso del río Rímac y, pasando Chosica, Matucana, San Mateo, llegaba a las alturas de Yauli y Morococha, para luego descender al fértil valle del Mantaro y arribar a la ciudad de Jauja, escala obligada en una eventual marcha hacia Huamanga o incluso Cuzco; la tercera era una ruta sustitutoria que ascendía la cordillera desde el vecino valle de Pachacamac, pasando por los pantanos de Cieneguilla y por el pueblo de Huarochirí, para desembocar también en la sierra central.²⁸ Todas estas rutas exigían del concurso de mulas y arrieros. Pero este medio de transporte tenía criaderos muy precisos que se ubicaban en los lejanos territorios de Salta y Jujuy. Desde allí se abastecía de acémilas a todo el virreinato, impulsando el funcionamiento de una dilatada ruta, trajinada sobre todo a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, mediante la que se unía Lima con Buenos Aires.²⁹

Estas rutas no pudieron ser improvisadas. Siguiendo a veces antiguos caminos prehispánicos, fueron edificadas siempre por el tráfico secular de los arrieros, superando cada año los inconvenientes que podían derivarse de los derrumbes, en un espacio escarpado y con bruscas precipitaciones pluviales. Sin embargo, estos obstáculos físicos no fueron los únicos ni los más difíciles. Para el Tribunal del Consulado, la principal barrera se encontraba en esa especie de autosubsistencia en el interior de la cual se esforzaba por persistir la mayoritaria población indígena. Aparentemente no necesitaban bien alguno, "pues ellos no visten ropa de Castilla, sino de la tierra, que ellos mismos trabajan, y la tienen en abundancia..."³⁰ Pero donde esta escasa demanda parecía quebrarse era en algunos centros urbanos, como Cuzco y Arequipa, bordeando cada uno los 30.000 habitantes, y, desde luego, en los campamentos mineros. El siglo XVIII, contra algunas suposiciones, fue escenario de la recuperación minera peruana: los rendimientos se duplicaron, especialmente entre 1776 y 1812. Esta fase ascendente se había iniciado tiempo antes, a partir de 1720 en Potosí, pero, a medida que transcurrió el siglo, los centros más dinámicos estuvieron en el Bajo Perú, en Cerro de Pasco, Huarochirí y


Yauli, sin olvidar en el norte los yacimientos de Hualgayoc. En 1791, la población de Pasco fue calculada en 6.776 habitantes, pero el empadronador precisaba que "en esta doctrina los mas de sus habitantes no son estables, a causa que la subsistencia en ella pende del fruto de las minas, y según es mas o menos este, así a proporción crece o disminuye el número de las personas..."³¹ Todas estas circunstancias permiten entender que Lima buscara prioritariamente su articulación espacial tanto con Cuzco y Arequipa, en el sur andino, como con los espacios mineros de la sierra central o del actual altiplano boliviano.

Sin embargo, conviene no exagerar el rol que pudo desempeñar la demanda minera. En el Perú, esta actividad difería sustancialmente de la minería en Nueva España. Aquí se trataba de un conjunto de medianas y pequeñas empresas, dirigidas por mineros que llegaban "apenas a cubrir sus gastos," subordinados a los comerciantes a quienes recurrían solicitando préstamos.³² En el Bajo Perú los mineros mayormente eran dueños de uno o dos "pozos" trabajados por un promedio de doce operarios, ubicados en lugares apartados, ya sea por los desiertos circundantes, como ocurría en el mineral de Guantajaya, o por la elevada altitud, como en Morococha y Cerro de Pasco. Algunos casos se alejaban e esta imagen endeble, como el minero Miguel de Espinach en Hualgayoc, con 167 operarios y diecisiete "pozos," o Matías de Urita, con dos "pozos" pero 243 operarios.³³ Pocos comerciantes limeños tuvieron la audacia suficiente para incursionar directamente en la minería, como Pedro Abadía, factor de la Compañía de Filipinas e introductor de la máquina a vapor para el desagüe de las minas.³⁴ Otras dos excepciones fueron Isidro de Abarca, prior del Tribunal de Minería, y Juan de Arrieta, minero en Cajatambo. En 1770, en los testamentos de Lima, sólo encontramos a un minero y en 1810, dos.³⁵

El conjunto de la minería peruana llegó a reclutar a 18.000 operarios, pero estos trabajadores, por su escasa concentración y evidente dispersión geográfica, no crearon la demanda suficiente para impulsar de manera espontánea el comercio interno. En estas circunstancias, los propios mercaderes limeños tuvieron que buscar los medios para expandir la estrechez del mercado colonial. Conviene a esta altura desechar la imagen rutinaria de un capital comercial estéril y parasitario. Los comerciantes limeños supieron desarrollar una capacidad inventiva casi hasta el límite permitido por las circunstancias, al edificar, desde la capital, una intrincada red mercantil que pretendía abarcar las provincias del interior. Esta red articuló circulación y producción.

Como funcionaba la red? Dos fueron los instrumentos más importantes. Primero, se trató del empleo de un mecanismo clásico en una sociedad colonial: la imposición del mercader sobre el consumidor, ejercida a través del "reparto" a que tenían derecho los corregidores. Estos últimos eran una combinación entre jueces y comerciantes; autoridades provincianas que, en compensación a su trabajo y los costos del cargo, tenían la potestad de colocar diversos productos (mulas, telas, rejonés) en los lugares que estaban bajo su jurisdicción, de acuerdo a un arancel que, en la mayoría de las veces, era violado, especialmente cuando se obligaba a los indios a comprar productos de los que podían prescindir.

GRAFICO I: *Red Mercantil*



Los corregidores, desde que ascendían al puesto, mantenían relaciones de dependencia con los comerciantes. Ellos les prestaban el dinero necesario para postular al cargo y luego los "habilitaban" de mercancías, poniendo a su disposición las reservas de sus bodegas o adelantándoles el dinero que necesitasen. A su vez, los corregidores generaban nuevas dependencias, en particular con los indios, directamente o a través de alguna autoridad local, como el curaca.³⁶

Junto a este conducto impositivo, que a la postre desembocaba en el consumidor indígena, los mercaderes edificaron un complicado sistema de

intermediarios que tenía como principal eslabón a un comerciante itinerante: un pequeño empresario que, ya sea por préstamo monetario o habilitación, se surtía de mercaderías en Lima, con ayuda de los arrieros partía hacia las provincias, donde a su vez, mediante nuevos préstamos, adelantos o permuta, entregaba esas mercaderías a un comerciante provinciano, a un hacendado o al dueño de un campamento minero. Estos, a su vez, empleando a veces también la compulsión o nuevos endeudamientos, terminaban colocando los productos entre los consumidores indígenas. Tanto en el caso de los corregidores como en el de los comerciantes itinerantes, el sistema de comercialización se amparaba en medios extraeconómicos, como los lazos de parentesco o las relaciones de dependencia que se formulaban en el interior de las haciendas o los campamentos mineros.

Podríamos ilustrar lo dicho con la mención de algunos casos concretos. Un grupo de pequeños comerciantes, habilitados en un gran almacén de Lima, formaron una "compañía" que se traslada al puerto de Arica. Allí se dividen en tres grupos. Uno recorre La Paz, Oruro, Chuquisaca y Potosí; el otro, Moquegua, Tarapacá e Iquique; y el tercero establece en Tacna "tienda y casa en calidad de matriz para surtirlos de lo que necesitan."³⁷ De manera similar procedieron otros dos empresarios. En julio de 1775, uno de ellos, Manuel Gómez, parte para la villa de Pasco llevando diversas mercaderías. Allí vende todo, instala una tienda y regresa a Lima trayendo dinero y "piñas" (plata recién extraída). Forma una "compañía" con Lorenzo Camelo, que aporta 1.000 pesos, de los cuales se invierten 800 en adquirir nuevos productos, y entonces vuelve a salir el 18 de setiembre para llegar a Cerro de Pasco cinco días después. Terminadas las ventas, baja a la capital el 15 de noviembre, para al poco tiempo regresar llevando aguardiente, jabón, telas, pescado seco, yerba del Paraguay, pasas y otros productos.³⁸ Un ejemplo más podría ser el de Pascual de Amaya, teniente de infantería y comerciante, que llega al cerro de Yauricocha transportando telas y aguardiente, allí entrega todas sus mercaderías al minero y hacendado Joseph Barrientos, atendiendo a que, por su permanencia en el lugar, encontraría los medios para vender esos productos. Pero éste, a su vez, termina contrayendo otras deudas con los mineros de la región, a quienes debe adelantar telas o aguardiente y que, en el mejor de los casos, terminan pagándole con plata piña.³⁹ Esta relación acabó en un juicio entre el comerciante y el minero. Resultan muy frecuentes, tanto en la audiencia como en el cabildo, los litigios por incumplimiento o demora en el pago de deudas. En 1810, en plena crisis mercantil, en los testamentos treinta

y nueve indican algún tipo de préstamo y cuarenta admiten deudas. Un comerciante debe 3.685 pesos, un noble 9.000 pesos y un labrador 14.000. Otro préstamo asciende hasta los 168.065 pesos.

Una variante de los casos mencionados anteriormente podría ser Toribio Silva. Compró al fiado o al contado efectos de Castilla a diversos comerciantes, como el Conde San Isidro, Manuel de Saldívar, Miguel Maticorena, y los remitió al Cuzco para expedirlos en la tienda de su socio Mauricio de Clavos. Vicente Fernández siguió la ruta opuesta. Fue hasta Piura transportando efectos que pertenecían a Benito Pereira entre ellos paños de Inglaterra, tafetanes de Italia, listonería de Nápoles, junto a una variedad de productos locales, todos los cuales sumaban 15.887 pesos. Una tercera parte de las ventas serían para el comerciante que seguía en Lima.

De esta manera, el crecimiento comercial que experimenta la economía peruana entre 1750 y 1780 no es sólo atribuible – como cree Jürgen Golte – al comercio impositivo de los corregidores. Intervinieron también los propios grandes comerciantes limeños, los arrieros y los comerciantes itinerantes o viajeros, como se les denominaba por entonces. Es probable que desde el interior mismo de las comunidades se produjeran algunos cambios, entre otros un sensible incremento en la división del trabajo, acorde con el crecimiento demográfico que, al parecer, evidencia la población indígena: 610.000 habitantes en 1750, 700.000 en 1800 y 760.000 en 1820.⁴⁰

Javier Tord, en un decisivo artículo, ha mostrado gráficamente cómo los ingresos por concepto de comercio se triplican en la Caja Real de Potosí y ascienden casi verticalmente hasta 150 por ciento tanto en Oruro como en La Paz. Una curva similar se repite en Arequipa, y en Cuzco se incrementan cinco veces más.⁴¹ Es la expresión en gráficos y números del proceso de imposición de la capital sobre las provincias del interior o, si se quiere, de la edificación de un espacio mercantil. Pero nada de esto pudo estar exento de conflictos. El país se levanta contra Lima, mejor dicho, los campesinos contra la explotación mercantil. Proliferan los motines contra los corregidores y, precisamente entre 1750 y 1780, se agolpan la mayoría de alzamientos y rebeliones rurales del siglo.⁴² La revolución tupamarista encontrará aquí uno de los motores que permiten congregarse en su derredor a amplias capas sociales. Aunque fue derrotada, se produce luego la sustitución de los corregidores por los intendentes. Esto no significa, necesariamente, la desaparición de los odiados repartos. En algunos casos serán ejecutados por las nuevas autoridades, al margen de cualquier reglamentación, pero la necesidad del sistema,

que nacía no sólo de la imposición de Lima sino también del limitado mercado interior, queda en evidencia cuando la Corona discute con el Tribunal del Consulado la posibilidad de organizar otro mecanismo similar al reparto.

La red mercantil limeña no funcionó nunca como un mecanismo de relojería. Rápidamente acabaron contraponiéndose los intereses mercantiles de provincias con la acción de los corregidores. Ambos sistemas, el comercio itinerante y el comercio impositivo, entraron en competencia. En Arequipa, los mercaderes locales interpusieron un proceso ante el Tribunal del Consulado contra el corregidor Fernando de Piélagos, que pretendía obligarlos a que se abastecieran en el almacén propiedad de esa autoridad.⁴³ En Arica hubo un enfrentamiento similar.

Pero, a pesar de todos los inconvenientes y obstáculos enumerados, los grandes comerciantes limeños comenzaron a crecer amparados no sólo en el comercio de exportación - importación, sino recurriendo también al mercado interno. Sin embargo, la edificación de este espacio recién empezaba y los lazos que los unían al país eran bastante débiles. Raro era el mercader limeño que no viajase a la península para supervisar sus negocios, visitar parientes o enterarse de las novedades de Madrid, donde algunas grandes tiendas encontraban en ellos espléndidos consumidores de ropas y objetos de lujo, atentos siempre a las últimas modas europeas.⁴⁴ Pero esto contrastaba con el escaso contacto que mantenían con los pueblos en el interior del país. Allí se limitaban al recurso de los intermediarios. Para la aristocracia, el comercio no era un deshonor, siempre y cuando no se ejerciera con las propias manos.

Aparte de las provincias, la propia ciudad de Lima era un importante mercado, pero allí también fue necesario introducir algunos mecanismos que acelerasen la circulación comercial. Las ventas corrían a cargo ya sea de los tenderos o de los cajoneros (propietarios de pequeños puestos de abasto ubicados alrededor de la Plaza Mayor o en sus cercanías). En cualquier cajón podían encontrarse los más diversos productos: martillos, alambre, fierro, junto con cintas, chompas francesas, además de té, café, yerba del Paraguay, aguardiente, incluso "chafalotes" (entre espada y puñal) y, a veces, libros. Una variedad similar se podía encontrar en las pulperías. En cambio, los tambos tendían a especializarse en el expendio de vinos y aguardientes. Al igual que en otros casos, los grandes importadores no mantenían relaciones directas con los pequeños comerciantes, sino que recurrían a un intermediario llamado *corredor*, quien por lo general pagaba en efectivo. Pero a él no le quedaba otro recurso que emplear el sistema de adelantos y deudas para colocar los

productos. Una práctica admitida era que el corredor ocultase el nombre del almacenero o mayorista que lo proveía; a su vez, el comprador debía evitar la curiosidad de preguntar.

Muchos miembros de la aristocracia mercantil llegaron a diversificar sus intereses en otras actividades. Oficiaban de prestamistas, como los hermanos Elizalde o Agustín Quijano. En 1770, 23 por ciento de los testadores limeños se habían beneficiado como prestamistas, mientras 31 por ciento tenían deudas al momento de morir. Los préstamos más frecuentes eran de 1.000 a 1.500 pesos, pero podían ascender hasta los 2.200 pesos.⁴⁵ Los comerciantes incursionaban eventualmente en algunas actividades manufactureras. Elizalde, por ejemplo, tenía una fábrica de lona (abastecía a las naves del comercio). No existía especialización mercantil. Otra forma de paliar los riesgos. La actividad más frecuente fue el arriendo de cajones, tiendas o pulperías. Mencionaremos algunos casos: El Marqués de Montemira era propietario de una tienda en el portal de escribanos.⁴⁶ Matías de Elizalde le arrendaba una pulpería a José Linares. Juan de Encalada arrendaba otra al convento de Santa Rosa. Lo mismo hacía José Gonzales, Conde de Fuente Gonzales. Los eslabones de la cadena proseguían cuando el arrendatario llevaba adelante su pequeña empresa con un "partidario," alguien que aportaba con su trabajo. Linares, por ejemplo, recurría a un "partidario" que vendía los productos de su tienda en pueblos, haciendas y tambos de los alrededores de Lima.⁴⁷

La relación más frecuente recibió el nombre de "al partir." Alguien, por lo general un acaudalado comerciante, colocaba el dinero, arrendaba la tienda o el cajón y otro, a cambio de administrar el negocio, tenía derecho a la mitad de las utilidades. Así funcionaba la bodega de Miguel de Castañeda sita en la calle de Pescadería, y la fábrica de lona propiedad de éste y de su hijo político Joaquín de Asín, teniendo como socio "al partir" de utilidades a un tal Quintela.⁴⁸ En otros casos, el propietario se limitaba a arrendar el negocio, como ocurrió por ejemplo con la panadería que tenían la Condesa de Vista Florida y el Conde de Torre Velarde. José María Sancho Dávila fue propietario de hasta once tiendas.⁴⁹ De estos contratos no siempre quedaba constancia notarial.

Es así como entre la aristocracia mercantil y los sectores populares emergieron heterogéneas capas medias, en apariencia independientes pero en realidad subordinadas, de una manera u otra, al capital comercial. Arriendos, adelantos, sistemas de "al partir" o préstamos (al interés del 6 por ciento), garantizaban esta dependencia. En Lima fueron censados 287 pulperos, además de cuarenta y ocho abastecedores y sesenta fabri-

cantes, a los que deberíamos añadir el número indeterminado de panaderos y molineros, para tener así una idea aproximada del artesanado y el pequeño comercio. Pero en las capas medias deben incluirse también los labradores (más de 300), medianos propietarios en los valles cercanos a la capital; la burocracia, compuesta, entre otros sectores, por más de 400 empleados; y finalmente los intelectuales, bajo cuyo nombre habría que incluir a médicos (21), abogados (91), estudiantes (366), cirujanos

TABLA III: *Estructuración Social de Lima (Ocupaciones), 1770 - 1810*

Actividades	1770	1810
Hacendados	8	3
Comerciales	31	19
Artesanos	14	10
Labradores	2	6
Ganaderos	1	1
Mineros	1	2
Arrieros	2	
Mayordomo	1	
Religioso	8	11
Burócratas	8	3
Curacas	2	
Escribanos	3	
Médicos	1	2
Marinos	2	1
Abogado		1
Pobres	6	
No se indica	31	55

Fuente: AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, testamentos e inventarios.

Nota: Las cifras se refieren únicamente a los testamentos realizados por hombres. Hacendados equivale a gran propietario y labrador a mediano o pequeño terrateniente; en ocasiones los dos términos se emplean como sinónimo. Algunos declaran más de una ocupación.

(56), notarios (13), escribanos (58), periodistas, etc.⁵⁰ Volviendo a utilizar los testamentos, después de comerciantes y hacendados, las ocupaciones más frecuentes son artesano, religioso, burócrata, escribano, marino (ver Tabla III).⁵¹

Al margen de las críticas tímidas que algunos escritores realizarían a la administración colonial (el abogado Baquijano frente al Virrey

Jáuregui), en general este sector social no pudo desarrollar una praxis independiente y propia. Crecieron al amparo de los grandes comerciantes. Muchos de ellos – panaderos y pulperos, por ejemplo – eran igualmente peninsulares. Compartían la fidelidad al monarca y la defensa de los intereses metropolitanos. La biografía del médico Hipólito Unanue, fiel a la causa realista hasta el final (consejero de Abascal, emisario de Pezuela), aunque al poco tiempo colaboraría con San Martín y después con Bolívar, no fue un derrotero excepcional. Simboliza claramente a un grupo social que quedó a la deriva, cuando no fue arrastrado al remolque de la aristocracia, mientras otros miembros, paralelamente, se desgajaban y caían en las capas sociales más bajas de la ciudad.

III. *Efímero esplendor*

La historia de la clase alta colonial tuvo un episodio previo. Al comenzar el siglo XVII, desde Lima un conjunto de comerciantes y banqueros, muchos de ellos portugueses, desplegaron empresas y negocios. El punto de partida fueron los asientos de esclavos, mediante los cuales organizaban, desde Portugal, el tráfico negrero entre África y América. Luego vino la adquisición de haciendas y minas y, finalmente, el establecimiento del llamado Banco de Juan de la Cueva, pero todo esto se derrumbó en pocos años por la acción combinada de la depresión económica europea, la crisis de la minería peruana y, por último, la Inquisición que en 1635 apresó a unos cien "señores del comercio".⁵² Cerca de treinta y cinco serían ajusticiados y el resto presos o desterrados.⁵³ La recomposición de la clase alta colonial debió esperar hasta el siglo siguiente.

Entonces, la aristocracia mercantil limeña no era de antigua data, recién formada al compás del siglo y de los incrementos en las actividades mercantiles. A los miembros reclutados a través de la migración vasco-navarra, habría que añadir aquellas familias que, como los Vega del Rhen o los Marqueses de Valle Umbroso, se trasladaron de Huamanga o Cuzco a Lima. Tanto en 1770 como en 1810, 21 por ciento de los que realizaban testamentos eran originarios de provincias (ver Tabla IV).

En cualquiera de los casos, casi siempre se produjo una asociación estrecha entre los comerciantes y la administración colonial. Hemos mencionado el sustento que encontraron en el monopolio comercial y el recurso al mecanismo impositivo del reparto. Pero quizá ambos sistemas

exigieron que los comerciantes además integrasen la alta burocracia. Es así como es frecuente encontrarlos de oidores: Querejazu, Ortiz de Foronda, Bravo de Rivero; Felipe Sancho Dávila fue alguacil; como alcaldes de Lima figuraron Sebastián de Aliaga, José María Sancho Dávila, Miguel de Oyague, José Colmenares; Agustín Quijano fue gobernador del Cercado. Casi todos los mencionados tenían algún cargo dentro del ejército: Coronel de dragones como Oyague, o de caballería como José González y Fernando Carrillo de Albornoz. Desde luego que entre los cargos más preciados estuvieron, junto a los puestos públicos, los de prior y cónsules del Tribunal del Consulado, detentados, entre otros, por Antonio Elizalde, el Conde Villar de Fuentes, Francisco de Izcue, Joaquín Azcona, Isidro de Abarca, Joaquín Ferrer.

TABLA IV: *Principales Personajes de la Clase Alta Limeña*

Nombres	Lugar de naci - miento	Título/Orden	Actividad empresarial								Cargos públicos				M
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	A	B	C	D	
Abadía, Pedro	Na		x				x	x							
Abarca, Isidro de	Li	Conde	x				x				x		x	x	
Aguirre, Javier María		Carlos III	x	x											x
Ariaga, Sebastián de	Li	Conde			x	x	x				x		x	x	x
Alvarez del Villar, Antonio	Li		x				x								
Arias de Saavedra, Francisco	Li	Conde						x			x		x	x	
Arnaiz, Domingo	Bu					x					x				x
Arrese, Joaquín			x												
Arrieta y Ascaraja, Juan	Vi		x				x	x							
Asín, Joaquín	Na		x	x							x		x		
Ascona, Joaquín		Conde/Calatrava	x												
Baquijano y Carrillo, José	Li	Conde/Carlos III					x				x		x	x	
Boza, Pedro	Li	Marqués	x	x			x				x		x		
Carrillo de Albornoz, Fernando	Li	Conde/Montaza						x			x		x	x	
Castañeda, Juan Miguel	Vi	Conde	x	x	x	x	x	x							x
Colmenares, José Félix		Conde	x	x											
Elizalde, Antonio	Na	Santiago	x				x				x		x		x
Elizalde, José Matías	Na		x				x						x		
Encalada, Juan Félix	Li	Conde/Santiago					x			x	x		x		
Espinach, Miguel de								x						x	
Espinoza, Juan Francisco							x		x						
Escurre, Domingo de	Na		x										x		x
Ferrer, Joaquín	Bi	Carlos III	x										x		
Garate, Juan Bautista	E		x												
González Gutiérrez, Joseph	Li	Conde/Santiago	x		x	x					x				
González y Fuente, Joseph	Li	Conde/Santiago	x	x				x			x		x		
Iscua, Javier de			x	x											
Lamo y Zúñiga, Joaquín	Bu	Conde	x					x					x		
Larreta, Matías	Na		x	x									x		x

Nombres	Lugar de nacimiento	Título/Orden	Actividad empresarial								Cargos públicos				M
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	A	B	C	D	
Larriva, Vicente	Li		x		x										
Lavalle, José Antonio	Tr	Conde	x								x	x		x	
López, Miguel	Li		x		x										
Mendiburu, Miguel de	Vi		x	x		x									
Moreira, Francisco	Li							x			x	x	x	x	
Ortiz de Foronda, José	Li	Conde/Santiago	x	x				x			x				
Orrantía, Domingo de	Li		x								x				
Oyague, Miguel	Li	Conde/Santiago						x			x	x	x	x	
Puente y Castro, Esteban de la		Carlos III						x							
Querejazu, José de	Li	Conde/Calatrava	x					x			x	x			
Querejazu y Mollinedo, Antonio		Santiago									x				
Quijano, Agustín	Li	Conde/Calatrava	x					x			x		x		
Ramírez de Arellano, Domingo	Vig	Calatrava	x	x		x	x				x			x	
Ramírez de Laredo, Gaspar	Stgo.	Conde/Santiago									x	x			x
Riva Agüero, José	Li	Carlos III						x						x	
Sancho Dávila, Felipe	Li	Marqués/Monteza	x	x				x			x	x			
Sancho Dávila, José María	Li	Carlos III						x				x			
Torre Tagle, Matías		Calatrava										x	x		x
Tramarria, Pedro de	Li		x												
Vásquez de Acuña, José	Ay	Conde						x							x
Villar, José Antonio del	Vi							x							

Nota: (1) Comercio (casa comercial, bodega, tienda); (2) armador (propietario de naves); (3) manufactura; (4) servicios (panadería, pulpería etc.); (5) créditos; (6) minas; (7) haciendas (bajo este rubro quedan incluidas chacras y pequeñas propiedades); (8) obrajes.
 (A) Cabildo; (B) Audiencia; (C) Ejército; (D) Otros; (M) Suscriptor del *Mercurio Peruano* (1790 - 1795).

Ay = Ayacucho; Bi = Bilbao, Bu = Burgos; E = España; Li = Lima; Na = Navarra;
 Stgo. = Santiago/Chile; Vi = Vizcaya; Vig = Viguera

Fuentes: AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales (índice Terán); Tribunal del Consulado (H.3, L.N. 907, L.N. 975, L.N. 1031. Archivo Histórico Riva - Agüero; Jean - Pierre Clément, *Índices del Mercurio Peruano 1790 - 1795* (Lima, 1979); Guillermo Lohmann, *Los ministros de la Audiencia de Lima* (Sevilla, 1974); Manuel Mendiburu, *Diccionario Histórico Biográfico del Perú* (Lima, 1932); Luis Varela y Orbegoso, *Apuntes para la historia de la sociedad colonial* (Lima, 1924).


La culminación en la carrera de un comerciante fue casi invariablemente el ingreso a alguna orden nobiliaria. En Lima, durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, se produce una verdadera inflación de títulos. Ascenden casi verticalmente, de ocho durante el quinquenio 1761 - 65 a cincuenta y tres entre 1786 - 90, y en el lustro siguiente, noventa y uno.

En adelante se producirá un descenso igualmente brusco, hasta los nueve que se otorgan entre 1821 - 25 (ver Gráfico II). Desde luego que las órdenes no estaban reñidas con el comercio, mientras no fuese ejercido directamente. Por el contrario, aunque en apariencia era sólo una recompensa por los servicios al Rey y la Corona, lo cierto es que una sólida fortuna era un respaldo indispensable. El historiador Pablo Macera llega a sostener que si un noble no se vinculaba al comercio o a la burocracia, estaría condenado a la miseria.⁵⁴ En definitiva, el incremento de nobles obedece a un total de 161 que ingresan en la nueva orden de Carlos III, para lo cual un requisito más importante que la hidalguía y la constancia de no haber desempeñado oficios "bajos," era poder abonar la suma exigida. Esa orden se creó como un medio de solventar nuevos ingresos a la monarquía.⁵⁵

Un destino individual, el de Domingo Ramírez de Arellano, nos puede ayudar a precisar otros rasgos de esta aristocracia mercantil. Había nacido en Viguera, Logroño, el 8 de mayo de 1742, y pasó a América cuando en 1764 falleció su tío, el comerciante Andrés Ramírez de Arellano, quien, al no tener descendientes, lo designó como su heredero universal.⁵⁶ Domingo tuvo como principal rubro de sus actividades el comercio de exportación - importación. Fue propietario de la fragata "Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes." En los protocolos notariales aparece comprando azúcar a hacendados de Cañete. La internaba en Chile, de donde a su vez embarcaba trigo. Pero no se detenía en Valparaíso, sino que continuaba hasta Chiloé, para de allí importar cueros. Sobre el eje Callao - Valparaíso sus negocios se expandieron a escala continental. En su archivo se puede encontrar una intensa correspondencia con un empleado suyo, Bernardo Roca, establecido en Guayaquil, al igual que con otros comerciantes, tanto en Cerro de Pasco como en Potosí. Poseyó una recua de mulas propia y un obraje en la sierra. Al comercio sumó, finalmente, el oficio de prestamista.

El matrimonio con Catalina Baquijano y Carillo le permitió entrar en posesión de la hacienda Pando, cerca de Lima. Esta era hija del Conde de Vista Florida y heredó el título. Juan Bautista de Baquijano, su padre, vino al Perú durante el primer tercio del siglo XVIII. Poseyó barcos, casas y haciendas. A su vez, Domingo Ramírez de Arellano pertenecía a la orden de Calatrava. Fue también Capitán de Alabarderos y Prior en el Tribunal del Consulado. De su matrimonio tuvo una hija, doña Josefa Ramírez, que se casaría con Gaspar de Osma, miembro del Consejo de su Majestad y oidor, un aristócrata que, durante las guerras de la Independencia, emigraría al Callao, ocupado por los realistas.

GRAFICO II: *Ordenes Nobiliarias, Lima 1700 - 1825*



Fuente: El gráfico se basa en cifras proporcionadas por Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Los americanos en las órdenes nobiliarias (1529 - 1900)* (Madrid, 1947) I, pp.LXXV - LXXVI.

La aristocracia limeña desarrolló rasgos endogámicos. "Era una sociedad dentro de la sociedad," sostenía el historiador Jorge Guillermo Leguía. Pariente cercano de los Ramírez de Arellano fue José María Sancho Dávila, casado con la Marquesa de Corpa. El matrimonio similar del Marqués de Valle Umbroso con doña Grimanesa de la Puente unió un linaje cusqueño con uno de Lima. Alianzas matrimoniales como éstas garantizaban la estabilidad de los sectores dominantes. Eran imprescindibles dada la imbricación entre familias y empresas mercantiles. Un caso extremo pero ilustrativo fue el de Juan Miguel de Castañeda, quien sólo tuvo cuatro hijas mujeres y escasamente agraciadas; temeroso de cualquier arribista, optó por "importar" a cuatro aristócratas peninsulares para casarlos con ellas, uno de los cuales fue Joaquín de Asín, un

navarro, con el que compartiría la conducción de una fábrica de pólvora.

Junto a la endogamia, otro rasgo que traza el perfil de la aristocracia colonial es el lujo, en alguna medida denunciado por el economista Lequanda: las amplias casonas de Lima adornadas con lienzos, muebles y platería.⁵⁷ Algunas, como la de Osambela eran provistas de un adecuado mirador para desde allí observar la llegada de los barcos al Callao; mientras otras, como la de Castañeda, exhibían con orgullo en la fachada la proa de un navío. Las habitaciones eran altas y anchas, en la tradición de la casa solariega levantina, colocadas alrededor de un patio central rectangular. Siguieron en la parte posterior, un segundo patio y, en dirección opuesta al viento, los cuartos de los esclavos, para que el aire se llevase supuestos malos olores. Las dos secciones de la casona quedaban separadas y comunicadas a la vez por un angosto callejón. La biblioteca y las calesas completaban el mobiliario. Su extensión ideal era de 1.200 varas cuadradas.⁵⁸

Pero, más allá de la amplitud interior, otros rasgos distintivos de estas casonas dieciochescas fueron las paredes exteriores altas, los balcones y las ventanas enrejadas. A mediados del siglo XVIII se desarrolla una actividad artesanal de amplia demanda: la barrotería de hierro o bronce con piezas fundidas. Mamparas y ventanas de rejas se pueden observar todavía, por ejemplo, en la llamada Casa la Riva. Protegían y adornaban; a veces se les recargaba con adornos rococó. Fueron tan frecuentes en las fachadas limeñas que, comparando con La Habana de Alejo Carpentier (la ciudad de las columnas), podríamos llamar a Lima la ciudad de las rejas. Ellas separaban con nitidez a la aristocracia, cuya vida familiar transcurría con más frecuencia en las salas y comedores interiores, de la plebe, que invadía las plazas y calles de la ciudad, como veremos más adelante.

Algunos aristócratas consideraban – como el Conde de Casa Jijón en carta dirigida a Miguel de Jijón, residente en Lima – al lujo como un imperativo de su condición. "Aunque no sea por propia comodidad y gusto, estamos ... precisados a conservar la decencia necesaria para que no se burlen los émulo."⁵⁹ Pero no era un sacrificio tan grande si atendemos a la multitud de distracciones que enmarcaban la vida de la aristocracia. El Conde de la Vega del Rhen, aparte de veladas familiares (banquetes como el que pintara Tadeo Escalante en un "árbol de la vida," sobre los muros de Acomayo), el juego de naipes, las corridas de toros, era gran aficionado a la cacería y, al igual que otros, frecuentaba los pantanos de Surco (cerca de la hacienda Villa), donde podía ejerci-

tarse en la caza de venados o patos salvajes.⁶⁰ Otros "signos exteriores de riqueza" eran los perros, los caballos, las alhajas, las escopetas y un costoso vestuario. De especial significación fueron las calesas. En ellas se exhibían los aristócratas todos los domingos recorriendo la alameda que había edificado el Virrey Amat. Pero, evidentemente, más importante que cualquiera de los mencionados era la posesión de otros hombres: el número de esclavos.⁶¹

De la combinación de estos rasgos tradicionales con los elementos innovadores mencionados páginas atrás (talleres "al partir," redes de endeudamiento) derivó la edificación de un peculiar mercado de trabajo. Se requería de jornaleros y asalariados para poner en funcionamiento los circuitos mercantiles. Fuerza de trabajo esclava para las haciendas y también como símbolo de estatus en las ciudades. Artesanos que sustentasen los pedidos de rejas o platería. La relación podría seguir. Pero esta demanda era tan fluctuante e inestable como el devenir mismo del capital comercial limeño. Para saciarse requería de una heterogeneidad muy amplia de oficios. A esta situación se amoldaba más el jornalero eventual que el asalariado permanente. La desocupación temporal y el subempleo son factores constitutivos al esplendor mercantil. Fueron simplemente el reverso. Sería erróneo considerar estos rasgos del mercado laboral como anómalos o marginales. Eran parte imprescindible de la estructura colonial.

Pero el sustento del esplendor mercantil era sumamente frágil, como pudieron experimentarlo a medida que el siglo XVIII se aproximaba a su fin. Los comerciantes habían sido celosos defensores del monopolio. Para ellos, el contrabando era un "horrendo crimen," y exigían que quienes lo perpetrasen fuesen ahorcados sin misericordia.⁶² No pudieron sentir ninguna simpatía por la apertura de nueve puertos de España y América, decretada en 1765. Amenazaron con entregar las llaves de sus tiendas y cajones, anunciaron una inminente ruina general. Similares protestas se repitieron cuando, en 1777, se crea el Virreinato del Río de la Plata. El Atlántico se impone sobre la Mar del Sur y, aunque la población de Lima sigue incrementándose, en fechas similares la de Buenos Aires se multiplicará por cinco.

Aparece, de esta manera, un polo rival en el continente, y tanto los hacendados como los comerciantes de Santiago quedan al acecho de cuanto pueda favorecerlos en el conflicto. La hegemonía de los mercados limeños se deteriora. Al año siguiente, Carlos III decreta el libre comercio. Para el Tribunal del Consulado fue una especie de "institucionalización" del tráfico ilícito.⁶³ Abrir Arica como puerto libre equi-

valía, glosando nuevamente los pareceres de la corporación limeña, a la amputación de todo el Alto Perú.⁶⁴

TABLA V: *Efectos Personales Registrados en Testamentos, 1770*

Tipo	Hombres	Mujeres	Total
Ropa	38	44	82
Muebles	39	43	82
Vajilla	22	27	49
Alhajas	17	32	49
Libros	9	1	10
Calesas	10	9	19
Lienzos	15	22	37
Armas	12	—	12
Declaran:	110		
No declaran:	120		


Fuente: AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos.

Lima pierde, de esta manera y en pocos años, el respaldo colonial que siempre le había conferido la corona española. Quizá ésto hubiera aproximado a los comerciantes hacia posiciones reformistas, e incluso separatistas, si no mediaban otras circunstancias. Paralelamente, en las áreas del interior, donde reposaba — como decíamos — el otro pilar del fugaz esplendor mercantil, los motines urbanos y rurales desembocan en una "gran rebelión," que convulsiona, con Túpac Amaru II, a todo el Cuzco y después, con Túpac Catari, se propala hasta La Paz. El Tribunal del Consulado se compromete, entonces, a mantener 1.000 hombres armados y, además, otros 1.000 uniformados para combatir a los insurgentes, a lo que se sumarán algunos donativos particulares, como el de Querejazu, ascendiente a 2.000 pesos.⁶⁵ Comprendieron que España seguía siendo la mejor garantía de su poder y que, a pesar de la abolición del reparto o la apertura del "libre comercio," el destino de la aristocracia limeña estaba indisolublemente ligado a la Corona:

Las Américas son una parte integrante y muy principal de la monarquía española. Unidas íntimamente a ella y conspirando siempre a su mayor lustre, prosperidad, es muy difícil que ningún poder extraño consiga trans-formarla en ningún evento.⁶⁶

Sabemos que el vaticinio no se cumplió. Pero los comerciantes se aferraron casi con desesperación a este proyecto, no obstante que los cambios desencadenados por las reformas borbónicas se sintieron rápidamente en sus libros de contabilidad y en el peso de sus arcas. Después de un brusco ascenso en las recaudaciones de la Caja Real de Lima en la década de 1770, antes que termine ese período se inicia un descenso que, dibujando una febril inestabilidad, proseguirá hasta terminar el siglo. Una trayectoria similar será seguida por los ingresos en la recién creada aduana de Lima (ver Gráfico III).

GRAFICO III: *Ingresos de la Caja Real y la Aduana de Lima, 1760 - 1799*



Fuente: Javier Tord y Carlos Lazo, "Economía y sociedad en el Perú colonial (dominio económico)," *Historia del Perú*, t.IV (Lima 1980), pp.549 y 550.

En 1787, un mercader limeño describe los intercambios como muy abatidos, señalando como causa el "libre comercio."

Los muchos registros que han conducido bastante ropa, e infinita mercería, pues no hay calle en que no se vean dos o tres tiendas de este género, fuera de que los Almacenes se hallan abarrotados sin poder vender ni al fiado porque no se encuentra persona segura de vida y muerte con quien hacer dependencia.⁶⁷

Se benefician navíos y comerciantes extranjeros inundando el escaso mercado, mientras para los mercaderes locales las cobranzas se hacen difíciles. Aumentan los juicios por deudas. La morosidad interfiere los negocios. Terminan fallando incluso los más cumplidos. Juan Domínguez, vecino de Lima y comerciante, que se enorgullecía de haber pagado puntualmente las habilitaciones que le hacían los almaceneros, en 1797 tiene que admitir "la injuria de los tiempos: la común y general decadencia en que se halla el comercio, me ha venido a tocar en desgracia de experimentar la adversidad;" se hallaba bordeando "la ruina total."⁶⁸ Acabó partiendo para Trujillo, a la espera de mejor suerte. Ese mismo año los ingleses amenazaban la costa. Se teme que el Callao termine bloqueado. La fragata "El Carmen" opta por no salir, enterada que otra fragata se encontró con una goleta inglesa. Los demás navieros deciden exigir que se forme un convoy armado. El azúcar se queda en los almacenes del puerto y corre el riesgo de deteriorarse.⁶⁹ El precio del trigo asciende, perturbando la vida en la ciudad. Aunque estos problemas duran apenas pocos meses, 1797 sería la antesala en el callejón sin salida a donde se dirigía casi inexorablemente el comercio limeño.

Desde dos años antes, Ignacio de Lequanda había constatado los inicios de la crisis mercantil. Las acuñaciones monetarias y las cifras de la Caja Real confirman su versión. El fenómeno afecta incluso a las adquisiciones de títulos nobiliarios. "Este comercio está en notable decadencia, así por la división del Virreinato, escasez de dinero y compradores, como también por los muchos efectos que hay en esta Plaza por cuyo motivo no saben qué hacer las gentes..."⁷⁰

Así empezó el epílogo de un drama que, visto desde su inicio, pudo tener otro desenlace: bruscamente se interrumpió el proceso que llevaba a la edificación de una clase dominante colonial. La aristocracia limeña, liderada por los comerciantes del Tribunal del Consulado, no sólo tenía un mismo sustento material, sino que además parecía cohesionarse con proyectos políticos propios, la opción a favor de una integración mayor con España, la procedencia común de sus miembros, los lazos de parentesco y los hábitos cotidianos. Pero, ante todo, la aristocracia se definía en ese empeño por dominar a las economías vecinas de Quito y Santiago y, paralelamente, construir una vasta red mercantil que significara la imposición de Lima sobre los espacios andinos. Las dificultades para crear este mercado interno colonial — tema que sobrepasa los límites de nuestra investigación — permitirían entender las débiles raíces que, en definitiva, unieron a la aristocracia con el país. A la postre, quedó suspendida entre el gran comercio de exportación y los vastos espacios interiores. En alguna medida, su trayectoria resume esa ambivalencia de un país provisto de "millares de puertos y caletas que le

proporcionan comunicación cómoda con todo el resto del mundo," mientras de espalda al mar se podía contemplar "un terreno inmenso, dividido por grandes e inaccesibles cordilleras, multitud de caudalosos ríos, tarabitas o pasos dificultosísimos..."⁷¹

NOTAS

- * La investigación que sustenta este trabajo fue realizada gracias a la ayuda de CLACSO y Social Science Research Council; para la redacción final recibimos una beca de FOMCIENCIAS. Después de entregarlo a las editores de éste tomo, fué publicado como capítulo del libro del autor, *Aristocracia y plebe: Lima 1760 - 1830* (Lima, 1984).
- 1. Autos entre el Señor Conde de San Jijón y los albaceas de Juan Felipe Orueta, AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 155.
- 2. Jorge Juan y Antonio Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América* (Londres, 1826), I:216.
- 3. En la exposición de este trabajo emplearemos la categoría "mercado interno colonial" en la acepción que ha sido propuesta por Marcello Carmagnani: un mercado que se estructura a partir de la imposición colonial, sin que responda, necesariamente, a una variación cualitativa en la división del trabajo y la separación entre agricultura e industria. Comp. las conclusiones de *Les mécanismes de la vie économique dans une société coloniale* (Paris, 1973).
- 4. AGN(P), Archivo Moreyra, Caja 125.
- 5. AGN(P), loc. cit.; AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 155, 1789.
- 6. AGN(P), Archivo Moreyra, Caja 132.
- 7. AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos. Hemos revisado todos los testamentos limeños de 1770 (230 Casos) y 1810 (182 casos), gracias a la colaboración de Magdalena Chocano. Ante la imposibilidad de trabajar sistemáticamente toda la documentación, optamos por este procedimiento. Los notarios de Lima no estaban especializados, sino que recibían a todo tipo de clientes e intervenían en cualquier tipo de transacción. Las dos fechas escogidas, 1770 y 1810, se ubican en los dos polos cronológicos de nuestro libro. La primera fecha es previa a la crisis mercantil, la segunda es la antesala de la independencia.
- 8. Carlos Malamud, "El fin del comercio colonial: una compañía comercial gaditana del siglo XIX," *RI*, 151 - 152(1978), 299.
- 9. Miguel Maticorena, "Los vascos en el Perú," *SDS*, 30:12 (1979), 12; ver también Malamud, "El fin del comercio," p.290.
- 10. Alberto Flores Galindo, *Aristocracia y plebe*.
- 11. Naufragaron, por ejemplo, "Soledad" y "Valverde," navíos de Bartolomé Parra, vecino de Lima. Manuel Mendiburu, *Diccionario histórico - biográfico* (Lima, 1932), VIII: 348. También naufragó "El Fuerte" de Fernando Romero, AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, L. N. 907, la fragata "Leocadia" rumbo a Panamá, AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Aizcorbe 1800/01, Protocolo 1, f. 227.
- 12. Seguros podían convenirse en España pero no en Lima.

13. AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Martín de Prada, 1808 - 14, f. 442. Mendi-
buru, *Diccionario*, VII: 306. Ver anexo III.
14. MP, Tomo I, Nr. 24 (1791). Carmagnani, *Les Mécanismes*, p.55.
15. AGN(P), H 3, L.N. 1031, f. 140.
16. Municipalidad de Lima, 7 diciembre 1, AGN(P), O.L. 7 - 15.
17. AM Lima, leg. sin numerar.
18. Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Historia de Valparaíso* (Valparaíso, 1869),
II:326.
19. Actas de Cabildo, 23 de mayo de 1782, AM Lima.
20. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Historia marítima del Perú*, siglos XVII - XVIII
(Lima, 1972 - 75), IV: 266, AGN(P), Real Hacienda, Astillero de Guayaquil,
2 legajos.
21. AGI, Lima, 751.
22. AGI, Indiferente, 1527.
23. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, L.N. 1031, f. 142 v.
24. Las cifras de la Tabla II deben ser tenidas como provisionales. Todavía nadie
ha estudiado con el detenimiento necesario la demografía de Lima en el siglo
XVIII. Falta incluso la crítica de fuentes sobre el material censal disponible.
Los estudios de Fernando Ponce sobre Arequipa no han tenido eco, lamen-
tablemente, en Lima.
25. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 155, 1789.
26. Don Mariano Garagay pagó el importe de un negro esclavo en 400 pesos en
yerba (1789), AHRA, Documentos de Ramírez de Arellano, A - I - 77.
27. MP, No. 190 (28 de Octubre de 1792), pp.132 - 133.
28. AGI, Mapas y Planos, Perú y Chile, leg. 33.
29. Al respecto, consultar el testimonio de Carrio de la Vandra, *El lazarillo de
ciegos caminantes*.
30. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, H - 3, L.N. 1031, f. 186v.
31. AAL, Estadística, leg. 4, 1779 - 1800.
32. John Fisher, *Minas y mineros en el Perú colonial* (Lima, 1977), p.77. Ver
también las investigaciones de Magdalena Chocano y César Espinoza.
33. *Ibid.*, p.78.
34. AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Manuel Suárez, 1807 - 1809, f. 876. *Idem*.
1810 - 1811, f. 442; *Idem*, 1820 - 25, f. 880.
35. AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos, 1770 - 1810.
36. A modo de ejemplo mencionaremos las relaciones entre el curaca de Huacho
Diego Samanamud y su corregidor, a quien llegó a deber 2.496 pesos. BNP,
C 957.
37. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 146, 1764 - 65.
38. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 149, 1776 - 77.
39. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 146, 1764 - 65.
40. Estas cifras provienen de las estimaciones realizadas por Günther Vollmer,
*Bevölkerungspolitik und Bevölkerungsstruktur im Vizekönigreich Peru zu Ende
der Kolonialzeit, 1741 - 1821*, Tesis de doctorado, Universidad de Colonia,
1965, pp.367 - 368.
41. Javier Tord, "Sociedad colonial y fiscalidad," *Apuntes*, IV: 7 (1977), p.23.
42. Ver Alberto Flores Galindo, "La revolución tupamarista y los pueblos andi-
nos," *Allpanchis*, 17 - 18 (1981), pp.253 - 265. No hemos podido consultar
todavía la versión final de la tesis que Scarlett O'Phelan dedicó al tema; Scar-
lett O'Phelan, "Túpac Amaru y las sublevaciones del siglo XVIII," en Alberto
Flores Galindo, ed., *Túpac Amaru II, Antología* (Lima, 1976).

43. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 149, 1776 - 77. También leg. 146, 1764 - 69.
44. Julio Luna, "Viajes por motivos de salud," *El Comercio*, 24 de agosto de 1978.
45. AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos, 1770.
46. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 150, 1778 - 79.
47. AGN(P), Juzgado de Secuestros, leg. 6.
48. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 161, 1795.
49. AGN(P), Inquisición, leg. 60, 1789. Ver el inventario de los bienes de Sancho Dávila en AHRA, G - 328.
50. AGI, Indiferente, 1527.
51. AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos, 1770 - 1810.
52. Juan de la Cueva está siendo estudiado en una vasta investigación proyectada por Margarita Suárez.
53. AGN(P), Inquisición, leg. 61, siglo XVIII. Gonzalo Reparaz, "Los portugueses en el Perú durante los siglos XVI y XVII," *Mercurio Peruano* 472 (abril 1968), p.434.
54. Pablo Macera, *Trabajos de historia* (Lima, 1977), II: 170.
55. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Los americanos en las órdenes nobiliarias (1529 - 1900)* (Madrid, 1947) I: CXXV - CXXVI.
56. AHRA, Documentos de Ramírez de Arellano.
57. Gilbert Chauny, *Arquitectura residencial en Lima, 1746 - 1820* (Lima, 1975), pp.65 - 66.
58. Emilio Harth - Terré, "Historia de la casa urbana virreinal en Lima," *RANP*, XXVI, (Lima, 1962), p.7 y ss.
59. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 155, 1789.
60. César Pacheco Vélez, "Las conspiraciones del Conde de la Vega del Rhen," *RH*, 21(1954), 355 - 425.
61. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, Leg. 159, 1792 - 93.
62. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, H - 3, L.N. 1227, Leg. 344, f. 7.
63. Miguel Maticorena, "El comercio libre de 1778," *El Comercio*, 12 de noviembre de 1978.
64. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, H - 3, L.N. 975, f. 294. Sin embargo, una opinión discrepante fue planteada en el *Mercurio Peruano*: el comercio libre, según uno de sus redactores, compensó la pérdida de Buenos Aires y ocasionó la prosperidad de Lima.
65. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, H - 3, L.N. 907, f. 212 - 215; L.N. 975, F. 138 - 139 y L.N. 1031, f. 154.
66. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, H - 3, L.N. 1173, leg. 327, f. 53 v.
67. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 160, 1794.
68. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 162, 1796 - 97.
69. Ibid.
70. AGN(P), Tribunal del Consulado, Contencioso, leg. 157, 1790.
71. Enrique Rávago, *El Gran Mariscal Riva Agüero* (Lima, 1959), p.255.

11. URBAN MARKET AND AGRARIAN HINTERLAND: LIMA IN THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD

Marcel Haitin

Since the publication more than thirty years ago of Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo's seminal "Lima y Buenos Aires: Repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del virreinato del Plata," our understanding of this period of Peruvian history has been colored by a persistent image of widespread stagnation and economic decline.¹ In recent years, however, this traditional interpretation has begun to be replaced by a less pessimistic and at the same time more nuanced model of Peruvian economic performance. John R. Fisher's 1977 monograph on the growth (rather than decline) of postpartition Peruvian silver production has categorically revised long-held views about the condition of this key sector of the colonial economy.² There are also indications of economic vitality in other sectors of the Peruvian economy. An earlier study by Fisher of the impact of Bourbon administrative changes in the viceroyalty suggests that overseas trade was experiencing modest economic expansion in the 1790's.³ The long-awaited publication of statistics of colonial revenue entering the Lima treasury by John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein bears out the British historian's thesis, for they show that tax collections from commerce (*alcabalas*) and foreign trade (*almojarifazgos*) rose steadily and at times dramatically during the fifty-year period 1736-1785.⁴ *Alcabala* revenues rose even higher in the 1790's, to about four million pesos in the quinquennium 1790-1794.⁵

In addition to confirming the flourishing state of the mining sector of Lower Peru, the treasury accounts of Lima also suggest regional economic expansion, for the net remittance from provincial treasuries to the Lima matrix increased substantially between the 1760's and the 1780's. They also provide a sense of demographic transition, as revealed in the growth of tribute revenue in the last fifty years of the eighteenth century.

The new perspective on the global state of the Peruvian economy afforded by the recent historiography should certainly not obscure the fact that our knowledge of substantive problems is still rather patchy. The agricultural sector is a case in point. The movement over time of the two-ninths of one-half of the tithe collected as Crown income

shows, for instance, a healthy increase between the 1740's and 1760's, but this impetus appears to have been spent by the following decade.⁶ On the other hand, tithe figures for the Lima archbishopric suggest a more positive trend in agricultural production. While the average figure for the period 1774–1779 was 126,546 pesos, the years 1790–1794 saw an 18 percent increase to 148,866 pesos. The value of the tithe in 1803 was 182,349 pesos, a figure apparently maintained throughout the decade. In 1810–1814 tithe revenue averaged 184,826 pesos.⁷ At about the same time that eighteenth-century commentators pointed to the dismal condition of the sugar haciendas of Trujillo, one Crown official noted with satisfaction that tithe revenue in that province had increased from 72,685 pesos in 1759/60 to 131,509 pesos in 1787/88, a surge he ascribed to the discovery of silver ore in Hualgayoc in the early 1770's.⁸

These contradictory strands of evidence underscore what seems to be the crucial aspect of the colonial economy: its spatial fragmentation and regional diversity. The fundamental integrative force here is obviously represented by the dynamic inter-relationship between regions and markets. In this regard, the key role played by the mining sector of the Peruvian economy (as the tithe data for Trujillo reveal) has been recognized by most colonial historians.⁹ On the other hand, the part played by urban markets as stimulators of trade, agriculture, and industry still needs to be delineated in sharper detail.¹⁰ In this paper, therefore, we attempt to refine our understanding of late colonial Peru's agrarian sector from a regional perspective: the capital of the viceroyalty and its hinterland. Because of Lima's functional importance as intermediary between the outside and domestic economies, we are concerned to develop two tightly interwoven avenues of historical evidence: first, the impact external factors had in transforming the size and structure of urban demand, second, the response of the rural economy to the urban market through the analysis of price trends for selected agricultural commodities.

Let us begin with modifications in the city's traditional commercial structure. Prior to the changes in Crown policy that took place during the second half of the eighteenth century, Lima had been the beneficiary of the mercantilistic economic ideas followed by Spain since the early colonial period. As the southern terminus of the fleet system that connected the peninsular and colonial economies, the city held a relatively tight monopoly of European trade and export of bullion. Lima's most important merchants, organized in a *Consulado* since 1613, controlled the viceroyalty's internal markets by purchasing most of the European

merchandise imported into Peru and through dominance of marketing and pricing mechanisms. The transition from a strictly regimented to a progressively looser transatlantic trade structure, begun in the 1740's as a consequence of the Spanish - British war of 1739 - 1748 when single ships were allowed to ply the alternative route around Cape Horn and anchor at Callao irrespective of time and condition of the Peruvian market, inaugurated a period of progressive erosion of the ability of *Limeño* importers to control an increasing flow of goods into Peru. In institutional terms, this process was carried to completion by 1778 with the elimination of the Cádiz - Lima trade monopoly and the further simplification of transatlantic shipping through the abolition and reduction of a number of regulatory constraints.¹¹

Events resulting from Spain's almost continuous involvement in European conflicts also contributed to destroy what little was left of Lima's old monopolistic structure. In the aftermath of the Spanish-British war of 1779 - 1783, for example, peninsular merchants shipped the large inventories they had accumulated during the years when communications between Spain and the American colonies were interrupted. As a consequence of the excess of supply over demand, prices of imports began to fall drastically, commercial capital in Lima became tied to merchandise that was rapidly depreciating, and a rush of business failures ensued. By 1795, much of the Peruvian debt owed to metropolitan interests still remained unpaid.¹²

These episodes of European warfare continued to undermine Spain's ability to trade with its colonies and made it impossible for the large *Limeño* merchant to exert an effective degree of control over the supply of foreign goods entering the Peruvian market. New hostilities between Spain and England (1796 - 1802) forced the Spanish Crown to open colonial trade to neutrals (1797).¹³ Seven years earlier, the Nootka Sound dispute between the two powers was solved when the Bourbons grudgingly conceded England permission to navigate, trade, and fish in the Spanish Pacific, an agreement that resulted in an increase of smuggling episodes along the coast of southern Peru.¹⁴ Vessels from other countries also began to penetrate the South Pacific market. In 1800, for example, a ship from Hamburg was allowed to sell its cargo in Lima.¹⁵ Between 1788 and 1809, some 257 United States sails plied the coasts of Chile and Peru.¹⁶

It was Britain, however, that presented the greatest threat to *Limeño* commercial interests. By 1806, a brisk trade under a licensing system was underway from Britain to the Pacific coast of South America and

the Río de la Plata.¹⁷ The rhythm of exports to Spanish America increased substantially when Britain began to suffer the effects of Napoleon's continental blockade. By 1808, in the aftermath of the fall of the Spanish Crown to the French, Britain and Spain became allies in the war against the common enemy; this alliance further encouraged British penetration in the Spanish American market. In 1807–1808, for instance, eleven ships sailed from England to Chile and Peru, their hauls laden with merchandize valued at 933,000 pounds Sterling.¹⁸ In response to a viceregal inquiry, the Lima Consulado estimated that in the two-year period 1809–1810 nine million pesos worth of manufactures had been smuggled into Peru while for the period 1800–1810 contraband trade entering the viceroyalty by the Panama–Paíta route had exceeded twenty million pesos. On the other hand, legal imports through Montevideo, Panama, and Spain, for the same eleven-year period, were estimated at 29.5 million pesos.¹⁹ Whatever their merits, these figures indicate the declining importance of legal trade and the comparative advantage of extralegal economic avenues.

The steep erosion of the Lima–Cádiz commercial route severely affected the large *Limeño* wholesaler who over the course of the early colonial period had been the principal beneficiary of Lima's monopoly of trade. The undermining of his control over commercial events had as its main consequence the appearance of competing interests, some powerful, some modest, within the city's mercantile community. A foreboding of developments that would show their full impact in the closing decades of the eighteenth century occurred during the period of registered ships when, as a result of the expansion of trade, the *Limeño* importer, fearful about the very real possibility that he would be unable to dispose of his stock in a glutted market, elected to restrict the amount of goods he purchased. This forced the Spanish merchant just docked at Callao to set up shop and sell his cargo directly to the public. As a result, *Limeño* businessmen had thereafter to share their domestic market with a new and substantial group of peninsular merchants.²⁰

The liberalization of trade after 1778 and the recurrent dislocations of inter-oceanic communications through the turn of eighteenth century continued the process. The two wealthiest men in late colonial Lima were the merchants Pedro Abadía and José Arizmendi. Abadía had a personal fortune of four million pesos; Arizmendi was worth over two million pesos.²¹ These men were closely connected to the Royal Philippine Company, a stock corporation which since 1796 imported goods into Peru directly from Manila.²² Abadía and Arizmendi possessed the abi-

lity and entrepreneurial flexibility to engage in unconventional commercial ventures involving other sectors of the Peruvian economy and foreign markets that had been beyond the reach of the city's traditional mercantile groups. Abadía, for example, managed to consign cargoes of *cascarilla* bark for sale in Russia; through his connections with Asia, he was able to introduce into Peru better strains of sugarcane which he imported from India.²³ In 1819, when Lima was being strangled by the insurgents' sea blockade, it was the firm of Arizmendi and Abadía that struck a deal with the Viceroy whereby they donated 200,000 pesos to the exchequer, 50,000 as an outright grant and the remainder against custom duties. In return, the viceroy granted the two merchants the right to use one or two ships of any flag to import merchandize from China.²⁴ The two businessmen also invested directly in Peru's mining sector, forming a company in 1812 to finance the construction in London of steam engines to be installed at Cerro de Pasco.²⁵

Small merchants were also able to take advantage of the new economic opportunities. During the 1786 market glut, for instance, the Lima Consulado noted that while large commercial houses had withdrawn from business or gone into bankruptcy commerce was being conducted by "hands of very limited means."²⁶ Five years later, the "*Mercurio Peruano*" reported that since the liberalization of trade one third more retail shops (*tiendas de varear géneros*) had opened their doors to *Limeño* consumers.²⁷ Again, in 1810, at a time when the vicerealty was flooded with English manufactures, Lima's main square was teeming with stalls in which foreign merchandize was sold.²⁸ Tadeo Haenke, the Czech naturalist who visited Lima in the late 1790's, noted that, in addition to the wholesalers (*almaceneros*) and commission merchants (*encomenderos*), the viceregal capital featured independent small merchants who purchased merchandize in small quantities, hauled it to the interior for sale, and returned to Lima to start the process anew. These modest entrepreneurs apparently also traded in silver *piñas*, purchasing small quantities at a discount, on a cash basis, at the pit head, and selling them to the Lima mint. Since this trade did not involve offering advances to the miner, it was free from risk and usually gave the small merchants good financial returns.²⁹

By the late colonial period, therefore, the old *Limeño* monopolist, so deeply committed to the Cádiz commercial lifeline, saw his position weakened by the emergence in the city of new and more dynamic economic groups. This redistribution of commercial wealth, although unaugeable, appears to be the most significant social consequence to

evolve out of the Bourbon reform period. Writing in the "Mercurio Peruano" in 1790, José Rossi y Rubi, the Vice-President of the *Sociedad de Amantes del País*, indicted the old monopolists who longed for times long past and exaggerated the city's poverty because of the absence of "those gigantic capitals" existing at the beginning, and even in the middle of the eighteenth century. Observing that earnings were less substantial because they were distributed among a larger number of individuals, Rossi y Rubi pointed to the increased prosperity of the artisan, the small-scale merchant, the laborer, and the trader.³⁰ This assessment was shared by many prominent creoles.³¹ In his visit to Lima twelve years later, Alexander von Humboldt also noticed that commercial wealth was evenly distributed particularly, as he was to find out later, when compared to Mexico's.³²

Rossi y Rubi's favorable prognosis of the changes brought about by the implementation of the Bourbon reforms appears to be essentially correct but requires further amplification. The available evidence suggests, for instance, that the city experienced a period of urban growth in the last third of the eighteenth century followed by stagnation or perhaps decline of the building industry in the early nineteenth century.³³ On the other hand, examination of parish registers of baptisms and burials for the years following 1790 indicates that Lima - with a total population of roughly 53,000 in 1790 - experienced a mild demographic increase, fueled mainly by immigration, which peaked during the first decade of the nineteenth century. The outbreak of revolutionary activity within and without the viceroyalty in the late 1800's caused a substantial number of refugees to seek sanctuary in the viceregal capital. As a result, by 1811 Lima had swelled to an estimated 80,000 inhabitants. The population declined immediately thereafter, but sharp demographic fluctuations associated with the movement of civilians and armies in and out of the city continued to characterize the remainder of the period.³⁴

Connected to the changes in the structure of commercial life were the expansion and transformation of urban patterns of consumption, as seen in the more cosmopolitan air urban life had taken since the 1770's, with new cafés, inns, barber shops, and commercial establishments opened to the public.³⁵ Several factors account for the general well-being of the city's middle groups. The economy of Lima rested upon two basic pillars: commerce and government. If the new economic climate that evolved as a consequence of imperial policy brought about a redistribution of commercial wealth, it also contributed to mitigate, in a city

accustomed to operate within a wider viceregal space, the economic shock of market losses and territorial dislocation. An increase in the elasticity of Peruvian demand after the loss of twenty-three provinces to the new Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata was reported by a senior customs official in 1794.³⁶ While this increase in internal consumption was undoubtedly related to the decline in the cost of imports, it was also the expansion of silver mining, to which we have alluded, that contributed to stimulate local demand for industrial and consumer goods. This demand continued to be met by Lima's mercantile community.³⁷ The overall increase in the size of government promoted by a Crown interested in a more efficient colonial administrative apparatus also contributed to modify the structure of urban demand.³⁸ Not only were many mid- and low-echelon posts made available to *Limeños* in the civil bureaucracy but also in a substantially expanded military establishment.³⁹ Finally, the 1790's were years of relative prosperity for the capital's artisans, brought about by the increase in the number of consumers and an apparently plentiful supply of currency.⁴⁰

Let us turn now to the last part of our topic, namely, the response of the agrarian hinterland to the urban market. The viceregal capital was an impressive urban conglomeration that performed, as Peru's neural center, a variety of complex economic, administrative, and social activities associated with the various groups which made up its active population. In the late eighteenth century, urban consumption surpassed eight million pesos per annum and 60 percent of this amount was spent in domestically-produced foodstuffs.⁴¹ In functional terms, therefore, as coastal Peru's principal market, Lima depended upon trade linkages that extended well beyond its adjacent hinterland. The pull of urban demand radiated to a significant number of regional markets along the Peruvian coast and into the sierra. In the late 1780's, for example, the provinces sent Lima domestic manufactures and agricultural products amounting to about 1.8 million pesos per year, a figure representing close to 40 percent of the total value of viceregal output.⁴² Hispanoamerican imports supplied the remaining needs. In exchange, Lima provided the interior with European goods, mainly textiles, but also paper, iron tools and nails, metals, some furniture items, and pharmaceutical products. It also supplied the provinces with American commodities such as indigo, cacao, tobacco, and wax, and with African slaves imported through Buenos Aires via Chile.⁴³

How did the agrarian sector respond to urban demand? We may approach this problem through the examination of the behavior of

wholesale prices for selected commodities reaching the Lima market.⁴⁴ Starting with the movement of prices for some comestibles, between 1799 and 1819 the average percentage growth rate for potatoes (calculated on the basis of the linear trend in the logarithms of the index numbers) was 0.51 percent per annum. Prices for pumpkins exhibit stronger gains. Between 1798 and 1818, the index for this staple rose at a rate of 2.75 percent per year. Quinoa followed closely, at an annual rate of 2.68 percent (1798–1814). Rice, on the other hand, did not exhibit a noticeable trend, the annual average rate being 0.12 percent (1795–1818).⁴⁵

Although lacunae in the data prevent calculation of rate, it is clear that, with few exceptions, the direction of prices for garden crops and grains also follows a growth pattern.⁴⁶ Black beans, lima beans, and chickpeas show price increases over this period. As for grains, three quotations for maize for the period before Independence suggest that the cost of the cereal was also rising. In 1798, white maize flour sold for twenty-two reales each fanega. The following years the price rose to twenty-four reales. In 1807, it had climbed 82 percent over the 1798 figure, to forty reales per fanega. In the decade following the early 1820's (at which time consumers paid seventy reales for one fanega of maize flour) the price of this staple never dropped below the twenty-eight reales mark. These scattered data suggest that the long-term trend for maize prices was also one of growth.

As for animal products, the abundance of hens kept the bird's unitary value fixed at about six reales (1790–1819). The overall trend for unsalted pork grease (*unto sin sal*) between 1799 and 1819, was one of mild growth (0.6 percent per annum). Prices for this commodity, however, were generally depressed. For eleven years out of twenty for which we have information, index numbers (1799 = 100) were below 100. With the exception of 1812, when the index reached 121, relatively strong prices in the early 1800's gave way to a declining trend whose bottom was reached in 1816, when the index hit a low of 58 points. This trend was reversed in the following years when insurgent activity helped push prices upward.⁴⁷ As for mutton, the data are not completely reliable because our source, Santa María hospital, purchased the commodity under an annual supply contract. Nevertheless, the series shows a steady rise. From 1792 to 1798 the hospital paid 13.5 reales per carcass. The price rose to fifteen reales in 1801 and remained at that level until 1806, when the institution began paying sixteen reales. Disruption of internal trade during 1811–1812 caused supplies from the sierra to Lima almost

to cease; as a result, the hospital could only obtain pieces of mutton at retail prices. In 1813, it paid fifty-six reales for half a carcass. By 1815, however, the reestablishment of communications brought prices back to sixteen reales, at which level they remained to the end of the decade.

While it is clearly impossible to identify with much precision the reasons behind the changes in the price of a commodity in particular, the more so since we lack detailed knowledge of regional conditions, the essential feature of the price of staples we have just analyzed is one of moderate vigor. An unweighted arithmetic average of relatives of prices for hens, potatoes, pumpkins, rice, and unsalted pork grease for the period 1799–1819 shows an average percentage growth rate of 0.66 percent per year. In addition, as has been noted previously, tithe figures for the Lima archbishopric, although undeflated, also suggest an increase in agricultural production. The principal operative factor that accounts for the long-term rise in the cost of foodstuffs must be found in that substantial and dynamic market that was late colonial Lima. The modest but sustained rise in prices and the relatively low value of the index numbers at critical conjunctures, suggest that the price rise was not directly related to agrarian crises of *ancien régime* type. As we have seen, the urban market acted as a potent engine whose strength exceeded the geographic demarcations of the Lima valley. But the effects of urban demand can be appreciated most clearly at the local level, for contrary to what has been supposed, Lima's rural landscape in the eighteenth century was one where small and medium-size estates, rather than latifundia, predominated. Of 190 production units in the city's hinterland (that is, the eight districts surrounding the urban core plus the Carabayllo and Pachacamac valleys, twenty and thirty kilometers from the city, respectively) for which data on size are available, at least 47 percent did not exceed 145 hectares each and at least 16 percent had an area of 73 hectares or less. Each district contained only one or two large haciendas. It was in districts like Surco and Carabayllo that good access to water and closeness to the urban market happily combined in a sector of relatively prosperous and heavily cultivated small-scale landholdings.⁴⁸

It is within the more restricted area of cash-crop agriculture that an agrarian crisis may be identified with certainty. The movement of prices for sugar and *aguardiente*, the principal cash crops, behaves in a markedly different pattern than that for foodstuffs. Between 1790 and 1819, the index of sugar prices declines at an average rate of 0.62 per-

cent per year. After mild gains in the 1790's that peaked in 1800 when the index reached 106 ($1792/95 = 100$), sugar prices fell to an index of 88 in 1803. Prices recovered somewhat after the latter year, but it was not until the 1820's that sugar prices returned to (and surpassed) the level they had reached twenty years earlier. With minor variations, the series of *aguardiente* prices follows the same pattern as that for sugar, with the notable difference that index numbers for *aguardiente* are consistently lower than those for sugar.⁴⁹ If we combine sugar and *aguardiente* into a single index of cash crops, the resulting average percentage growth rate for the period 1799–1819 is negative: –0.96 percent per annum.

The differential behavior in the price movement of foodstuffs and cash crops must be understood in terms of the relative weight of internal and external factors affecting the viceroyalty. Sugar and *aguardiente* were not only consumed in Lima but were also exported to Hispanoamerican markets. These commercial products were therefore highly sensitive to market forces vaster than the city's. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the Peruvian internal market for sugar became saturated early in the eighteenth century; moreover, by the late colonial period the size of the viceroyalty's Hispanoamerican market also began to suffer a series of contractions, particularly by competition from Brazilian producers in the Río de la Plata market. The outbreak of revolution in 1810 practically sealed the Chilean market to Peruvian sugar (while motivating Peruvian landowners to step up domestic production of wheat). In general terms, sugar producers responded to declining demand by increasing rather than reducing output. This effort to offset the weakening trend of sugar prices had the obvious effect of further depressing prices and aggravating the crisis. The same type of problems befell the wine and *aguardiente* industry which was greatly affected by the establishment of royal monopolies for *aguardiente* in Guayaquil and Panama (1777) and the imposition of a surtax in addition to the normal *alcabala*. Moreover, traditional markets in the Altiplano were beginning to produce their own spirits while the old Potosí market had shifted its wine purchases to Mendoza. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the urban economy could not provide a sufficiently ample umbrella to protect sugar and spirit producers from the structural vulnerabilities inherent in an integrated colonial market.⁵⁰

While our price evidence reveals that the agrarian sector reacted positively to the urban demand for comestibles, it would be clearly dangerous to propose generalizations at the viceregal level. As has been

noted, spatial fragmentation and regional diversity are factors of importance in the colonial economy. And direct linkages between urban markets and supplying regions not always produced beneficial effects, either in local or regional contexts. These ties could produce a profound disarticulation of traditional commercial circuits. The decline of sugar production in the region of Trujillo in the second half of the eighteenth century was, in large part, a direct consequence of the relative geographic advantage enjoyed by producers closer to the viceregal capital, the principal consumer market.⁵¹ Notwithstanding these disturbing elements, the importance of urban markets as growth poles for economic development cannot be minimized. But only detailed study of economic phenomena in a variety of regional contexts will establish whether the validity of the old notion of agrarian crisis in eighteenth-century Peru must be rejected or thought out afresh.

NOTES

1. Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, "Lima y Buenos Aires: Repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del virreinato del Plata," *AEA*, 3 (1946), 669-874.
2. John R. Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, 1776-1824* (Liverpool, 1977).
3. John R. Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784-1814* (London, 1970), pp. 133-36.
4. John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, eds., *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America: Vol. 1, Peru* (Durham, N.C., 1982), pp. 357-387. For a historical synthesis which utilized the same type of fiscal data see, J. Tord and C. Lazo, *Hacienda, comercio, fiscalidad y luchas sociales (Perú Colonial)* (Lima, 1981).
5. Francisco Gil y Taboada, "Memoria de gobierno," in M.A. Fuentes, ed., *Memorias de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú*, 6 vols. (Lima, 1859), VI, appendix, p. 27.
6. TePaske and Klein, *Royal Treasuries*, I, 360ff.
7. Data for period 1774-1779 in J.H. Unanue, *Guía política, eclesiástica y militar del virreynato del Perú para el año de 1793* (Lima, n.d.), p. 186; the 1790-1794 figure is my own estimate based on the two-ninth of the tithe that corresponded to the Crown; Gil, "Memoria," in Fuentes, ed., *Memorias*, VI, appendix, p. 26; 1803 value in J. Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda, con aplicación a España*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Madrid, 1833), I, 351; information for 1810-1814 in V. Rodríguez Casado and J.A. Calderón Quijano, eds., *Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Abascal, 1806-1816* 2 vols. (Seville, 1944), I, 21. It should be noted that in the 1790's the archdiocese of Lima accounted for 37 percent of the total viceregal value of the tithe.

8. J.I. de Lequanda, "Descripción geográfica de la ciudad y partido de Truxillo," *MP*, No.247 (1793), p.42.
9. See for example, C. Sempat Assadourian, et al., *Minería y espacio económico en los Andes: Siglos XVI - XX* (Lima, 1980).
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 25 - 26. For a discussion of the role of urban centers in traditional societies see, E.A. Wrigley, "Parasite or Stimulus: The Town in a Pre-Industrial Economy," in P. Abrams and E.A. Wrigley, eds. *Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology*, (Cambridge, 1978), p.295 - 310.
11. Céspedes del Castillo, "Lima y Buenos Aires," p. 692; G.J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700 - 1789* (Bloomington, 1979), pp.137, 213 - 16, 218 - 19; S. Villalobos R., *El comercio y la crisis colonial: Un mito de la independencia* (Santiago de Chile, 1968), p. 99.
12. "Ydea succinta del comercio del Perú y medios de prosperarlo con una noticia general de sus producciones," by J.Y. Lequanda, BM, Egerton MS.771, fol.38v.; "Representación del Real Tribunal del Consulado del Perú sobre el comercio libre entre España y América, Madrid, 3 Feb. 1788," printed in Villalobos, *Comercio*, pp. 277 - 79; Gil, "Memoria," in Fuentes, ed., *Memorias*, VI, appendix, p.13.
13. V. Vásquez de Prada, "Las rutas comerciales entre España y América en el siglo XVIII," *AEA*, 25 (1968), 24, 34 - 35; Villalobos, *Comercio*, p.115.
14. Abascal, *Memoria*, I, 207 - 208.
15. Libro del Cabildo 39, fol. 180, 1800, AHML.
16. Villalobos, *Comercio*, p.149; A.P. Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800 - 1830* (1941; reprint New York, 1961), pp. 2 - 26, 47 - 52.
17. J. Lynch, "British Policy and Spanish America, 1783 - 1808," *JLAS*, 1 (1969), 24 - 29.
18. *Ibid.*, p.29.
19. *El Peruano* (15 May 1812), p.355; (11 Feb. 1812), p.112; (4 Feb. 1812), p.118.
20. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp.213 - 16.
21. R.H. Bartley, *Imperial Russia and the Struggle for Latin American Independence, 1808 - 1828* (Austin, 1978), p.72; T.E. Anna, *The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru* (Lincoln, 1979), p.10.
22. Villalobos, *Comercio*, p.111.
23. Bartley, *Imperial Russia*, pp.72 - 76; M. de Mendiburu, "Abadía," *Diccionario histórico - biográfico del Perú*, 2nd ed., 11 vols.(Lima, 1931 - 35), I, 54 - 57.
24. U.S., Senate Executive Documents, 35 Congress, I Sess., no. 58, pp. 138, 153 - 155.
25. J. Fisher, "Silver Production in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1776 - 1824," *HAHR*, 55 (1975), p.36.
26. "Representación del Real Tribunal del Consulado," p.278.
27. Hesperióphylo [J. Rossi y Rubil], "Reflexiones históricas y políticas sobre el estado de la población de ésta capital," *MP*, 10(1791), 96.
28. Villalobos, *Comercio*, p.157. In 1806, the Lima City Council moved to acknowledge the need to licence hawkers (*tendejoneros*) who had begun selling European goods near one of the city's churches; AHML, Libro del Cabildo 41, fol.79v., 1806.

29. T. Haenke, *Descripción del Perú* (Lima, 1901), pp.50, 64 – 65, 134.
30. Hesperióphylo, "Reflexiones," p.96.
31. Cephalio [J. Baquíjano y Carrillo], "Disertación histórica política sobre el comercio del Perú," *MP*, 27 (1791), 245 – 46; *El Peruano* (June 1812), p.409.
32. A. de Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, 2nd ed., 4 vols.(London, 1814), I, 224, 234 – 35.
33. M.M. Haitin, "Late Colonial Lima: Economy and Society in an Era of Reform and Revolution," (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1983), pp.102 – 103.
34. I have consulted the *Libros de Bautismos* and *Libros de Funerales* of Santa Ana, San Lázaro and Santiago del Cercado's parishes for the period 1790 – 1840. The registers of the first two parishes are located in the Archivo Arzobispal; those of Santiago del Cercado remain in the parish. For a comprehensive analysis of demographic trends and vital characteristics of Lima at this time, see my "Late colonial Lima," chapter V.
35. Hesperióphylo, "Reflexiones," pp.95 – 96.
36. BM, Eg. MS. 771, fol.33.
37. For example, see statistics on imports sold to Cajamarca in 1788, in J.I. Lequanda, "Descripción geográfica del partido de Caxamarca en la intendencia de Truxillo," *MP*, 338 (1794), 211; see also data on merchandize registered at Cerro de Pasco (1786 – 1815), in J.R. Fisher, "Miners, Silver Merchants and Capitalists in Late Colonial Peru," *IAA, N.F.*, 2 (1976), 266 – 268.
38. G. Céspedes del Castillo, "Reorganización de la hacienda virreinal peruana en el siglo XVIII," *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español*, 23 (1953), 329 – 369. For a Chilean example see, J.A. Barbier, "Reform and Politics in Bourbon Chile, 1755 – 1796," *Cahiers d'Histoire*, 10 (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 121 – 122.
39. Hesperióphylo, "Reflexiones," p.96.
40. *Ibid.*, pp.95 – 96; Haenke, *Descripción*, p. 73.
41. M.P. Pérez Cantó, "Abastecimiento de la ciudad de Lima en el siglo XVIII," in F. Miró Quesada L., et al., *Historia, problema y promesa: Homenaje a Jorge Basadre*, 2 vols. (Lima, 1976), I, 468.
42. BM, Eg. MS. 771, fols. 212v, 221.
43. Haenke, *Descripción*, p.49.
44. The analysis of price movements that follows is based on documentation contained in the account books of a number of Limeño hospitals: Hospital Real de Santa María y Colegio de la Caridad, Hospital Real de Santa Ana, Hospital de San Bartolomé, and the Hospital Real de San Andrés. The basic series is that of Santa María hospital (1790 – 1826). The information collected from the other institutions was used mainly as controls, although, when appropriate, a number of quotations was utilized to fill in unavoidable gaps. Most of these account registers are located in the Archivo de la Sociedad de Beneficencia Pública de Lima (hereafter cited as SBPL). A few, however, have been lost to private collectors. In 1975 the Pontificia Universidad Católica was able to purchase part of the Maldonado collection of medical documents and, as a result, some of the lost ledgers are now housed in the Archivo Histórico Riva – Agüero. A detailed description of the Maldonado purchase is in A.E. Arrieta Alvarez and C. Gutiérrez Muñoz, "Índice analítico de la colección Maldonado," *Cuadernos del Seminario de Historia*, 11 (1973 – 75), 22 – 90. The 1807/08 account book of Santa Ana hospital is in BNP, MS. D10709. As

a check on the long-term direction of some prices, I have collected information for the post-Independence period. This was extracted from account books belonging to a number of monasteries closed by the republican government in the late 1820's. These 13 legajos are located in the AGN(P), Archivo del Ministerio de Justicia, Cuentas de Conventos Supresos, 1827-35.

Due to paucity of data, I have constructed index numbers on the basis of two different base years: 1792/95 and 1798/99 (also because of lacunae, in some cases the base was calculated with fewer than the stated number of years). While the earlier base period appears to be normal, that is, no major internal or external events seem to have affected the Lima market, the late 1790's were years of rising prices. While of course there is no difference in the proportional change from value to value, the reader should be aware that the choice of a base year for which prices were relatively high will give the impression that growth was gentler than it really was. This impression will be confirmed by the moderate rates of growth I have calculated. Therefore, the argument that we will develop, to the effect that the price of foodstuffs increased over time, is on the side of caution. One last caveat: the statistics on mint production published by J. Fisher in *Government and Society*, pp. 254-55; and M.E. Rivero y Ustáriz in *Colección de memorias científicas, agrícolas e industriales*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1857), I, 227, show that the period under discussion was one of protracted deflationary pressure on the price structure of the Lima market.

45. The linear trend formulation is:
 for potatoes: $\log y = -1.7998 + 0.0022 \times (1790)$;
 for pumpkins: $\log y = -19.2028 + 0.0118 \times (1790)$;
 for quinoa: $\log y = -18.7031 + 0.0115 \times (1790)$;
 for rice: $\log y = 1.1900 + 0.0005 \times (1790)$.
46. Data are from the *Libros de Cuentas* of Santa María hospital. It is difficult to obtain a clear idea of trend with regard to the price of wheat or, rather, bread. This is because of price regulation by the Cabildo because hospitals usually had annual contractual arrangements for delivery of bread, and because price fluctuations affected consumers in terms of variation in the weight (rather than the price) of each piece of bread. As an illustration, however, we may note that Santa María hospital paid its supplier seven reales per every ten hands (*manos*) - some four to five kilograms - of bread between 1790 and 1810. The price rose 14 percent (to eight reales) in 1811. Data in SBPL. Because of space limitations, most price series do not appear in this paper. For a complete appendix see M. Haitin, "Prices, the Lima Market, and the Agricultural Crisis of the Late Eighteenth Century in Peru," *JLA* (forthcoming).
47. The linear trend formulation for unsalted pork grease is:
 $\log y = 12.8619 + (-0.0060) \times (1790)$.
48. Haitin, "Prices."
49. The trend formulation is:
 for sugar: $\log y = 6.9237 + (-0.0027) \times (1790)$;
 for aguardiente: $\log y = 4.2437 + (-0.0013) \times (1790)$.
50. Haitin, "Prices." On the integration of the sugar market see, G. Rico de Angulo, *Proyecto relativo al comercio, suerte y servidumbre de los esclavos, inclinado a su transición oportuna a libres* (Cádiz, 1813), p.19.

51. S. Ramírez Horton, *The Sugar Estates of the Lambayeque Valley, 1670 - 1800: A Contribution to Peruvian Agricultural History* (Madison, 1974), pp.28 - 33; T. de Croix, "Memoria de gobierno," in Fuentes, ed., *Memorias*, V, 134 - 136.

PRICE SERIES:

All prices in reales; figures in italics denote years for which only one price quotation was available; no data found for missing years.

TABLE I: *Aguardiente (botija), (1792/95 = 100) and Unsalted Pork Grease (arroba), (1798/99 = 100)*

Year	Aguardiente (botija)		Unsalted Pork Grease (arroba)	
	Average Price	Index (1792/95 = 100)	Average Price	Index (1798/99 = 100)
1794	160.00	100.00	-	-
1795	-	-	-	-
1796	-	-	-	-
1797	-	-	-	-
1798	-	-	-	-
1799	172.00	107.50	75.00	100.00
1800	168.00	105.00	-	-
1801	144.00	90.00	56.00	74.67
1802	143.34	89.59	56.00	74.64
1803	116.62	72.89	79.19	105.59
1804	161.87	101.17	87.50	116.67
1805	183.35	114.59	79.00	105.33
1806	178.98	111.86	68.00	90.67
1807	139.44	87.15	75.48	100.64
1808	142.97	89.36	73.10	97.47
1809	135.12	84.45	64.70	86.27
1810	135.31	84.57	62.50	83.33
1811	144.15	90.09	66.25	88.33
1812	128.12	80.08	90.50	120.67
1813	142.00	88.75	61.75	82.33
1814	138.92	86.82	58.25	77.67
1815	140.67	87.92	59.11	78.81
1816	150.34	93.96	43.75	58.33
1817	142.00	88.75	95.75	127.67
1818	134.00	83.75	90.67	120.89
1819	202.67	126.67	102.88	137.17
1820	194.00	121.25	-	-
1821	209.00	130.62	-	-
1822	209.00	130.62	-	-


TABLE II: *Potatoes (carga), (1798/99 = 100), Pumpkins (serón), (1792/95 = 100) and Quinoa (costal), (1798/99 = 100)*

Year	Potatoes (carga)		Pumpkins (serón)		Quinoa (Costal)	
	Average Price	Index (1798/99 = 100)	Average Price	Index (1792/95 = 100)	Average Price	Index (1798/99 = 100)
1794	-	-	16.00	100.00	-	-
1795	-	-	-	-	-	-
1796	-	-	-	-	-	-
1797	-	-	-	-	-	-
1798	-	-	10.12	63.25	50.50	100.00
1799	24.21	100.00	17.50	109.38	-	-
1800	29.74	122.84	18.88	118.00	-	-
1801	35.26	145.64	21.75	135.94	56.00	110.89
1802	28.31	116.94	23.00	143.75	47.97	94.99
1803	28.93	119.50	-	-	50.17	99.35
1804	37.58	155.23	21.38	133.62	57.08	113.03
1805	33.81	139.65	19.00	118.75	71.00	140.59
1806	32.04	132.34	20.00	125.00	88.00	174.26
1807	30.74	126.97	20.00	125.00	78.00	154.46
1808	39.75	164.19	20.00	125.00	92.25	182.67
1809	41.00	169.35	23.75	148.44	96.50	191.09
1810	31.75	131.14	27.00	168.75	88.00	174.26
1811	34.12	140.93	29.00	181.25	89.44	177.11
1812	31.52	130.19	35.34	220.88	76.00	150.50
1813	30.43	125.69	32.00	200.00	55.75	110.40
1814	33.68	139.12	29.33	183.31	52.50	103.96
1815	30.34	125.32	26.25	164.06	58.66	115.96
1816	30.82	127.30	20.21	126.31	83.33	165.01
1817	36.74	151.76	23.56	147.25	83.33	165.01
1818	35.69	147.42	20.67	129.19	86.67	171.62
1819	28.16	116.32	25.33	158.31	-	-
1820	36.87	152.29	28.25	176.56	-	-
1821	58.50	241.64	34.62	216.38	168.00	154.46
1822	38.64	159.60	27.72	173.25	-	-
1823	33.15	136.93	21.38	133.62	-	-
1824	60.77	251.01	-	-	-	-
1825	-	-	-	-	78.00	154.46
1826	-	-	13.75	85.94	-	-
1827	-	-	-	-	-	-
1828	-	-	-	-	-	-
1829	-	-	-	-	-	-
1830	30.83	127.34	-	-	-	-
1831	22.20	91.70	-	-	-	-
1832	26.06	107.64	-	-	58.67	116.18

TABLE III: *Rice (botija), (1792/95 = 100) and
Sugar (arroba), (1792/95 = 100)*

Year	Rice (botija)		Sugar (arroba)	
	Average Price	Index (1792/95 = 100)	Average Price	Index (1792/95 = 100)
1790	-	-	21.28	96.90
1791	-	-	22.99	104.69
1792	-	-	-	-
1793	-	-	-	-
1794	-	-	23.25	105.87
1795	18.06	100.00	20.67	94.13
1796	-	-	-	-
1797	-	-	-	-
1798	21.00	116.28	-	-
1799	19.67	108.91	28.84	131.33
1800	17.97	99.50	31.13	141.74
1801	27.52	152.38	28.00	127.50
1802	25.21	139.59	22.16	100.91
1803	25.31	140.14	19.30	87.89
1804	22.30	123.48	23.56	107.29
1805	21.33	118.11	26.61	121.17
1806	22.13	122.54	27.38	124.68
1807	20.94	115.95	24.76	112.75
1808	19.28	106.76	24.34	110.84
1809	18.93	104.82	24.29	110.61
1810	20.74	114.84	23.32	106.19
1811	25.70	142.30	22.97	104.60
1812	20.71	114.67	23.86	108.95
1813	20.12	111.41	22.18	101.00
1814	18.68	103.43	17.15	78.10
1815	15.36	85.05	25.65	116.80
1816	24.66	136.54	22.94	104.46
1817	25.70	142.30	-	-
1818	22.96	127.13	17.62	80.24
1819	27.39	151.66	17.41	79.28
1820	25.86	143.19	31.96	145.54
1821	40.62	224.92	45.27	206.15
1822	23.82	131.89	47.39	215.80
1823	30.83	170.71	34.72	158.11
1824	26.80	148.39	42.78	194.81
1825	22.32	123.59	37.50	170.77
1826	17.67	97.84	-	-
1827	19.00	105.20	28.50	129.78
1828	14.50	80.29	22.38	101.91
1829	-	-	-	-
1830	17.74	98.23	-	-
1831	17.40	96.35	17.50	78.69
1832	12.54	69.44	18.06	82.24
1833	13.28	73.53	-	-
1834	-	-	-	-
1835	-	-	-	-
1836	-	-	-	-
1837	-	-	-	-
1838	-	-	-	-
1839	-	-	-	-
1840	12.00	66.45	15.71	71.54
1841	-	-	17.99	81.92

GRAPH I: Index Numbers of Foodstuffs and Cash Crops, 1799 - 1819



Note: Short Dash: Foodstuffs; Dot: Cash Crops. The Average Percentage Growth Rate for Foodstuffs is 0.66 and for Cash Crops - 0.96.

COMMERCE IN LATE COLONIAL PERU AND MEXICO: A COMMENT AND SOME COMPARATIVE SUGGESTIONS*

Nils Jacobsen

It is characteristic for the commercial systems of the ancien regime colonial empires that even purely economic variables, such as the volume of trade, commodity prices, or the direction and composition of commodity flows, appear strongly influenced by the political regulatory frame constructed by metropolitan governments and their colonial administrations. It is thus not surprising that in the historiography on the trade to and within the Spanish Indies so much emphasis has been placed on the regulatory policies of institutions as the *Consejo de Indias*, the *Casa de Contratación* and the *Consulados* in Cádiz, Mexico and Lima. Particular for the late colonial period a good deal of attention has been focused on that body of royal laws, ordinances and decrees which apparently brought such sweeping changes not only on the trade, but also to the fiscal and administrative structure of Spanish America and which is commonly referred to as the Bourbon reforms. Only during the last fifteen years has there grown a substantial body of studies on economic and social aspects of Spanish American commerce during the late colonial period. Only since the late 1970's do we possess thorough quantitative studies on the trade between Spain and Spanish America during the last century of the colonial regime. Only since the publication of Brading's innovative study on miners and merchants in Bourbon New Spain have we begun to get a glimpse of the mercantile and credit practices among the commercial elite of that viceroyalty, as well as its social recruitment mechanisms, problems which have typically remained unexplored for the case of Peru until the just completed work of Flores Galindo and Haitin.¹ Even for the better studied Mexican viceroyalty many issues concerning the late colonial commercial structure remain obscure: What was the pattern of transport, its cost and the degree to which it allowed the rise of an integrated market covering the core of the viceroyalty? To which degree was trade competitive or, conversely, continued to rely on clientelistic monopolization of commodity and credit markets? How did mercantile interest rates develop? Did their evolution influence investment decisions?

While shifting the focus away from institutional histories, much of the recent economic and social historiography on late colonial commerce does not escape the spell of Bourbon policy making: Spectacular increases of trade volumes are explained as consequences of *comercio libre*, the rise of new groups of traders and the relative decline of others are described as the result of lifted trade monopolies or the establishment of *comercio neutral*. In short, the power of the Spanish crown to effect changes in the economic and social structure looms large in most of these studies.

The three papers to be discussed here, as different as they are in methodological approach, in scope and contents, share this trait: They use particular Bourbon reform measures or other political events for periodizing changes in commercial patterns and the composition of the merchant communities. Barbier approaches his topic from the perspective of modern political history, tracing an evolving commercial policy-making process on the basis of the conflicting interests bearing on it. Flores Galindo looks at the operation of Lima's mercantile aristocracy primarily from the point of view of the social historian, while Haitin approaches the same city's commerce with its overall economic structure foremost in his analysis.

It is clear that these papers, demonstrating the broad range of issues now being researched in the area of Spanish America's late colonial commercial structure - from policy-making to price history -, hardly in and of themselves facilitate a comparison of the two vicerealties' trade pattern. With the overall purpose of this volume in mind, I shall thus begin with a critique of the three individual papers and then attempt to outline some major points for a comparison of New Spain's and Peru's late commercial structures.

In his paper on the policy struggle over Habana's right to re-export European goods to Vera Cruz, a struggle which spanned most of the reign of Charles IV, Barbier lucidly presents another facet of his general model for Spain's colonial policy evolution during the twenty years between Charles' III death and the dramatic events of 1808. By 1807 the royal finance and colonial administrations in Madrid were ready to pursue a policy, which singlemindedly tried to maximize fiscal revenues, even if this upset the longstanding frame of colonial commercial policy and thus might be prejudicial to entrenched and hitherto powerful mercantile interests. For the specific issue studied by Barbier here, this meant allowing La Habana's merchants the re-export of European commodities to Vera Cruz, so that receipts from this potentially rich

trade would obviate the need for hefty amounts of Mexican crown silver flowing to Cuba as *situado* instead of aiding Madrid's treasury in the fight against mounting deficits. But such a policy shift, according to the author, also spelled the death of the coalition of interests, constitutive for the Bourbon reform era, between the crown and Madrid interests on the one hand and the Cádiz Consulado and coastal Spain's mercantile interests on the other.

Much of this conflict over La Habana's role in the Spanish empire's colonial structure during the reign of Charles IV has been studied previously in the literature.² The value of Barbier's contribution here lies in his emphasis on the strong link between commercial and monetary issues, in identifying particular interests with both sides in the policy debate and in deftly placing these developments, concerning a single issue, within the broader frame of Madrid's colonial policy between 1788 and 1808.

I would like to suggest two lines of critique to Barbier's arguments, one concerning the significance of species shortages in late eighteenth century Cuba and the other dealing with the alignment of interests which had an impact on Madrid's policy-making process.

Cuba's species shortage had two causes: 1. the different intrinsic value of the currency which its merchants and bureaucracy received from New Spain from that of its major trading partners, Spain and the United States and 2. the rapid development of the island's sugar industry between 1792 and 1808. After the clipped coinage which had stimulated the island's exports, had been called in by the mid-1780's, the strong Mexican pesos began to circulate since the early 1790's. These coins immediately flowed out again, because both U.S. and Spanish merchants could make speculative profits on exchanging them for gold or Spanish pesetas. This was a condition which could not even be halted by a positive balance of trade with foreign areas and indeed continued to characterize Cuba's currency situation until the mid-nineteenth century.³ It is true that the negative balance of trade with "foreign colonies," particularly the United States, also caused coinage to flow out from the island. But this negative balance of trade, as Barbier has pointed out, was a necessary side effect of the extremely rapid expansion of Cuba's sugar industry after St. Domingue's collapse as major producer. This expansion was enthusiastically pushed by La Habana's merchant community, and while planters became ever more indebted for lack of own funds for the acquisition of slaves and agricultural implements required to increase their sugar production, the Habaneros, both

merchants and *prestamistas*, were the main beneficiaries in this "take off" period for Cuba's plantation economy. They were willing to supply credit to the planters against payment in sugar as long as the market promised high returns and expanded. In this way the rapid growth of sugar production was underwritten by massive investments of merchant capital in Cuba from diverse sources, as the peninsula, New Spain and even the United States.⁴ This infusion of capital probably did as much as the crown *situado* to compensate for the island's negative balance of trade. Since the high rates of imports into the island was in good measure a direct gauge of merchant investors' confidence in the further growth of the Cuban sugar economy, it is obvious that the Habaneros could live with the negative balance of trade and the consequent shortages of species.

Their political pressure to liberalize species and trade flows between the island and Vera Cruz should thus not be seen primarily as an attempt to find replacement for the declining *situado* specie entering Cuba. Rather it aimed at strengthening La Habana's (and thus the merchants' own) commercial and financial centrality, to transform the port into "el almacén general, el emporio de éstas Américas," as the *sindico* of the city's newly created Consulado, Arango y Parreño, declared.⁵ Of course the Habaneros hoped to take in more Mexican currency with gaining the privilege of selling European goods in New Spain. But this increased amount of currency was meant to sustain the expansion of both exports and imports from and to Cuba, a function of pump priming, one might say, for the further growth of the island's sugar industry. This process would continue to produce negative balances of trade, and the Habaneros, through these very trade deficits, would further fortify their control over the island's economy.

With regard to the interests which had a bearing on Madrid's decision making over trade between Cuba and New Spain, it would appear that Jaques Barbier may have downplayed the combined voice of New Spain's Consulados – united on this issue inspite of their otherwise fierce rivalry – and the colony's viceregal administration, something carefully documented by Ortiz de la Tabla.⁶ Between 1797 and 1799, when the question of European re-exports from Habana to Vera Cruz was first debated, interests of the Mexico and Vera Cruz Consulados coincided completely with those of Cádiz. Madrid's policy must have been aimed as much at not alienating New Spain's merchant guilds, a key power group in this centerpiece and most valuable revenue source of Spain's American empire, as it was at maintaining a balance between

crown (fiscal) and coastal commercial interest in the peninsula itself. While the growing pressure of fiscal issues clearly had a strong impact on the 1807 policy change, one may wonder, whether the desire to keep New Spain as closely integrated into the empire as possible, did not play an equally important role. After all, in 1807 the alternative for Madrid's policy makers was not whether Mexico was to be provisioned with European goods only from peninsular ports or also, by way of re-exports, from La Habana. Rather, in the face of the metropolis' incapacity to keep up regular trade with America, the only realistic options consisted in making La Habana the entrepot for neutral ships arriving with European goods for the Mexican market, or seeing the viceroyalty supplied completely by direct links between foreign ports and Vera Cruz. Under prevailing circumstances granting La Habana a privileged status in transatlantic commerce did not only legalize a de facto trade pattern established at least since 1805, but also offered the only, albeit feeble, possibility to limit direct access to New Spain's market by foreign merchants. One may also wonder to which degree changes in the pattern of commerce during the war years had strengthened the position of those merchants in Vera Cruz and the interior of New Spain (especially in the intendancy of Oaxaca), who openly favored re-exports from La Habana (Ortiz de la Tabla only views these as minor "defections" from the opposing view of New Spain's Consulados).

One final comment on periodization: For Barbier the royal decree of 1807 signalled the abandonment of the commercial policies of the Bourbon reform era, thus pushing the political turnabout, at least in this issue, nearly to the very end of Spain's ancien regime. It is ironic that on the question of trade between La Habana and Vera Cruz Barbier should identify the position, which helped to maintain the interests of the Consulados of Cádiz, Mexico and Vera Cruz on the basis of commercial regulations from the seventeenth century, contained in the *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias* of 1687, with the Bourbon reform policy, while he attaches the abandonment of that policy to a measure liberalizing trade. If nothing else, this suggests that the peculiar mixture of Spanish aggrandizement and enlightened reform characteristic of Charles' III commercial policy some fifteen years later through the rapid turn of events had been converted into a last line of defense for the most powerful merchant groups in the peninsula and New Spain. The fiscal crisis and the disruption of transatlantic commerce which resulted from the Napoleonic wars, was producing a strange coalition between mercantilist bureaucrats in Madrid, who were reducing their political projects

to the immediate welfare of the Spanish state in its hour of need, and "dissident" merchants at various points in the empire, who profitted from a further liberalization of trade. What then is to be gained from the application of a common label "Bourbon reforms" to commercial policies evolved over more than forty years?

The problems raised by Alberto Flores Galindo's paper on the economic operations and the social demeanor of Lima's merchant aristocracy during the eighteenth century are of different nature. The value of his contribution, part of a larger study, rests on providing us for the first time with information about the social, economic and political mechanisms by which the highest stratum of Lima's merchants attained and attempted to solidify wealth and power. We now learn that in many aspects they operated much in the same way as those of other Spanish American cities in the Bourbon era: The continuity of a family's commercial operations was often assured by having a nephew from the peninsula take over the business in Lima; exclusivity and social distancing were pursued by endogamous marriage patterns. But Flores Galindo tries to cover much vaster ground in his paper and touches upon as diverse issues as the articulation of various modes of production, the relation between "mercantile splendour" and the structure of the labor market, the ties between the merchants and the colonial bureaucracy, and commercial conjunctures. While very suggestive, the treatment of some of these issues raises more questions than it answers. What does it mean, for example, to insist on calling Lima's Consulado merchants both an *aristocracy* and the dominant colonial *class*? It is impossible to discuss all of these questions here. I shall limit myself to make a few remarks primarily on the author's periodization scheme and his interpretation of the effects of the commercial crisis of the mid-1780's, as well as some methodological problems.

Timing and nature of both the rise and the decay of what Flores Galindo views as the ephemeral wealth and power of Lima's merchant aristocracy in the third quarter of the eighteenth century seem problematic. His view that between the mid-1630's and the early decades of the Bourbon era a long break occurred in Lima's mercantile penetration of the Andean hinterland, roughly coinciding with the phase of the seventeenth century crisis debated for many of the Atlantic economies, seems untenable. The decline of silver production, which reached its nadir probably during the early decades of the eighteenth century, never lead to an abandonment of the credit and commodity circuits stretching from Lima to Potosí, Quito and places in between. Even the production

of precious metals did not decline uniformly throughout the viceroyalty since the 1630's and some mining regions, notably Puno, reached their apex precisely during the last third of the seventeenth century, presumably the nadir of the crisis.⁷ Other activities, which presumed fairly large credit and commercial circuits, were either in their "take off" phase during the seventeenth century, as the *repartos* by *corregidores*, or reached their peak of production, as the Quito *obrajes*.⁸ The Lima merchants provided credit for such enterprises and were involved in the commercialization of the goods produced or sold in the Sierra. This is not to say that the crisis of the seventeenth century had no effect on Lima's merchant community and its control over the Andean hinterland. Rather the period between 1635 and the early decades of the eighteenth century witnessed a thorough restructuring process affecting both overseas trade and ties with the Andean hinterland: It was marked by a changing relative weight of transatlantic and domestic trade, by a different composition of European imports (cheaper grades of textiles beginning to assume greater significance since the later seventeenth century), declining unit prices for European goods (meaning that the import capacity of the viceroyalty did not decline proportionate to the decline of precious metals shipments). Also during this period, what Sempat Assadourian has called the "Peruvian space", i.e. that vast region which had been integrated into one, albeit precariously weak commercial network during the late sixteenth century through the rise of the silver mining complexes, for the first time began to shrink. This process continued in the later eighteenth century, as Flores Galindo observes, with the excision of the Viceroyalty of La Plata and Lima's consequent loss of control over Alto Peru's mines.

If this view of the period of crisis has any merit, then Flores Galindo's idea about the "project" of Lima's merchants during the eighteenth century requires serious revision: It was not that the creation of a mercantile space in the Andean hinterland was "just beginning" during the Bourbon era. Rather Lima's merchants readjusted their methods of penetration, the spatial patterning of their trade in the Sierra, and the type of goods they supplied.

But what about the effects of *comercio libre* for the city's mercantile aristocracy? Did it really bring about a rapid decay of their "ephemeral splendour" after 1783? Flores Galindo here coincides fully with the conventional view, as it was first suggested by the bitterly complaining petitions and *informes* of Lima's Consulado during the 1780's and magisterially expounded by Céspedes del Castillo's study on the relation

between Lima and Buenos Aires. To be sure, the glut of the market, produced by the first rush of liberalized trade after the peace of Paris, caused a grave short-term crisis and led to the recomposition of Lima's merchant community.

But the author does not convincingly show that Lima's merchants did not benefit from the strong growth of imports at least until 1797, as well as the rise of Peru's silver production, which continued until the early years of the nineteenth century. Fisher has shown that it was the Lima merchants who, working through *aviadores* and *repartos de bienes* by *subdelegados* (although forbidden) reaped high profits in the expansion of silver production.⁹

Flores Galindo is certainly right, when he suggests that Lima was losing market shares in the trade of Chile, Alto Peru and even the southern Intendencias of Lower Peru itself. But this was occurring at a time when volume and value of European imports were rising fast. We thus need much better documentation to tell whether Lima's trade in those regions was declining in *absolute* terms before 1810. At the same time it now appears likely that the sale of European goods in the remaining areas of the viceroyalty and particularly in Lima itself, i.e. regions where Lima's merchants still maintained an undisputed hegemony, was expanding at least until the mid 1790's and thus compensated for any losses sustained in the South.

As Sergio Villalobos has shown more than twenty years ago, complaints about ruinous gluts on the market, due to the effects of *comercio libre*, neutral ships since 1797, an increased presence of foreign merchants and rampant contraband, were not only uttered by Lima's merchant aristocracy, but just as often – and with the same voice of desperation – by the newly established merchant guilds of Santiago and Buenos Aires, the beneficiaries of the Bourbon commercial reforms.¹⁰ Since such complaints were raised simultaneously with a large expansion of trade, they cannot be used as evidence for a pervasive and lasting commercial decadence. Rather they demonstrate greatly changed conditions of trade, under which merchants used to monopolies and privileges, saw their profit margins slashed as agile and at times highly capitalized competitors entered the market. As Flores Galindo has pointed out, under these circumstances quite a few of the monopolistic merchants succumbed in this brisk new business climate. But others survived and did well, either by adapting or by carving out a share for themselves in one of the niches in which good monopolistic profits were still to be had, as for example trade and credit operations with the burgeoning silver

mines through *aviadores*. At the same time new fortunes were made by the very merchants who entered the market only after the liberalization of the trade between the late 1770's and the 1790's. Such merchants or companies, both peninsular and creole, at first operated independently of Lima's Consulado and were viewed as dangerous rivals. But by the second decade of the nineteenth century, they often had become respected members of the merchant guild. The largest fortunes existing in Lima during that time, such as those of Pedro Abadia and José de Arizmedi, had been made since the 1780's, i.e. the presumed beginning of decay.¹¹ Lima's mercantile aristocracy of the late eighteenth century thus would seem to have been much less of a closed, quasi corporate social stratum than Flores Galindo assumes. It may very well be that the drastic changes in the viceroyalty's commercial structure since the early 1780's forced this stratum to allow fast rising new merchants to join its ranks precisely at the moment when it had begun to close itself off as an exclusive aristocratic group.

Flores Galindo primarily uses two types of evidence to support his claim concerning the decay of Lima's trade since the 1780's: 1. a comparison of various data on merchants and their capital in wills from two sample years, 1770 and 1810, and 2. a variety of trade, tax and production statistics contained in the literature on this period.

The first source, the wills drawn up before Lima notaries in 1770 and 1810, raises the question, how much confidence we may place in this small sample. With a merchant community numbering in the hundreds, what does it tell us that ten or six merchants respectively possess between 2500 and some 60,000 pesos in cash in the two sample years, lying more than a generation apart? What share of a merchant's total assets was held as liquid cash in his strong box at any given moment, and how much was invested in merchandise or circulating as credits? Also the range of credits which Flores Galindo found in the wills, up to 2,200 pesos in 1770, seems low. We know of quite a few loans by Lima's merchants to miners, for example, amounting to more than 10,000 pesos. For the purpose of analysing the fate of the Lima mercantile aristocracy, a more promising – and not necessarily more laborious – research strategy might have consisted in tracing all notarial contracts pertaining to a few merchant families over a period of forty or fifty years.

The variety of statistics on trade, taxation and production which Flores Galindo cites from the literature, faces a double drawback as evidence for his arguments. In the first place, several of these statistics

allow rather different conclusions than those the author draws from them. It is true, for example, that the revenue collected by the viceroyalty's *caja matriz* in Lima declined somewhat after a peak in the 1780's. Nevertheless the mean receipts for every five-year period between 1790 and 1820 continued to surpass the collection of any similar period before 1780, in most cases by as much as 50 to 100 percent.¹² Similarly it is true that the production of silver and gold coins in the Lima mint reached its apex in 1794 and from then on stagnated. But the mean annual mint production was slightly higher between 1796 and 1815 than it had been in the preceding twenty-year period.¹³

Secondly, the statistics on mintage, tax collection, silver production and new titles of nobility all show peaks at different points of time between the mid-1780's and 1804. For example the conferral of new titles of nobility peaked in the quinquennium 1790-94, and stayed at a comparatively high level during the following ten years. But Flores Galindo views the political administrative changes of the late 1770's as major causes for the decline of Lima's monopolistic merchants. Thus one is left wondering when precisely this decay of Lima's mercantile aristocracy set in.

My comments on Alberto Flores Galindo's paper owe much to the revisionistic notions about Lima's late colonial economy developed by Marcel Haitin in his contribution to this volume and, in greater detail, in his recent dissertation. Rather than focus on one preeminent social strata, Haitin presents an interpretation of Lima's overall economy between the 1780's and the outbreak of the Wars of Independence. Just as Alberto Flores Galindo, he stresses the intermediary position of the city between overseas trade and the Andean hinterland, but places more emphasis on Lima's centrality as a market in its own right and the great significance of the bureaucracy (both civil and ecclesiastic) for its economy. To my knowledge Haitin is the first author who manages to come to a balanced realistic assessment of Lima's economy in the quarter century before the Wars of Independence, an assessment which comes to grips with the confusing evidence both for crisis or decline and continued buoyancy. He does so by insisting on differentiated conjunctures for Peru's regional and sectoral economies, as well as on changes in the social distribution of benefits from Lima's trade and industry. Haitin mostly agrees with Flores Galindo concerning the crisis of the city's monopolistic merchants. At the same time he stresses two elements which provided new prosperity to certain groups of traders and artisans: the continued strength of the viceroyalty's mining production and the city's population growth,

My comments on Marcel Haitin's paper concern his explanation of price increases in connection with Lima's population growth and his view about the distribution of mercantile capital since the 1780's. Any one who has ever worked on Peruvian economic history knows the frustration which arises from the absolute dearth of price data for any period prior to the late nineteenth century. Haitin's series on prices for agricultural commodities, carefully constructed from hospital accounts, thus constitute a welcome tool. His findings on the gradual decline of sugar prices coincide fully both with qualitative studies on the crisis of late colonial Peru's sugar industry as well as with recently published price series for Potosí.¹⁴ At the same time the author's finding that prices for garden crops and cereals rose moderately between the 1790's and 1818/19 raises some interpretative questions. His price series only cover a relatively short period, during which exogenous factors often may have distorted longrange price trends. Thus we may wonder whether the long-range growth of Lima's population, underway since the 1746 earthquake, really constituted the main cause of these price rises. Prices for grains and tubers were also rising in Potosí between 1790 and 1810. This rise, however, reversed a trend towards lower prices that began in the mid-1750's, inspite of population growth. Tandeter and Wachtel view climatic conditions as principal factor responsible for the renewed price increase after 1790.¹⁵ Also for Haitin's data on Lima for key food crops such as potatoes and quinoa the impact of climatic cycles on prices is discernible, inspite of the author's claim to the contrary. For population growth to be the culprit behind rising food prices, it would need to be shown that the number of people in the market rose faster than agricultural production. This was indeed what happened in Mexico since the 1770's. The relatively slower growth of agricultural production than of population owed much to the fact that in the densely settled central parts of that viceroyalty most land apt for crop production had been put under the plough by the 1780's.¹⁶ What little we know so far about the complex interrelationship between population, climate, production and social structure in the countryside of late colonial Peru does not suggest a similar development in the Andes: Here the demographic recovery had set in too recently for the rural population to be pushing against upper limits of crop production under prevailing social and technological conditions. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that the growth of agricultural production could not have kept apace with population growth - as Tandeter and Wachtel suggest it did during the third

quarter of the eighteenth century —, if exogenous factors had not interfered.

Marcel Haitin makes much of the changed size distribution of Lima's mercantile wealth since the 1780's. Unquestionably the overall number of wholesalers, commission agents and shopowners was on the rise and most new practitioners only controlled very modest operations indeed. Neither do I wish to quarrel with the author's assertion that during the market glut of the mid-1780's "hands of very limited means" temporarily assumed a much greater weight in Lima's commerce than previously.

I remain skeptical however, whether this constitutes enough evidence to diagnose a lasting dispersal of the city's mercantile wealth for the remaining thirty-five years of the colonial era. Contemporary accounts purporting to witness such a dispersal are suspect, because a greater distribution of wealth among "industrious" small traders and artisans coincided with how an enlightened author would have wanted to perceive progress. In other words, reports about the growing well-being of ever larger numbers of small traders may be just as much an expression of the general confidence of its author about the city's economic development as any accurate account on the distribution of its mercantile wealth. Humboldt's often cited comparison between Lima and Mexico may also very well have been skewed. Some four years after *comercio libre* was finally introduced in New Spain in 1789, Viceroy Conde de Revillagigedo described the changed commercial climate there nearly in the same way as we have heard it for Lima:

El que ésta nueva especie de comerciantes va cada día en aumento es una verdad tan notoria que no se atreverán a negarla los mismos que aseguran el comercio decaído. Ellos dicen que es excesivo el número de efectos que viene, y que se han retirado de comerciar los sujetos de gruesos capitales. Conque es preciso que para dar giro y salida a las existencias se empleen muchos individuos de corto caudal.¹⁷

Humboldt may also have confused the larger absolute values of mercantile wealth in Mexico with a greater degree of concentration.

After the regulatory reforms between the 1770's and 1790's the shopkeeper as well as the small trader attempting to sell European goods on his own account either in Lima itself or in the Andean hinterland, was just as dependent on credit from the large import merchant as Flores Galindo has described it for the earlier decades. No trader could survive one or two commercial slumps independently, if he did not possess enough capital to carry him through a number of years during

which his merchandise was not selling and his commodity loans were not being repaid. It would seem that the need for credit and hence fairly substantial commercial capitals was increasing in a business environment calculating with lower profit margins. In brief, the increased number of small traders since the 1780's was merely an expression of the growing volume of trade. To determine changes in the rate of concentration of mercantile capital we would require evidence from wills of a very substantial sample of merchants and shopkeepers of different means and, probably a more precise measure, an analysis of *almojarifazgo* accounts as to the number of importing and exporting merchants and their shares of the whole commodity flow over the last half-century of the colonial era.

I would like to conclude by proposing some broad points of comparison between the structure and evolution of commerce in late colonial New Spain and Peru.

1. The expansion of the Atlantic economies and the subsequent liberalization of Spanish commercial regulations had a more favorable effect on the trade of New Spain than on that of Peru during most of the eighteenth century. While in this period Peru suffered the escision of vast territories from its commercial space, that of New Spain remained largely intact. The volume of transatlantic and intercolonial trade to New Spain grew much more rapidly during the first six decades of the century than trade with Peru. As John Fisher has recently shown, it appears that both viceroyalties participated equally in the expansion of trade during the 1780's and 1790's.¹⁸ In other words, the different volumes of maritime trade to New Spain and Peru, as one might observe them from around 1800, had their origin in divergent trends early in the century and not towards its end. Mexico's commerce further benefitted from growing European demand for a number of its agricultural commodities, such as sugar, indigo and cochineal. Peru, due to its unfavorable location, hardly benefitted at all from this new demand. — During the last dozen years before the outbreak of the Wars of Independence the merchants of Mexico City and Vera Cruz were probably affected more seriously by *comercio neutral* than were their colleagues in Lima. By 1806/07 a great part of European goods destined for New Spain reached the viceroyalty by way of the Cuban entrepot. A similar threat posed by Valparaiso to the merchants of Lima only became effective with the complete opening of trade to foreign vessels and merchants since the early 1820's.

2. While Peru suffered an external splitting of its commercial space, the trade liberalizations of the 1780's and 1790's lead to a decentralization of trade networks and commercial wealth *within* New Spain. This came to the fore most clearly with the foundation of the new Consulados of Vera Cruz and Guadalajara in 1795; but the merchant communities in many other provincial centers, such as Oaxaca, Querétaro, San Miguel el Grande and León also showed increased vigour. Their onesided dependence on the merchants of Mexico City decreased. This decentralization lead to a stronger integration of the Mexican market. No such development can be observed in the truncated viceroyalty of Peru. Here the trade liberalization primarily lead to a changed social composition of Lima's own merchant community. But the merchant communities in most of the provincial centers, such as Cuzco, Arequipa, Huamanga and Trujillo, remained relatively weak, and their dependence on Lima for the supply with European goods and credit diminished little.

3. While it was typical for merchants in both viceroyalties to diversify their investments, the composition of their "portfolio" and, hence, capital flows between various sectors of the economy, differed notably during the late eighteenth century. In both viceroyalties merchants invested heavily into haciendas. But investment of mercantile capital in mines tended to be only short-range and of limited scale in Peru, while in New Spain some of the huge fortunes in late colonial mining were made by members of Mexico's Consulado. For Lima's merchants probably their investment in ships played a greater role than for those in Mexico City or Vera Cruz. We are lacking data to compare mercantile investments in industry and urban real estate.

4. Given New Spain's considerably larger population and her greater urban agglomerations, the northern viceroyalty's market for most commodities obviously was considerably larger than that of Peru during the late colonial period. To the degree that commercial structures were still shaped by privileges and monopolies, this favored a larger scale of commercial operations and hence a greater accumulation of mercantile capital in New Spain compared with Peru. The closer links with mining enterprises just mentioned above may also help to explain the greater frequency of merchants with very great fortunes in Mexico. It should be noted that this need not be a sign of a greater concentration of mercantile capital in New Spain, since most likely the base of small and middling merchants was also correspondingly broader here. But the greater accumulation of capital may have had some repercussions for the

economy at large, as in Mexico it must have been easier to gather large sums of money for new investment projects, say a new drainage shaft for a mine, than it was in Peru.

5. The most difficult and at the same time most important issue concerns the market mechanisms, or the economic organization of trade in both viceroyalties. While at the highest level, the import of European goods, there is, for both viceroyalties, much evidence for increasing competition among merchants since the 1780's, it appears that the articulation with the sphere of production continued to rely heavily on coercion, monopolization and on privileges. For the case of Mexico there even exists good evidence to suggest that those extending credit towards small Indian and mestizo producers – not only traders, but also miners, hacendados and crown officials – strengthened their position during the last third of the eighteenth century, as currency became scarce inspite of growing mining output. At the same time circulation of commodities and credit between merchants, crown officials and other "respectable" businessmen became more agile through the widespread use of bills of exchange. In Mexico, then, a cleavage may have developed during the late colonial period between trade mechanisms used among the middle and upper strata of society on the one hand and those mechanisms applied by traders and officials to the lowest strata of rural and urban society.

In Peru, on the other hand, the abolition of *repartos* produced a decline of coercive trade practices towards the Indian rural population. At the same time, the basic conditions of domestic trade – dispersal and isolation of population nuclei, low level of production and income, continued importance of forced labor regimes – favored monopolistic trade practices even more than in Mexico. It is thus not surprising that the growing credit operations by Lima's merchants and intermediate traders with the new mining centers should have immediately relied on monopolistic and speculative practices. Although it is for the time being impossible to say whether the trade liberalizations since the 1780's brought about an overall decline of coercion in Peru's domestic trade patterns, it seems fairly clear that in the Andes no comparable cleavage of commercial practices between various social strata of the society developed.

The Bourbon reforms' effect on commercial patterns was ambivalent and contradictory in both viceroyalties. On the one hand there was growing competition, and free trade brought down the prices for European goods. At the same time the raised levels of taxation and the

growing scarcity of coinage as a consequence of increased silver remittance to the peninsula, made large sectors of the population ever more dependent on the small groups within late colonial society who were in a position to extend credit. In this way the Bourbon reforms managed at once to threaten and strengthen the mercantile interests in New Spain and Peru.

NOTES

- * I would like to thank Scarlett O'Phelan for a critical reading and suggestions on this commentary and Magnus Mörner for leaving me his notes on the papers discussed, which were the basis for his oral commentary during the Bielefeld conference.
- 1. David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810* (Cambridge, 1971); Alberto Flores Galindo finished a dissertation on merchants and social structure of Lima during the eighteenth century in 1982; in the meantime it has been published as *Aristocracia y plebe, Lima 1760-1830* (Lima, 1984); Marcel Haitin, "Late Colonial Lima: Economy and Society in an Era of Reform and Revolution" (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1983).
- 2. Javier Ortiz de la Tabla Ducasse, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz, 1778-1821, Crisis de dependencia* (Sevilla, 1978), pp.167-223; Julio Le Riverend, "Relaciones entre Nueva España y Cuba, 1518-1820," *RHA* Nos. 37-38(1954), 45-108.
- 3. Julio Le Riverend, *Historia económica de Cuba* (Barcelona, 1972), pp.177-179.
- 4. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, *The Sugar Mill, The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba* (New York/London, 1976), pp.28-30.
- 5. Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior*, p.183.
- 6. *Ibid.*, pp.167-223.
- 7. Jorge Basadre, *El Conde de Lemos y su tiempo*, Colección de Autores Peruanos del Siglo XX, Vol. II, (Lima, 1948), pp.204-214.
- 8. Nicholas Cushner, *Form and Factory. The Jesuits and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in Colonial Quito, 1600-1767* (Albany, 1982), pp.89-94, 107-115.
- 9. John Fisher, *Minas y mineros en el Perú Colonial, 1776-1824* (Lima, 1977), pp.204-212.
- 10. Sergio Villalobos R., *Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata, 1700-1811* (Buenos Aires, 1965), pp.58-59, 94-95.
- 11. Haitin, "Late Colonial Lima," pp.85-87.
- 12. See John TePaske's contribution to this volume.
- 13. Calculation based on John Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru, The Intendant System, 1784-1814* (London, 1970), pp.254-255, Appendix 3.

14. Susan Ramirez - Horton, *The Sugar Estates of the Lambayeque Valley, 1670 - 1800: A Contribution to Peruvian Agrarian History* (Madison, 1974); Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, *Precios y producción agraria, Potosí y Charcas en el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires, 1983), pp.30 - 40.
15. Ibid., pp.66 - 76.
16. Enrique Florescano, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708 - 1810)* (Mexico, 1969), pp.189 - 190.
17. Enrique Florescano and Fernando Castillo, eds., *Controversia sobre la libertad de comercio en la Nueva España, 1787 - 1818*, 2 vols.(Mexico, 1975), II: 15.
18. John Fisher, "Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy, 1778 - 1796," *JLAS*, 13:1 (1981), 21 - 56.

VI. THE PUBLIC SECTOR

12. GENERAL TENDENCIES AND SECULAR TRENDS IN THE ECONOMIES OF MEXICO AND PERU, 1750-1810: THE VIEW FROM THE CAJAS OF MEXICO AND LIMA

John J. TePaske*

During the past three decades the debate over a crisis in seventeenth-century Hispanic America has heated up considerably, but the debate has also fueled many new questions about eighteenth-century economic conditions. For the seventeenth century the conventional view still has strong adherents in those who argue that the period was one of recession, depression, crisis, or stagnation, an epoch characterized by demographic decline or stasis, low productivity and a drift toward a subsistence economy in the agricultural sector, sharply reduced silver production, and a catastrophic drop in external and internal trade. On the other side a growing band of revisionists has argued that the seventeenth century was not an epoch of crisis or depression at all, but a period of readjustment and reorientation within the colonial economy and colonial society, a time in which Spain's overseas kingdoms underwent considerable internal economic development in agriculture and industry, increased its silver production (in Mexico at least), and with the dramatic rise in smuggling, more than offset the radical decline in the legal trade by purchase of illicit goods from Europe and the Far East.¹

This debate over the seventeenth century has now opened many new questions concerning the eighteenth century. If there was a severe seventeenth-century depression, was there a period of recovery and sustained economic growth in the eighteenth century? Did this epoch mark a unilineal, triumphal march to prosperity across the century, or did it occur by fits and spurts with identifiable cyclical changes? If there was no serious crisis in the seventeenth century, was there more continuity in economic development patterns over time than generally supposed? Attention has been focused on these questions by a wide variety of scholars analyzing different topics and regions. Some assume, argue, or document an eighteenth-century boom; others argue for some growth in cyclical patterns; still other show that high prices and inflation, war,

drought, famine, epidemic disease, mercury shortages, repressive or regressive taxes, unenlightened governmental fiscal policies, and man-land pressures in rural areas which led to proletarianization of the rural labor force in the face of a growing money economy, belie or at least call into question an eighteenth-century boom, particularly during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

This paper will attempt to provide a new focus for this growing debate by looking at trends in Mexico and Peru from the vantage point of the public sector, a macrocosmic analysis based on the accounts (*cartas cuentas*) of the two principal regional treasuries (*cajas*) of Mexico and Lima. Virtually complete for the period 1750 to 1810, these annual records of income and disbursements for each treasury provide at least one quantitative base for comparing economic conditions in the two regions in both the public and the private sector. Although it should be clearly recognized at the outset that there are dangers in relying on tax records to assess economic conditions, used carefully, these records constitute an important source for establishing and measuring significant economic trends in both Mexico and Peru.²

The Matrix Treasuries of Lima and Mexico and the Structure of the Treasury System in New Spain and Peru, 1750 - 1810

The treasuries of Mexico and Lima stood atop a well-structured nexus of *cajas* within their respective regions. By 1750 in Mexico *caja* districts existed for every major port - Veracruz, Acapulco, Tabasco, and Campeche. In the Yucatán royal treasury officials for the *caja* of Mérida collected some import-export duties as well, but that treasury was more significant as the seat of an administrative-market center with a large Indian population. To the northwest in Nueva Galicia the treasury of Guadalajara had operated since the mid-sixteenth century to serve that important mining, administrative, and market area. Moreover, almost all major silver producing centers in Mexico had *cajas* by 1750 including Durango, Guanajuato, Pachuca, San Luis Potosí, Sombrerete, Zacatecas, and Zimapán. Over the next half century this treasury network expanded to include the northern frontier outposts of Arispe, Chihuahua, and Saltillo and the mining centers at Bolaños and, successively, at Los Alamos, Rosario, and Cosalá in the far northwestern reaches of New Spain. In the 1780's new *cajas* were also set up in the capitals of each intendancy, which added Valladolid de Michoacán,

Oaxaca, and Puebla de los Angeles to this nexus. On the southeast coast the tiny military outpost of the Presidio del Carmen merited a *caja* as well, giving Mexico twenty – three treasuries by the end of the eighteenth century, including the matrix treasury of Mexico.

As a matrix treasury Mexico was the clearing house for virtually all the treasuries in the viceroyalty (Mérida, Campeche, Tabasco, and the Presidio del Carmen were the exceptions; they used the *caja* of Vera Cruz instead). These *cajas*, at least those producing income for the Crown, sent their revenues to Mexico from mining and sales taxes, tithes, tribute, salary imposts, royal monopolies, pension funds, and a host of other assessments after administrative costs, salaries, and other expenses had been paid in the treasury district.³ In Mexico City the viceroy and his aides allocated these funds for viceregal bureaucratic salaries and administrative expenses, defense and war, charitable and educational activity, missions, and military subsidies for the Caribbean islands, Florida, Louisiana, and the Philippines. If anything remained as surplus, it went to Spain.

A similar system developed in Peru where Lima was the matrix treasury for both Upper and Lower Peru. By 1750 there were *cajas* in the regional market centers of Arequipa, Cuzco, Jauja, La Paz, and Trujillo; the mining districts of Cailloma, Carabaya, Carangas, Chuquito, Huancavelica, Oruro, Potosí, and Vico y Pasco; and the ports of Arica, Piura y Paita, Saña (also Trujillo), and Lima, the latter collecting import – export duties for Callao. In Upper Peru this network of treasuries expanded somewhat in the 1770's when Charcas and Cochabamba became official treasury districts in 1773 and Santa Cruz de la Sierra became a sub – treasury of Cochabamba a short time later, but in Lower Peru the system contracted, perhaps to promote administrative efficiency. In 1760 eleven *cajas* functioned in the region: Arequipa, Cailloma, Carabaya, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Jauja, Lima, Piura, Saña, Trujillo, and Vico y Pasco; by the time of the wars of Independence there were only eight: Arica, Arequipa, Cuzco, Huamanga, Lima, Puno, Trujillo, and Vico y Pasco. The others either had gone out of existence or had been incorporated into one of the new or existing *cajas*.

For over two hundred years of the colonial period Lima was the matrix treasury for all the *cajas* of Lower and Upper Peru. Every treasury in both areas sent its surplus revenues to Lima for distribution by the viceroy and his subordinates, again like Mexico after all administrative costs and salaries had been paid in the *caja* district. In the City of Kings royal bureaucrats allocated royal taxes for subsidies to military

garrisons in Chiloé, Concepción, Valdivia, and Panamá; for the upkeep and improvement of the mercury mines at Huancavelica; and for the maintenance of the Pacific fleet (Armada del Sur), so important for insuring safe passage of Peruvian silver to the Isthmus of Panamá and the carrying of European goods back to Callao. Administrative and military salaries, war, charitable and educational activity, upkeep and construction of public and ecclesiastical buildings and bridges, and a host of other things also took large sums from the revenues coming both from outside *cajas* and from the Lima area. Again, as in Mexico, surplus funds went to Castile. During the early seventeenth century this amounted to over 50 percent of what the matrix treasury of Lima collected.

After 1760, however, this system changed dramatically when the treasuries of Upper Peru severed their ties with Lima and began remitting surplus revenues to Buenos Aires for support of the growing military and civil establishment in the Rio de la Plata. Initially, Lima shared these surplus funds, but by the 1770's all monies formerly sent to the Pacific coast from Carangas, Charcas, Chucuito, Cochabamba, Oruro, La Paz, and Potosí were flowing to Buenos Aires with Potosí serving as an intermediate transfer point for these. Lima's revenues from outside *cajas* were thus reduced to those produced by Arequipa, Arica, Cailloma, Carabaya, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Jauja, Piura, Saña, Trujillo, and Vico y Pasco. After administrative reorganization in the 1780's, only the seven treasuries of Arica, Arequipa, Cuzco, Huamanga, Puno, Trujillo, and Pasco fell within the Lima orbit, an important factor in assessing and interpreting the Lima account data.⁴

General Tendencies and Secular Trends in Mexico: The View from the Caja of Mexico, 1750 – 1810

Tables I and II have been developed from the royal accounts of Mexico and Lima to show the major sources of royal income by quinquennia for the entire eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Broadly these taxes can be placed in a number of categories: 1. taxes on mining production including the sale of mercury; 2. taxes on agricultural and commercial activity encompassing tithes (*novenos*), sales taxes (*alcaballas*), import-export taxes (*almojarifazgos*), and imposts on *pulque*; 3. income from the sale of indulgences (*bulas de santa cruzada* and *bulas cuadragésimales*); 4. up to 1786 extraordinary income, and, for the late eighteenth century; 5. mint assessments, and 6. income from the tobacco

monopoly.⁵ Also, in order to place the period 1750–1810 into a broader context and to measure the pace of change more precisely over the whole eighteenth century, Tables I and II use data for the *entire* century 1700–1810.

For Mexico, then, what do the nominal figures from the *cartas cuentas* reveal concerning economic developments in the eighteenth century, not only the figures for total revenues collected but also for the various categories of taxes? Broadly for the first forty years of the eighteenth century, they reveal modest growth in the commercial–agricultural sector and a more substantial development for the mining sector, particularly after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession when new supplies of mercury from Almadén became available. In fact, income from silver taxes and the sales of mercury almost doubled between the first and fourth decade of the eighteenth century. Sales tax and tithe collections, however, barely rose at all during the first quarter century, although they increased somewhat after 1725. Tribute income followed the same pattern as that for the *alcabalas* and *novenos*, but overall the increase in mining production seems primarily responsible for a modest rise in royal revenues during the early part of the century.⁶

The middle of the eighteenth century (1740–1775) appears to have been an epoch of more rapid growth in all sectors of the Mexican economy, particularly in the commercial sector, perhaps spurred on by the increase in silver production. Although income from mining taxes and sale of mercury reflected a continued rise in silver mining, more dramatic surges came in trade and commercial activity where the collection of sales taxes doubled between the 1730's and the 1770's. This increase stemmed in part from the elimination of the *alcabala* tax farms in the 1760's and 1770's, in part from more efficient collection techniques, in part from a rise in population, and in part from increased commercial activity, but whatever the reason, the increase was substantial. Tribute collections also rose sharply in the early 1740's and sustained that higher level over the next three decades. Tithe income, however, increased only moderately.

Most apparent as the cause for the increase in total revenues was the meteoric upsurge in income from the *ramo* of *extraordinario*, that catch–all category for colonial accountants for which there was no established *ramo* (and the *bête noire* of modern–day analysts). What types of income did this *ramo* produce? In 1750, as an example, *extraordinario* included income from various monopolies such as cockfighting, playing cards, powder, and leather; payment of fleet costs by miners

who had purchased mercury; reintegration of salaries paid in advance to soldiers or officials who had died or otherwise forsaken their posts; return by the *caja* of Acapulco of 14,000 pesos which had not been put aboard the Manila galleon bound for the Philippines; import-export taxes from Manila; an individual gift to Ferdinand VI; back taxes paid from the sale of *aguardiente* and *vino mescal*; two large loans for strengthening the Spanish defensive posture in the Caribbean; and monies garnered from the confiscation and sale of illegal goods found on the Manila galleon.⁷ Income from this *ramo* thus contained a diverse hodge-podge of revenues which cannot be categorized. Increases in payment for rights over royal monopolies such as cockfighting and playing cards might well have meant an increase in those enjoying and being able to afford the pleasures of gambling in Mexico or in those able to buy leather and powder, but loans and *reintegros* where just that, loans and *reintegros*. Also if income from *extraordinario* rose so sharply in the 1740's and again in the 1750's, it may have been due to more efficient collection efforts by earnest royal officials as well as to the increasing profitability of royal monopolies and the income to be obtained from them. Whatever the reason, this account category expanded rapidly in Mexico during mid-century to constitute almost a quarter of treasury income in the 1760's. More than likely the 1740's marked a watershed in the Mexican economy, and the *ramo* of *extraordinario* clearly reflected this change in economic rhythm as well.

If the 1740's were one turning point in the Mexican economy, the 1770's were still another, a time when the pace of tax collections seemed to quicken once again in virtually all *ramos* of the royal treasury. In the 1760's, for example, taxes on silver amounted to about twelve million pesos, rose to fifteen million in the 1770's, sixteen million in the 1780's, nineteen million in the 1790's, and over twenty million in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Sales tax income jumped markedly also, almost doubling in the decade 1776-1785 from the previous ten years (1766-1775). During the same period taxes on the sale of *pulque* followed the same trend with tithe collections rising also but at a slower pace. Overall, total revenues into the Mexican *caja* increased even more substantially than those on sales or mining at the end of the eighteenth century; in fact they increased exponentially. Total revenues in the quinquennium 1776-1780 were forty-three million pesos; by the last quinquennium of the century they amounted to eighty-seven million pesos; and during the five years prior to the outbreak of the Wars of Independence (1806-1810), they reached 112 million pesos. If Crown

revenues reflected the state of the Mexican economy, the viceroyalty seemed to be flourishing as never before. The millenium had apparently arrived.

But had it? Was the last quarter of the eighteenth century and first decade of the nineteenth something of a golden age for Mexico, a period manifesting economic growth and prosperity in all sectors of the economy? Did the larger, ever-expanding revenues truly reflect an increasingly prosperous economy? The answer to this questions may lie in the juxtaposition of the account figures against a host of other factors – royal tax policies, administrative reforms, prices and inflation, demographic changes, patterns of imperial expenditure, currency debasement schemes, and the like.

First, what was the apparent pattern of growth in trade, silver production, industry, and agriculture, as reflected in the revenues flowing into the *caja* of Mexico? Clearly expansion of all these sectors played at least some role. In the quinquennium 1771–1775 silver taxes produced seven million pesos. Thirty years later in the quinquennium 1801–1804 they produced over ten million pesos or about 1.4 times what they had generated in the earlier period. For sales taxes income produced in the quinquennium 1771–1775 amounted to six million pesos and eleven million pesos for the quinquennium 1781–1785, or 1.8 times as much. Thus, economic expansion may have played some role in the expansion of the tax revenues, although clearly total tax revenues rose at a far more rapid pace than silver production taxes and later at a much more rapid rate than sales tax collections.

Imposition of new taxes was another factor responsible for the phenomenal rise in royal revenues. Beginning in the 1770's about the same time as the rapid increase in treasury income, the Crown began assessing a host of new taxes in Mexico – salary deductions for a multitude of pension funds (*montepíos*, *inválidos*), *fondos* for pious works, new taxes on *pulque*, *aguardiente* and *vino mescal*, subsidies on both the ecclesiastical and civil establishments, additional tribute assessments for support of hospitals and legal defenders of the Indians (*medio real de hospital*, *medio real de ministros*), nuisance taxes such as one imposed for the shoeing of horses or the right to slaughter calves prematurely; new requirements and higher payments for the royal *gracias al sacar*, a new set of indulgences (*bulas cuadragésimales*) to allow one to eat meat on certain days of Lent when it was normally prohibited; increased salary taxes; and a host of other new imposts. These new taxes and an increase in old levies on such things as *aguar-*

diente and *pulque* thus were as responsible as economic expansion for the meteoric rise in royal revenues in the late eighteenth century.

Still another vital reason for the expansion or seeming expansion in treasury incomes was the imposition of forced loans on various assigned or special *ramos* (*ramos ajenos* and *ramos particulares*) of the royal treasury, *ramos* normally reserved for or allocated to specific purposes in either Mexico or Spain. The *ramo* of *temporalidades*, for example, was normally assigned to religious ends in Mexico, yet income from it was oftentimes shifted to the *real hacienda* for military and civil expenses. Tobacco income was supposedly reserved for the Crown for shipment to Spain, but it too was oftentimes diverted by treasury officials for the immediate needs of the viceroyalty. As examples, in 1789 the royal treasury of Mexico owed over five million pesos to various creditors, the largest of these being the *ramo* of *temporalidades* for over one million pesos borrowed from it.⁸ In 1798 these debts had grown to well over twenty-three million pesos with the largest sum of eight million pesos owed to the tribunal of the *bulas de santa cruzada* for advances made to the royal treasury officials from that *ramo*.⁹ (Not surprisingly, in 1805, *bulas*, *novenos*, *polvora*, and *confiscaciones* all were shifted from *ramos particulares* to the *ramos de real hacienda* in the *caja* of Mexico.)

This process of borrowing from the various *ramos* of the treasury continued into the epoch of the Wars of Independence and was implemented by royal policies which forced individuals and institutions to provide additional monies for the royal coffers through forced loans. Pious foundations, bishoprics, religious orders, the mining guild and Consulado, and wealthy individuals all poured specie into the royal treasury for use in shoring up imperial defenses or for remissions to Spain. In fact, by the end of the first stage of the Wars of Independence in 1816, the royal treasury owed over eighty million pesos to individuals, institutions, and various *ramos* of the treasury. More than ten million of these loans had come from the trade and mining guilds, over six million from the *estanco* of tobacco, ten million from religious and charitable institutions and foundations, twenty-four million from unpaid military subsidies (*situados*), and five million from various *ramos particulares* and *ramos ajenos* of the royal treasury. In fact this enormous debt led one bureaucrat in Madrid to suggest that it be placed into three categories: 1. Thirty-two million pesos to be paid back as soon as possible; 2. Seven million to be paid sometime in the future if possible, and 3. forty-one million to be written off, including the twenty-four owing for unpaid *situados*.¹⁰ All this can only fortify the view that tax policies and loans

forced on institutions, individuals, and *ramos* of the *real hacienda* contributed greatly to the increases in royal revenues late in the eighteenth century and early in the nineteenth and most likely were more important than economic growth in New Spain for the rise in treasury income.

Price increase may also be crucial for the rapid rise in revenues at the end of the colonial period. Fortunately, price series and price indices for various regions and products abound for eighteenth-century Mexico to enable a more accurate assessment of the real meaning of the account figures.¹¹ Generally, for the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, although there were cyclical price changes caused by drought, famine, or epidemic disease, prices were relatively stable, making the nominal values of the royal account data more reliable in assessing economic trends for the earlier epoch. Beginning in 1775, however, about the same time as the dramatic upsurge in royal income, prices began to rise drastically and sharply affect the purchasing power of the peso throughout Mexico. Comparison of nominal and real values of net revenues into the *caja* of Mexico during this epoch demonstrates how rapidly the value of the peso declined in this period. In the late 1780's (1786-1790), for example, nominal net revenues were fifty-six million pesos; adjusted for prices, they amounted to only thirty-two million pesos. Prices came down somewhat during the next quinquennium, but in the five-year period 1796-1800 the eighty-seven million pesos collected by royal officials had a purchasing power of only sixty-seven million. For the decade prior to the outbreak of the Wars of Independence, the situation got even worse when the real value of royal revenues diminished to half their nominal value. The other ramifications stemming from rising prices such as the increasing cost of silver production, agriculture, and manufacturing; reduced profits; and royal revenues based more on an increase in prices than on increased production must also be taken into account when considering the state of the economy.

Still another question concerning Mexican economic development concerns the increase in tax revenues as a function of demographic growth. Did the rise in royal revenues outstrip the population growth rate in Mexico during the eighteenth century? Unfortunately demographic data are neither as precise nor as rich as those for prices or tax collections, although some convenient benchmarks do exist. Rough estimates for the Mexican population indicate a total of 3.6 million in 1742, 5.2 million in 1793, and 6.1 million in 1810. Another estimate for the center-west of Mexico in Guanajuato and Michoacán shows that the

population quintupled between 1700 and 1810, virtually the same pattern as in the Guadalajara region.¹² Using these estimates, one finds that population grew 1.44 times between 1742 and 1793 and by 1.17 times between 1793 and 1810; for the whole period 1742 to 1810 population grew 1.69 times. Tax collections more than kept pace with this growth to 1793 but slowed after that. Nominal tax figures show that royal revenues increased 2.95 times between 1742 and 1793 and 1.6 times during the years 1793 to 1810; for the period 1742 to 1810 they increased 4.75 times, in every case faster than the population growth rate. If one uses real rather than nominal values, however, the pattern is somewhat different. From 1742 to 1793 the real value of royal revenues increased 2.54 times, but between 1793 and 1810 no increase occurred because of the rise of prices, despite the fact that nominal values of Crown income were sixty-nine million pesos in the early 1790's and 112 million in the quinquennium ending in 1810. For the entire century, royal revenues increased in value tenfold nominally and sevenfold in real terms. If population quintupled, this meant that in either case royal revenues increased at a faster rate than the population of Mexico, although again the loans and allocations made to the royal treasury may well account for this rise.¹³

To all this might be added a crude, highly speculative effort to establish per capita income figures for eighteenth-century Mexico based on the population counts of 1742, 1793, and 1806 and gross national product estimates based on silver production. (The method for this has been discussed in detail elsewhere.)¹⁴ These crude estimates confirm the patterns already established. In 1742, for example, annual per capita income in Mexico not adjusted for prices amounted to 28 pesos, 26 pesos after price adjustments. In 1793 this sum had risen to 43 pesos annually and 41 pesos in real terms. Thirteen years later, however, stagnation or downturn had set in with annual per capita income still at 43 pesos nominally and at 37 pesos adjusted to the inflationary spiral. Again the crude estimates bear out a mid-century spurt and end-of-century downturn.

What then can be stated definitively about the Mexican economy in the eighteenth century? Clearly it was a century of growth in all sectors, slow development at first and more substantial growth from 1740 to 1775. Then, despite the seeming increases in royal revenues, the pace of expansion lessened hindered by high prices and inflation, war and interruption of trade, obscurantist fiscal policies, and other factors. In fact the large sums produced by the royal treasury in the last quarter of

the eighteenth century serve more to mask the reality of what was actually occurring in the Mexican economy than to clarify some of its growing problems.

Still, with all the caveats and warning signals which have emerged concerning the prosperity and vitality of the Mexican economy, there is strong evidence of growth and increasing wealth. What is perhaps most impressive about the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Mexico – in addition to the rising prices and inflation, forced loans, repressive fiscal policies, and a host of new taxes, all of which seemed to hold back economic development – is the great wealth which had been accumulated by specific institutions, individuals, and various *ramos* of the royal treasury over the century. That the mining and merchant guilds could provide over ten million pesos in loans to the *caja* of Mexico and large sums in outright donations, that the *estanco* of tobacco could contribute more than five million, that the *tribunal* of the *bulas de santa cruzada* could accumulate eight million pesos in reserves, that religious institutions and pious foundations could provide more than thirteen million pesos to the treasury of Mexico testifies to the economic vitality of these institutions and to their growing wealth over the eighteenth century. They had become rich from the production of more and more silver, from increased trade, from greater sales of snuff, cigars, and cigarette tobacco, from more purchase of indulgences by those seeking atonement, redemption, or spiritual favors for themselves or others, and from larger and larger contributions from tithe payers, givers, penitents, and renters.¹⁵ And the monies which created these institutions had to come from Mexicans at many levels of society, Mexicans who had the specie to buy tobacco or indulgences or merchandise or offices or to contribute to their favorite church or charity. If the Mexican economy fell on bad times at the end of the eighteenth century, the evidence is strong that it had flourished earlier. That wealth was unequally distributed, that rural society in Mexico had been proletarianized in the face of man-land pressures and a growing money economy, that poverty and banditry had increased, and that high prices ate away at profits and wages and prevented further development may well be true, but the economy showed all the signs of having prospered nevertheless, particularly during the middle of the century.

General Tendencies and Secular Trends in Peru: The View from the Caja of Lima, 1750 – 1810

If Mexico seemed to grow and prosper in the eighteenth century, what then was the pattern in Peru, so similar in many ways to its counterpart to the north? Both Peru and Mexico were vital imperial centers, focal points for the viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain respectively. Both regions had large Indian populations with rich deposits of silver. As such, both might have been expected to maintain the same economic rhythms, but this was not the case.

In 1700 Peru was deep in the throes of depression. Mining production had declined, and shipments of silver from the mines of Upper Peru to Lima had dropped precipitously. Trade had slackened, the Armada del Sur was sailing for Panamá only sporadically, and the fair at Puer-tobelo had become virtually insignificant.¹⁶ The mercury mines at Huancavelica had fallen into a state of disrepair, and mercury production had dropped. The depression seems to have begun in the 1660's and taken hold gradually. Initially in the 1660's, 1670's, and 1680's, royal treasury officials in Lima compensated for revenue losses from declining silver production and trade by selling land titles, titles of nobility, offices, and annuities (*censos*), but when these expedients were exhausted, income began dropping sharply in the 1690's, reflecting the decline of the economy, particularly silver mining, which had made Peru the Crown jewel of the Spanish empire in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.¹⁷

From one perspective Peru seems to have remained depressed for the first three quarters of the eighteenth century with little evidence of any sustained recovery or growth during this period. Although income from mining production increased substantially, it did not fuel a steady advance in the commercial or agricultural sectors of the economy. After a sharp decline from 1700 to 1725, for example, sales tax revenues rose a bit because of an increase in the ships calling at Callao with European goods, but then income dropped off during wartime when these vessels failed to reach the Lima area. In the 1760's sales tax collections suddenly doubled over the previous decade because of increased trade, but fell back again in the quinquennium 1771 – 1775 to a sum only a bit larger than that garnered by royal officials seventy – five years earlier during the first five years of the century. Tithe income also spurted in the early 1760's but dropped again in the latter part of the decade and early 1770's. In fact, aside from mining, tribute was the only *ramo* of the

Lima treasury to show any sustained growth; but in this case doubling of the Indian population in the Lima district between 1750 and 1800 seems mostly responsible.¹⁸ Extraordinary income actually declined over the century, but this was caused primarily by the addition of new *ramos* to the accounts or the reinstitution of old entries which had fallen into disuse. Thus, looked at from most vantage points except mining and tribute, the Lima account figures show that Peru had little tendency to emerge from the economic doldrums in the first sixty or seventy years of the eighteenth century. In fact, despite the brief resurgence in the early 1760's, total income into the Lima *caja* for 1766-1775 was no greater in nominal and probably real terms than for the first decade of the century.

Although these indicators may well reflect the realities of economic life in Peru - stasis with some cyclical change - viewed another way, the accounts suggest both a new economic reorientation and perhaps some economic revival, particularly in Lower Peru. Like the treasury of Mexico the *caja* of Lima relied in large measure upon remissions from other treasuries in the viceroyalty for its revenues. From 1580 to 1700, for example, 60 percent of total revenues into the *caja* of Lima came from the interior and coastal *cajas* of Peru and Upper Peru (approximately 232 million pesos out of a total of 385 million collected), most of this from the rich mining treasuries of Potosí and Oruro.¹⁹ At the opening of the eighteenth century, however, as these mines grew less and less productive or were exhausted, income into the Lima treasury dropped, particularly because of reduction in the monies being remitted from *cajas* outside the City of Kings. Between 1700 and 1760, for example, only 23 percent of the income of the *caja* of Lima came from outside treasuries; in the halcyon days of the seventeenth century the proportion was over 50 percent of total revenues. In terms of total sums being remitted, the slash in income was even more astounding. For the first fifty years of the seventeenth century, Lima treasury officials took in approximately 125 million pesos from its dependent treasuries; for the first fifty years of the eighteenth century the same *caja* garnered only seventeen million pesos from the same source, about one-seventh that of the previous epoch.²⁰

In the 1760's the situation for the *caja* of Lima appeared to become even more critical when the *cajas* of Upper Peru began severing ties with the matrix treasury. In 1766 the *cajas* of La Paz, Potosí, and Oruro sent their last significant surplus tax revenues to the City of Kings. Chucuito made its last remission in 1769 and Carangas in 1776, effecti-

vely cutting off the last major sources of income to the Lima treasury from Upper Peru. Yet, through all this readjustment and reorientation, royal officials in Lima managed to sustain royal income at the same levels for the first three quarters of the century and to counteract and compensate for this great loss of income from Upper Peru. This could only have been done by garnering additional revenues in Lima itself or from the various *cajas* of Lower Peru.

Actually, the loss of revenues from Upper Peru in the 1760's and 1770's was not as serious for Lower Peru as might be supposed. Viewed from a long-range perspective, the real losses and subsequent adjustment by the Lima *caja* had already occurred. For example, from 1641-1650 the treasury in the City of Kings received 53 percent of its income (over 23 million) from other *cajas*, mostly from Potosí and Upper Peru. One hundred years later (1741-1750) these same treasuries produced only 13 percent and about two million pesos for the Lima *caja*, clear evidence of how drastically income from outside treasuries had declined. Interestingly, too, during the 1770's, the very epoch of foundation of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, more monies were flowing into the Lima treasury from other *cajas* than at any other time in the eighteenth century.²¹

Revival of the mining economy in Lower Peru seems largely responsible for the ability of Lima treasury officials to survive the loss of Upper Peru and maintain consistent levels of income into the Lima *caja*. For the first decade of the eighteenth century silver production in Lower Peru was about 2.3 million pesos; by the 1760's it had risen to 16.2 million, a sevenfold increase, with the most significant jump occurring in the mid-1730's, when Philip V lowered the tax rate on Peruvian silver from a fifth to a tenth. In fact, the reform was so successful that legal production in Lower Peru more than doubled from 3.3 million pesos in the first quinquennium of the 1730's to 7.6 million in the second quinquennium. With only a few modest setbacks, probably caused by the lack of mercury, mining production continued to rise until it reached a peak of 40.6 million pesos in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Although the amount of silver produced dropped to 38.7 million in the first ten years of the nineteenth century, that decade still was a milestone because the mines of Lower Peru outstripped production in those of Upper Peru (30.2 million pesos) for the first time.

The growth of the mining economy in Lower Peru occurred in different regions at different times. At the Cerro de Pasco mining production grew steadily throughout the century from approximately 300,000

pesos in the first quinquennium of the century to a peak of 11.2 million pesos in the last quinquennium making it the second most important mining area in Peru in 1800, second only to Potosí. Both Huancavelica and Cailloma flourished at the opening of the eighteenth century when production rose steadily to 1750 before dropping off. From 1730 Jauja consistently produced small amounts and silver tax income for the Crown. Arequipa became more significant as a generator of silver taxes after 1780 when the miners at Cailloma began registering their silver here after the *caja* of Cailloma was closed. Most important, though, in the last quarter of the century, was the sudden silver boom in the Trujillo area. To 1773 no silver at all was produced in the region, but the discovery of ore at Hualgayoc rocketed Trujillo into a prime position as a silver producer, and for a brief time in the late 1770's and early 1780's the Hualgayoc mines challenged those of the Cerro de Pasco. To the end of the century mining production grew steadily in Trujillo, although not quite as rapidly as in the Cerro de Pasco region.²²

Mining production may well have been responsible for fueling the seeming resurgence in the Peruvian economy in the late 1770's. In successive quinquenniums from 1776 to 1790 total income into the Lima *caja* jumped from twelve million pesos (1776-1780) to sixteen million pesos (1781-1785) to 18.7 million pesos (1786-1790). Growth seemingly occurred in all sectors. In 1776-1780 income from sales taxes almost tripled compared with that of the previous five years; revenues from *almojarifazgos* quadrupled during the same period. The rapid increase in mining production also led to a rise in mining revenues, while greater supplies of mercury emanating from both Almadén and Huancavelica gave impetus to silver production. At the same time remissions from the *cajas* of Lower Peru to Lima jumped by one million pesos from three million (1771-1775) to four million (1776-1780), indicating an economic upsurge in regions outside Lima as well. Imperial reforms were partially responsible for the increased revenues - the decree of *comercio libre* in 1778, new imposts on *aguardiente*, repair of the mines of Huancavelica, formation of the *cuerpo de minería*, adjustments in sales tax rates - but revival of the economy was also a cause. Even serious local uprisings such as the one in Arequipa in 1780 protesting new sales tax rates and the new impost on *aguardiente* and the rebellions which swept through the Andean highlands in the early 1780's, surprisingly, did not significantly slow the pace of economic growth. A new economic rhythm seemed firmly established in Peru in the late 1770's.

But, alas, the economic revival did not last and apparently could not be sustained. After 1800 mining production slowed a bit and mercury sales began dropping, income from sales taxes and trade imposts declined, and tribute income turned downward.²³ In fact, for the Lima *caja* the quinquennium 1786–1790 was the zenith for the eighteenth century, producing 18.7 million pesos, leveling off by 1800 to about fourteen million pesos per quinquennium until independence in 1821. Peru was probably victimized by its geographic position. Just as it seemed to emerge from its economic doldrums and began to prosper a bit, European wars interrupted the flow of goods from Spain. Unlike Mexico, which was flooded with legal and illegal British, American, and French goods, Peru was not as easily accessible for these traders, and foreign merchants saw no reason to chance the dangerous voyage through the Straits of Magellan and around Cape Horn to make their profits in Peru when they were more easily available in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, or Buenos Aires.

When income into the *caja* of Mexico needed to be increased during the pre-independence decades, infusions of money from mint assessments, the tobacco monopoly, the *ramo* of *temporalidades*, forced loans on the mining and merchant guilds, and other expedients helped to produce new monies for imperial uses and to keep funds flowing into the royal *caja*. The same was true in Peru but on a far smaller scale; individuals, institutions, and the *ramos ajenos* and *ramos particulares* of the Lima treasury simply were not as wealthy as their counterparts in Mexico. None had benefitted as much as in Mexico from a sustained period of economic growth in which they could accumulate wealth and build up their profits and reserves. Only the *estanco* of tobacco prospered in Lima to become the one real source of large contributions to the Lima *caja* in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Neither the Consulado nor the new Tribunal de Minería in Peru, set up in 1787, had the resources to meet the exigencies of war and imperial defense. The revival of trade and mining simply had no sustained growth in Peru.

Lack of sustained development was also reflected in the inability of royal officials to lay new taxes on Peruvians as they had in Mexico at the end of the eighteenth century. The Peruvian economy simply had not prospered enough to make many new taxes possible. In the late 1770's a new impost on *aguardiente* appeared along with a number of new pension fund taxes (*montepíos*) and assessments on Peruvian Indians for Indian hospitals and legal defenders (*medio real de hospital* and *medio*

real de ministros). Peruvian bishoprics had to pay assessments levied by the Crown for the Real Orden de Carlos III, but there were limits on the number and amount of such levies. In fact in 1793 the Lima account lists only forty-one entries on the income side of the ledger; that same year the account for the *caja* of Mexico shows ninety-five, again evidence that the royal treasury had not benefitted from a long period of economic development in Peru. It simply had not occurred.

In conclusion, then, this paper has assumed a broad, macro-cosmic perspective using the data from the accounts of the matrix treasuries of Mexico and Lima. From both a comparative and synchronic point of view for each region, this fiscal data has provided some intriguing indices and benchmarks for the course of Mexican and Peruvian economic developments in the eighteenth century. As might be expected, however, the paper poses as many questions as it answers, but by turning the hourglass over once again, perhaps we can come closer and closer to the truth.

NOTES

- * I wish to thank Tinker Foundation, National Endowment for the Humanities, and the American Philosophical Society which provided the research funds for this paper. This is a part of a larger project analyzing the fiscal structure of five major areas of the Spanish empire in America. Professor Herbert S. Klein of Columbia University is co-investigator for this project.
- 1. The current debate over the seventeenth-century crisis in the Spanish Indies has been summarized in John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality," *PP*, 90(1981), 116-135. Also see the criticisms of TePaske's and Klein's views by Professors Jonathan Israel and Henry Kamen and a rejoinder by TePaske and Klein in *PP*, 97(1982), 144-161.
- 2. For a discussion of the accounts as a source and the pitfalls, dangers, and rewards in their use, see the introductions to the volumes of account data; John TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, *Ingresos y egresos de la Real Hacienda en México*, 3 vols. (Mexico, forthcoming), and in John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, *Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 3 vols. (Durham, N.C., 1982). The former contains accounts for the twenty-three treasuries of Mexico, the latter the accounts for the sixteen treasuries of Lower Peru, the nine treasuries of Upper Peru, and the five treasuries of Chile and the fourteen of the Rio de la Plata.
- 3. Some *cajas* in Mexico like those of Arispe, Presidio del Carmen, and Saltillo actually produced little or no income. As military outposts they depended in large measure on subsidies from the opulent treasuries such as Durango, Guadalupe, San Luis Potosí, and Mexico.

4. For a fuller discussion of the development of treasury systems in both Peru and Mexico, see the introduction by TePaske and Klein in the appropriate volumes listed in footnote 2.
5. Actually since tobacco revenues and income from seized Jesuit estates were allocated for special uses, the amounts taken in often did not appear in the accounts. Only when a contribution from the *estanco* or the *temporalidades* was made to the *ramos* of the *real hacienda* was it usually entered in the accounts.
6. Table I may be a bit misleading in regard to the sums collected as silver taxes in the *caja* of Mexico. Up to 1726 royal accountants reported only *net* sums collected in the viceroyalty, considerably less than was actually produced. After 1795 the accounts list only what was produced in the district of the treasury of Mexico. For a more detailed breakdown on silver production in Mexico in the eighteenth century *caja* by *caja*, see John J. TePaske, "Economic Cycles in New Spain in the Eighteenth Century: The View from the Public Sector," *Bibliotheca Americana*, I:3(1983), 169 – 203.
7. Carta cuenta de la real caja de México, año de 1750, AGI, Contaduría Section (hereafter Contaduría), Leg. 836.
8. Estado general de los valores y distribución que han tenido los Ramos Comunes y Particulares de la Real Hacienda en las Tesorerías de Nueva España en el año de 1798, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 2026.
9. Estado general de los valores y distribución que han tenido los Ramos Comunes y Particulares de la Real Hacienda en las Tesorerías de Nueva España en el año de 1789, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 2026.
10. Sobre la deuda de la R. Hazienda y medio de restablecer su crédito, Año de 1817, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Sala de Manuscritos, No. 1971 – 23.
11. I am deeply grateful to Professor John Coatsworth for providing the price indices which make these estimates possible. These price indices and the adjustments made for them may be found in the article cited in note 6.
12. Population estimates are taken from Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, *La población negra de México* (México, 1972); Claude Morin, "Sentido y alcance del siglo XVIII en América Latina: El caso del centro-oeste mexicano," in Enrique Florescano, ed. *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América (1500 – 1975)* (México, 1979), pp.154 – 170; Eric Van Young, *Hacienda and Market in Eighteenth-Century Mexico: The Rural Economy of the Guadalajara Region, 1675 – 1820* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981), 30 – 39.
13. Debasement is still another factor to be taken into account when assessing the significance of the treasury accounts. Unlike Spain where debasement and devaluation were very common under the Hapsburgs and early Bourbons, in Mexico and the Indies generally there was little tampering with either the value or silver content of the peso. In fact the *peso de ocho* of 272 *maravedís*, used as the unit of account for this paper, was never devalued. It was debased, however, but not until the eighteenth century. To 1728 the *peso de ocho* contained 25.561 grams of fine silver. In 1728 Philip V reduced the content to 24.809 grams. From 1772 to 1786 it fell still further to 24.433 grams and from 1786 to 1825, the end of the colonial period, its content was further reduced to 24.245 grams. Thus, over the eighteenth century the silver content of the *peso de ocho* declined by a bit over one gram. Significantly, perhaps, two debasements occurred at the same time as the Crown began asserting its new fiscal policies and imposing a myriad of new taxes in Mexico.

14. For a discussion of the method used to arrive at these per capita income figures, see my article alluded to in note 6, "Economic Cycles in New Spain." I argue in that piece that probably the per capita income in 1742 was closer to thirty – seven pesos annually in nominal terms and thirty – five pesos in real terms.
15. Brian R. Hamnett points out as another example that ecclesiastical sources invested sums estimated between 44.5 million and 60 million pesos in the economy of New Spain. Pious funds, he shows, were worth fifty million pesos at the time of the Wars of Independence. Brian R. Hamnett, "The Appropriation of Mexican Church Wealth by the Spanish Bourbon Government – The 'Consolidación de Vales Reales,' 1805 – 1809," *JLAS*, 1(1969), 87.
16. For an opposite view of the seeming depression, particularly in trade, see L. A. Clayton, "Trade and Navigation in the Seventeenth – Century Viceroyalty of Peru," *JLAS*, 7(1975), 1 – 21.
17. Kenneth J. Andrien, "The Sale of Fiscal Office and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633 – 1700," *HAHR*, 62(1982), 50 – 71.
18. The figures provided by Günter Vollmer, *Bevölkerungspolitik und Bevölkerungsstruktur im Vizekönigreich Peru zu Ende der Kolonialzeit, 1741 – 1821* (Köln, 1968), demonstrate that the Indian population of the Lima district almost doubled between 1750 and 1800, a phenomenon reflected in tribute collection figures. On this score it should be noted that comparison of tribute figures for Lima and Mexico can be misleading, because the Mexican treasury reported *total* net tribute income for most of Mexico, while Lima listed tribute income solely for the Lima district.
19. John J. TePaske, "New Silver, Castile, and the Philippines (1590 – 1880)," in John F. Richards, ed., *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern World* (Durham, N.C., 1983). Appendix VII of this article lists the total revenues into the Lima treasury and the sums remitted to Castile, 1582 – 1800.
20. *Ibid.*
21. The place of Upper Peru in the fiscal structure of the viceroyalty of Peru is explained in John J. TePaske, "The Fiscal Structure of Upper Peru and the Financing of Empire," in K. Spalding, ed., *Essays in the Political, Economic, and Social History of Colonial Latin America* (Newark, Del., 1982), pp.69 – 94. The various appendices, pp.86 – 94, provide a breakdown on the remission patterns for each of the *cajas* in Upper Peru.
22. See the unpublished paper by John J. TePaske, "Silver Mining and the Imperial Reform in Upper and Lower Peru, 1700 – 1810," presented at the 44th International Congress of Americanists in Manchester, England, September 11, 1982.
23. Actually, as in Mexico the government subsidized the sale of mercury to encourage an increase in mining production in the 1770's, 1780's, and early 1790's to 1795. During this period it cost 111 pesos to produce one quintal of mercury at Huancavelica; the government sold this mercury to miners at seventy – five pesos per quintal; Luis Navarro García, *Hispanoamérica en el siglo XVIII* (Sevilla, 1975), p.226.

EXPLANATIONS OF TABLES

Explanation of Table I

Table I was taken from the *cartas cuentas* for the *caja* of Mexico found in Leg.s 816–840 of the Contaduría Section and Leg.s 2029, 2044–2072 of the Audiencia of Mexico Section of the Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla, Spain. Two accounts for 1808 and 1812 were found in Books 81 and 68 respectively of the Ramo de Real Hacienda of the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City. To 1786 the net total of income into the *caja* of Mexico was determined by taking the original accounts, total and subtracting all monies carried over from the previous year (*existencia*, *alcances de cuentas*), deposits (*depósitos*) which could be removed at any time, loans (*préstamos* of many different types), and entries like *cambio de platas*, temporary infusions of coins into the treasury which were reminted and given back to their owners.

After 1786 a great many problems arise, and the net totals are only well-informed estimates of the annual amounts taken in. For these accounts the method described above has been followed where applicable (*existencia* was no longer used as an account entry), but in order to account for the inclusion of carry-overs from the *ramos particulares* and *ramos ajenos* which began to appear in 1796 and 1797, I have subtracted the *real hacienda en comun* on the data side of the ledger since this *ramo* usually accounted for all carry-over sums as debits on the *data* side. Also the estimates for 1789, 1793, 1794, 1797 and 1798 were checked with Estados Generales of the Real Hacienda found in Leg. 2026 of the Audiencia of Mexico Section of the Archivo General de Indias and were found to coincide very closely with the sums listed in these *estados*, although probably the estimates are a bit low.

Explanation of Table II

Table II was taken from the *cartas cuentas* for the *caja* of Lima found in Leg.s 1760–1772 of the Contaduría Section of the Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla. Other accounts were found in the Archivo General de la Nación in Lima, Sección Histórica, in the Cuentas Mayores, Lima: Libros 1011, 1045A, 1046, 1063B, 1066, 1074, 1082, 1090, 1092, 1098, 1112, 1117, 1120, 1127A, 1155, 1167, 1170, 1187, 1207, 1211, 1217A, 1222, 1230A, and 1238; also Leg.s 15–20 and 25 of that same archive.

The net totals to 1786 were arrived at in the same way as the net totals for the *caja* of Mexico, described above for Table I. After 1785 total amounts were determined by going through each *libro mayor* of the accounts *ramo* by *ramo*, noting down the income for each *ramo* and the expenditures made from it, including the sums collected from previous years, which were lumped into one category, *cobrado de valores años anteriores*. Two accounts in the series from 1786–1820 for Lima (1788 and 1812) are aberrations; they are accounts called *estados*, representing the total amounts taken in and expended in the whole area of the Viceroyalty of Peru. They are useful, however, for comparative purposes, since they list sums collected for import-export taxes, sales taxes, *aguardiente* imposts, and other categories subsumed under the *otras tesorerías* categories in the accounts of the *caja* of Lima after 1785.

TABLE I: Revenues Collected in the Royal Treasury of Mexico, 1701 - 1816
By Quinquennium with Percentages of Total in Each Category
1,000 Pesos of 227 Maravedís)

Years	Net Silver Total	Taxes on Silver Prod.	Sale of Mer - cury %	Sales Taxes %	Indian Exac - tions %	Tithe (Nov - nos) %	Pul - que %	Sale of Indul - gences %	Extra - nary Income %	Mint Ascas - ments %	Tobacco %	Other %						
1701 - 1705	10,084	1,257*	12	1,057	10	1,848	18	1,575	16	231	2	502	5	224	2	1,186	12	23
1706 - 1710	10,156	1,609*	16	1,840	8	1,939	19	1,526	15	256	3	670	7	562	6	706	7	19
1711 - 1715	11,135	1,392*	13	1,395	13	1,839	17	1,735	16	284	3	674	6	712	6	746	7	19
1716 - 1720	12,479	2,169*	17	1,418	11	1,824	15	1,748	14	185	1	646	5	993	8	1,677	13	16
1721 - 1725	10,129	1,764*	17	1,534	15	1,790	18	1,542	15	270	3	457	5	718	7	514	5	15
1726 - 1730	15,751	4,615	29	2,029	13	2,351	15	2,367	15	266	2	713	5	578	4	789	5	12
1731 - 1735	17,550	4,854	28	2,165	12	2,546	15	2,615	15	394	2	999	6	824	5	1,079	6	12
1736 - 1740	16,602	4,968	30	1,917	12	2,634	16	1,604	10	320	2	896	5	773	5	1,484	9	11
1741 - 1745	23,499	4,469	19	2,430	10	4,178	18	3,122	13	985	2	987	4	689	3	3,690	16	15
1746 - 1750	23,217	5,810	25	2,472	11	3,853	17	3,133	13	425	2	928	4	665	3	3,352	14	11
1751 - 1755	27,850	6,032	22	3,230	12	5,106	18	3,373	12	409	1	924	3	808	3	6,157	22	7
1756 - 1760	29,786	6,531	22	3,231	11	5,064	17	3,834	13	472	2	1,027	3	895	3	6,606	22	7
1761 - 1765	29,839	5,346	18	3,054	10	4,902	16	2,923	10	452	2	1,519	5	825	3	7,231	24	12
1766 - 1770	31,787	5,588	18	2,831	9	5,504	17	3,755	12	374	1	1,691	5	884	3	7,678	24	11
1771 - 1775	36,752	6,566	18	2,989	8	5,930	16	3,981	11	564	2	1,856	5	979	3	7,186	20	7
1776 - 1780	42,775	7,966	19	3,195	7	7,605	18	4,279	10	557	1	2,919	7	1,195	3	6,579	15	7
1781 - 1785	61,791	8,216	13	2,660	4	11,111	18	4,282	7	772	1	4,355	7	1,119	2	6,087	10	10

786 - 1790** 55,507

1791 - 1795 69,417

1796 - 1800 87,403

1801 - 1805 72,175

1806 - 1810 111,580

1811 - 1815 51,317

1816 9,777

* Until 1776 silver taxes consist only of those collected in the area under the immediate jurisdiction of the treasury of Mexico. After 1776 they include taxes collected in all the treasuries of Mexico.

** After 1783 accounting procedures change so radically that it is impossible to provide comparable figures for the period 1786 - 1816 except to estimate the yearly total collected.

Notes: * Until 1796 silver taxes consist only of those collected in the area under the immediate jurisdiction of the treasury of Mexico. After 1726 they include taxes collected in all the treasuries of Mexico.

** After 1785 accounting procedures change so radically that it is impossible to provide comparable figures for the period 1786 - 1816 except to estimate the yearly total collected.

TABLE II: *Revenues Collected in the Royal Treasury of Lima, 1701-1820
By Quinquennium with Percentage of Total in Each Category
(Pesos of 272 Maravedís)*

Years	Net Total	Taxes on Silver – Gold Production %	Sale of Mercury	%	Sales Taxes	%	Tithes (Novenos)	%	Import- Export Taxes	%	
1701 – 1705	7,577,507	35,951	.5	NL	1,132,364	15	150,287	2	364,696	5	
1706 – 1710	8,889,747	69,511	.8	NL	576,661	6	125,700	1	212,355	2	
1711 – 1715	3,548,587	126,357	4	NL	541,668	15	61,271	2	183,937	5	
1716 – 1720	5,770,966	263,215	5	NL	805,881	14	75,416	1	406,989	7	
1721 – 1725	6,339,210	213,333	3	NL	491,747	8	88,894	1	80,859	1	
1726 – 1730	7,688,139	103,432	1	NL	1,157,289	15	97,356	1	269,101	4	
1731 – 1735	6,490,776	132,164	2	NL	867,602	13	99,991	2	335,638	5	
1736 – 1740	5,608,660	313,955	6	NL	872,852	16	79,353	1	252,007	4	
1741 – 1745	5,000,706	170,225	3	NL	729,543	15	69,677	1	217,976	4	
1746 – 1750	8,283,468	591,840	7	22,772 ³	.3	944,862	11	86,902	1	292,623	4
1751 – 1755	7,921,365	420,535	5	220,862	3	1,192,747	15	165,329	2	222,472	3
1756 – 1760	8,204,104	413,031	5	415,193	5	926,428	11	379,254	5	279,428	3
1761 – 1765	13,473,813	569,474	4	531,393	4	2,160,426	16	602,470	4	458,493	3
1766 – 1770	7,591,935	929,681	12	273,149	4	2,180,593	29	125,920	2	584,210	8
1771 – 1775	8,300,975	1,120,452	13	682,248	8	1,392,539	17	170,540	2	315,043	4
1776 – 1780	12,187,974	1,132,351	9	1,198,562	10	3,708,782	30	156,620	1	1,267,064	10
1781 – 1785	16,066,348	1,051,239	7	1,579,484	10	2,680,590	17	141,297	.9	1,055,272	7
1786 – 1790	18,652,405	807,007	4	2,578,630	14	NL	100,908	.5	NL		
1791 – 1795	15,682,182	535,634	3	811,127	5	NL	17,693	.1	NL		
1796 – 1800	14,178,236	443,189	3	564,385	4	NL	34,250	.2	NL		
1801 – 1805	14,421,070	340,434	2	919,126	6	NL	NL		NL		
1806 – 1810	14,518,781	339,630	2	587,810	4	NL	29,307	.2	NL		
1811 – 1815	15,452,970	796,577	5	747,210	5	NL	195,888	.9	NL		
1816 – 1820	17,593,050	438,864	2	98,702	.6	NL	84,774	.5	NL		

Notes: NL = Not listed or not applicable

Numerical subscripts indicate the number of years the entry was listed during the quinquennium.

TABLE II, continued...

Years	Avería	%	Tribute	%	Ferre- terías	%	Extra - ordinary Income	%	Sale of Indul - gences	%	Mint Asses - ment	%	Taxes on Aguar - diente	%	Tobacco	%
1701 - 1705	NL		178,695	2	NL		2,414,323	32	379,277	5	NL		NL		NL	
1706 - 1710	NL		232,847	3	NL		2,712,740	31	258,486	3	NL		NL		NL	
1711 - 1715	NL		185,013	5	NL		1,006,322	28	5,397 ³	2	NL		NL		NL	
1716 - 1720	86,076	2	155,369	3	NL		1,793,813	31	432,525 ⁴	7	NL		NL		NL	
1721 - 1725	282,187	4	122,853	2	NL		1,452,249	23	63,961	1	NL		NL		NL	
1726 - 1730	448,872	6	120,360	2	NL		1,646,446	21	66,960 ²	1	NL		NL		NL	
1731 - 1735	339,846	5	280,159	4	NL		1,641,352	23	NL		NL		NL		NL	
1736 - 1740	368,314	7	257,160	5	NL		1,525,001	27	NL		NL		NL		NL	
1741 - 1745	152,521	3	300,217	6	NL		1,724,837	34	NL		NL		NL		NL	
1746 - 1750	220,663	3	368,760	4	130,055 ²	2	3,529,227	43	NL		NL		NL		NL	
1751 - 1755	278,317	4	705,645	9	476,696	6	1,861,158	23	NL		NL		NL		NL	
1756 - 1760	385,370	5	1,451,632	18	556,821	7	825,301	10	NL		NL		NL		NL	
1761 - 1765	856,602	6	1,939,579	14	488,231	4	1,281,282	10	144,743 ¹	1	500,000 ¹	4	NL		141,354 ²	1
1766 - 1770	590,575	8	673,845	9	NL		1,024,806	13	158,743	2	NL		NL		245,000 ³	3
1771 - 1775	553,063	7	1,081,750	13	NL		1,061,789	13	NL		NL		NL		15,000 ¹	2
1776 - 1780	108,469	1	991,145	8	NL		1,975,433	16	14,768	1	NL		262,375 ³	2	15,000 ¹	1
1781 - 1785	41,173	3	1,449,648	9	NL		1,781,404	11	244,995	2	1,280,000	7	485,738	3	NL	
1786 - 1790	NL		1,701,232	9	NL		NL		155,491	8	958,084	5	NL		NL	
1791 - 1795	NL		645,239	4	NL		NL		106,402	7	1,205,559	8	NL		NL	
1796 - 1800	NL		461,209	3	NL		NL		113,008	8	768,660	5	NL		NL	
1801 - 1805	NL		352,291	2	NL		NL		166,921	1	808,500	6	NL		NL	
1806 - 1810	NL		435,143	3	NL		NL		165,579	1	1,080,368	7	NL		1,399,021	10
1811 - 1815	NL		344,936	2	NL		NL		171,326	1	2,138,629	14	NL		1,517,806	10
1816 - 1820	NL		792,308	5	NL		NL		123,881	7	1,428,653	8	NL		4,225,380	24

Notes: NL = Not listed or not applicable

Numerical subscripts indicate the number of years the entry was listed during the quinquennium.

TABLE II, continued...

Years	Impositions on Censos		Former Jesuit Properties		Other Treasuries Total		Other Trea- suries less Major Ramos		Other	
		%		%		%		%		%
1701 - 1705	NL		NL		2,088,282	28				10
1706 - 1710	NL		NL		3,186,384	36				17
1711 - 1715	NL		NL		625,510	18				23
1716 - 1720	NL		NL		1,017,217	18				12
1721 - 1725	NL		NL		2,294,234	36				21
1726 - 1730	NL		NL		2,837,929	37				12
1731 - 1735	NL		NL		2,190,744	34				10
1736 - 1740	NL		NL		1,021,054	18				16
1741 - 1745	NL		NL		694,778	14				20
1746 - 1750	NL		NL		1,222,729	15				17
1751 - 1755	NL		NL		990,629	13				17
1756 - 1760	NL		NL		985,900	12				19
1761 - 1765	NL		NL		2,001,621*	25	1,421,914**	11		18
1766 - 1770	NL		NL		2,064,590*	27	376,974**	5		5
1771 - 1775	NL		NL		3,010,392*	36	719,531**	9		14
1776 - 1780	NL		19,000 ¹	.2	4,078,837*	33	735,283**	6		6
1781 - 1785	1,879,256	12	NL		4,081,474*	25	1,111,178**	7		7
1786 - 1790	165,397	.9	17,117 ²	.1	7,647,553***	41				25
1791 - 1795	840,859	5	NL		8,502,217	54				20
1796 - 1800	615,043	4	487,258 ²	3	8,000,840	56				21
1801 - 1805	98,500 ²	.7	626,573	4	7,724,318	54				24
1806 - 1810	NL		415,251	3	7,064,163	49				21
1811 - 1815	23,450 ³	.2	318,562	2	3,407,512	22				38
1816 - 1820	174,386 ³	1	266,674	2	5,853,678	33				23

Notes: NL = Not listed or not applicable

Numerical subscripts indicate the number of years the entry was listed during the quinquennium.

* Includes the total entering the treasury of Lima from outside cajas.

** The total entering the treasury of Lima excluding the ramos of alcabalas, almojarifazgos, averfa, azogue, extraordinario, novenos, tributos, bulas de santa cruzada, casa de moneda, tabaco, aguardiente, and 1.5% diezmos y quintos de plata oro, 1765 - 1785.

*** Beginning in the 1786 other treasuries includes not only the income from cajas outside Lima but also the ramos of alcabalas, almojarifazgos, and aguardiente in the hands of the aduana.

13. LAS REFORMAS FISCALES BORBONICAS Y SU IMPACTO EN LA SOCIEDAD COLONIAL DEL BAJO Y EL ALTO PERU

Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy

El presente trabajo* tiene como objetivo analizar el *impacto inmediato* que tuvieron sobre los diferentes sectores sociales de la población colonial, las reformas fiscales Borbónicas. Estas medidas económicas cargaban el propósito de drenar un mayor excedente económico de las colonias a la metrópoli, a través del endurecimiento de los cobros fiscales y los controles aduaneros.¹ Fueron aplicadas en la región del sur – andino del virreinato peruano (que comprendía el Bajo y el Alto Peru) entre 1775 – 1783, propiciando una coyuntura de violencia, que eventualmente culminó con la "gran rebelión" de 1780.²

Mi intención no es referirme a como las reformas se plantearon en la teoría o se legislaron desde el papel. Pretendo más bien incidir en los conflictos que se suscitaron al tratar de ponerlas en práctica, y encontrarse que chocaban con una realidad socio – económica que, habiendo relativamente alcanzado un punto de equilibrio, venía operando en la colonia "desde tiempo inmemorial." La cuál, además, demostró estar en capacidad de generar sus propios mecanismos de defensa y resistencia al cambio y la reforma.

Quizás el primer anticuerpo provocado por las reformas Borbónicas, fue el hecho que se encomendara su establecimiento a funcionarios venidos "de afuera" (desde Europa, España o inclusive Lima), quienes fueron enviados a las provincias peruanas, con ésta específica misión. Con ésta política se marginaba claramente a los notables vecinos provincianos, quienes se sentían con un tácito derecho a ser las personas más indicadas para hacerse cargo de dicha implementación.

Ya los recientes trabajos de Burkholder y Chandler sobre la pugna entre criollos y peninsulares a nivel de la Audiencia de Lima, han señalado que desde que José de Gálvez fue nombrado Ministro de Indias (1776), la Corona adoptó una política orientada a reducir la clara influencia que en los años anteriores habían estado ganando los criollos, dentro del gobierno colonial. No resulta pues casual que en 1779, un año antes del estallido de "la gran rebelión," de dieziseis oidores de la Audiencia de Lima, nueve fueron españoles y sólo siete criollos.³

Esta corriente de discriminación frente a los criollos, también se reflejó en las provincias. Si bien las quejas sobre las trabas que se

ponían a los criollos para ocupar cargos de corregidores estuvieron presentes a lo largo de todo el siglo XVIII, luego de la inflexible política de Gálvez, los criollos envueltos en la develada conspiración cuzqueña de 1780 declararon con resentimiento "que ni aún alcaldes ordinarios querían ya hacer a los criollos."⁴

Sin embargo, la perspectiva de la Corona frente al problema era justamente la opuesta. El interés por enviar funcionarios foráneos para cubrir los puestos claves de la administración fiscal, respondía a la necesidad de garantizarse que éstos individuos no hubieran tenido oportunidad de arraigarse en las colonias, y consecuentemente, no se hubieran creado compromisos con pobladores locales, que afectarían su imparcialidad en el momento de aplicar las nuevas medidas económicas.⁵ Dentro de ésta línea, Don Bernardo Gallo, el odiado aduanero de La Paz, de acuerdo a los registros, era genovés. Mientras que, Don Bautista Pando, el recién nombrado aduanero de Arequipa, era señalado como español.⁶

Habría entonces que precisar, que si bien la Corona no estuvo del todo errada al confiar la implementación de las reformas Borbónicas a funcionarios europeos y españoles que velaran por incrementar las ganancias fiscales (como efectivamente lo hicieron), tuvo el desacierto de no prever el profundo malestar que ésta actitud provocaría en los residentes criollos y españoles de las provincias. Estos últimos, para sentirse integrados y aceptados por las elites provinciales, contraían muchas veces matrimonio con criollas de la región, sacudiéndose así de su origen peninsular, y acercando sus expectativas a las del sector criollo.⁷

No es pura coincidencia entonces, que en el caso concreto de la conspiración del Cuzco de 1780, fue precisamente un hacendado criollo nacido en el Cuzco, Lorenzo Farfán de los Godos, quien a pesar de ser cobrador de alcabalas, encabezó una campaña contra el establecimiento de la Aduana del Cuzco, por sospechar que vendrían "nuevos aduaneros" a desplazarlo de su cargo.⁸ Igualmente, Eugenio Cárdenas de la Riva, el guarda del camino de Puquín, quien era natural de La Paz, se permeabilizó a la conspiración, debido a los insistentes rumores que circulaban de que "lo quitarían de caminero."⁹ A esto habría que sumar el hecho de que efectivamente existió un sentimiento bastante generalizado en el Bajo y el Alto Perú, de que el visitador Areche estaba estableciendo gravámenes por su libre albedrío, sin la debida aprobación del Rey.¹⁰ Así lo confirman por lo menos, las declaraciones de numerosos reos procesados por su participación en la gran rebelión de 1780-81.¹¹

Dentro de la re-estructuración del fisco, las dos medidas econó-

micas que más airadas protestas engendraron, fueron ciertamente la creación de las aduanas, y la subida de la alcabala del 4 al 6 por ciento. Ambas afectaban directamente la producción y circulación de bienes entre el Bajo y el Alto Perú. El normalmente activo comercio entre el sur andino ya había sido recortado al transferirse en 1776 el Alto Perú al recién constituido Virreinato del Río de la Plata, también denominado Buenos Aires.¹² Las trabas orientadas a desestabilizar éste tradicional flujo comercial se agudizaron cuando un año después, en 1777, se prohibió la circulación de metales del Alto al Bajo Perú.¹³ Consideramos que la creación de aduanas no respondió a un intento de impulsar o reforzar los mercados del surandino, sino más bien de obstaculizar el desarrollo de los mismos, provocando eventualmente un colapso comercial entre el Alto y el Bajo Perú.

Es interesante observar que la crisis pareció precipitarse, cuando se inició el establecimiento de aduanas, en puntos estratégicos del Bajo Perú. Mientras las aduanas bloquearon sólo el Alto Perú, al crearse en 1775 la Aduana de Cochabamba y en 1777 la de La Paz, las protestas no llegaron a paralizar el comercio regional.¹⁴ Fué cuando se instalaron aduanas en Arequipa y Cuzco, bloqueándose con ello por ambos extremos el circuito comercial Cuzco-Potosí, que las protestas escalaron en intensidad, culminando eventualmente con la gran rebelión de 1780, cuyo radio de acción justamente envolvió el circuito mencionado. El incremento de la alcabala y la creación de aduanas a lo largo de la ruta comercial que articulaba el Bajo y el Alto Perú fueron por lo tanto, dentro del paquete de medidas económicas promovidas por los Borbones, "la pluma que dobló al camello."¹⁵

Por ejemplo, en el caso concreto de la alcabala, con la decretada alza al 6 por ciento, las ganancias líquidas obtenidas por efecto de las ventas, se reducían. Esto debido a que de acuerdo con la nueva tasa, había que separar un mayor monto de dinero para cubrir el incremento en la contribución. Por otro lado, es evidente que la finalidad intrínseca a la implantación de aduanas, era corregir el modo en que venían operando "tradicional" y "libremente" las transacciones comerciales dentro de la región. Y es que las aduanas tenían como objeto, por una parte ejercer un estricto control sobre la entrada y salida de mercaderías, y por otra, asegurar que la alcabala que se cotizaba estuviera ajustada al 6 por ciento y guardara una proporción equivalente al total del producto introducido para la venta.¹⁶

Es cierto que de primera impresión, las medidas pueden haber parecido estar orientadas simplemente a garantizar un sistema más eficiente en el cobro de impuestos, antes que dirigidas a promover un cambio radical en la taxación. Sin embargo, a través de las quejas de quienes resultaron "afectados" por su implementación, el trasfondo que


emerge es más complejo. Primeramente, la subida de la alcabala del 4 al 6 por ciento decretada en 1776 resultaba indudablemente más dijorable que una subida radical del 2 al 6 por ciento, que en vez de significar un aumento de 50 por ciento sobre el impuesto inicial, representaba más bien un 200 por ciento. Lo curioso y quizás contraproducente fué, que en algunos casos y algunas provincias, esta última exorbitante subida fué la que efectivamente se aplicó, no precisamente porque no se hubiera estipulado ya en 1772 que la alcabala debía cobrarse al 4 por ciento, sino porque esta alza previa, nunca entró en vigencia, debido a la negligencia y táctica indecisión por parte de las autoridades locales.¹⁷

En segundo lugar, la significativa curva ascendente en el rubro de alcabalas entre 1779 y 1780, es incuestionable para las Cajas Reales del Alto y Bajo Perú (Potosí, La Paz, Cochabamba, Cuzco y Arequipa), y decididamente sus efectos como detonante de la "gran rebelión" deben ser subrayados (ver Gráfico I). Efectivamente se puede constatar, que la curva relativa al total de alcabalas en el Bajo y el Alto Perú, alcanza su punto máximo, justamente en 1780, coincidiendo este pico con el momento más álgido de las protestas sociales en el sur-andino, que precedieron ese mismo año el estallido de la gran rebelión.¹⁸ Mientras las Cajas Reales de Potosí, Cochabamba, Cuzco y Arequipa registraron sus cifras más altas por recolección de alcabalas en 1780, La Paz alcanzó su máximo absoluto en 1779, es decir un año antes. Esta evidencia refuerza nuestra hipótesis, de que el Alto Perú necesitó del Bajo Perú para movilizarse en conjunto contra las medidas económicas. Es interesante constatar que a pesar de la transferencia del Alto Perú a Buenos Aires en 1776, cuatro años después, en 1780, el Alto y Bajo Perú funcionaron como un todo, como una unidad acoplada y sincronizada con un interés común:¹⁹ salvaguardar los mercados del sur-andino frente a la incidencia de Buenos Aires y la indiscriminada penetración de productos europeos, con la apertura del libre comercio.²⁰

Sin embargo, queda aún por establecer, si esta pronunciada alza registrada en 1780 con relación a las alcabalas:

- 1) fué consecuencia de un incremento real en la producción y el comercio colonial;
- 2) fué resultado de haber entrado en vigencia la nueva tasa de alcabala al 6 por ciento, y de efectuarse su cobro a través de las aduanas;
- 3) o si respondió más bien a que el cobro de alcabalas se hizo *acumulativo*, incluyéndose en la cifra final, el monto correspondiente a las alcabalas rezagadas de los años anteriores, en que ilegalmente se siguió cotizando al 2 por ciento.

GRAFICO I: Alcabalas en el Bajo y el Alto Perú, 1768 - 1784 (En pasos bienales)



Fuentes: AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Legs. 1104, 1136, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284; Audiencia del Cuzco, Legs.

39, 40, 41; Audiencia de Charcas, Legs. 656, 665; BM, Additional (ms) 19, 572;

John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration 1763 - 1810. The Intendant System in the*

Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata (New York, 1969), p.300, Apéndice II Cuadro F; Pedro


Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica, geográfica, física, política, civil y legal del*

gobierno de la Intendencia de Potosí (1791) (Potosí, 1952), p.315; Brooke Larson, "Economic

Decline and Social Change in an Agrarian Hinterland: Cochabamba in the Late Colonial


Period," (Tesis de Ph.D., Columbia University, 1978), p.447.

GRAFICO II: Alcabalas en el Bajo y el Alto Perú, 1775 - 1786 (Desagregado)



Fuentes: AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Legs. 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1415; Audiencia del Cuzco, Legs. 39, 40, 41; Audiencia de Charcas, Legs. 656, 665; John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration 1782-1810. The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata* (New York, 1969), p.300, Apéndice II Cuadro F; Pedro Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica, geográfica, física, política, civil y legal del gobierno de la Intendencia de Potosí (1791)* (Potosí, 1952), p.315; Brooke Larson, "Economic Decline and Social Change in an Agrarian Hinterland: Cochabamba in the Late Colonial Period," (Tesis de Ph.D., Columbia University, 1978), p.447.

GRAFICO III: Total de Alcabalas en el Bajo y el Alto Perú, 1775 - 1786 (Cumulativo)



Fuentes:

- AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Legs. 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1415; Audiencia del Cuzco, Legs. 39, 40, 41; Audiencia de Charcas, Legs. 656, 665; John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration 1762 - 1810. The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata* (New York, 1969), p.300, Apéndice II Cuadro F; Pedro Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica, geográfica, física, política, civil y legal del gobierno de la Intendencia de Potosí (1791)* (Potosí, 1952), p.315; Brooke Larson, "Economic Decline and Social Change in an Agrarian Hinterland: Cochabamba in the Late Colonial Period," (Tesis de Ph.D., Columbia University, 1978), p.447.

Si este último factor tuvo algún peso, ello querría decir que entre 1779 y 1780 se cobró lo que se había venido debiendo de 1772 en adelante, poniéndose al día la contabilidad fiscal. De allí que el rubro de alcabalas apareciera tan inflado. No obstante, nos inclinamos a pensar que en el pico que alcanzó en 1780 la recolección de alcabalas, hubo espacio para que se combinaran las tres variables arriba mencionadas. Lamentablemente, esta hipótesis es difícil de comprobar, pues las Cajas Reales no siempre precisan en la entrada de alcabalas, el origen de las mismas.

Siendo el mercado un punto de confluencia para los diferentes grupos de intereses, las protestas de comerciantes, arrieros, viajeros y trajinantes que hemos logrado registrar, nos han permitido identificar las fuerzas económicas que operaban dentro de las redes comerciales del sur-andino y percibir las repercusiones, que sobre estos diferentes sectores tuvieron las Reformas Borbónicas. En este sentido, el impacto que tuvo el incremento en el cobro de alcabalas y el consecuente reajuste de cuentas, no pudo ser el mismo en un grande que en un mediano o pequeño productor. Por su liquidez económica un gran o un mediano productor, estaba indudablemente en mejor posición para afrontar la subida de la alcabala de lo que estaba un pequeño productor. Mas aún si tenemos en cuenta, que un gran productor estaba en posición de diversificar su economía invirtiendo en las diferentes ramas de la producción, pudiendo en caso de ser necesario, transferir capital de una rama a otra, y así compensar pérdidas y redistribuir ganancias. Sólo un paquete de medidas económicas que *comprometieran todas las ramas de la economía colonial* podría por lo tanto afectarlo, y paradójicamente, esto fué lo que efectivamente ocurrió.

La evidencia señala que para poder esquivar el pago de alcabalas y subsecuentemente conseguir así una ganancia marginal en sus ventas, muchos campesinos indígenas habían orientado su producción agraria al cultivo de *productos exentos del pago de alcabala*, como lo eran el maíz, coca, ají, chuño, papa, azúcar etc. Sus protestas contra la alcabala no se redujeron por lo tanto a rechazar el incremento de la misma, sino también al hecho de que en el *nuevo esquema de cobros* la aplicación de la alcabala se ampliaba a productos del consumo indígena, tradicionalmente exentos, "...siendo así que de estos efectos nunca han pagado los indios alcabala."²¹

Inclusive los chorillos, a nivel de la producción manufacturera, fueron afectados por las reformas. Hasta ése momento sólo los obrajes estaban sujetos al pago de alcabalas por la venta de sus productos. No debe llamar por lo tanto la atención, que para mediados del siglo XVIII varios obrajes habían sido transferidos a la categoría de

chorrillos y más de un criollo acomodado consideraba que era más lucrativo fundar y controlar chorrillos, antes que obrajes.²² Con los chorrillos se liberaban del pago de impuestos, permitiéndoles ello disponer de mayores ingresos. Esto lleva a cuestionar el aceptado concepto de que los chorrillos eran manejados por individuos de una mediana capacidad económica, dado el carácter doméstico de la empresa.²³ Para muestra de lo contrario tomemos el caso de Don Mateo Orcaín y Rivero, quien además de ser propietario del chorrillo y hacienda Paucarpata, se desempeñaba como regidor perpetuo del Cabildo del Cuzco.²⁴ Era por lo tanto, un vecino "notable" del Cuzco.

Al proponerse dentro de las reformas fiscales, ampliar la alcabala que gravaba los paños y bayetas producidos en los obrajes, a los tejidos manufacturados en los chorrillos (que hasta ése momento habían permanecido protegidos), Cuzco, con sus numerosos chorrillos, era indiscutiblemente un área sensible para ser afectada por esta nueva política.²⁵ La intención que cargaba esta medida económica anti-proteccionista, era la de ir paulatinamente quebrando la industria textil colonial, para que el mercado interno fuera fácilmente copado por los textiles europeos introducidos a través del comercio libre. Resulta coherente entonces, encontrar a Ildefonso del Castillo, administrador del chorrillo de Paucarpata, conspirando contra las medidas. No es tampoco casual que hacendados-obrajeros como el criollo Don Bernardo de la Madrid y los españoles Don Antonio Figueroa y Don Francisco Cisneros (casados con criollas prominentes), se vieron implicados en la gran rebelión de 1780.²⁶ Las medidas económicas estaban afectando la esfera agraria y la esfera manufacturera, y en ambas, ellos tenían intereses.

Incluir, dentro del nuevo esquema de alcabalas, la coca, el maíz, el chuño, el ají, textiles de chorrillo etc. perjudicaba al campesino indígena que los producía y comerciaba. Pero también esta medida era resentida por el propietario de minas y obrajes, que pagaba parte del salario de sus operarios en especies, y precisamente en estos productos.²⁷ Indirectamente se estaba también afectando la minería, que ya había sufrido un primer revés, al activarse el control sobre la contribución del *quinto*, con la clara intención de reducir el contrabando.²⁸ Se estaba comprometiendo por lo tanto, todas las ramas de la economía colonial.

En el caso de los hacendados de Arequipa y La Paz, les debió resultar conflictivo no sólo el incremento de la alcabala que pesaba sobre los productos agrarios, sino también la imposición del *nuevo impuesto* del 12.5 por ciento sobre el aguardiente, ya que ambas eran provincias productoras (Gráfico II).²⁹ De acuerdo a la evidencia, antes de la gran rebelión habían estado cotizando 18.5 por ciento por

el derecho al comercio del aguardiente. Concretamente en el caso de Arequipa se llegó a solicitar que se suspendiese el encabezonamiento, pues sumado al cabezón se les estaba conminando a pagar la nueva tasa de alcabala al 6 por ciento, y el nuevo impuesto del 12.5 por ciento con que se había gravado el aguardiente.³⁰ Es explicable entonces que en el caso de los hacendados de Sinti (La Paz), éstos solicitaran tajantemente que se les rebajara la alcabala del 6 al 4 por ciento, y que además se decretara la anulación del nuevo impuesto del aguardiente.³¹

Es importante sin embargo precisar, que si bien para criollos y mestizos el problema de la alcabala se reducía al *reajuste de su incremento*, para el campesino indígena representaba, de un lado, la *innovación* de un impuesto que hasta ése momento había exceptuado los productos "de la tierra" en que tradicionalmente ellos comerciaban, y de otro lado, la presencia de las aduanas, donde los sometían al sistema de *guías* y *tornaguías*, cuya operatividad no comprendían, evidenciándose con ello los precarios niveles de monetarización en que sus transacciones comerciales se realizaban.

Las rigurosas disposiciones adoptadas con relación al sistema de guías, con el fin de que los trajinantes y viajeros acreditaron pertenecer a la categoría de *indios tributarios*, resultó una complicación para los campesinos envueltos en el comercio regional.³² Más incomprensible les pareció todavía, el sistema de tornaguías al que fueron paralelamente sometidos. Este último consistía en pagar una fianza al pasar por la aduana, depósito que podía ser recuperado al exhibirse de regreso el recibo o tornaguía, el cuál indicaba que la venta del producto se había efectuado, con el respectivo pago de la alcabala.³³ Es decir, los pequeños comerciantes del sur-andino se vieron forzados a duplicar el monto de dinero con que normalmente operaban, para así estar en posición de cancelar la nueva tasa de alcabala al 6 por ciento, más una suma equivalente, por derecho de fianza. Se demandó por lo tanto del campesinado indígena una liquidez monetaria, de la cual no tenía disponibilidad inmediata.

Las quejas de los trajinantes, viajeros y arrieros en la Aduana de Arequipa, apuntaron consistentemente al malestar que les ocasionaba tener que depositar en la aduana sus productos, para que éstos fueran tasados. "Esta conducción y exámen les parecieron violentos, así por su ignorancia y miseria, como por la costumbre en que habían vivido de todo lo contrario."³⁴ En la Aduana de La Paz, los indios de la comunidad de Coroyco protestaron porque se retenía la coca que traían para comerciar, con el peligro de que se descompusiera y fuera imposible venderla. Además, señalaron que en su calidad de *indios forasteros* pagar la fianza en La Paz les resultaba inconveniente

...pues como ha sido costumbre pagar de contado la alcabala de todo efecto, traen tasadamente aquello que comprende, y afianzado o depositado el dinero se les irroga mucho perjuicio, y que no habían de pagar más de una vez la alcabala, o en la Aduana, o donde iban a vender, pues así lo acostumbraban desde sus antepasados, sin que hubiese aumento.³⁵

Reiterativamente en el Cuzco las protestas se desencadenaron contra los vistas de aduana, que cobraban la alcabala aún a los indios "que eran exceptuados de *tiempo inmemorial*." ³⁶

Sin embargo, la guía tenía su razón de ser. Parece que se había hecho una costumbre que muchos indígenas introdujeran productos pertenecientes a criollos y/o españoles, para liberarlos de este modo del pago de impuestos.³⁷ Con la creación de las aduanas y la presencia de "gente de afuera" para hacerse cargo del chequeo de los productos internados, estos arreglos clandestinos, montados con el fin de evadir la alcabala, fueron descubiertos y sancionados. Inclusive, en la Aduana de La Paz, Don Bernardo Gallo se ganó muchas enemistades, porque obligaba a los comerciantes indígenas y mestizos a medir y pesar sus productos en presencia del vista de aduana, poniendo así en evidencia el hecho de que muchos acostumbraban a introducir prácticamente el doble de varas de tejidos de las que declaraban, y la misma práctica fraudulenta seguían con respecto a las arrobas de granos y coca en que comerciaban. Consecuentemente tanto los trajinantes como los viajeros que transitaban por La Paz, reclamaron que no se les debía medir las bayetas en los caminos o cantos de la ciudad.³⁸

No en vano, una de las demandas que más insistentemente llevaron adelante los involucrados en la gran rebelión fue

...que se les dejen a los naturales el paso y conducto *libre* para que puedan viajar y transitar no sólo a la ciudad de La Paz, sino también a cualquier otros lugares, [y que] ni en éstos ni en sus caminos se les infiera estorbo o perjuicio el más mínimo, castigando severamente a los contraventores, y que en esta *misma libertad* disfruten igualmente todos los españoles en sus tránsitos, tratos y comercios, que hiciesen en los lugares de los naturales.³⁹

El reclamo es elocuente, y trae a colación una ácida crítica a la inoperancia del sistema de aduanas, y las nefastas consecuencias que su funcionamiento estaba originando en la actividad comercial del sur-andino, donde existía una economía segmentada, coexistiendo mercados incipientes, paralelos a mercados más desarrollados.

Trabajos recientes como los de Wibel y Brown para el caso de Arequipa, se han encargado de señalar los conflictos que ocasionaron la rigidez del cobro de alcabalas en las aduanas, y la inflexibilidad de los oficiales encargados de efectuar dicho cobro.⁴⁰ No obstante, consideramos que los desajustes que se generaron no se limitaron a estos

puntos, sino más bien pueden ser entendidos en su completa dimensión, si tenemos en cuenta dos factores relevantes, que no han merecido la suficiente atención. Por un lado el trastorno que debió provocar el hecho de que productos tradicionalmente exentos se vieran incluidos en el *nuevo esquema de la alcabala*, y por otro lado, que los mecanismos fraudulentos de que se valían los grandes hacendados usando indígenas como intermediarios, quedaran suprimidos mediante el sistema de las *guías*.

La política fiscal Borbónica no sólo se materializó en el incremento de la alcabala y el establecimiento de aduanas, sino que también estuvo encauzada a modificar sustancialmente la estructura del *tributo indígena*, a través del cual la Real Hacienda percibía considerables ingresos.⁴¹ Para potenciar los beneficios económicos del tributo, se adoptaron básicamente dos medidas: llevar a cabo un exhaustivo y riguroso censo de la población colonial y ampliar el tributo que hasta ése momento había recaído solamente sobre los indígenas, a la creciente población de mestizos, sambos y mulatos.⁴²

La *revisita general* que con este propósito se mandó efectuar, reveló que existía un significativo número de indígenas que se habían estado registrando en los censos previos bajo la categoría de mestizos, para así evadir el tributo. También puso en evidencia, que estaba en pleno auge el mecanismo de "ocultación de tributarios," que era la cobertura más utilizada por las autoridades civiles y eclesiásticas, para incluir sólo parcialmente a la población indígena en edad de tributar (entre dieziocho y cincuenta años), dentro de las listas oficiales de tributarios.⁴³ Estas irregularidades pueden explicar que en el censo que en 1785 realizó en el Cuzco el Intendente Mata Linares, con el fin de medir el impacto demográfico de la rebelión de Túpac Amaru, los resultados fueran tan inesperados. La revisita arrojó un incremento de 12,821 indios tributarios, la cuál elevó a 37,729 el número de tributarios, totalizando un monto de 281,346 pesos por concepto de tributos.⁴⁴ Es decir, alrededor del 30 por ciento de la población indígena en condiciones de tributar, había estado consistentemente evadiendo el tributo. La práctica también demostró que no era aconsejable ampliar el tributo a las otras castas, por los anticuerpos y protestas que dicho proyecto había desatado.⁴⁵ El Virrey Don Agustín de Jauregui tuvo que reconocer que muchos mestizos se plegaron a las huestes de Túpac Amaru, por haber creído que serían obligados a tributar, al igual que los indios. Efectivamente, la participación de mestizos fué significativa en la gran rebelión, pero su adhesión al movimiento no estuvo determinada exclusivamente por la ampliación del tributo, sino también porque en su situación de arrieros, chacareros, trajinantes y viajeros, se vieron directamente afectados por las aduanas y alcabalas.⁴⁶

Del presente trabajo se desprende, que en el Perú colonial del siglo XVIII, un medio eficaz para maximizar la acumulación y generar un excedente económico fue la *evasión de impuestos*. Este mecanismo podía funcionar a varios niveles. Evadían impuestos los hacendados y chacareros que declaraban menos parcelas de tierras que las que usufructuaban, para así reducir el cabezón. También se liberaban de impuestos, aquellos criollos que optaron por fundar chorrillos y así ahorrarse la alcabala. Evadían impuestos aquellos productores que utilizaban indios para transportar sus mercancías, sabiendo que de esta manera no se les cobraría la alcabala. Justamente, por reducir el monto de sus impuestos, fué que numerosos hacendados hicieron caso omiso de la subida de la alcabala del 2 al 4 por ciento, decretada en 1772. Las autoridades locales (que probablemente también tenían propiedades), se coludieron a favor de los hacendados, expresando que no habían dado cumplimiento a la nueva legislación, por no quedarles claro cuales eran los productos sujetos al 4 por ciento. Finalmente, para conseguir algunas ganancias marginales que le permitiera hacer frente a tributos y repartos, el campesino indígena también entró en el juego de la evasión de impuestos, dirigiendo su producción y comercio hacia los productos "de la tierra," que estaban exonerados de pagar alcabalas, y declarando siempre una menor cantidad del producto que estaba introduciendo al mercado, para aminorar de esta manera el pago de alcabalas. Paralelamente hubo indígenas que arreglaron su inscripción como "mestizos," para así evitar la cotización del tributo indígena.

El programa fiscal de los Borbones sacudió los cimientos de la tradicional economía colonial y, sobretodo, de uno de sus principales recursos de acumulación: la evasión de impuestos. Las reformas Borbónicas se dirijieron 1) a gravar todas las ramas de la economía colonial; 2) de una otra manera afectaron a todos los sectores de la sociedad colonial, propiciando la plataforma ideal para montar una alianza, la cual se materializó con la gran rebelión de 1780.⁴⁷ Podemos por lo tanto establecer una correlación entre el relajamiento del cobro de impuestos - ausencia de brotes de rebelión por un lado, y el endurecimiento en la recaudación de impuestos - estallido de rebeliones, por otro.

No hubo por lo tanto un *acoplamiento* entre las medidas fiscales propuestas por los Borbones y la realidad económica colonial del virreinato peruano, donde una mayor demanda de liquidez monetaria a través del incremento del sector impuestos afectaba la estabilidad económica colonial, montada sobre las bases de una monetarización incipiente. Como resultado de ello, ciertos productos seguían intercambiándose en los mercados regionales a través del trueque, y el sistema de salarios en los centros productivos era de carácter mixto:

parte en plata o moneda, y parte en especies.

Si bien debemos admitir que la política fiscal de los Borbones no mantuvo una continuidad consecuente, ello se debió a que al ponerse inicialmente en práctica, se cometieron abusos que tuvieron que ser violentamente enmendados. Si efectivamente el programa sufrió recortes, negociándose incluso alguno de sus puntos, éste respondió a la necesidad de aminorar la resistencia que las medidas encontraron por parte de todos los sectores de la sociedad colonial.⁴⁸ Sin embargo, los planteamientos incluidos en el proyecto fiscal guardaban una racionalidad económica: acelerar la recaudación de impuestos para aumentar los ingresos de la Real Hacienda. Si el plan no funcionó, no fué precisamente por falta de una coherencia interna del mismo, sino por falta de concordancia entre las medidas económicas y la realidad colonial. El nivel de desarrollo de la economía de mercado en el Virreinato del Perú, aparentó ser más "moderna" de lo que efectivamente era. El termómetro que midió esta inconsistencia, fueron precisamente las reformas fiscales Borbónicas.

Las reformas tuvieron como consecuencia inmediata, el abrir una brecha irreversible entre la sociedad colonial y la Corona.⁴⁹ Las protestas frente a las medidas económicas salpicaron todo el territorio del virreinato. No obstante cabe preguntarse porqué sólo el sur-andino estuvo en capacidad de generar una caja de resonancia de tal intensidad, que desembocara en el estallido de la gran rebelión de 1780-81. Consideramos que es probable que las reformas fiscales también tuvieron la peculiaridad de acentuar los regionalismos.

A nuestro entender, el sur-andino del virreinato peruano fue la región donde se *acumularon las contradicciones coloniales*. Sólo las provincias del sur-andino estuvieron sometidas a la mita minera de Potosí. Además concentrándose en esta región la población indígena colonial, la masa de tributarios era la más alta del virreinato. Si a ésto le sumamos el reparto, las presiones económicas a las que era sometida esta región eran considerables. Al transferirse en 1776 el Alto Perú al Virreinato del Río de La Plata (Buenos Aires), hubo un debilitamiento de las tradicionales redes comerciales que unían el sur-andino. La creación de aduanas a partir de 1775 en adelante en puntos estratégicos del circuito comercial Cuzco-Potosí y el incremento de alcabalas, al que se sumó el nuevo esquema de alcabalas, terminó por desestabilizar el sistema económico regional. Dado el impacto de la disrupción económica, una rebelión de las dimensiones descritas, sólo habría podido prender en el sur-andino peruano. Si las reformas fiscales Borbónicas no hubieran sido aplicadas con tanta rigurosidad en esta región, la gran rebelión probablemente no habría llegado a estallar, o en todo caso, no se habría presentado con la misma intensidad.⁵⁰

NOTAS

- * La presente investigación ha contado con el apoyo de la British Academy. Aunque originalmente preparado para la conferencia de Bielefeld, se publica simultaneamente en la revista *Historia y Cultura* de Lima. La autora agradece los comentarios realizados por el Prof. John Lynch, Prof. Manfred Kossok y Dr. Nils Jacobsen, al presente trabajo.
- 1. Brooke Larson, "Economic Decline and Social Change in an Agrarian Hinterland: Cochabamba in the Late Colonial Period," (Tesis de Ph.D., Columbia University, 1978), p.275.
- 2. Oscar Cornblit, "Levantamientos de masas en Perú y Bolivia durante el siglo XVIII," en Alberto Flores Galindo ed., *Túpac Amaru II - Antología* (Lima, 1976), pp.172 - 174. Primera edición en español, *RLAS*, 2 (1970).
- 3. Mark Burkholder, "From Creole to Peninsular: the Transformation of the Audiencia de Lima," *HAHR*, 52 (1972), p.400, 402. También puede consultarse Burkholder and D. Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority* (Columbia, 1977), pp.103, 106.
- 4. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, *El corregidor de indios y la economía peruana del siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1977), p.147. En 1761 de siete criollos que se presentaron como candidatos para puestos de corregidor, sólo uno, el Conde de Portillo, obtuvo el corregimiento de Chucuito; Víctor Angles Vargas, *El cacique Tambohuacso* (Lima, 1975), p.63.
- 5. John Frederick Wibel, "The Evolution of a Regional Community Within Spanish Empire and Peruvian Nation. Arequipa 1780 - 1845," (Tesis de Ph.D., Stanford University, 1975), p.17.
- 6. Leon Campbell, "The Foreigners in Peruvian Society During the XVIIIth Century," *RHA*, 73 - 74 (1972), 153 - 163. También consúltese: John Preston Moore, *The Cabildo in Perú Under the Bourbons* (Durham, 1966), p.137.
- 7. Dentro de los inculpados a causa de la rebelión de Túpac Amaru se encontraban dos españoles (Don Juan Antonio Figueroa y Don Francisco de Cisneros), casados con las criollas Andrea y María Esquivel, respectivamente. Para mayores detalles consúltese Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, "La rebelión de Túpac Amaru: Organización interna, dirigencia y alianzas," *HL*, 3 (1979), pp.99, 102.
- 8. Angles Vargas, *El cacique Tambohuacso*, p.70.
- 9. Ibid.
- 10. Correspondencia de Don Antonio de Areche, AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Leg. 1039.
- 11. O'Phelan Godoy, "El movimiento Túpacamarista: Fases, Coyuntura económica y perfil de la composición social de su dirigencia," en *Actas de Coloquio Internacional Túpac Amaru y su Tiempo* (Lima, 1982), p.471. Las declaraciones se encuentran en AGI, Audiencia de Cuzco, Legs. 32, 33 y Audiencia de Buenos Aires, Legs. 67, 319.
- 12. Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *Lima y Buenos Aires: Repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del Virreinato de la Plata* (Sevilla, 1947), p.29.
- 13. John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration 1782 - 1810. The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata* (New York, 1969), p.41.

14. Lillian Estelle Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt, 1780 - 1783* (Oklahoma, 1966), p.281, para el caso de La Paz. Larson, "Economic Decline and Social Change," p.53, para el caso de Cochabamba.
15. O'Phelan Godoy, "El movimiento Túpacamarista," p.469.
16. Pedro Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica, geográfica, física, política, civil y legal del gobierno de la Intendencia de Potosí (1791)* (Potosí, 1952), p.502.
17. Archivo General de la Nación, ed., *Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1928), Serie III, Vol. 5, p.190, 194.
18. S. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru* (Köln, Wien, 1985), pp.168 - 173.
19. *Ibid.*, p.258 - 259.
20. John Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru. The Intendant System, 1784 - 1814* (London, 1970), p.5. En contraposición el programa Borbónico estimuló el desarrollo del Río de La Plata, beneficiándolo con la excepción de ciertos impuestos. Para mayores detalles consúltese: Susan Socolow, *The Merchants of Buenos Aires 1778 - 1810* (Cambridge, 1978), p.113.
21. AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Leg. 1052. Autos seguidos sobre la sedición y tumulto acaecido en esta ciudad de Arequipa. La evidencia indica que en la aduana se venía cobrando alcabala de los granos de trigo, semilla de papa, chuño.
22. Magnus Mörner, *Perfil de la sociedad rural del Cuzco a fines de la Colonia* (Lima, 1978), p.84. Mörner señala la proliferación que habían experimentado los chorrillos en las provincias cuzqueñas. En el trabajo de Maximiliano Moscoso, "Apuntes para la historia de la industria textil en el Cuzco colonial," *RU*, 122/125 (Cuzco, 1965), 67 - 94 se hace mención de numerosos chorrillos que venían funcionando en el Cuzco, aunque sin identificarse a sus propietarios.
23. Fernando Silva Santisteban, *Los obrajes en el Virreinato del Perú* (Lima, 1964), p.33. "Chorrillo era un pequeño obraje que carecía de batán, *comunemente* de los indios, no pasaba de tener seis telares. Los operarios de los chorrillos eran habitualmente *los mismos integrantes del núcleo familiar*, es prácticamente el exponente de la industria doméstica." Subrayado es nuestro.
24. Angles Vargas, *El cacique Tambohuacso*, p.168.
25. Boleslao Lewin, *La rebelión de Túpac Amaru* (Buenos Aires, 1967), p.148. En la Aduana de La Paz, en 1780 gravaron con la alcabala al 6 por ciento la yerba, la coca y las bayetas de los *chorrillos*.
26. Angles Vargas, *El cacique Tambohuacso*, p. 62. Declaraciones de Ildefonso del Castillo. O'Phelan Godoy, "La rebelión de Túpac Amaru," p.99, 112, 114, alude a la participación de Cisneros y Figueroa, en la gran rebelión.
27. Manuel Espinavete López, "Descripción de la provincia de Abancay," *MP*, Vol. XII (1795), p.141. "...los jornales se satisfacen a todos, parte en dinero y parte en comestibles y vestuario."
28. Orden de Don José Antonio de Areche, sobre "que no se permita sacar plata ni oro sin fundir ni quintar," Junio, 1779, RAH, Colección Mata Linares, Tomo 108.
29. Relación del gobierno del Virrey Guirior, f. 103: "en 23 de Junio de 1777 determiné se cargase sobre aquel licor el considerable impuesto de doze y medio..." BM, Egerton 1811.
30. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts*, p.168.

31. Ibid., p.187.
32. *Documentos para la Historia del Virreinato del Río de La Plata*, 3 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1912 - 1913), III, 76 - 77.
33. Graciela Ibarra de Roncoroni, "Un aspecto del comercio Salteño (1778 - 1811)," en *Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas*, Rosario, 8 (1965), 313 - 314, "La tornaguía resulta de una exigencia administrativa para asegurar que los comerciantes paguen el impuesto debido por sus ventas... En cada asiento constan los siguientes datos: Nombre y apellido del vendedor, número de la guía, fecha, nombre del que recibe y destino a que se remite la mercadería. Sobre el margen derecho figura el nombre del fiador y sobre el izquierdo el rótulo de cancelada."
34. AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Leg. 1052.
35. AGI, Audiencia de Lima, Leg. 1039. Subrayado es nuestro.
36. Ibid. Subrayado es nuestro.
37. Don Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, "Memoria de gobierno," en M. A. Fuentes, ed., *Memorias de los Virreyes que han gobernado el Perú*, 6 tomos (Lima, 1859), VI, 69.
38. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts*, pp.182 - 183.
39. AGI, Audiencia de Buenos Aires, Leg. 319, citado en O'Phelan Godoy, "El movimiento Túpacamarista," p.471. Subrayado es nuestro.
40. Wibel, "The Evolution of a Regional Community," *passim*; Kendall Walker Brown, "The Economic and Fiscal Structure of Eighteenth - Century Arequipa," (Tesis de Ph.D. Duke University, 1978).
41. Herbert S. Klein, "Structure and Profitability of Royal Finance in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1790," *HAHR*, 53 (1973), 442 - 469.
42. Rubén Vargas Ugarte, *Historia del Perú. Virreinato (siglo XVIII)* (Buenos Aires, 1954), p.372.
43. Javier Tord Nicolini, "El Corregidor de Indios del Perú: comercio y tributos," *HC*, 8 (1974), 198.
44. Fisher, *Government and Society*, p.112.
45. Carlos Díaz Rementería, "En torno a un aspecto de la política reformista de Carlos III: las matrículas de tributarios en los Virreinos del Perú y Río de La Plata," *RI*, 37(1977), 147 - 148, 59.
46. "Virrey Agustín de Jaúregui," in Manuel de Mendiburu, *Diccionario Histórico Biográfico*, 6. vols. (Lima, 1874 - 1890), VI, 354. Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration*, p.60, 244. Para el caso de la participación de mestizos en la gran rebelión consúltese: O'Phelan, "La rebelión de Túpac Amaru," p.101.
47. O'Phelan Godoy, "La rebelión de Túpac Amaru," p.102.
48. Algunas medidas tuvieron que replegarse debido a las protestas que motivaron. La aplicación de la alcabala a los granos tuvo que dilatarse. RAH, Colección Mata Linares, Vol. 110. La actividad de la Aduana de Arequipa quedó momentáneamente paralizada; ver Lewin, *La rebelión de Túpac Amaru*, p.162. La extensión del tributo a mestizos, zambos y mulatos, nunca entró en vigencia.
49. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts*, p.261.
50. Ibid., p.260.

COMMENTARY

Manfred Kossok*

The contribution by Scarlett O'Phelan is of particular interest for demonstrating, on the basis of solid sources, the effects of the Bourbon reforms "from below." In contrast to much of the literature on the Caroline reforms in which theoretical – juridical questions are excessively dominant, O'Phelan presents us with a material – social study. Of course the author's chosen geographical focus permits only in part generalizations concerning the whole of Spanish America during the so-called reform era.

The author convincingly documents the quantitative and qualitative changes of fiscal policy, the key element of the whole reform project. It becomes clear that the major categories of the population – creoles, mestizos and Indians – were affected by the altered system of taxation, and by which mechanisms this occurred. As a consequence the possibilities of a general opposition against the Spanish policies and its dedicated representatives were enhanced. The connection drawn by O'Phelan between reform policy and revolutionary crisis (1780) must be viewed as conclusive.

The results and interpretations of the study invite further discussion and give rise to the following lines of thought:

1. As close as the connection between reforms – especially the new fiscal policies – and the revolutionary movements of 1780 may have been, the other factors which triggered and gave it its peculiar imprint, must not be neglected. Otherwise the impression may arise that the great crisis commencing in 1780 was a mere tax rebellion of which, as is well known, there were many during the colonial period – just as in the history of feudalism in general. Such a perspective would constitute an underestimation of the complexity and programmatic breadth of the movement since 1780, of its new historical quality – precisely transcending tax protests – as an integral part of the pre-independence process. The connection between the economic and political spheres in reality was considerably more complex.

* Translated from German by Nils Jacobsen

2. Creoles, mestizos and Indians admittedly were all affected by the new fiscal policy, albeit in rather different ways, something which the author has not stressed sufficiently. Also on this point a differentiated approach is necessary, in order to comprehend the distinct behavior of the mentioned groups (classes, strata) during the critical years of 1780 – 1781 and especially thereafter.

3. Besides the growing delimitation between Bajo and Alto Peru, clearly perceived by the author, a delimitation whose proto – national potential might well be worth a study of its own, there arises the question of an intra – regional (localistic) differentiation concerning the application and consequences of the new fiscal policies. For the type of dissolution later experienced by the "uniform" colonial system, the dialectical relationship between intra – and inter – regional diversification requires detailed analysis.

4. Only in passing does the author mention the significant consequences of the new fiscal policies for the process of accumulation. Because of the well known close connection between primitive accumulation and the genesis of capitalism, more attention should be dedicated to this problem, in order to come to grips with the double deformation of the process of accumulation in the Iberian world: on the one hand concerning the volume and quality of accumulation directed "to the outside" (from the colony to the metropolis), for which a comparison to the analogous studies of Enrique Semo on New Spain would be worthwhile; on the other hand concerning the primarily feudal (and not capitalist) utilization of the products of the accumulation process in the metropolis, or its immediate or indirect drainage to the other European centers of accumulation. These are, after all, decisive defining points for the later socioeconomic character of the independent regimes. What was articulated, at the surface, as resistance motivated by traditionalism and insistence on entrenched rights, ultimately had its substance in fundamental economic conflicts of interests.

The results of John TePaske's study on the development of revenue collection in the *cajas* of Mexico and Lima reaffirms the well known picture about the general economic tendencies of development during the period of the Caroline reform policies and the open crisis of the traditional colonial system. This study documents the continuing dominance of mining inspite of the general upswing in agriculture, something already affirmed by numerous contemporary authors (e.g. Humboldt). Peru's capacity to compensate for the loss of Upper Peru that occurred with the

foundation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, seems quite remarkable. It serves note on us, not to underestimate the degree of flexibility of colonial economies.

What makes such a study problematic, is that an augmented inflow of revenue does not constitute immediate proof for a comparable economic upswing. For the Mexican case the author himself relativized the results by attempting to juxtapose the nominal and deflated real revenue income. Analogous data for Peru unfortunately are not available, a fact which made it impossible to fully accomplish the interesting comparison. One would also have to investigate the problem to which degree the greater efficiency of fiscal policies lead to higher collections of the treasury without necessarily implying a proportionally equivalent economic development. The paper by Scarlett O'Phelan offers interesting clues for this discrepancy, which, of course, cannot be measured with precision. As a partial correction one would need to add the "illegal quota" (contraband trade, tax evasion and similar activities).

The author's attempt to calculate the per-capita tax rate for Mexico appears less compelling: On the one hand, the available statistics on population are too imprecise. On the other hand, the very measure of a tax rate for a colonial feudal economy must be questioned for the following two reasons: 1. the extreme polarization between a minority of property owners and the large majority of non-proprietors; and 2. the great significance of a non-integrated subsistence economy, which often is not even registered through tribute collection.

Beyond the detailed calculations of revenue quantities, there is the problem of the functional utilization of the accumulated sums (for productive ends or for the quasi-feudal formation of treasure). As is well known, the late colonial period was characterized by an acute shortage of capital in the mining sector as a consequence of an insufficient credit system. From the deformation of the process of accumulation (both towards the exterior and the interior) follows the further problem, that figures on quantitative growth need not necessarily constitute an index for qualitative changes in the structure of production (and, by extension, in the social structure). One may deduce as a working hypothesis, that from this there arose rather important consequences for the nature of the future independent societies. The quantitative economic growth had the potential to deepen the conflict of interests between colony and metropolis, since the discrepancy of economic power and political subordination experienced by the creole aristocracy (large landholders, local notables) was becoming more acute. Colonial economic

growth did not, however, imply a corresponding gain in bourgeois (capitalist) substance. In this way a deficit of social hegemony – relative to other revolutionary processes of the epoch – was preprogrammed.

The question concerning the cyclical nature of economic development (cycle understood as periodicity), which TePaske raises in connection with various methodological approaches and interpretations found in the literature, can, I believe, be answered negatively. Rather it is the element of steady progression without qualitative leaps which is dominant, combined with partial, regionally differentiated recessions. In this the complicated influence of exogenous factors would require precise analysis.

Also the difference between the various "core areas," which without doubt contributed the lion's share of revenue, and the less important, but at the same time more dynamic "periphery," should not escape our attention.

Finally, concerning the revenues of Lima (and their partial flow to Spain), the question still requires detailed analysis what the consequences (at least temporarily) of the profound crisis of 1780–81 might have been.

14. THE MONEY PLANT: THE ROYAL TOBACCO MONOPOLY OF NEW SPAIN, 1765 – 1821

Susan Deans – Smith

I.

In a recent review article John Fisher posed the question of whether or not

...the Bourbon reforms tend to bewitch all who study them. Did they really comprise the smooth, coherent, masterly program of imperial change and revival that generations of commentators, from the very imperial policy makers of eighteenth century Spain to the researchers of today have identified? Might they not be more realistically depicted in terms of a halting, uncertain, inconsistent desire for imperial modernization and centralization, characterized more by delay, contradiction and obstruction than by decisiveness?¹

It is a question well worth asking but one which still awaits a satisfactory response. Certainly in the following analysis of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly of New Spain, evidence presented can only be used to support the traditional view of the Bourbon reforms. The monopoly's administration and management illustrates not just the organizational capacity of the Bourbon reformers but the lengths to which they were prepared to go to ensure its success in producing revenues for the Spanish crown. Behind those revenues, however, lies a hitherto virtually untouched history of how the establishment of the monopoly affected New Spain and those individuals caught in the changes it wrought.² Emphasis will be placed on two groups affected by the imposition of the monopoly: the tobacco growers and the *cigarreros* (private tobacco store owners). Before examining what happened to these groups a brief look at the background to, and fiscal structure of the Tobacco Monopoly is in order.

The monopolization of tobacco in New Spain came relatively late compared to other Spanish American colonies. A formal monopoly had been established in Cuba in 1717, in Peru by 1752 and in 1753 Chile and La Plata were added to the Peruvian jurisdiction. Venezuela, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Nueva Granada joined the group in 1778, thirteen years after it had been established in New Spain. Monopolies were established in the Philippines in 1782 and Puerto Rico in 1783.

The Visitor General, José de Gálvez, had always supported the idea of such a monopoly in New Spain and was only too well aware of its revenue potential. Writing to the Viceroy in 1766, he commented:

Muchos son los millones que perdió la Corona en tantos años que ha corrido el tabaco por toda la América Española como género de libre comercio. Mas de un siglo ha que el Venerable Dn. Juan de Palafox aconsejó al Conde de Salvatierra ... que se estancara el tabaco ... pero ha sido, tal la desidia de los que han gobernado estos Dominios distantes del Trono, que, ó no pensaron en los asuntos más importantes, ó se finixieron dificultades que nunca hubo.³

Reluctance to establish a monopoly can be partially explained by a fear of hostility on the part of vested interests.

Yet those fears and objections were superseded by a greater threat – possible defeat at the hands of the British. Military reform was necessary and the costs of raising regular and militia units in New Spain made the imposition of new taxes imperative as did the general war effort of the peninsula. Since tobacco was deemed to be a substance unnecessary to sustain human life, the creation of the monopoly was judged to be the fairest and least burdensome way of generating new revenues. The Crown's decision was made public in two royal decrees of December 14, 1764 and January 18, 1765.⁴ Profits received from the Tobacco Monopoly along with those from the playing card and quicksilver monopolies were to be placed into the *masa remisible* and shipped directly to Spain. Production was for the domestic market only.

Designed to secure control over tobacco and tobacco products throughout the colony, the monopoly was placed in the hands of a professional, salaried bureaucracy. The Viceroy, acting as President of the Junta de Tabaco, met and conferred periodically with the members of the General Directorate. All policy decisions were taken at this level. Selection of personnel was the responsibility of the General Directorate, accounts and finance were administered by the *Contaduría* and *Tesorería* sections. Bureaucrats were paid fixed annual salaries while other employees such as the members of the *Resguardo* units were paid fixed daily wages. By 1790 there were an estimated 17,256 individuals employed and paid by the monopoly.⁵

By 1810 New Spain provided three quarters of all profits received from the Spanish colonies. The contribution made to those profits by the sale of tobacco was substantial and, after silver, was probably the most lucrative source of revenue to which the Spanish Crown had access. As


can be seen from Graph I, using current pesos (nominal) total receipts from the monopoly followed a secular upward trend to nine and one half million pesos by 1809; profits grew steadily until 1799 when the trend seemed to stabilize at between three and one half and four million pesos. It should be noted here that state management of the tobacco industry was not apparently as efficient as that of private control – one estimate of the values of tobacco sales in 1748 for all of New Spain was placed at 12,348,000 pesos.⁶ In order to express the value of these receipts, however, in terms of their purchasing power, the data have been deflated by an index of maize prices based on Florescano's Mexico City figures. The deflated data (Table I, Graph II) show that the highest point and longest period of sustained increase in the value of tobacco receipts occurred by 1792 when total receipts reached nine million pesos and stabilized thereafter at around seven million pesos; profits reached their peak of five million pesos in 1792, thereafter fluctuating between three million and four million pesos. Hence, in real terms, the high point of fiscal returns from tobacco occurred well before 1809 although the income from the sale of the tobacco products remained substantial until the outbreak of the insurgency in 1810. Not surprisingly, the most lucrative administrations were Mexico City and its environs (Querétaro came under its jurisdiction), Valladolid and Guadalajara.

Throughout the period, the General Directorate was concerned to keep prices of tobacco products at a reasonably moderate level in order to avoid encouraging contraband. Nevertheless, prices were increased twice – in 1777 and 1800. Until the first increase consumers could purchase a pack of *cigarros* containing between forty-two and sixty *cigarros*, according to the quality, for one half real. *Papeles de puros* (packs of cigars) containing between six and sixteen *puros*, again depending on their class, could also be purchased for one half real. With an eye to reaching all types of consumers, certain types of *cigarros* could also be sold in sets of twelve for one tlaco (there were five tlacos to one half real).⁷ Leaf tobacco was sold at six reales per pound in the General Administration of Mexico but at seven and one half reales in Chihuahua. After 1777, however, this price of leaf was standardized throughout the colony at eight reales per pound. The price of *cigarros* and *puros* was then increased by reducing the quantity contained in each packet. The number of *cigarros* ranged between thirty-six and forty-eight per pack and between five and fourteen per pack of *puros*. After 1800, leaf sold at ten reales per pound, *puros* remained the same, *cigarros* were now sold in packs containing between forty-two and thirty

GRAPH I: *The Royal Tobacco Monopoly of New Spain, 1765 - 1809*

a. Current Pesos


— Total Receipts
 Total Costs
 ----- Net Profits



GRAPH II: *The Royal Tobacco Monopoly of New Spain, 1765 - 1809*

b. Constant Pesos

— Total Receipts
 Total Costs
 - - - - - Net Profits



for one half real.⁸ It should be noted that although the cost of tobacco products to the consumer increased, the cost of leaf tobacco purchased by the crown did not. The ability of the General Directorate to maintain the same purchase price of tobacco from the growers for almost forty years is crucial to an understanding of the fiscal success of the monopoly. This is one of the issues with which we shall deal in the next section.

TABLE I: *Total Receipts, Costs of Production and Net Profits of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly, 1765 – 1809 (Current and Constant Pesos)*

YEAR	TOTAL RECEIPTS		TOTAL COSTS		NET PROFITS	
	Nominal	Deflated	Nominal	Deflated	Nominal	Deflated
1787	5,957,720	2,984,531	3,036,655	1,521,218	2,921,065	1,463,313
1788	6,243,183	3,463,298	3,336,942	1,851,111	2,906,241	1,612,187
1789	6,293,182	3,910,922	2,682,971	1,667,343	3,610,211	2,243,579
1790	6,235,315	4,404,715	2,837,349	2,004,344	3,397,966	2,400,372
1791	6,485,627	5,939,763	3,058,789	2,801,345	3,426,838	3,138,417
1792	6,705,635	9,260,648	2,991,004	4,130,650	3,714,632	5,129,999
1793	6,684,864	6,811,559	3,258,772	3,320,534	3,426,092	3,491,025
1794	6,526,352	5,288,711	3,417,540	2,758,973	3,108,812	2,509,738
1795	6,975,463	4,662,743	3,039,864	2,031,995	3,935,599	2,630,748
1796	7,336,540	7,527,747	3,400,312	3,488,931	3,986,228	4,090,117
1797	7,660,350	6,271,265	3,847,000	3,149,406	3,813,350	3,121,858
1798	8,251,574	5,220,202	3,711,778	2,348,186	4,539,796	2,872,016
1799	7,521,621	5,297,289	4,125,232	2,905,298	3,396,390	2,391,992
1800	7,433,159	5,145,479	4,020,559	2,783,164	3,412,600	2,362,315
1801	7,825,914	5,978,087	3,832,079	2,927,262	3,993,834	3,050,824
1802	7,686,835	4,006,064	3,594,205	1,873,152	4,092,630	2,132,911
1803	7,747,529	5,558,817	4,196,914	3,010,915	3,550,615	2,547,252
1804	7,910,719	7,493,339	4,125,747	3,908,068	3,784,972	3,585,272
1805	8,599,624	6,531,691	4,352,379	3,305,772	4,274,345	3,246,502
1806	9,116,393	6,141,466	5,255,066	3,540,195	3,861,327	2,601,272
1807	9,417,205	6,832,478	6,287,483	4,561,767	3,129,781	2,270,755
1808	9,061,468	5,214,333	4,613,982	2,655,071	4,447,486	2,575,014
1809	9,558,698	5,126,682	5,978,748	3,206,623	3,579,950	1,920,059

Source: Fonseca y Urrutía, *Libro de la Real Hacienda* Vol. VII; Relaciones Generales for years 1790 – 1809, extracted from various volumes of the Ramo de Tabaco, Archivo General de la Nación, México; E. Florescano, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México 1708 – 1810* (México, 1969). Base years for the maize price index: 1726 – 1742 = 100.

II.

Apart from the creation of the extensive administrative machinery which provided the base of the monopoly operations, three major steps were taken to ensure complete control over tobacco: the restriction of tobacco cultivation, elimination of the *cigarrerías* and the erection of the state tobacco factories and *estancillos* (monopoly tobacco stores). Not all were achieved at the same time and, as we shall see, the Spanish Crown was not in complete control of income from sales of tobacco until 1775.

In 1765, merchants and dealers throughout New Spain were required to declare all their tobacco stocks and sell them to specially appointed officials representing the new monopoly. Cultivation of tobacco was henceforth declared illegal with the exception of that grown in what is today the state of Veracruz. More specifically, the area chosen encompassed the *villas* of Orizaba, Córdoba, Huatusco and Zongolica. Prior to the monopoly, tobacco was grown as a cash crop mainly in Guadalajara, Puebla and Oaxaca. Very little is known as to actual numbers involved and the real impact of the monopoly prohibition for these growers. Evidently whatever protests were made by these growers fell on deaf ears. The advice was to convert to other crops. A less acceptable alternative as far as the Spanish Crown was concerned was, of course, contraband. Given the efforts put into eliminating clandestine cultivation of tobacco, some growers found contraband a viable option.

The areas in Veracruz were chosen partly for the quality of the tobacco produced there and partly for the relative ease with which illegal cultivation could be controlled by reason of the geographical features of the region. By 1803 the Intendancy of Veracruz covered 4,141 square leagues and had a population of 156,000, a ratio of approximately thirty-eight inhabitants per square league.⁹ Such a low population created an enormous obstacle to the development of urban centers, commerce and local artesan crafts in view of the lack of sustained demand from local markets. Veracruz remained throughout the colonial period a region dependent upon its agricultural products, most notably vanilla, sugar, cotton, maize and tobacco. Sugar and tobacco were the major crops of the growing zone prior to the implementation of the monopoly. In order to take a closer look at the tobacco growers, emphasis will be placed on Orizaba as it is impossible to deal with all four areas in this paper.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century tobacco had slowly begun to displace sugar as the dominant cash crop of Orizaba. By the early 1700's Orizaba had gained fame as one of the most important tobacco-producing regions of the colony. A wide-leaf plant was cultivated (of the species *Nicotiana Tabacum*) which produced a good, aromatic tobacco. Thus, since a shift had occurred away from sugar to tobacco almost fifty years before the monopoly, the Spanish Crown simply accelerated a trend that already was under way.

While tobacco growers in Guadalajara wondered how to make their future living, the growers in Orizaba contemplated their new situation. Instructions were given that *diputados* (representatives) were to be elected from the *común de cosecheros*. These had to travel to Mexico City where, theoretically, they negotiated with the General Directorate for satisfactory prices at which they would sell their tobacco to the monopoly. The relationship between the monopoly and the growers was carried out via a contract system. Such contracts stipulated prices, conditions of delivery, packaging, deductions to be made for waste and shrinkage and the duration of each contract. The General Directorate decided how much tobacco had to be produced in order to satisfy the needs of the domestic market. Licenses were issued to each planter who had agreed to the new contract stating how many *matas* (plants) he had been allocated. The eventual amount was a compromise between how many *tercios* of tobacco the General Directorate required, how many growers wished to contract and the production capacity of each.¹⁰ Growers were then bound by these conditions. Excess cultivation of tobacco by growers above their license allocation was treated as contraband activity. After delivery at the monopoly warehouse in Orizaba, each planter's *tercios* of tobacco were weighed, evaluated and, after deductions such as the *alcabala* (6 percent) and *diezmo* (8 percent), he received a cash payment. For its part, the monopoly represented a guaranteed buyer and, of far more significance, it advanced to the planter's interest-free credit to help cover costs of production.¹¹ It seems that this was done in order to ensure that the required production levels were met by the growers. Left to their own resources, apparently, the majority would have been unable to increase the quantity of tobacco cultivated. Writing to the Viceroy in 1764, the man who was to become the first Director General of the monopoly, Jacinto Espinosa commented:

...los labradores cosecheros y rancheros que se ocupan y emplean en la siembra y cultivo de tabacos en Orizaba y Córdoba ... son pobres y que piden a los Hacenderos y marchantes algun dinero para el havió de sus gastos de

siembra ... por lo que se hace preciso e indispensable se les proponga y asegure que por cuenta de la Real Hacienda se les subministran y anticipara el mismo havió que antes ... en dinero efectivo y no en otras especies....¹²

Another adviser to the General Directorate, Don Antonio Carlin, observed that prior to the monopoly few growers cultivated more than 30,000 or 40,000 *matas*. Considering that by the beginning of the 1770's 100,000 *matas* was to be the average number planted by many growers with some receiving licenses to plant 5,000,000, then clearly an intensification of cultivation was under way.

Any illusions that the deputies elected by the growers could influence the contracts drawn up were soon destroyed. By 1772 they were refusing to agree to further contracts until the prices offered by the monopoly were increased. Indeed, in 1777 the deputies and the *común de cosecheros* were abolished. The growers found themselves unable to bargain. In 1765 prices for tobacco were set at three and one fourth reales a pound of first grade tobacco, two and one half reales a pound of second grade, one real a pound of third grade and *punta* was to be purchased at twenty-four reales an arroba.¹³ Gálvez, the Visitor General, furious that the prices had been set so high, at least by his standards, declared that they must be reduced. Thus, the second contract drawn up in 1767 stipulated that the prices for first, second, third grade tobaccos and *punta* were to be set at three reales, two reales, one real and twenty-four reales respectively. Between 1765 and 1810 fifteen major contracts were drawn up and agreed upon despite continuous and severe conflict between the growers and the monopoly. Prices were always the central point of contention. On two occasions planters complained that it was simply not worth their while to continue growing tobacco at the prices offered and that there was no point in signing a contract. On both occasions the monopoly, with royal approval, took the same action. The General Directorate ordered the *Factor* of Orizaba to buy up or rent as many tobacco *ranchos* as possible so that the Crown could cultivate its own tobacco, thus bypassing the recalcitrant planters. Shortages of tobacco were to be met by imports from Cuba and Louisiana. Both options proved extremely costly to the crown, but they served their purpose. The growers eventually submitted and accepted the prices offered by the monopoly. By 1810 they were still being paid the same prices stipulated in the 1767 contract (with the exception of *punta* which had been lowered to twenty-two reales per arroba). Moreover, following the abolition of the *común de cosecheros* and dissolution of general contracts

(a temporary measure) those growers who contracted individually did so at lower prices still – two and three – fourths reales, one and three – fourths reales, one real for first, second and third grades, and twenty – two reales per arroba of *punta*.¹⁴ Thus most growers eventually faced a fall in real income during the inflationary years of the late eighteenth century as costs of labour and basic necessities increased, a situation which was acknowledged by the Director General.¹⁵ Yet for whatever reasons, economic, political or a combination of both, the growers continued to supply the monopoly with tobacco during the chaotic period between 1810 and 1821, often without receiving full payment for the value of their tobacco.¹⁶

Given the paucity of information concerning the tobacco trade and planters prior to 1765, any comparison between pre – and post – monopoly situations is rendered extremely difficult. The best that can be done at the moment is to take a brief look at the planter group of Orizaba.

One advantage of the contract system and licensing of growers was that those growers known as *los cosecheros verdaderos* were given preference when the tobacco quota was allocated between the planters. Partly to prevent an influx of potential tobacco growers tempted by the thought of interest – free credit, those individuals known to have made their living from growing tobacco prior to the monopoly, especially those with their own *ranchos* and equipment were permitted to request their preferred quantity of *matas* first. The monopoly, of course, did have a vested interest in this. Subsistence farmers with few tools and even less skill at growing tobacco were not in a position to produce high quality tobacco which satisfied the consumer. At the same time, a limit on the number of growers who could contract meant that growers were more likely to receive the quantity of *matas* requested. Only when their allocations had been made and if a quantity remained to be distributed would new growers be allowed to contract. Thus, a distinction can be made between a core group of planters, *los cosecheros verdaderos*, and the rest of the growers who were far less stable in their composition. While the former group generally grew tobacco every year, the latter were a mixture of what appears to be a floating rural migrant group, and local subsistence farmers who grew tobacco when it was convenient to do so. Thus determination of how many growers were involved is not a simple exercise.¹⁷

If the numbers are measured by the quantity of licenses issued, then we get the following range of figures:

Year	Number of Licenses Issued
1769	228
1774	200
1788	236
1789	290
1790	133
1795	227
1799	159

However, if the *aviados* of certain planters are added then the numbers increase. For the year 1789, for example, by adding the total number of *aviados* the number becomes 575. Conversely, the numbers are reduced if the amount of harvests delivered to the monopoly warehouse is taken as a measurement:

Year	Number of Harvests Received
1769	90
1774	138
1789	129

The discrepancies can be accounted for, in part, by poorer growers selling their tobacco to wealthier growers after cutting the leaf since they could not afford to dry and cure their tobacco. A different set of figures is presented altogether if the numbers of planters receiving credit is taken as a measurement as to how many individuals were involved.¹⁸

Year and Number of Growers Receiving Credit

1792	83	1799	56	1806	126
1793	70	1800	58	1807	148
1794	76	1801	56	1808	176
1795	65	1802	104	1809	176
1796	61	1804	82	1810	114
1798	60	1805	69	1811	110

Thus, for the moment, it seems as though the core group had a numerical range of between 50 and 150.¹⁹

The credit advanced by the monopoly was not given to everyone. Planters had to be able to provide a suitable *fiador* and/or security against any credit borrowed. Restrictions were imposed on the use of monopoly credit to prevent it being invested in other interests. An overall amount was decided depending upon the quantity of plants a grower had to cultivate. The amounts and names were entered into *registros de créditos*. Amounts allocated were generally divided into two parts, the first to cover costs of growing the tobacco, the second to cover its *beneficio* (curing, drying and packing). Money for the latter operation was not delivered until monopoly officials, namely the *Factor* and the Inspector General, were satisfied that the first credit quota had been used for its correct purpose.

Much of the credit advanced went to pay labour costs. One crucial feature to remember about tobacco is that it was (and is) a labour intensive crop. There was always a high demand for *tabaqueros*, especially skilled ones. Effectively, these workers could determine the quality of a planter's crop. Knowing when to cut the leaves, and how to cut them correctly was a skilled operation. Cutting too high, too low and too soon could mean the difference between a crop with a high proportion of a high grade leaf, as opposed to one with predominantly low grade leaf. *Cuadrillas* of Indians were brought in from the surrounding pueblos to perform a variety of tasks. Workers were needed for the preparation of seed beds, transplanting, weeding, topping, suckering, cutting, stringing and hanging the leaves, sorting and packing. Those planters who employed *operarios* on their tobacco *ranchos* paid them between two and three-fourths reales and three reales per day (with or without food depending on the task).²⁰ By 1800 growers were complaining that costs of labour had risen to between three reales and four reales per day.²¹ Competition for skilled workers undoubtedly exercised an influence on rural wages, but so did competition between tobacco growers and sugar *hacendados*. It was not simply a question of a shortage of skilled tobacco workers but of workers in general. Commenting on the problems faced by tobacco growers, Antonio de Sobrevilla observed that the *gente operaria* constituted the greatest cost, not just for the *jornales* but for the money which remained owing to the growers from workers who ran away or died. Costs were increased further by having to pay people to search for and bring back recalcitrant *operarios*.²²

Any idea that the tobacco growers were akin to a homogeneous group of yeoman farmers is firmly dismissed by looking at the following two

examples: In 1779 the total value of tobacco *cosechas* in Orizaba amounted to 240,085 pesos. Of that amount 5 1/2 percent of the total number of growers paid, received 40 percent of the value of the crop with three growers receiving 61,942 pesos, 22,366 pesos and 11,303 pesos respectively.²³ In 1792 the spectrum of payments included Manuel José Hernández who received ten pesos from a crop worth 360 pesos after credit and other deductions had been made; Don Felipe Torres received 331 pesos from a crop worth 3,531 pesos, while Da. Bernarda Rendón received 21,416 pesos from her crop valued at 36,000 pesos.²⁴

The differentiation of the planter group implied by these two examples is borne out if we take a closer look at the growers. Based on planter cultivation profiles the pattern of differentiation which emerged between the growers can be roughly described as follows:²⁵

1. an "elite" core of wealthy growers, the merchant - planters;
2. a middle group, ranging from prosperous to poor *rancheros*;
3. a marginal but ever - present group of subsistence farmers, the *pegujaleros*.

The first group tended to be wealthy Spanish merchants for whom tobacco was one of several economic interests. Often holding political posts they were more likely to live in the *villa* of Orizaba rather than on tobacco *ranchos* which they owned or rented. They employed *mayordomos* to look after their tobacco crops and were *aviadores* for the bulk of the Indian growers and poor creole or mestizo planters. For 1789/90, for example, one of the most outstanding tobacco planters of Orizaba, Don Antonio Montes Argüelles had thirty-eight creole and mestizo *aviados* distributed throughout the jurisdiction of Orizaba. He was also *aviador* to 358 Indians of the Sierra de Tequila and forty-eight Indians from Tomatlan. On average, however, the number of *aviados* was much lower, varying from one to fifty.²⁶ These planters generally cultivated between 600,000 and 5,000,000 *matas*. Argüelles is typical of this group. A peninsular Spaniard, he was a *regidor* of Orizaba. His house in the *villa* was valued at 20,000 pesos. He owned two *boticas* and a general store valued at 30,000 pesos. His bulls for the *abasto de carne* of Córdoba and Orizaba were valued at 75,600 pesos and his tobacco *ranchos* (including stock) were worth 18,000 pesos. At the time of his death his total estate was valued at 283,600 pesos, 138,788 pesos after payment of debts.²⁷ So also, by 1810 Don Francisco Florentino Avila

owned six houses, a *tienda de comercio*, two tobacco *ranchos* (valued at 6,000 pesos). His goods and properties were worth 56,800 pesos. Don Domingo Piñeiro, Spanish, also by 1810 owned four houses, three tobacco *ranchos*, and 150 mules, collectively worth 51,268 pesos.²⁸ Clearly these individuals were not solely dependent upon income received from the sale of their tobacco crop. They could withstand bad years when the value of a harvest was low.

The second group constitutes the majority of the core group of growers. These medium to small-scale planters were generally creole or mestizo *rancheros* (the majority were probably *arrendatarios*).²⁹ They were likely to live on their *ranchos*, have a few *aviados*, and cultivate between 100,000 and 500,000 plants. They generally owned livestock ranging from sheep to bulls. Values placed on *ranchos* which were owned by various planters ranged between 300 pesos and 3,000 pesos. The main difference between this group and the previous one was that they were much more vulnerable to fluctuations in the tobacco harvest, this crop being their major source of income. It should be noted here that one of the problems facing a grower was that, if he borrowed a certain amount of credit based on an estimated value of his crop he ran the risk of finding that he could just about pay off the credit and other deductions. No adjustments were made for bad harvests, prices could not be increased. The margin between profit and loss could be very thin indeed.

The third group, the *pegujaleros*, according to the Commander of the *resguardo*, can be divided into two categories: Those individuals who owned their *ranchelos* and who knew no other profession than that of growing tobacco, and those of no fixed domicile who requested licenses at the time of the allocation of *matas*, generally cheated their *aviadores* and were a major source of contraband for dealing in tobacco leaf.³⁰ Generally mestizo or Indian (occasionally mulatto), they tended to cultivate between 6,000 and 60,000 plants.

The *pegujaleros* were a source of contention between monopoly officials and the tobacco growers. In the light of restricted quantities of tobacco to be harvested each year, the more growers there were the less number of plants were available for allocation. The wealthier growers argued that the *pegujaleros* were too poor to produce high quality tobacco. The Crown responded that if such people were not permitted to cultivate tobacco they would have no means of earning an income. The *Factor* of Orizaba, Mendiola, a candid individual, observed drily that "above all else they (the *pegujaleros*) are the reserve body upon which

the Renta counts against the threats of the tobacco growers."³¹

Certainly by the first decade of the nineteenth century this pattern of differentiation within the core group seems to have established itself. Based on the growers receiving credit, you find a distribution pattern which suggests the existence of a strong middle group of small to medium-scale planters but, at the same time, what appears to be an expansion and consolidation of the elite group. Such differences did not go unnoticed by the tobacco growers who were well aware of the existence of a "privileged" group of planters. Reacting strongly to an assessment made by the *Factor* of Orizaba that the monopoly was responsible for the economic growth and prosperity of the *villa*, a spokesman for the informally reconstituted *común de cosecheros* responded:³²

Se describen muchas y hermosas fábricas nuevas, otro tanto más opulento y decoroso en los vecinos, un comercio brillante con un rápido y lucroso giro, y todo por afecto de los beneficios que ha comunicado al establecimiento de esta Renta ... no es más que una violenta estracción del dinero ... reducida toda la utilidad verdadera a una corta parte á veinticinco o treinta comerciantes...³³

Given the existing information, any assessment of the beneficial effects bestowed upon the regional economy by the establishment of the monopoly must be a speculative exercise at this stage. Apart from tobacco, sugar was the only other cash crop of significance. This suffered from two disadvantages, however, in that there was not a large market for it and, of more importance to the local farmers, it demanded heavy capital investment. Migration and contraband were other possibilities or, indeed, to work for the sugar hacendados or wealthy tobacco growers. A guaranteed buyer did not necessarily mean constant flows of capital into the economy – such dependence upon a single crop could plunge the region into crisis as it was to do in 1782 and 1801. Nevertheless, there were positive features which were direct results of the monopoly's presence: the interest-free credit which enabled wealthier planters the freedom to invest their own capital in other activities such as commerce and property; improvements of the highways from Veracruz to Mexico City. This was designed to achieve two things: to improve the route from Orizaba and Córdoba to Mexico City in order to speed up the transportation of tobacco from the growing regions to reduce wastage en route. In a wider context, the highway was conceived as part of a plan to encourage the import-export trade centered in Veracruz but also

to strengthen the development of the sugar and tobacco growing regions of Córdoba and Orizaba.³⁴ This, in addition to the substantial comings and goings of the muleteers responsible for transporting the tobacco was designed to encourage the commercial development of the area.

III.

If history has permitted the tobacco growers to give their views on the Tobacco Monopoly, it has not been so kind to their urban counterparts, the *cigarreros*. The few protests that have survived reveal little of their struggle to withstand the decision of the General Directorate and José de Gálvez to take over the private tobacco stores. The ultimate testimony to their fate is their elimination and it is to this process and their replacement by the royal factories and *estanquillos* to which we now turn.

The decision to control the manufacture and sale of tobacco products was not without conflict. In 1764 when the initial discussions were in progress concerning this policy, Espinosa, one of the Director Generals pointed out to the Viceroy that between 5,000 and 6,000 individuals were occupied in the manufacture and sale of tobacco and that they could not be left without employment.³⁵ He complained that the attempt to create a tobacco factory in Puebla had been the cause of several riots in which leaflets had been distributed with statements such as "death to Spain, long live the English" followed by threats promising to burn down the monopoly offices. Velarde, the *Fiscal* (Treasury Attorney) received petitions which made obvious a "general repugnance" to the abolition of private manufacture of tobacco products, i.e. *puros* and *cigarros*. On July 26, 1766, 30,000 people occupied the city of Guanajuato, threatened to burn the monopoly offices and demanded a return to control over the sale of leaf tobacco only. In December of the same year, popular riots broke out in Puebla and Oaxaca, albeit on a smaller scale, but with the same objective - withdrawal of the decision to take over the *cigarrerías*.³⁶ José Gálvez, dismissive of any suggestions that there was a link between the riots and the decision to control the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, began to outline how such control was to be achieved. The transfer must be carried out, but in a way that would keep the potential social and economic dislocation to a minimum. This was to be done by ensuring that the ex-*cigarrerías* were absorbed by either the new monopoly stores or the royal factories. Initially emphasis was placed on the need for a gradual transition from private to state

control over the manufacture and sale of tobacco and tobacco products. All existing *cigarrerías* were declared non-transferable through sales (at least to other private citizens), monopoly officials were to prepare registers of all the existing tobacco shops in Mexico City and tobacco factories were to be set up in the major urban centers of New Spain - Mexico City, Querétaro, Puebla, Guadalajara. Factories were also eventually established in Orizaba, Oaxaca and Durango. Thus, for a period an uneasy co-existence was maintained between private and state-owned tobacco shops. It did not last for long. With the encouraging signs of a 50 percent "profit" figure from Mexico City factory in 1769 the General Directorate was motivated to speed up the process of elimination of the private shops.³⁷ To permit the final transfer from private to public control, several surveys were carried out to determine location, age, family size, scale of operation and general economic condition of the *cigarreros* of Mexico City. Based upon the results of these surveys those owners with the largest families, owners of advanced age or widows would be given first refusal on the offer of a license to operate an *estanquillo*. When all licenses had been allocated those *cigarreros* remaining and their employees would be offered work in the Mexico City factory.

The takeover took about ten years to complete. In 1765, there were an estimated 543 *cigarrerías* in Mexico City.³⁸ By 1772 they were down to 286. By 1775 all tobacco shops were in the hands of the monopoly. One hundred and ten *estanquillos* were in operation. Riva Agüero, one of the Director Generals, estimated that in order to achieve control, it had been necessary to relocate approximately 400 owners and 1,700 tobacco workers.³⁹ Clearly, the Mexico City factory bore the burden of absorbing the majority of displaced *cigarreros*. Indeed, although the figures available for the number of individuals involved in the tobacco trade and industry are, at best, dubious, if the maximum estimate of 5,000 to 6,000 is taken, then the employment of 7,500 in the Mexico City factory indicates that extra jobs were created. This positive feature was counteracted, however, by the need to reduce the number of workers periodically after the 1790's when acute shortages of paper resulted in lower production of cigarettes.

Thus far, it has not proved possible to trace the pace of the takeover for the rest of New Spain. In 1772, well into the transition phase, the distribution of *cigarrerías* throughout the colony was as follows:⁴⁰

General Administration of Mexico	739
Factoría de Durango	104
Factoría de Valladolid	204
Factoría de Puebla	72
Factoría de Guadalajara	386

As to the *cigarreros* themselves not that much is known. Thus far, only one of the surveys carried out by the monopoly has been located. Taken in 1773 it revealed that of the existing 146 *cigarreros*, approximately half were women, seventeen of whom were widows or daughters of the previous owners. The total labour force employed in the shops amounted to 691, 30 percent of which was female. The largest shop employed thirty-one workers (all female) although the average shop employed between four and eight workers. Seven owners were classified as not needing their tobacco stores because they had other economic interests. Eight offered to sell their shops to the monopoly. Of the six who put prices on their stores, one wanted eleven pesos, three requested twenty pesos each, one, twenty-five pesos and the final one suggested 120 pesos. No indication of wages paid to the employees is given, or indeed, if the larger concerns operated with a system of wage labour at all. No direct statement of ethnic background is given. No assessment of daily takings is made.⁴¹ In the same year, 1773, the views of the *comunidad de cigarreros* were made known through the *Procurador del número de la Real Audiencia*. They offer us a rare glimpse into the *cigarreros'* self-perceptions of their situation. They lamented that their families were being ruined by the operation of the Mexico City factory. They requested that the King order the elimination of the *cigarrerías* to be stopped and that the manufacture of *cigarros* should remain free. They also emphasized the detrimental effect on women since so many derived their livelihood from the manufacture and sale of *cigarros*, not merely in Mexico City, but throughout the colony. They were thus being deprived of an honest livelihood and exposed to great dangers (i.e. prostitution).⁴² The response to their pleas has already been described.

The reaction of the General Directorate to accusations that the monopoly had caused nothing but misery and unemployment was that, on the contrary, the policy devised to effect the takeover was such that nobody would be left without some employment of some sort. To what extent that was achieved is impossible to say. For those who were employed as *estanquilleros*, they were to receive a commission on sales for their salaries. However, there was a minimum and a maximum rate

set to ensure that they received something. No *estanquillero* was to receive less than six reales per day nor more than twenty – two reales. Commission on sales varied between 4 percent and 9 percent.⁴³ Hours of operation were between six a.m. and ten p.m. and only family members were permitted to work in the *estanquillos*. This was to be uniform throughout the colony. By 1780 the distribution of *estanquillos* throughout the *cascos* of the administrative divisions was as follows:⁴⁴

Mexico City	64	Guadalajara	18	Córdoba	18
Valladolid	9	Orizaba	17	Veracruz	13
Puebla	26	Oaxaca	9	Mérida	2
Durango	2	Rosario	1		

Thus the option of opening up a tobacco store was removed from the list of possibilities available to New Spain's artisans. Even the possibility of gaining a license became less feasible as limits were placed on the number of *estanquillos* which could operate. Moreover, the policy adopted after the takeover was completed was that if an *estanquillo* became vacant, retired monopoly bureaucrats or their widows or children were given preference among those seeking access to a license.

The gradual takeover of the *cigarrerías* was accompanied by the parallel process of the creation of the royal factories. Between 1769 and 1777 four factories became operational: Mexico City, Puebla, Oaxaca and Orizaba – Querétaro and Guadalajara were added two years later. It seems that there were no private "factories" as such. It was José de Gálvez who strenuously advocated their establishment in New Spain using the tobacco factory of Seville as a model. José de Gálvez's views on the merits of the factories were quite clear. The manufacture of *puros* and *cigarros* was to be standardized and a steady supply of these made available throughout the colony. The consumer was to be protected from the fraudulent practices, allegedly carried out by the *cigarreros*. Chiles, ashes, and other "noxious substances" were often mixed in with the tobacco to give it "body." Monopoly products were to be of the highest standard. Colonial society in general, Mexico City in particular, was to reap the benefits from the "social" effects of the factories. For Gálvez, the Mexico City factory was

...tan beneficioso al Público como el mejor hospicio por el gran número de pobres que se mantienen del jornal que ganan y por los muchos delitos que se evitan con el recojimiento voluntario de una multitud de ociosos y de mujeres pobres que en aquel asilo socorren su necesidad y se livertan de infinitos riesgos.⁴⁵

Each factory was similar in structure and administration, the major difference being the scale of operation. The Mexico City factory produced the bulk of *labrados* (manufactured products i.e. *puros* and *cigarros*) for distribution throughout New Spain, although each factory was responsible for supplying its immediate areas. Coahuila, Monterrey, Santander, Mazapil and the *factorías* of Valladolid, Guadalajara, Durango and Rosario were supplied by the Mexico City factory. Querétaro also supplied Guadalajara and Valladolid. Guadalajara, Puebla and Oaxaca were supplied by their own factories while Orizaba supplied Veracruz, Córdoba and parts of Puebla.⁴⁶ Table II shows the distribution of workers between the six factories for the quinquennium 1790 – 95. They emphasize two important characteristics of the factory structure: high employment of female workers and large numbers of pieceworkers.

TABLE II: *Quantities and Total Value of Tobacco Products Sold in New Spain, 1792 – 1806*

Year	Lbs. of Raw Leaf	Packets of Havanna Cigars	Packets of Domestically Produced Cigars	Packets of Domestically Produced Cigarettes	Lbs. of Snuff (all Grades)	Total Value (Pesos)
1773	1,387,091		3,486,635	28,548,635	19,456	3,089,270
1774	1,373,801		2,757,805	30,609,396	19,662	3,206,605
1775	1,073,565		3,325,117	40,936,966	20,246	3,681,861
1776	1,089,798		3,544,773	42,794,331	22,218	3,845,743
1792	348,564		9,585,744	89,930,721	17,549	6,705,635
1793	324,281		9,939,056	89,437,612	16,112	6,684,863
1796	347,590		10,426,393	99,108,282	17,663	7,336,539
1797	319,439		10,353,013	104,423,327	17,601	7,617,688
1798	247,975	1,208	12,338,321	113,752,168	21,827	8,251,574
1799	520,408	1,226	21,355,046	87,548,816	18,430	7,521,621
1800	635,024	3,415	15,163,510	89,989,580	20,682	7,433,459
1801	560,996	773	15,168,921	97,976,248	15,745	7,794,744
1802	611,646	1,640	14,648,040	95,104,840	24,285	7,686,824
1803	526,879	988	15,023,004	97,428,579	13,992	7,747,528
1804	539,568	826	15,141,370	99,822,406	14,465	7,910,719
1805	448,273	1,230	16,551,456	111,381,283	15,605	8,599,623
1806	345,457	1,621	16,712,433	121,377,189	14,672	9,116,392

Source: Compiled from the *Relaciones Generales*, the yearly accounts of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly for the years 1773 – 1776 and 1792 – 1806.

The labour force of the Mexico City factory can be divided into three major groups.⁴⁷ The administrative and supervisory personnel included the factory manager, accountants, carpenters, foremen and forewomen, guards and clerks. They received annual salaries or fixed daily rates with a range from fifty-three to 2,000 pesos per annum. The second group was comprised of workers with specific tasks such as preparation of the raw leaf, shredding it, packing up the *labrados* and stamping boxes. Their wages were within a range of ninety-one pesos to 249 pesos per annum. The third group, the pieceworkers, constituted the bulk of the work force. They carried out the actual manufacture of *puros* and *cigarros*, and included cutters, twisters and fillers. The majority received between three and eight reales a day with average annual incomes of between 100 and 271 pesos.⁴⁸ Overall, women received marginally less than their male counterparts. Although *maestros de mesa* and *maestras de mesa* both received one peso per day, a *maestro* was in charge of 119 workers while a *maestra* had 160 women to supervise. No Indians were found in the ranks of the administrative or supervisory personnel. For the year 1800, of the 7,074 factory workers, 525 were Indian tributaries (7.4 percent of total workers).⁴⁹

Although some workers gained increases in wages (mainly between 1771 and 1779) the majority did not (see Table III). Like the growers and, indeed, most other colonial workers, they were highly susceptible to the inflationary pinch of the late eighteenth century. Very early on, however, in the history of the Mexico City factory the tobacco workers organized a mutual-aid society known as the *Concordia*. By deducting one half real each week from members' wages a common fund was created which provided aid in times of emergency, illness for example. In 1771 the factory manager, Isidro Romaña, estimated that the *Concordia* had 5,600 members with total funds on hand of 70,394 pesos.⁵⁰

It has been estimated that by 1790 the tobacco workers constituted 11.6 percent of the economically active population of Mexico City.⁵¹ Indeed, by 1795 the Mexico City factory employed 59 percent of all tobacco workers employed in the six royal factories. The major difference between the tobacco workers and other workers (particularly those employed in the *obrajes*) was the nature of their labour. Thus far, no evidence of extra-economic coercion has been found with regard to

TABLE III: *Wages and Salaries of the Mexico City Factory Personnel (Selected)*

POSITION	1771	Y 1779	E 1788	A 1794	R 1801
a. <i>Yearly Salaries and Fixed Daily Wage (Pesos)</i>					
Administrador	1,400	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Contador	800	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
Maestro Mayor	500 - 550	400 - 600	600	500	600
Maestra Mayor	-	350 - 400	350 - 450	350 - 450	350 - 450
b. <i>Piecework (Reales)</i>					
Maestros de Mesa	-	8	8	8	-
Envolvedores*	-	4 - 4.5	4.5 - 5.25	4.5 - 6.5	-
Encajonadores*	-	-	4	4	-
Operarios	-	-	-	2 - 4	-

Source: *McWatters*, Table 7, p.245

Note: *Envolvedores* were employed to prepare the packs for the *cigarros* and wrap them according to their classification.

Encajonadores were packers who put the packs of *cigarros* into large wooden boxes, ready for distribution to other parts of the colony.

work in the tobacco factories. Piecework rates were neither exceptionally high nor low in comparison with other occupations.⁵² Throughout the final decades of the eighteenth century the state tobacco factories became a focal point of criticism for several reasons. For lack of space only two can be discussed briefly. The first attack was based upon the alleged decline in "profits" of the factories, particularly that of Mexico City. One estimate showed that the Mexico City factory's "profits" had fallen from 50 percent in 1769 to 28 percent in 1794.⁵³ This is not a marginal profit calculation and apparently was designed to show that it was more profitable to sell the leaf tobacco only and return manufacture of cigars and cigarettes to the private sector. Table IV shows the volume and value of sales of tobacco products in New Spain for 1773 - 1806. Both

packets of cigars and cigarettes show stable production levels. Reduced production is generally related to shortages of paper.

TABLE IV: *Distribution of Fixed Daily Wage and Pieceworkers in the Mexico City Factory, 1795*

Factory	Salary and Fixed Daily Wage		% of Total Workers	Pieceworkers		% of Total Workers	Total Number of Workers
	Male	Female		Male	Female		
México	373	64	6	3,646	2,991	94	7,074
Querétaro	76	15	7	716	590	93	1,397
Guadalajara	18	18	2	—	1,514	98	1,550
Puebla	57	15	7	460	495	93	1,027
Oaxaca	21	7	5	—	582	95	610
Orizaba	11	3	4	149	192	96	355
							12,013

Source: Estado de los empleados de las fábricas de la Real Renta del Tabaco de este Reyno, México, 20 July 1795, Francisco Maniau y Ortega, AGN México, Tabaco, V. 495.

The second criticism concerned the dangers inherent in the high concentration of workers in the Mexico City factory. The workers had already rioted twice, in 1780 and in 1794, primarily due to increases in their work quotas without a concomitant increase in wages. The "solution" was to divide the Mexico City factory into three separate units, one of which was the especially constructed and first state-owned tobacco factory which was opened in 1807.

The management and operation of the factories, their profitability and production costs all require careful consideration but cannot be dealt with here. A general question underlying any analysis of the tobacco factories is, to what extent they can be characterized as state-induced industrial-

zation. State control and management resulted in a change in the division of labour upon which the manufacture of tobacco products was based. There were no technical innovations, however, and manual labour predominated. There was clearly an emphasis upon a quantitative expansion of production but not toward a qualitative change in the mode of production. As such it is difficult to disagree with Moreno Toscano's observation that

el cambio o modificación principal que introdujo la fábrica de cigarros fue la concentración de un número grande de operarios en el establecimiento de la fábrica. Esta concentración en lugar de originarse en la necesidad de mejorar el proceso productivo, tuvo por causa una medida política de carácter monopólico impuesta por la Corona con fines fiscales.⁵⁴

For colonial society in general the Royal Tobacco Monopoly provoked a variety of responses. The Consulado de México, ever vigilant in its mission to prove the "harmful" effects of the monopoly, argued that it worked against the development of New Spain.

Las fábricas de todos los cigarros y puros que se gastan en el Reyno, se han fixado en Orizaba, Oaxaca, Puebla, México, Querétaro y Guadalajara, dejando de todas las demas poblaciones sin esta ocupación y quitandoles una multitud de familias á servir á aquellos seis lugares privilegiados. En ellos se viven con la sugestión y reconocimiento de Parroquias que en donde nacieron ... pero ... una vida la mas licenciosa y criminosa en spiritual y temporal.⁵⁵

Amidst the Consulado's painful lament of how the implementation of the factory system had broken up families and exposed decent people to the sexual immoralities of working in a factory, were complaints concerning the economic effects of the monopoly. Strong productive male labour was being wasted in the factories when it could be used in agriculture or in the mines. Moreover, it was labour used to produce profits which were then shipped out of the country. One of the monopoly's most vociferous critics was the Padre Antonio de San José Muro, a "Bethlemite" friar who seems to have devoted himself to a one man campaign against the monopoly.⁵⁶ Although he pointed to the evils of monopoly in general, one of his major concerns was the ill effects the factories had upon their workers. Conducive to blasphemy, licentious behaviour and subversion, the Mexico City factory was nothing short of "una casa de perdición."⁵⁷ In response to such attacks the Director General asserted that far from breeding delinquent citizens, not only was

the Mexico City factory a manufactory for *puros* and *cigarros* but "ha sido destinado taller para hombres de bien..."⁵⁸ Overall, consumers benefitted from the monopoly because they purchased better quality products. From the labour required by the factories emerged a group of producers and consumers simultaneously benefitting both New Spain and the metropolis. At least that is how the General Directorate perceived the effects of the monopoly. Mexico City could not fail to gain from the operation of the factory, since

continuaría tambien el maior fomento que recibe esta Capital en sus comercios trascendiendo á otros, con la circulación del crecido caudal de mas de 750,000 pesos que se distribuye anualmente en la Gente operaria que se ocupa en la labor de *puros* y *cigarros*.⁵⁹

IV.

Much of what constitutes the history of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly remains untouched. However, a general picture has emerged of what the production of four million pesos implied. Many of the hallmarks of eighteenth century mercantilism are to be found in the Spanish state's management of the tobacco monopoly in New Spain: an emphasis upon large centralized manufactures and capital contributions in the form of the interest-free credit allocated to encourage the cultivation of tobacco. Such management signified much more than an exercise in the raising of revenues. The reorganizations and restrictions which typified the absolutist Bourbon reforms were applied with a vigour which was felt throughout the colony. Farmers in New Spain were effectively prohibited from growing tobacco apart from the "privileged" who lived and worked in the province of Veracruz. Within a region largely dependent upon tobacco for its survival there emerged an elite merchant-planter group who manipulated the conditions created by the monopoly to their own advantage. The less able were subject to insolvency and destitution in the face of poor harvests and unsympathetic bureaucrats. If the cultivation of the crop was confined to the rural southeast, manufactures were firmly established in the major urban centres of New Spain, especially Mexico City. Production of cigars and cigarettes was removed from the hands of private artisans and placed into those of the workers employed in state-managed factories - a sweeping change and one which is too easily ignored or underestimated. Nurtured by the Bourbon state, the tobacco monopoly was to survive its demise only to experience its own in the new Mexican republic.

NOTES

1. J. Fisher, "Soldiers, Society and Politics in Spanish America, 1750 - 1821," *LARR*, 17 (1982), p.217.
2. Since H. I. Priestley analyzed the role of José de Gálvez in the creation of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly (see *José de Gálvez, Visitor - General of New Spain*, Berkeley, 1916) little attention has been paid to its workings. The most recent studies to emerge are: María Amparo Ros T., "La real fábrica de puros y cigarros: organización del trabajo y estructura urbana," in A. Moreno Toscano, ed., *Ciudad de México, ensayo de construcción de una historia* (Mexico, 1978) and D. L. McWatters, "The Royal Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico, 1764 - 1810," (Ph.D. Diss., University of Florida, 1979). This paper is based on the author's current doctoral research findings.
3. José de Gálvez to the Viceroy, Mexico, April 26, 1766, AGI, Mexico, 2257.
4. An indication of the feeble state of the Crown's finances at this time is that José de Gálvez had to secure loans to the amount of one million pesos from the merchants of the peninsula and New Spain with which to finance the beginnings of the monopoly.
5. Fabián de Fonseca y Carlos de Urrutía, *Libro de la razón general de la real hacienda*, VII, Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid).
6. José Díaz de Lavandero to Marqués de la Enseñada, October 1, 1748, AGI, Mexico, 2256.
7. Fonseca y Urrutía, *Libro de hacienda*, f. 59. *Cigarros* and *puros* (roughly translated as cigarettes and cigars) were classified according to their cut and thickness. *Cigarros* were divided originally into packs of Numbers 12, 13, 14 and 23 with sixty per pack; Number 11, with fifty - two per pack and Number 1, with forty - two per pack. *Puros* sold at six, eight, twelve and sixteen per pack. By 1800 the numbers per pack had been reduced to five, seven, ten, fourteen and sixteen per pack for *puros*; Numbers 12, 13 and 14 contained forty - two per pack, Numbers 10, 32 and 11, forty per pack.
8. Tarifa del precio á que se ha de vender el tabaco de Ruma, Polvo, Rapé, los puros y cigarros en las tercenas y estancos de este Reyno..., AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 37, Silvestre Díaz de la Vega.
9. Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre el reino de la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1966), p.175.
10. A *tercio* of tobacco had an average weight of 170 lbs.
11. Bernardo María de Mendiola, Factor de Orizaba, to Director General, January 5, 1778, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 48. A similar situation existed with the Tobacco Monopoly in Venezuela. See C.H. Wickham's discussion of how cash advancements became an integral part of the monopoly's operations in his "Venezuela's Royal Tobacco Monopoly, 1779 - 1810: An Economic Analysis" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Oregon, 1975), p.49.
12. Jacinto de Espinosa to Viceroy, December 18, 1764, AGI, Mexico, 2256.
13. Phelipe de Hierro to Viceroy, May 18, 1780, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 2.
14. Ibid.
15. Mendiola to Director General, November 16, 1803, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 88. Parallels can be drawn again with Venezuela. Wickham

- found that prices for tobacco "originally set forth in 1779 they remained in effect virtually unchanged until the end of the colonial period in 1810." Wickham, "Venezuela's Royal Tobacco Monopoly," p.49.
16. In 1815, for example, of sixty-eight *cosechas* received valued at 180,885 pesos, only 75,500 pesos were paid out. 10 percent of planters received no payment at all for their crop, 3 percent received approximately one quarter of the value, 10 percent, one third, 57 percent, one half and 10 percent the total value. Razon de Orizaba, Zacarias Beartegui, Antonio Rodriguez de la Vega, September 28, 1815, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 33.
 17. The major sources used for the quantitative aspect of the planter group include the *Matrículas de cosecheros* (lists of licenses issued yearly to the planters), the *Registros de créditos* and lists of *cosechas* delivered to the monopoly warehouses in the growing zone.
 18. The *Registros de créditos* are extremely useful documents. Compiled at the beginning of each growing year, i.e. August, September, they contain the grower's name, location of tobacco cultivation and/or *rancho*, number of *matas* allocated, amount of credit supplied, name of *fiador*, and any security against losses such as property, stock, etc.
 19. This is based on those numbers of growers in receipt of credit, named as owners of *cosechas* delivered and who appear with great frequency on the *Matrícula* lists throughout the period under consideration.
 20. Francisco del Real, Inspector General, to Contador General Silvestre Diaz de la Vega, May 1, 1781, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 44.
 21. Joaquín de Robles to Director General, May 29, 1804, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 88.
 22. Antonio de Sobrevilla to Francisco del Real, April 25, 1781, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 44.
 23. Razon de los cosecheros que en 1779 han entregado tabacos en la Factoria de Orizaba..., Phelipe de Hierro to Viceroy, June 28, 1780, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 35.
 24. Data General de Caudales de la Factura de la Real Renta del Tabaco de Orizaba, 1792. AGN(M), Administración General del Tabaco, Caja 125.
 25. Using the *Matrículas* and *Registros de créditos* it has been possible to build up "cultivation profiles" for the core group of growers. Much of the data remain to be processed but eventually it should prove possible to trace the fortunes of the group which should ultimately help to affirm or reject the pattern of differentiation suggested in this paper.
 26. Matrícula que contiene las siembras de tabaco contratadas por los cosecheros de Orizaba y Zongolica, 1788 para 1789, Directors General, Mexico, May 20, 1789, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 18. One account of the planter-*aviador* written by the *Factor* of Orizaba, Bernardo de Mendiola described the system as follows: "El aviador ó refaccionario recibe las sartas ... señalandoles precio á su arbitrio y discreción: ajusta su cuenta al vendedor, rebatiendo del importe lo anticipado y quedan de acuerdo sobre el resto." Mendiola to Director General, November 16, 1803, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 88.
 27. Testimonio sobre el embargo intentado contra el Cosechero de Tabacos, D. Antonio Montes Argüelles, September 20, 1786, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 501.
 28. Archivo Notarial de Orizaba, Registro de Créditos, 1810.

29. With the exception of two growers (to date) who described themselves as hacendados, most growers thought of themselves as *rancheros* and, indeed, were categorised as such by the General Directorate of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly. For the most part they seem to fit into the description provided by Brading: "In effect, therefore, the term *rancho*, as it was employed from the late eighteenth century onwards, encompassed two distinct types of enterprise. A *ranchero* could be either a prosperous, commercial farmer aided by several peons, or alternatively, he could be a smallholder eking out a bare subsistence on three or four acres of land." D.A. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajío, León 1700 - 1860* (Cambridge, 1978), p.151. As to the size of individual landholdings, that is a separate problem. As was typical of many tobacco-growing regions, planters did not speak in terms of acres but in terms of *matas* or "hills." Taking an average of several estimates of hills per acre, the figure comes to 5,000 hills per acre. Taking an average allocation of 100,000 *matas*, this would give an area of approximately twenty acres. Many of the growers who had much larger allocations, however, did not plant them on a single unit of land, but distributed the majority of the *matas* to be cultivated to their *aviados* scattered throughout the jurisdiction. For the sake of speculation, however, if the highest amount of 5,000,000 *matas* is calculated in terms of acres, this would average out at 1,000 acres, which could probably be placed in the category of a small estate.
30. Rafael García to Director General, March 25, 1795, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 38.
31. Mendiola to Director General, Orizaba, January 19, 1791, AGI, Mexico, 2259.
32. Mendiola to Director General, July 15, 1801, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 88.
33. José María Ortuño to Director General, 1801, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 88.
34. S. Florescano, "El camino México-Veracruz en la época colonial," (M.A. Thesis, El Colegio de México, 1968), p.19.
35. There were several alterations in the elections and, indeed, numbers of Director Generals. From 1766 until 1792, the general rule was that there should be two Directors General; after 1792, it was reduced to just one; Espinosa to Viceroy, December 18, 1761, AGI, Mexico, 2256.
36. Velarde to Viceroy, December 6, 1766, AGI, Mexico, 2256.
37. McWatters, "The Royal Tobacco Monopoly," p.251.
38. Ibid., p.105; Fonseca y Urrutía, *Libro de la Real Hacienda*.
39. Ibid., p.115. See chapter IV on the abolition of the private shops.
40. Resumen General del número de cigarrerías que existen en este Reyno de Nueva España, Phelipe de Hierro, Mexico, June 22, 1772, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 23.
41. Testimonio á la letra por duplicado de lo operado sobre la extinción de cigarrerías y establecimiento de estanquillos en esta ciudad de Mejico de cuenta de la Real Renta del Tabaco, José de la Riva, December 1, 1773, AGI, Mexico, 1373.
42. Comun de Cigarreros y Ocurso de Baltazar de Vidaurre (?) Procurador General de la Real Audiencia de la Ciudad de Mexico ..., January 26, 1773, AGI, Mexico, 2258.

43. McWatters, "The Royal Tobacco Monopoly," p.118.
44. Fonseca y Urrutía, *Libro de la real Hacienda*.
45. José de Gálvez to the Viceroy, December 31, 1771, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 49.
46. Estado de los empleados de las fábricas de la Real Renta del Tabaco de este Reyno, Mexico, July 20, 1795, Francisco Maniau y Ortega, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 495.
47. Ros, "La real fábrica," p.52; Fonseca y Urrutía, *Libro de la Real Hacienda*.
48. Ibid. If the working poor of Mexico City can be said to have cash incomes of between sixty and 300 pesos then the large majority of tobacco workers fit squarely into this category. See T. Anna, *The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City* (Nebraska, 1978), pp.23 - 24; also, Jorge González Angulo and Roberto Sandoval Zarauz, "Los trabajadores industriales de Nueva España, 1750 - 1810," in E. Florescano, ed., *La clase obrera en la historia de México; Tomo I: De la Colonia al Imperio* (Mexico, 1980).
49. Ros, "La real fábrica," p.53.
50. Isidro Romaña to the Directors General, November 5, 1771, AGI, Mexico, 2259.
51. Ros, "La real fábrica," p.51.
52. For a comparative discussion of the respective colonial industrial occupations, see González and Sandoval, "Los trabajadores industriales."
53. In the calculations made by the monopoly accountant, the cost of tobacco is calculated according to its sale price and not the purchase price to the Crown hence the costs of raw materials are much higher than they should be. If a simple marginal profit calculation is made using the cost of tobacco to the Crown and not to the consumer, then the range for profits of the Mexico City factory become more positive, i.e. 24 percent in 1769 to 41 percent in 1787. Given that monopoly policy decisions were based on the former calculation then those are the ones with which we have to deal. Nevertheless, the distinction is worth making.
54. A. Moreno Toscano, "Los trabajadores y el proyecto de industrialización, 1810 - 1867," in Florescano, (ed.), *La clase obrera I*, 318. It should be emphasized that at no point did the factories undergo technological changes of any kind. Labour was fundamentally manual.
55. Manifiesto que se hace en defensa de las Fábricas de cuenta de S.M. en su Real Renta del Tabaco de Nueva España, sus utilidades, y bien comun de la Gente operaria, de ambos sexos que trabaja en ellas y sus qualidades, contra el equivocado concepto del Real Tribunal del Consulado de Mexico. AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 49.
56. See J.S. Fox, "Antonio de San José Muro, Political Economist of New Spain," *HAHR*, 21(1941).
57. Proyecto del P. Br. Antonio de San José Muro, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 476.
58. Manifiesto, AGN(M), Renta del Tabaco, vol. 49.
59. Ibid.

15. ETAPA FINAL DEL MONOPOLIO EN EL VIRREINATO DEL PERU: EL TABACO DE CHACHAPOYAS

Christine Hünefeldt*

Hace casi tres décadas, Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo publicó un documentado trabajo sobre la Renta de Tabacos en el Virreinato del Perú. En este artículo, el autor describe el proceso de formación del monopolio y las principales reformas instauradas desde el momento de su fundación en 1752. Temporalmente su análisis termina hacia 1792, año en que se iniciaría el declive tanto de los valores totales de tabaco producido como de los beneficios líquidos obtenidos por la metrópoli.


Las primeras propuestas para la creación de un monopolio tabacalero se remontan al siglo XVII. Hubo una fase en la que se arrendó la renta del tabaco a particulares a cambio de un aporte previamente fijado entre el arrendatario y la Corona española.¹ Estas tentativas, sin embargo, no duraron por largo tiempo. A pesar de que hubo regiones coloniales en las que existió el monopolio estatal del tabaco ya en las primeras décadas del siglo dieciocho recién el reglamento de 1740 y las ordenanzas de 1759 sirvieron como base para la creación de la Renta de Tabacos en territorio colonial.² Sucesivamente estos cuerpos legales fueron ampliados, complementados y ajustados a las condiciones particulares de cada región.³

Hasta entonces, la producción del tabaco estuvo en manos de pequeños agricultores independientes (llamados *cosecheros* o *veguceros*), que vendían sus cosechas a comerciantes. Estos a su vez se encargaban de distribuir el tabaco a las haciendas, los pueblos, las ciudades y las minas.⁴ Parece haber sido práctica usual, el que los comerciantes compradores del tabaco pocas veces pagaban en dinero. Se pagaba en especies y en algunos lugares el tabaco hizo las veces del dinero.⁵ Esta práctica comercial no fue patrimonio de la producción tabacalera. Al igual a lo que sucedía con otros productos, el tabaco podía recorrer vastas regiones del espacio colonial hasta insertarse en forma de dinero en el mercado internacional. En el trayecto desde el centro productor hasta el puerto de salida, el tabaco podía ser cambiado por diferentes artículos — ropas de la tierra, minerales, lana, coca, etc. — consecutivamente, hilvanando entre sí a diversas regiones y diferentes circuitos comerciales.⁶

Los fines expresos que condujeron a la creación del monopolio fueron sustancialmente la elevación de los ingresos fiscales y la delimitación y el control del comercio (y el contrabando) intercolonial. La meta era coordinar en manos del monopolio la producción, la distribución y la venta de tal manera que se lograra un autoabastecimiento a nivel de virreinato. Dada la existencia de grupos de interés ligados a la producción tabacalera antes de la creación del monopolio, el ajuste a las metas del monopolio tuvo que ser gradual. En el caso de los cosecheros, la Renta de Tabacos aprovechó tierras y mano de obra existentes en regiones que — en parte hacia siglos — producían tabaco. A fin de efectivizar el control sobre las cantidades de tabaco producido, se formaron matrículas de cosecheros, en las que figuraban el número de matas asignadas a cada cosechero. En el caso ideal el reparto de las matas se hacía de acuerdo a los logros obtenidos por cada cosechero individualmente y de acuerdo a los requerimientos de consumo del virreinato, calculados con anterioridad. La Renta de Tabacos a través de sus almacenes de acopio de tabacos — las factorías, ubicadas en un lugar céntrico en relación al área de producción tabacalera — asumía las funciones que previamente habían sido patrimonio de comerciantes privados.⁷ De acuerdo a los defensores del monopolio, al arrogarse la factoría la exclusividad de la tasación y la compra de los tabacos a los cosecheros, se eximía a estos de las extorsiones a las que habían sido expuestos por parte de inescrupulosos comerciantes.⁸ Ahora el valor de las cosechas les sería abonado en dinero.

En un primer momento, los comerciantes por su parte quedaron marginados de sus actividades mercantiles. Ocasionalmente eran contratados por las factorías, ya sea para transportar el tabaco desde las chacras tabacaleras a los almacenes de las factorías, o de aquí hacia las administraciones del tabaco. Como se verá, las factorías nunca llegaron a prescindir totalmente de los servicios de estos comerciantes, a pesar de que las Ordenanzas de 1759 propugnaban la cancelación de toda actividad particular — transporte incluido — a favor del monopolio estatal. Sólo la preparación de cigarrós, puros y limpiones quedaba (en el Virreinato del Perú hasta 1780) en manos privadas, aunque la Renta de Tabacos también aquí controlaba peso, calidad y cantidad.⁹ En una suerte de última etapa en este proceso gradual de implementación del monopolio se instalaron las fábricas reales dedicadas a la elaboración del tabaco. En las tercenas y los estanquillos, los lugares de venta al menudeo, concluía la circulación del tabaco de acuerdo a los planes de la Renta (ver Dibujo I).

DIBUJO I: Los circuitos del tabaco de Chachapoyas durante el monopolio



Decisivamente, entonces, el éxito del monopolio dependería de la capacidad del estado colonial de organizar la producción, la distribución y el consumo del tabaco de acuerdo a sus planes y de la supeditación de los intereses de cosecheros, transportistas y de sus propios empleados a los cometidos de la Renta de Tabacos. La perseverancia de la lucha entre los intereses de uno y otro grupo – que trataremos de ubicar – parecerían revelar una intrínseca debilidad del monopolio en el Virreinato del Perú, sin que ello signifique que los ingresos logrados por la Renta sean despreciables, aun después de 1792.¹⁰ Para documentar lo enunciado nos moveremos en dos compartimientos de análisis contiguos a las propuestas de G. Céspedes del Castillo. Por una parte interesa saber cuáles fueron los efectos y las reacciones a las reformas suscitadas por la introducción y el perfeccionamiento del monopolio tabacalero a nivel local, y por otra parte conocer las razones de un supuesto declive a partir de 1792.¹¹

La Renta del tabaco: algunos indicadores cuantitativos

De acuerdo a los datos estadísticos proporcionados por G. Céspedes del Castillo puede ubicarse un período de auge de la producción tabacalera entre 1763 y 1788. En este lapso de tiempo el valor total de lo producido por la Renta fluctúa en torno a los 800.000 pesos anuales, con escuetos repuntes entre 1773 y 1776 y alrededor de 1786, y una baja hasta los 337.025 pesos en 1780, año en que se inicia el levantamiento de Túpac Amaru. En términos de ganancia líquida, es decir, deducidos los gastos por sueldos, local, compra de tabacos a los cosecheros y un porcentaje de aproximadamente el 10 por ciento entregado como comisión de venta a los tercenistas y estanquilleros, los beneficios logrados entre 1763 y 1788 van gradualmente en aumento – desde 19.991 pesos hasta alcanzar 445.662 pesos anuales. Los gastos ocasionados a la Renta como consecuencia de la sucesiva ampliación de sus cuerpos administrativos, irán disminuyendo conforme queda afianzada la infraestructura administrativa. La organización de la Renta toma gran impulso con las Instrucciones de 1776, al introducirse el sistema de las Intendencias. Primero el Visitador Areche, luego Escobedo perfeccionarán la administración colonial; el Visitador La Riva será enviado desde Nueva España para organizar, en base al éxito y las experiencias logradas allí, la Renta de Tabacos en el Virreinato del Perú.¹² El salto más brusco por gastos de orden administrativo se da entre 1776 y 1779. Mientras que entre 1780 y 1783 los gastos ascienden a 677.229 pesos, entre 1776 y 1779 llegaron

a 1.581.133 pesos. Serán La Riva y Escobedo quienes darán al monopolio su máximo desarrollo.¹³

Al final de sus gestiones quedaron establecidas la administración central en Lima, cinco administraciones subalternas en Tarma, Ica, Jauja, Chancay y Huánuco, y otras administraciones generales en Arequipa, Huancavelica, Cuzco y Trujillo. Los dos grandes centros productores de tabacos en el Virreinato a partir de 1780 fueron Saña y Chachapoyas. En el primero se producían los tabacos de Saña, que luego de pasar por los almacenes de la administración central en Lima, estaban destinados al consumo de la Capitanía General de Chile, mientras que el tabaco Bracamoro producido en Chachapoyas abastecería el mercado peruano.¹⁴ A partir de 1809 la factoría guayaquileña fue incorporada al Virreinato del Perú. En lo sustancial, sin embargo, hacia 1785 "la gran transformación de la Renta se había ya terminado de operar."¹⁵

Las preferencias por uno u otro tabaco estuvieron establecidas antes de la creación del monopolio, y la Renta tuvo que considerarlas al hacerse cargo de la distribución. Aparentemente el tabaco fumado estuvo muy difundido entre la población negra; poco a poco logra ascender la escala social.¹⁶ En Chile se prefería el tabaco de Saña, en el Perú el de Bracamoros, en el Cuzco específicamente el de Moyobamba. Los más ricos fumaban el tabaco cubano que también se consumía preferencialmente en España, mientras que el indígena preparaba el *camasayre*.¹⁷ Según Wibert la costumbre de inhalar el tabaco estuvo bien difundida también entre los quechua y aymara hablantes.¹⁸ Los cigarros y puros fabricados en Centroamérica eran preferidos a aquellos producidos en las fábricas de Sevilla. En parte, estas preferencias inhibieron la realización de la meta de autoabastecimiento. Por lo menos hasta 1777 fue necesario complementar la producción del Virreinato del Perú (incluyendo Chile) con tabacos producidos en Nueva España. Se trataba sobre todo del rapé o tabaco en polvo, que no fue producido localmente.¹⁹ Hasta mucho más tarde, a poco de la independencia, se seguían importando diferentes calidades de tabaco desde La Habana y Guatemala; antes de 1809 también de Guayaquil. Así fueron las viejas y nuevas preferencias del consumidor las que fijaron o afianzaron las rutas del comercio tabacalero tanto intercolonial, como al interior de los Virreinos, incluso en detrimento de lo producido en la metrópoli.

Existen afirmaciones de que lo producido por la Renta de Tabacos fue después de la minería el rubro más importante de los ingresos para la Corona española.²⁰ En Chile la Renta de Tabacos aportaba casi el 50 por ciento de los ingresos anuales totales entre 1788 y 1809. En

Venezuela entre 1780 y 1810 la Renta fue "una de las más robustas fuentes de ingreso de la hacienda colonial."²¹

En Nueva España la Renta produjo entre 1776 y 1809 un promedio del 18 por ciento de los ingresos totales.²² En oposición a la situación en Nueva España, Chile y también Venezuela, lugares en los que se registra un crecimiento constante de las ganancias producidas por la Renta de Tabacos, lo obtenido en el Virreinato del Perú estuvo sujeto a importantes fluctuaciones. Las ganancias más altas logradas – según G. Céspedes del Castillo – se registran en 1788, con 445.662 pesos, es decir aproximadamente el 10 por ciento de los ingresos totales de la Real Hacienda. Sin embargo, se registra un nuevo repunte de la producción y los beneficios logrados hacia 1810, con una ganancia de 284.967 pesos que van en aumento hasta 1815 en que llegan a 548.590 pesos (ver Tabla I), aproximadamente el 14 por ciento de los ingresos totales de la Real Hacienda.²³ Un año antes, en 1814 las ganancias bajaron a 16.548 pesos, pero el valor total de consumos alcanzó casi los niveles de 1788.²⁴ Ello significa que si bien entre 1814 y 1815 las ganancias bajaron estrepitosamente, esta baja no significa que se hayan producido y consumido sustancialmente menos tabacos, y que por tanto (si agregamos las existencias de 1813) tenemos una línea de ascenso de la producción y el consumo entre 1810 y 1815. Si esta tendencia se confirma, estaríamos en el Virreinato del Perú ante una suerte de auge tardío del monopolio, que en términos relativos solo era un 4 por ciento inferior a las cifras anotadas para Nueva España. Los ingresos por tributos indígenas formaban el 18 por ciento del ingreso de la Real Hacienda en el Virreinato del Perú (en Nueva España en 1808 este porcentaje ascendía a sólo 6 por ciento).²⁵ Ello significaría que hacia fines del período colonial, la Renta del Tabaco, junto a la minería y los tributos indígenas, fue una de las fuentes de ingresos más importantes para el estado colonial.

Cabe, entonces, preguntarse también acerca de las razones que provocaron las sensibles fluctuaciones de las ganancias líquidas obtenidas por la Renta de Tabaco y resolver una aparente contradicción entre la debilidad del monopolio en el Virreinato del Perú y la tendencia a la alza de los valores de consumo registrados por la Renta hacia fines del período colonial. Para ello, buscaremos algunos indicadores en los sucesos ocurridos en Chachapoyas, que como se ha señalado, producía en casi su totalidad el tabaco consumido en el Virreinato (Chile excluido).

TABLA I: *Consumos, Sueldos y Gastos, y Ganancias Líquidas de la Renta del Tabaco, 1786 – 1815 (en pesos)*

Año	Consumos	Sueldos y Gastos	Ganancias Líquidas
1786 (1)	843.932	483.466	360.466
1788	790.489 (790.483)	(2) (1)	445.662 (2)
1789 (2)	756.030		318.407
1790 (2)	842.874		397.022
1791 (2)			268.382
1792	600.764 (612.589)	(2) (1)	230.177 (2) (315.213) (1)
1793 (2)	551.265		236.014
1794 (2)	504.350		250.041
1795 (2)	505.350	(+)	250.041 (+)
1810 (3)			284.967
1814 (3,4)	731.892	715.343	16.548
1815 (4)	855.842	307.251	548.590

- Fuentes:
- 1) Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," pp.160 – 161.
 - 2) Operaciones que acreditan el estado actual de la real renta del tabaco del Perú, y decadencia a que han venido sus productos por la variación de su sistema, Lima, Julio 10 de 1796, BNP, C 3739.
 - 3) John Fisher, *Government and Society*, pp.110 – 111.
 - 4) Estado de los cotejos de los consumos, valor entero, gastos y líquidos que rindió la renta del tabaco del reino del Perú en el año de 1814 con el de 1815, etc., Lima, Septiembre 22 de 1819, BNP, D 9283.

Nota: +) Estos montos son proyecciones realizadas en el documento 2.

La producción en Chachapoyas

Chachapoyas está ubicada en las márgenes orientales del Alto Marañón, a unos 250 kilómetros de Cajamarca y a aproximadamente 550 kilómetros de Trujillo. En 1780 vivían 22.329 personas en Chachapoyas, cuya extrema pobreza llamó la atención del Visitador La Riva, quien en ese mismo año llegó a Chachapoyas para inspeccionar el funcionamiento de la Factoría.²⁶ Chachapoyas fue la primera factoría creada en el Virreinato, en 1753. En una circunferencia de aproximadamente 200 kilómetros hubo varios partidos dedicados a la producción tabacalera: Moyobamba, Guayabamba, Sipasbamba, Sesuya y Chillaos, rodeados a su vez de pueblos y comunidades bajo la tutela de subdelegados.

Durante su visita, el Visitador constató que el pago efectuado a los cosecheros era sumamente bajo. Los reconocedores, empleados de la factoría que tenían a su cargo la evaluación de la calidad y la cantidad del tabaco producido por los cosecheros matriculados, desechaban gran parte del tabaco cosechado. El restante era dividido por calidades ('primera,' 'segunda,' 'tercera'). Traducido a pesos, la ganancia que quedaba a los cosecheros se reducía a montos irrisorios. La Riva asegura que el cosechero que plantaba mil matas de tabaco producía 320 mazos, por los que recibía aproximadamente cinco pesos. Por otra parte, el cultivo de mil matas de tabaco implicaba trabajar por lo menos siete meses al año "duramente al sol, aire y aguas ... con el arado y azada personalmente desde el mas distinguido hasta el mas bajo, por su indigencia."²⁷ Aun los cosecheros mejor provistos - aquellos que estaban matriculados con una mayor cantidad de matas - no tenían acceso a mano de obra auxiliar "por carecer de Indios y Negros que les sirvan."²⁸

Las indicaciones en cuanto a la diferenciación existente entre el "mas distinguido" y el "mas bajo" son escuetas. Empero, es de suponer, que las diferencias sociales entre los cosecheros eran mínimas en vista de que según el Visitador, todos estaban obligados a cultivar "personalmente" sus chacras y de que no podían cultivar sino mil matas en siete meses de trabajo anual. Consecuentemente la productividad chachapoyana dejaba mucho que desear en ojos del Visitador. La Riva sostenía que para satisfacer las necesidades del Virreinato sería necesario elevar la producción a 12.000 zurroneos anuales.²⁹ En 1780 Chachapoyas sólo se cosechaban 2.000. Los logros de la factoría entre 1753 y 1780 no merecieron el aplauso de La Riva.

Con nuevas energías, el Visitador dictaminó un conjunto de medidas para elevar la producción, y mejorar la situación general de la región tabacalera. Las calidades de tabaco se redujeron a una sola clase. Ello permitiría uniformizar los precios de compra y venta del tabaco y haría - junto a una elevación del precio pagado a los cosecheros a tres quartillos de real el mazo - que "admitan gustosamente los cosecheros esta inovación; para que no extravien como hasta ahora, la mitad de sus partidas según su conjetura, obligados de sus necesidades y del Tavaco infimo que se les desechava, y ya se les recibirá tambien en el grado de consumible."³⁰ En oposición a lo que sucedía en otros lugares, en los que la tarea de cosechero fue una tarea buscada, en Chachapoyas era necesario "inclinarlos a extender mucho las siembras, y hacer la contrata de cuyas obligaciones como jente ruda recela la mayor parte temiendo

agravios y violencias."³¹ A partir de entonces, se preveía un pago de setenta y cinco pesos (a partir de 1803: ochenta pesos) por mil mazos de tabaco. Es decir, el pago a los cosecheros se quintuplicó.³² En 1808 hubo regiones en las que el cosechero recibía un real por mazo, es decir, 125 pesos por mil mazos.³³ Sin embargo, la elevación de la nómina por compra de tabacos concedida a las factorías no significaba automáticamente, que este aumento llegara a ser entregado a los cosecheros, y tampoco garantizaba que los cosecheros se librasen de "agravios y violencias."

Los factores estaban obligados a visitar por lo menos una vez por año cada uno de los lugares donde trabajaban los cosecheros. En cada partido, a su vez, permanentemente residía un guarda veedor, empleado de la factoría, que cada ocho días debía inspeccionar las chacras tabacaleras. La ronda volante, compuesta por un pequeño cuerpo militar de cuatro a seis personas, y también sujeto a la factoría, se encargaba de controlar permanentemente ríos y caminos en busca de los "tabacos extraviados." Ninguna de las personas empleadas por la factoría podía poseer o cultivar tabaco. Esas eran al menos las estipulaciones.

La Riva en su visita inculpaba al factor y a los guardas veedores de no cumplir a cabalidad sus funciones. No sólo que poseían chacras de tabaco, sino que además perjudicaban la calidad del tabaco producido al sembrar otras plantas entre las matas del tabaco. Ellos, señalaba, "siembran Abilla y Sapallo, por lograr mas proventos para su manutención: no descervan, aporcan, despuntan ni descogollan quando devian." Y peor aun, de aquí resultaba "que los mas de los cosecheros siguen su mismo exemplo, respecto a que saben que no ha de reprehenderlos ni dar parte a la Factoría de los delitos que con mas *execravilidad estan comprendidos*." Se trataba evidentemente de productos para el consumo propio, que no podían ser sembrados en otros terrenos por que no había quien podría hacerse cargo de su cuidado. Por otra parte, es probable que las dificultades del transporte hayan impedido o dificultado un regular suministro de viveres.³⁴ Al parecer la cercanía entre cosecheros y guarda veedores no sólo permitió que los cosecheros, siguiendo el ejemplo de los guarda veedores no cuidaran debidamente las matas de tabaco, sino además, que los guarda veedores utilizaran esta cercanía para adelantar sus propios intereses comerciales.

Al margen de lo provisto por las ordenanzas, los cosecheros no recibieron el valor de sus cosechas en efectivo. Tanto reconocedores como guarda veedores, señala La Riva, "cometían el atentado de entregar en ropas de la tierra, la mayor parte de aquellas cantidades que estan

dispuestas se den a los cosecheros ... [ya que] con la plata hacen mas aquellos Pobres, que con la ropa que se les hacia recibir como de por fuerza, en unos precios exorbitantes." Esta práctica de los repartos forzados tan usual en todo el Virreinato, primero en manos de los corregidores, luego de los subdelegados, en Chachapoyas adquiere una peculiaridad que es necesario recalcar. En el caso de subdelegados o corregidores, éstos compraban los bienes a repartirse en los almacenes de los grandes comerciantes limeños, ya sea con dinero que estos adelantaban o con dinero propio. En el caso de las factorías y los guarda veedores, el capital usado en la transacción provenía de la Renta y pertenecía en principio al cosechero. Con la apropiación de este dinero, era el estado colonial quien subvencionaba transacciones comerciales al margen de sus cometidos oficiales y de sus intenciones, y como se verá enseguida, incluso en contra de sus propios intereses. El capital adquirido de esta manera proporcionaba una liquidez que no costaba nada. Existen pruebas de que la práctica detectada por La Riva fue mantenida en pie a lo largo de todo el período de nuestro análisis, y de que los cosecheros no fueron las únicas víctimas.

Tabaco y comercio

Cosechado y 'reconocido' el tabaco, tenía que ser depositado en los almacenes de la factoría, en donde sería luego enzurronado, es decir forrado en cuero y marcado para evitar que pudiera ser intercambiado o mezclado con tabacos de contrabando ('cimarrones'). De acuerdo a las distancias por recorrer entre las chacras y la factoría, el transporte era efectuado por los propios cosecheros, o si las distancias eran mayores, por arrieros contratados por la factoría. Para trasladar el tabaco de Chachapoyas a los almacenes de Cajamarca se volvía a contratar los servicios de arrieros. Extraídos los zurroneos requeridos para el abastecimiento de Cajamarca y sus zonas aledañas, el tabaco era encaminado por Trujillo hasta el almacén central de Lima. En las diferentes etapas del camino entre Chachapoyas y Lima (cerca de 1.200 kilómetros) los respectivos arrieros cargaban con toda la responsabilidad del transporte, expuestos a asaltos y caminos intransitables. De acuerdo a lo constatado por La Riva, los arrieros recibían demasiada carga y poca remuneración, por lo que había "atendido a los pobres Arrieros con la minoración del peso de las cargas y algun mayor flete reparando la ruina en que estaban sepultados."³⁵

TABLA II: *Mazos de tabacos producidos en Chachapoyas, 1770 – 1815*

Año	Mazos	Comentario
1770 (1)	217.700	
1771 (1)	204.800	
1772 (1)	140.880	
1780 (2)	(34.626)	sólo mazos Bracamoro consumidos en el Arzobispado de Lima
1786 (1)	206.880	
1787 (1)	240.720	
1788 (1)	337.760	
1802 (3)	220.480	
1804 (4)	(80.000) (aprox.)	sólo mazos Bracamoro consumidos en el casco de la ciudad de Lima
1814 (5)	150.328	consumo total de mazos Bracamoro en el Virreinato
	310.366	mazos existentes en los almacenes de la Renta a fines de 1814
1815	131.563 (5)	consumo total de mazos Bracamoro en el Virreinato
	431.279 (5)	mazos existentes en los almacenes de la Renta a fines de 1815
	417.920 (6)	mazos de tabaco comprados por la Renta en Chachapoyas en 1815

Fuentes:

- 1) Real Renta de Tabacos, Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP, C 3400.
- 2) Estado que manifiesta los tabacos de rama, labrado, polvo existentes en la terzena y estanquillos de esta capital de Lima y administraciones foráneas agregadas a la General de su Arzobispado fin de Diciembre de 1779, etc., Lima, junio de 1781, BNP, C 907.
- 3) Cuenta final de consumos y valores de la renta del tabaco de la factoría y Administración General de Chachapoyas, relativa al año 1802, Lima, abril 4 de 1804, BNP, D 9616.
- 4) Datos resumidos de varios documentos: BNP, D 198, D 10249, D 10853, D 10854, D 10352.
- 5) Estado de cotejos, Lima, setiembre 22 de 1819, BNP, D 9283.
- 6) De acuerdo a los datos contenidos en BNP, D 9282, la Renta compró tabaco Bracamoro en Chachapoyas por un valor de 52.240 pesos y 6 3/4 reales. Lo oficialmente pagado al cosechero por mazo de tabaco ascendía a un real, de aquí resulta el número de mazos indicado.

Sin embargo, con los fletes destinados al arriero podía ocurrir lo mismo que con las asignaciones para los cosecheros. Estos, "aburridos de ver que no cobraban físicamente sus fletes en dinero como está mandado desde sus principios ... dejaban muchas veces regadas las cargas por los caminos a la inclemencia del sol y de la agua."³⁶ En 1802, año en que estamos ante una cosecha mediana de tabacos en Chachapoyas (ver Tabla II), los gastos por transporte desde los almacenes hasta Lima ascendieron a 16.711, lo que equivalía al 28 por ciento de los costos por mazo de tabaco (frente al 44 por ciento equivalente al costo por compra de tabaco a los cosecheros; ver Tabla III). La consecuencia más inmediata de los repartos a los arrieros fue el abandono de las cargas, por lo que la producción destinada a los almacenes de Lima podía encontrarse desperdigada por los caminos. Adicionalmente las actitudes descritas explican las dificultades que encontraron las factorías y administraciones en conseguir mulas para el transporte y para lograr un aprovisionamiento puntual en las diferentes dependencias subalternas, lo que a su vez provocaría las quejas del consumidor.

El alejamiento del arriero como consecuencia de las prácticas descritas y el hecho de que los propios arrieros fueran víctimas de repartos plantea una interrogante crucial: cómo llegaban las ropas de la tierra a las factorías, a manos de los cosecheros?

Una respuesta plausible a esta interrogante es la existencia de un doble circuito comercial nucleado en torno a los centros productores de tabaco. Por una parte, aquel animado por el transporte del tabaco, pagado por la Renta y parte de la organización del monopolio. Por otra parte, un activo comercio que abarcaba toda la ruta tabacalera entre Chachapoyas y Lima que permitiría no sólo comerciar con tabaco de contrabando, sino también con otros productos de la montaña. Con las ganancias logradas por la venta de estos productos y al repartirse los sueldos de arrieros y cosecheros, era posible adquirir bienes en Lima para reiniciar el ciclo de transacciones que partía de las chacras tabacaleras. Las ganancias eran fácilmente multiplicables. Al comerciante particular resultaba más ventajoso inscribirse en este circuito comercial que en el servicio al monopolio con el transporte de los tabacos. Al parecer, ni el aumento de los fletes pudo delimitar estos giros. Es probable que las rutas seguidas correspondieran a aquellas existentes antes de la creación del monopolio, pero parece viable pensar que la creación del monopolio activó sustancialmente las rutas comerciales.

TABLA III: *Gastos ocasionados a la Renta del Tabaco hasta que el tabaco de Chachapoyas estuviera depositado en los Almacenes de Lima*

año	por compra de tabaco	sueldos: factoría, veeduría, rondas	fletes	otros aprox.	costo por mazo aprox. (1)
1770 (2)		20.929			9 granos
1771 (2)		21.445			10 granos
1772 (2)		15.954			10 granos
1786 (2)		57.669			2.2 reales
1787 (2)		67.565			2.2 reales
1788 (2)		92.224			2.2 reales
1802 (3)	26.075	12.750	16.711	4.000	2.1 reales
1815 (4)	52.240	18.216	18.936	200	1.7 reales
1802	44%	21%	28%	7%	
1815	58%	20%	21%	1%	
aprox.					
1750	39%	—	47%	14% (5)	

Fuentes y Notas:

- 1) El precio de venta al público por mazo ascendía hasta 1795 a 8 reales, luego a 9 reales, es decir, el beneficio obtenido por la Renta del Tabaco por los mazos de Bracamoro procedentes de Chachapoyas, fluctuaba a partir de 1786 aproximadamente alrededor del 300%, descontados todos los gastos. Había, sin embargo, administraciones que apenas cubrían sus gastos: Puno, Conchucos, Trujillo hacia 1815. Ver "Estado de los cotejos," Lima, 22 de Setiembre de 1819, BNP, D 9283.

En la administración de Chile el precio del tabaco por mazo vendido al público permaneció igual desde 1753 hasta el fin del estanco, a 4 reales por mazo. Ver Stapff, "La renta del tabaco," p.7.

- 2) Lamentablemente estos datos no se encuentran desagregados. Las cifras han sido ligeramente redondeadas. Ver "Real Renta de Tabacos," Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP C 3400, fs. 5 ss.
- 3) "Cuenta final de consumos," Lima, 20 de abril de 1804, BNP, D 9616.
- 4) "Estado de los cotejos," Lima, 22 de setiembre de 1819, BNP, D 9283.
- 5) Los porcentajes para 1750 han sido calculados en base a los indicadores anotados por Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," p.139 para los tabacos de Saña. La precaria disponibilidad de fuentes con series temporales más cerradas sólo permite una constatación tentativa por ahora: al parecer hubo en el largo plazo un aumento de los gastos por compra de tabacos, una disminución por aquellos de los fletes en la composición del costo de la unidad de tabaco.

Tampoco escapó a los ojos de los visitantes que llegaron después de La Riva, que los propios factores y demás empleados de la factoría eran cómplices de este tráfico. En los primeros años del siglo XIX el subdelegado de Chachapoyas, D. Matías Machuca y Larrea, comunicaba al Virrey Avilés, que los guarda veedores, lejos de cumplir sus deberes, lo que más les importaba era "que el que haya quien anticipadamente le recivan los trapos de sus comercios para cobrarselos puntualmente a el tiempo de la Tasación de los Tavacos," es decir, constataba la misma situación que La Riva veinte años antes.³⁷ En 1816 se descubre una malversación de fondos en la factoría, y el factor es sometido a un juicio de residencia. Uno de los declarantes en este juicio aseguraba que el factor, D. Andrés Llanos y Mendoza "siempre tenia avilitación anticipada a los Cosecheros de Sipasbamba que manejaba y que saliendo a las tasaciones andaba igualmente con cargas de comercio por delante, avilitando de nuevo con los efectos de su contenido, al mismo tiempo que por los anticipados que tomaba el dinero que resultaba a favor de los cosecheros."³⁸ Es decir, este comercio ligado estrechamente a la producción tabacalera, existía desde los inicios del monopolio hasta su abolición (brevemente en 1812 y definitivamente en 1820).

Además de este circuito comercial paralelo al transporte de tabacos y con la complicidad de los empleados de la factoría, distinguible por el tiempo de productos llevados y traídos, también hubo un doble circuito en términos geográficos. Uno que incluía las rutas desde las chacras productoras hasta los almacenes de la factoría, y otro que partía de Chachapoyas hasta Cajamarca (Trujillo - Lima). Como se ha señalado, hasta aproximadamente 1780 el primer circuito desde las chacras hasta la factoría estaba a cargo de los cosecheros, y en parte a cargo de arrieros. Hacia fines de siglo y comienzos del siglo XIX surgen nuevos problemas. La creación del Virreinato de La Plata, la disminución en la provisión de mulas del Tucumán, y según el subdelegado de Chachapoyas, la abolición de los corregimientos en 1784 y las sequías en Piura, lugar del que se lograba obtener una parte de las mulas requeridas, aparejó una fatal escasez de mulas.³⁹ Ello condujo no sólo a que, ya tasados los tabacos, estos permanecieran meses y hasta años en las improvisadas casuchas de los cosecheros sin un adecuado almacenamiento, sino que además, a fin de asegurar un abastecimiento mínimo, el traslado del tabaco a la factoría se hacía "en muchas ocasiones ... á hombros de Indios."⁴⁰ Los cientos de pregonos en pueblos y ciudades para transferir la conducción del tabaco al mejor postor no encontraron el más mínimo eco. Nadie estaba dispuesto a asumir esta tarea, que como se ha indi-

cado, no sólo era mal pagada, sino que además exponía a no recibir dinero alguno.⁴¹ Fue entonces que se pensó en los pueblos indígenas en las circunferencias de las chacras y la factoría. Los indios tenían que pagar tributos y necesitaban ingresos monetarios para cumplir con sus pagos. Quedaría a cargo de los subdelegados organizar esta suerte de mita - arriera. Hacia 1804 se comenzó a elaborar registros de las mulas existentes en los pueblos. Ese mismo año, el subdelegado aseguraba:

La Provincia de Olleros cituada entre la ciudad de Chachapoyas, y las siembras de Moyobamba y Huayabamba, no dexa de estar provista a lo menos de doscientas Mulas, que sin embaraso, y distribuidas a discreción, bastan para poner en la Factoria sus Cosechas sin pérdida de tiempo. El valle de Luya, tiene también el número de Arrieros necesarios, para sacar a los mismos Almacenes las cargas de Jamalca, y demás lugares del Partido de Cipasbamba. En las Doctrinas de Jalca, Santo Tomás y las Balzas, hay también las suficientes, para poner con prontitud a las Márgenes del rio Marañon quantas cargas se acopien en Chachapoyas; y á este servicio estan siempre prontos los Indios de las expresadas tres Doctrinas, y lo abrasarian gustosos por la combeniencia que les resulta de tener un renglon seguro en que travajár para satisfacer sus Tributos y subbenir las demás necesidades que les rodean.⁴²

Un juicio iniciado por los indios de la comunidad del pueblo de Jaulia en la doctrina de Olleros pocos meses más tarde, contra su cura que pretendía trasladarlos a otro lugar a fin de asegurar el "pasto espiritual," indica que al menos por algún tiempo, se siguió las recomendaciones del subdelegado. Para permanecer en Jaulia, los comuneros adujeron que servían con "fletes, víveres y Peones" al Rey, siendo "tributarios y que continuamente servimos a nuestro natural Señor el REY nuestro amo en el acarreto de sus Reales intereses del privilegiado ramo de Tavacos, asi de Moyobamba como del Valle de Guayabamba á entregar en los almacenes de esta ciudad [Chachapoyas]."⁴³ Al margen de los servicios de transporte, la comunidad aportaba víveres a los pobladores de Chachapoyas. Prohibido - aunque como se ha visto, sin mucho éxito - el sembrío de verduras entre las matas, el abastecimiento de ganado (Jaulia fue una comunidad ganadera) y víveres corría a cargo de las comunidades circundantes. Ello a su vez debe haber disminuído considerablemente el interés de sus pobladores a aportar sus mulas para el transporte de tabacos, valiendoles la acusación de perezosos, ociosos, inactivos y adormecidos.⁴⁴

El transporte desde la factoría a los almacenes de Cajamarca fue concedido como "negociación esclusiva de los Arrieros" a un pueblo que

en 1804 era "una nueva población:" Celendín, ubicado en la provincia de Cajamarca. Dos *diputados* nombrados por la factoría de Chachapoyas tenían la obligación de asegurar el abastecimiento de mulas y arrieros para efectuar el traslado de los tabacos.⁴⁵ Este circuito prometía mejores ingresos y su organización no estuvo sujeta a las dificultades del circuito menor entre chacras y factoría. Utilizando las mulas existentes en los pueblos que rodeaban las chacras y la mano de obra indígena, y luego a los arrieros de Celendín, el subdelegado de Chachapoyas en 1804 sugería dividir el *acarreto* de los tabacos entre los celendinos y los pueblos indígenas. Postulaba que les fuera permitido a los mitayos - arrieros conducir los tabacos hasta las orillas del río Marañón, donde luego serían recogidos por los arrieros de Celendín. Toda la transacción de entrega sería controlada por un encargo de la factoría en un nuevo puesto/almacén a ser construido en Las Balsas. Proponía, además, que los tabacos de Sipasbamba y Sesuya (que eran los más inmediatos a la factoría), fueran almacenados en las *casas de comunidad* y que el cuidado - a cambio de un pago de cincuenta pesos anuales - quedara a cargo de los respectivos alcaldes de Mendau y Las Balsas.

Tanto en términos de organización como de ahorro a la Renta, las propuestas del subdelegado eran viables y beneficiosas. No pudieron encontrar, sin embargo, el aplauso general. Una de las razones fue la resistencia de los indígenas; no sólo porque estuvieron expuestos a no recibir el pago por sus servicios, sino también porque era más rentable dedicarse a otras actividades comerciales. Igualmente, al separar el circuito de transporte del control inmediato de la factoría permitiendo a los pueblos y sus arrieros el traslado hasta el Marañón y hasta Las Balsas se interrumpía la negociación de los empleados de la factoría y de los comerciantes privados dedicados a otros rubros. Ya los cosecheros no tendrían que llegar hasta la factoría a entregar los tabacos, tampoco los arrieros llegarían a recogerlos. Al no pasar el tabaco primero por la factoría también se coartaba las posibilidades de contrabando, en medida que lo entregado previamente por cosecheros y arrieros no necesariamente tenía que coincidir con las cantidades luego despachados por la 'via oficial' (ello se detallará enseguida). Inevitable era, asimismo, el choque de intereses entre subdelegados y empleados de la factoría, ya que al menos una parte de las asignaciones por fletes se destinarían a cubrir los tributos; sería dinero que no podría ser retenido por los empleados de la factoría, dinero que era extraído del circuito comercial privado.

El significativo fracaso de las propuestas del subdelegado de Chachapoyas queda documentado por las afirmaciones del Visitador Andrés de Eguren en una carta dirigida al Director General de la Renta de Tabacos en 1814:

En virtud de los conocimientos prácticos que he adquirido de la situación local de esta provincia, genios y proporciones de sus Avitantes ... es indispensable preciso y necesario crear en la capital de Olleros del tránsito comun y ordinario para Moyobamba, una Diputación compuesta de un solo Individuo, dotado con cincuenta pesos para que este ha [?] de remober la Arrieria de los Pueblos de Jaulia, Diozan, Yambafalca, Quinfalca, Chuquin, Cuelcho, Caunal, Taupa, Goncha, Ruta, Tumbilla y Chirquilla, que estan casi contiguas la una de la otra; pues hé visto por esperiencia, que no teniendo aquellos Naturales, un Agente que les inspire sentimientos de honor, ellos por si solo no apetezen sino es el ocio, e inacción, con que congenian sin que vasten reconvenciones, ni providencias judiciales, que los saquen de este adormecimiento y pereza común y natural a todos los indios ... Una que otra vez se le comisiona al Teniente de la Ronda para que solo active la salida a Moyobamba de los nominados Pueblos, y aunque en ocasiones se consigue el intento de que salgan, a su regreso se meten con las cargas en sus hogares, y se están alli meses enteros sin que se tenga noticia de su paradero.⁴⁶

Mientras tanto, el problema del transporte quedaba irresuelto. Y, mientras más escaseaban la voluntad de los arrieros y las mulas, más arreciaba la competencia con los comerciantes privados; "lo único que se há conseguido és despertar las continuas y odiosas disputas que alli se ofrecen con los comerciantes de cascarillas, cacao, lonas y otros efectos."⁴⁷ Un silencioso comercio que hacia décadas funcionaba en contra de los intereses del monopolio se había convertido en una disputa bulliciosa de grupos interesados, dispuestos a defender sus prerrogativas. Para los indios de Chachapoyas el tributo al parecer no representó el supuesto aliciente que el subdelegado asumía en 1804; tampoco se registran quejas por el incumplimiento del pago de los tributos.⁴⁸ Lo probable es que el suministro de víveres, asi como la entrega de lonas y cueros para el enzurronado del tabaco hayan bastado para cubrir los tributos.⁴⁹

Como consecuencia de los múltiples problemas tanto a nivel de la producción como del transporte, el monopolio fue incapaz de cubrir con la producción chachapoyana la demanda del consumidor. La Riva en 1780 había calculado que hubiera sido menester producir aproximadamente 12.000 zurronez anuales para cubrir esta demanda. Si bien La Riva era conocido por su "ambición desmedida," de todas maneras se produjo bastante menos de lo necesario.⁵⁰ En los años de mayor producción en Chachapoyas, sólo se obtuvieron 4.222 zurronez en 1788 y

5.224 en 1815. Para cerrar la brecha entre lo obtenido y lo necesario estaba el contrabando.

El contrabando

Aunque difícil de cuantificar, es posible que la diferencia entre las frustradas perspectivas propagandizadas por La Riva y la producción real de Chachapoyas, sea un indicador general del volumen de estas transacciones ilegales. Todo tabaco que no era cultivado por un cosechero matriculado en los registros de la factoría era considerado de contrabando. El contrabando encontró un piso propicio tanto en la corrupción de los empleados de la factoría como en la incapacidad del estado colonial de implementar y proponer un efectivo control; ciertamente, en una área geográfica que por su simple constitución era difícil de controlar. El Ucayali, el Marañón y el Huallaga fueron las rutas fluviales predilectas, y los agricultores (y también los cosecheros) en los márgenes de estos ríos debieron sentirse particularmente tentados a usarlas. El tabaco cimarrón llegó no sólo a Cajamarca y Piura al norte de Chachapoyas, sino sobre todo, por Huánuco hacia el sur (ver Dibujo I). Estaban comprendidos en el contrabando también arrieros y hacendados, a través de quienes el tabaco cimarrón llegaba a los tambos, a manos de jornaleros y yanacunas. La Riva aseguraba haber impuesto severas multas y castigos "a todos aquellos Hacendados ... en atención a que muchas ó las mas veces, estos son los auxiliadores, y en alguna manera Receptadores de los malignantes contrabandistas."⁵¹

Especialmente en 1785 y 1793 se realizaron enormes campañas para combatir el contrabando. En 1785 el Visitador Bernardo Marconie hizo arrasar y quemar treinta y tres sembrados de tabaco, a la par que otros dueños de sembras prefirieron arancar sus plantas ante la inminente llegada del Visitador y huir, "temerosos del castigo."⁵² Grupos formados por peones completarían la tarea de limpiar los márgenes de los ríos; a quienes detectaban sembrios clandestinos se les abonaba gratificaciones. Por la acción iniciada en 1793 sabemos que las plantaciones ilícitas se extendían hasta Huanta, "frontera á la Montaña de los Chunchos infieles," y Tayacaja en el actual departamento de Huancavelica, lugar en el que el tabaco era sembrado en los mismos lugares que la coca.⁵³ Un vecino de Huanta aseguraba que había observado

asi Peones como Hacendados veneficiar los unos cogiendo porción de ojas de las maduras, unas sobre otras, y tenerlas de vaxo de sus camas hasta que

mortiguadas manejan en Mazitos cubriendo con Quilma, y puestos en humo lo usan, y los otros por de pronto las secan en el fogon para lo mismo, gastando los primeros para auxiliar sus vicios y los segundos consumiendo para adelantar el trabajo de los Hornaleros, siendo esto el consumo de todos aquellos que practican, siendo el nombre común de saire.⁵⁴

Era, entonces, un contrabando que funcionaba paralelamente al monopolio, puesto que de haberlo querido hubieran podido comprar la *totalidad* del tabaco consumido. Así, como se negociaba el tabaco cimarrón, en las alforjas de los contrabandistas también venían otros productos de la montaña, provocando quejas por la evasión del pago de alcabalas.⁵⁵ A pesar de los esfuerzos realizados por parte del estado colonial, los resultados fueron endebles. Las penas leoninas impuestas no surtieron el efecto deseado.⁵⁶ Casi resignadamente en 1814 se afirmaba que "generalmente hablando, no se puede embarazar la extracción furtiva de los Contrabandos ... y son ... quantiosos ... los contrabandos que se hacen por el Rio Huallaga a Guánuco sin poderlo remediar."⁵⁷

Contando el contrabando con la complicidad de los empleados de la factoría, las posibilidades de un efectivo control se reducían a zero. El 'contrabando oficial' (el de los empleados de la factoría), a decir de La Riva, se llevaba a cabo con los tabacos entregados en la factoría. "Como quiera que ellos se inspeccionan a si mismos", señalaba, oficialmente los empleados de la factoría declaraban enzurronar una determinada cantidad de zurrone, que correspondían a los pagos legal - o nominalmente efectuados a los cosecheros. Sin embargo, la cantidad de tabaco entregada podía reducirse a la mitad, "en no voleando los mazos con la precisa apretura que se requiere." Al no ajustar bien los mazos con la debida cantidad de tabaco, no sólo era posible estafar a la Renta en un 100 por ciento, sino que además de aquí "dimana la pérdida de su fortaleza y el riesgo de su pudrición."⁵⁸ Así, los estancos y tercenas expendían un tabaco cuya calidad dejaba mucho que desear y que fue fuente renovada de quejas de los consumidores, mientras que probablemente por la misma razón el tabaco de contrabando lograba ampliar su mercado de consumo.⁵⁹

En los dos grandes levantamientos en la segunda década del siglo XIX, el contrabando y el tabaco aparecen como una cuestión más que echa leña al fuego, traduciendo el descontento por la política tabacalera del estado colonial. En 1812 estalla un violento levantamiento en Huánuco. Pocos días antes se había esparcido la voz de que desde Lima se habían enviado

rigorosas y exclusivas providencias para que todas aquellas personas que sembrasen, beneficiasen o tuviesen tabacos en maso u oja, fuesen sequestrados sus bienes, presas sus personas, y tenido o reconocidos como traidores contrabandistas ... sin perdonar aun los miserables pueblos.⁶⁰

José Crespo y Castillo, el líder mestizo del levantamiento fue acusado de almacenar tabaco en su casa. El levantamiento estuvo dirigido contra la familia Llanos compuesta de treinta y un personas que controlaban el comercio, las haciendas y los puestos políticos más importantes de la región.⁶¹

La constitución liberal dada por las Cortes de Cádiz preveía la libertad de manufacturas, es decir, también la apertura para que todos pudieran sembrar tabacos. No sorprendería en este contexto la oposición de los españoles en Huánuco a la implementación de la constitución, *también* por el control factible de ser ejercido gracias al monopolio y al monopolio del poder. Si bien el tabaco no fue la decisiva bandera de lucha en este levantamiento, en base a las vastas redes sociales ligadas por la producción tabacalera, valdría la pena preguntarse hasta que punto el tabaco, el monopolio y el contrabando enardecieron los ánimos en el contexto de estas luchas. Es una tarea por hacer.

En el Cuzco, en los años 1813/14 el tabaco se convirtió en uno de los argumentos de reivindicaciones difundida en estos años.⁶² Los cusqueños aprovecharon el marco constitucional para dejar brotar sus recelos no sólo frente a la predominancia limeña, sino también frente a la dependencia de los tabacos de Chachapoyas (al Cuzco llegaban sobre todo los tabacos de Moyobamba), su desigual calidad y su decontinuado abastecimiento. Querían cultivar su propio tabaco y tenían – en Paucartambo – la zona climática ideal para realizarlo. El ayuntamiento constitucional revistió su proclama regionalista en un manto de sugerentes reformas:

...Fomentando ... la industria y la agricultura de esta provincia, fundamento sólido y duradero de la opulencia de la Nación; remediará tal vez los contrastes reprobados de los cosecheros de Chachapoyas y las grandes pudredumbres que padecen al paso que recompense la fidelidad de los que se establezcan Cosecheros Cusqueños; haorará [sic!] el exeso de ciento por ciento que a los primeros se ha aumentado al mismo tiempo que impedirá la disminución del Erario causado por los fletes de los tabacos de Bracamoro, Habano, Saña y Guayaquil.⁶³

Además, como se agregaba en la misma exposición del ayuntamiento, se evitaría el contrabando debido al desabastecimiento ocasionado por el

trajín entre Chachapoyas y Cuzco, y "la mala versación que franquea a los infieles." Para subrayar los argumentos vertidos se señala que estaban "disgustados generalmente los Consumidores con el tabaco de Bracamoro," y que con ello los consumidores estarían obligados o a "reducir su consumo ó a buscar el de Apolobamba resultando de cualesquiera de estos extremos decadencia notable en el ramo."⁶⁴ Era, pues, un ayuntamiento constitucional que no buscaba la libertad de cultivos, sino la cobertura del monopolio con cosecheros inscritos, pero — en el Cuzco.

La oposición a Lima (y probablemente también al propio miedo) resaltan más nítidamente cuando en 1813 existe la intención de subir el precio del tabaco de nueve reales la libra a dieciseis reales el mazo. Ese mismo año la administración general del Cuzco advertía a la Dirección General de Tabacos en Lima, que

el variar el precio corriente, no parece conveniente en las circunstancias actuales de consternación en que se halla el Público con la derrota de la división de nuestro Ejército en Salta ... temo, no sin fundamento que al disgusto con que el Público ha de recibir esta novedad, siga alguna inquietud por parte de los malcontentos, que todo lo trastorne y cause un perjuicio irremediable a la Renta.

Se temía que con el aumento del precio "algunos particulares emprendan esta negociación con los Tabacos de Miciones u otros, y seria sumamente difícil evitar estos contrabandos por la escases de manos auxiliares."⁶⁵ A los pocos días de haberse redactado este informe, estalla el levantamiento de los hermanos Angulo y Mateo G. Pumacahua. Recién en marzo de 1814 se decretaba en Lima no alterar el precio del tabaco y asegurar el suministro con tabacos de Guatemala y Guayaquil.⁶⁶

De manera bastante distinta, tanto en el Cuzco como en Huánuco, los problemas discutidos en torno a la producción y la comercialización del tabaco, encontraron un piso de resonancia política. Si bien en ninguno de los dos levantamientos el tabaco fue la razón decisiva para explicar el estallido, el tabaco y todo el campo anexo que arrastraba, fue una razón más que revelaba no sólo el descontento ante imposiciones coloniales, sino también los intereses en conflicto tanto a nivel regional, como al interior de los grupos sociales dentro y fuera de la esfera del monopolio.⁶⁷ Con reservas quisiera sugerir, que en Huánuco estamos ante una élite regional que gracias a la existencia del monopolio del tabaco ensancha sus bases de acción comercial, sobre todo a través del contrabando y los repartos, utilizando los mecanismos descritos. En el

Cuzco encontramos una élite que buscaba cierta independencia de producción tabacalera en función del desarrollo regional, aunque claramente subrayando los intereses de la Renta de Tabacos y la permanencia del sistema monopólico. Estaríamos ante un proceso global de afianzamiento de los intereses locales gracias al monopolio.

Finalmente es necesario referirse brevemente a las fábricas reales, en las que se ataban y liaban cigarros y puros, con las que se buscaba aumentar las entradas de la Renta, así como concretar la última fase de la monopolización del tabaco. El 'sueño urbano' duró once años.

Las fábricas

En España las fábricas reales fueron un éxito, se multiplicaban en las ciudades más importantes y en una época tan temprana como 1790 se instalaron maquinarias, sobre todo para producir el rapé y el tabaco en polvo.⁶⁸ La preparación de puros, cigarillos y cigarros por largo tiempo seguiría siendo una tarea netamente manual.

En territorio colonial en un primer momento se mantuvo la libertad de manufacturas del tabaco (de acuerdo a las Ordenanzas de 1759), pero los tabaqueros privados estarían sujetos a control y a producir sólo en pequeñas cantidades.⁶⁹ Recién en 1780 se instalaron dos fábricas en el Virreinato del Perú, una en Trujillo, otra en Lima. Cuando estas fábricas iniciaron sus operaciones, la de Lima contaba con cincuenta operarios. En su momento de máximo auge (probablemente entre 1781 y 1786) llegó a tener 663, con una nómina de personal que ascendía a 155.905 pesos anuales. De acuerdo a G. Céspedes del Castillo "en 1781 ambas fábricas abastecían ya al Perú y a Chile con su producción anual de 8.635.652 ataditos de cigarros liados en papel, 4.315.040 ataditos de puros y 249.745 limpiiones que producían a la Renta beneficios líquidos superiores a los 360.000 pesos al año." Los ataditos de veinticuatro cigarros o aquellos de ocho a doce puros en 1781 se vendían a medio real.⁷⁰

Ya en 1791 se decretó el cierre de las fábricas. Las razones explicitadas en el Superior Decreto del 26 de diciembre de 1791 indican las desventajas creadas a la Renta por no haberse llegado a consumir todo el tabaco labrado en las fábricas.⁷¹ La fabricación quedaba nuevamente abierta a la iniciativa privada. En el mismo decreto se fijaba la venta por libras (en vez de mazos) y se fijaba un peso de dieziseis onzas. Intentos posteriores de reintroducir las fábricas propuestas por el Virrey Abascal fracasaron ante las condiciones políticas.⁷²

El cierre de las fábricas fue un tema controvertido. Si bien el decreto de diciembre de 1791 afirmaba que las fábricas eran perjudiciosas a la Renta, hubo quienes con datos a la mano podían mostrar que con el cierre los consumos bajaron, es decir, que los montos percebidos cayeron. En los últimos tres años de existencia de las fábricas (1788 - 1790) el consumo ascendió a 2.389.393 mazos, produciendo una ganancia líquida para el mismo período de 1.161.091 pesos. En el trienio posterior a la cancelación de las fábricas (entre 1792 y 1794) el consumo ascendió a sólo 1.656.329 mazos y se obtuvo una ganancia líquida de 716.232 pesos. La Dirección General de Tabacos explicaba la disminución de los ingresos y del consumo en los términos siguientes:

...A proporción que fué faltando la provicion general de Puros, y Cigarros en las Administraciones, y Estancos del Virreynato, fueron progresivamente minorando los Consumos ... La principal razón en que esto estriva ... es, la de que adoptado el sistema de la venta en rama, el Tavaco por su natural constitución del mazo, no puede dividirse en quartillos y octabos de Real, que es la Moneda, ó quota con que regularmente se abastecen los consumidores Pobres, cuyo número es crecido; sucediendo lo contrario con el Labrado, pues de cada Mazo de Tavaco resultan un mil, y mas cigarritos, que admiten una división y subdivisión muy lata, proporcionada á esa especie de consumo: De que se sigue por una ilusión forzosa la minoración de ventas en los Pueblos, Haziendas, y Tambos de lo interior del Virreynato (atendida la dificultad de poderse provéer bajo de aquel metodo) cuyos consumos reunidos, son de no poca consideración en la extensión vasta de esta Renta.⁷³

Esta básica contradicción entre las afirmaciones vertidas en el decreto y el análisis efectuado por la Dirección General es difícil de resolver. Parece, sin embargo, que los cigarreros privados jugaron un rol importante en la decisión de cerrar las fábricas. La relativamente baja cantidad de operarios que laboraban en la fábricas indicaría que sólo una pequeña parte de los fabricantes particulares de cigarros y puros pudieron ser absorbidos hacia las fábricas reales. Ello provocaría descontento. Como lo indicaba Hipólito Unánue,

en el hecho de reservarse a la Real renta la fábrica de cigarros, quedaba sin recurso para subsistir el gran número de familias que se alimentaba labrándolos ... Viniendo hechos de Europa desde el zapato a la gorra, queda muy corto espacio a los peruleros para el ejercicio de las artes mecánicas. El tabaco alimentaba entonces a un número crecido de familias, no sólo en Lima, sino en todo el reino. El indigente padre de familia ocurría a la tercena, y a costa de un corto precio, conseguía un buen mazo. Lo reducía a cigarros ayudados de sus hijos, y en su venta y corta ganancia encontraban el medio seguro de subsistir.⁷⁴

La fuerza de presión de los cigarreros en Lima y en "todo el reino" también queda manifestada en reacciones posteriores, cuando para compensar la baja del consumo por la abolición de las fábricas se aumentó el precio de la libra de tabaco de ocho a nueve reales. Al cotejar las ventas efectuadas antes y después del aumento del precio, la misma Dirección General constataba que el resultado era "venderse ahora mas caro, y ganarse menos."⁷⁵ Al respecto se indicaba:

Este es un contraste que tiene sus causas, y principios conocidos, que acaso se ocultarían a los Autores del proyecto, por falta de los devidos conocimientos en este vasto mecanismo. Varios son los que pudieran señalarse, pero entre ellos, el mas poderoso és, el que respecta a la Docis de Tavaco que los cigarreros abastecedores imbierten en sus Manufacturas la qual, haviéndola estos minorados en proporción á el aumento que se hizo en el precio del Tavaco, el resultado há sido, consumirse menos cantidades, que aquellas que se consumían quando el Tavaco se vendía á ocho Reales; y como ahora se vende menos, aunque el Tavaco balga mas, nunca parece el aumento que se havia calculado. De esto hay una prueba bien reciente en la repulsa que sobre este mismo Capitulo acaban de hacer los cigarreros: Pues, haviéndoseles querido obligar a que imbiertes en sus Manufacturas, aquella Docis de Tavaco que la Renta imbertia en sus Fábricas extinguidas (llebándose en esto la mira de lograr mayor consumo, y de consiguiente, el aumento de utilidades que se solicitaba) los cigarreros lo han resistido vigorosamente fundados en la alteración del precio del Tavaco, que les deja muy pocos ensanches comprándole á nueve Reales, para proveer al Público en Labrado aun con quatro onzas de rebaja en cada mano, respecto de la quota de las Fábricas.⁷⁶

A fin de mantener su nivel de ingresos, los cigarreros compensaron el alza del precio del tabaco proporcionado por las administraciones rebajando el peso de la fabricación de puros y cigarros. Así se mantenía el número de unidades vendidas al por menor, pero disminuía el tabaco comprado a las administraciones, es decir, el volumen del consumo total del tabaco. Los cigarreros no pudieron ser obligados a proporcionar cigarros y puros con el mismo peso establecido para las fábricas extinguidas. Sin admitirlo expresamente, el estado colonial tuvo que aceptar la respuesta de los cigarreros y la baja de sus ingresos procedentes de la venta de tabaco.

Aunque a una escala bastante menos importante, entonces, también en los centros urbanos, en los que existieron fabricantes particulares de cigarros y puros, el estado colonial tuvo que ceder ante las presiones del grupo interesado. Tanto los sucesos descritos en Chachapoyas, como la resistencia de los cigarreros documentan la debilidad del monopolio, su dependencia frente a las fuerzas que crea con su presencia y los vaivenes

de su política tabacalera.

Fin del final

De acuerdo a lo expuesto, hubo una serie de intereses bien fundamentados y asentados de características muy específicas y en buena medida regional y ocupacionalmente contradictorias que impidieron que la eficacia de un buen pensado sistema de reformas encontrara la viabilidad deseada. Esto parece haber sido la razón esencial de fluctuantes niveles de productividad y de consumo.

En el ámbito rural los cosecheros se vieron expuestos a típicas extorsiones coloniales, sin que los administradores del aparato tabacalero estuvieran en condiciones o quisieran implementar a cabalidad los dispositivos reales. Los cosecheros y en parte también los arrieros fueron víctimas de repartos, las comunidades indígenas fueron incluidas a las labores del monopolio por las vías de la mita y el tributo. El estado colonial no logró crear las bases de una economía monetarizada en su esfera de acción. Los capitales proporcionados por la Renta de Tabacos agrandaron los márgenes del capital comercial privado, y los propios empleados de las fábricas sucumbieron ante la tentación de un enriquecimiento más rápido vía el comercio y aprovechando su presencia 'oficial' en la zona productora. La corrupción y el contrabando animaron rutas y productos comerciales que estaban al margen del tabaco, pero que pudieron existir gracias a la existencia del monopolio y su infraestructura. El afianzamiento de estos intereses demostraría la debilidad del estado colonial para perfeccionar el monopolio, pero por otra parte también tenía una base de acción segura e incluso la capacidad de aumentar al interior de ciertos márgenes sus niveles de ingreso, gracias a la creación de fuertes intereses locales privados.

En el ámbito urbano, donde existieron las fábricas y se concentraba la mayor parte de los cigarreros, el estado colonial tampoco pudo, a pesar de su cercanía geográfica, imponer sus expectativas en la producción de los cigarros y puros. Si en el ámbito rural fueron las élites (como se ha tratado de demostrar, con pretensiones muy concretas y no coincidentes), quienes actuaron en contra de la consolidación de un eficiente monopolio tabacalero, en el gremio de cosecheros y en el grupo de los cigarreros el estado colonial encontró una resistencia que no pudo quebrar.

La existencia del monopolio garantizaba un flujo permanente de dinero vía sueldos, pagos a los cosecheros y arrieros del cual se derivaban

otras fuentes de ingresos. El monopolio al asentar con contratas a los cosecheros los fijó geográficamente permitiendo que los repartos forzados se realizaron con cierta regularidad; lo mismo sucedía con los arrieros. Contaban los agentes de este supra - circuito de comercio con las instalaciones del estanco y hasta con los agentes (los guarda veedores) para obligar a arrieros y cosecheros a admitir los repartos. Por otra parte, las comunidades circundantes tenían un mercado para sus productos, esencialmente víveres, entregados tanto a la población urbana en Chachapoyas como a los cosecheros. Sus tributos los pagaban en forma de lonas y cueros al subdelegado respectivo.

A pesar, entonces, del cortapisas, puesto a las gestiones del estado colonial para implementar su política monopolista, la región en sí vivía de la existencia del monopolio. Las anotaciones del viajero inglés Lister en 1826, hechas a raíz de conversaciones con el entonces Intendente de Chachapoyas parece confirmar estas afirmaciones:

Comimos nuevamente con el Intendente, quien entonces nos mostró el censo y los tributos de los habitantes de la provincia. Las cifras acusaban 5.083 mujeres y 5.093 hombres. El tributo pagado por los blancos [!] (personas que tienen parte de sangre europea) era 4.426 pesos anuales; y por los indios, 8.708 pesos. Este impuesto era, según entendí, de naturaleza personal y variaba de acuerdo con el lugar en que se vivía.

El Intendente nos informó que la población de la provincia de Chachapoyas había ... llegado a los veinte mil. La disminución se debía al cambio experimentado por el tabaco. Antes de la revolución el comercio de tabaco era monopolio del gobierno y como el tabaco se produce hacia la región oriental de Chachapoyas, algunas personas, entre las que estaba el actual Intendente, fueron nombradas para hacer las compras y llevarlas hacia la costa. Estas personas recibían considerables salarios y el trabajo pagado en pesos, al cambio, por el gobierno, en grandes sumas o por lo menos comparativamente grandes, había entrado entonces en circulación. Cuando cesó el monopolio, se produjo una paralización temporal, y varias familias afectadas abandonaron el distrito. El Intendente era también de opinión que la demanda simultánea de reclutas había producido un dañino efecto. Dijo que desde el comienzo de la revolución, 1.800 hombres se habían ido de la provincia como soldados.⁷⁷

Igualmente importante que el suministro de sueldos y asignaciones gracias a la existencia del monopolio y el reclutaje de hombres para el ejército, fue el hecho de que ante la inseguridad política creada por las convulsiones a partir de 1812, los indios que hasta entonces habían coadyuvado a activar el comercio (sobre todo de zarzaparrilla, y cera de abejas) desde el interior de la montaña hasta Pasco, dejaron de hacerlo

por temor ante la presencia de los soldados españoles enviados a Pebas.⁷⁸ En parte, con esta actitud, se interrumpía el circuito comercial paralelo a la producción tabacalera. Posteriormente hacia 1819 y 1820 "el vicioso sistema de rentas" y los impuestos al añil y las cascarillas "a la buelta de poco tiempo" causaron "la ruina del comercio y la agricultura."⁷⁹

Sobre estas bases debilitadas sustancialmente, el contrabando marítimo con tabacos de Virginia desembarcado en las costas pudo sin problemas cubrir el consumo en territorio todavía colonial.⁸⁰

NOTAS

- * Dejo constancia de mi sincero agradecimiento por las sugerentes críticas efectuadas a una versión anterior del presente trabajo por parte de los editores, Nils Jacobsen y Hans - Jürgen Puhle, así como por parte de John Fisher y Horst Pietschmann. Parcialmente sus sugerencias han podido ser volcadas a la redacción.
- 1. Margarita Murillo Gonzales, "El estanco colonial del tabaco," *Cuadernos Colombianos* 2(1975), 641 ss.
- 2. Este fue el caso de Cuba entre 1717 y 1723. Ver *ibid.*, p.647.
- 3. *Ibid.*, p.650.
- 4. *Ibid.*, p.642.
- 5. *Ibid.*, p.660. Agnes Stapff, "La renta del tabaco en el Chile de la época virreinal," *AEA*, 218(1961), 13.
- 6. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial: Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico*, (Lima, 1982), pp.171 ss.
- 7. Stapff, "La renta del tabaco," p.8.
- 8. Murillo Gonzales, "El estanco colonial," p.660.
- 9. Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco en el Virreinato del Perú," *RH*, 21(1954), 145.
- 10. Nils Jacobsen detectó explícitamente esta manera de encuadrar la documentación aquí presentada (comunicación personal).
- 11. Deseo subrayar el carácter incompleto y tentativo de los argumentos vertidos en las páginas siguientes. Una corroboración de los datos aquí presentados requeriría de un confrontamiento con documentación existente en el AGI. Lamentablemente no me ha sido posible consultarlos hasta la fecha.
- 12. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," pp.152 ss.
- 13. *Ibid.*, p.153.
- 14. Stapff, "La renta del tabaco," pp.9 ss.
- 15. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," p.157.
- 16. Murillo Gonzales, "El estanco colonial," p.641.
- 17. Para una definición y descripción de su modo de preparación ver abajo.
- 18. Johannes Wibert, "Metafísica del tabaco entre los indios de Suramérica," *Montalbán*, 5(1976), 195.

19. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," p.151.
20. Stapff, "La renta del tabaco;" Murillo Gonzales, "El estanco colonial."
21. Eduardo Arcila Fariás, "La administración de la Renta de Tabacos en Venezuela," AEA, 51(1974), 10 ss.
22. Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre el Reino de la Nueva España*, editado por Juan A. Ortega y Medina (México, 1966), p.268. Ver también el trabajo de Susan Deans - Smith en este volumen.
23. John Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784 - 1814* (London, 1970), pp.110 ss. Teniendo en cuenta el valor total de los consumos - que es un indicador sobre todo en función de los niveles de producción y de consumo -, y no las ganancias de la Renta, se percibe un continuo ascenso hasta 1786, una lenta baja hasta 1804 aproximadamente, y un rápido incremento a partir de 1810. En parte seguramente la baja entre 1786 a 1792 se explica por la destrucción de plantas por enfermedades y el consecuente paulatino agotamiento de las existencias. Ver Stapff, "La renta del tabaco," p.37.
24. Fisher, *Government and Society*, pp.110 ss. Estado de cotejos de los consumos, valor entero, gastos y líquidos que rindió la renta del tabaco del reino del Perú en el año de 1814 con el de 1815, etc., Lima, setiembre 22 de 1819, BNP, D 9283.
25. Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, *Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú*, (Lima, 1978), p.194.
26. Real Renta de Tabacos. Contiene los documentos con que se manifiesta el desarraigo y desconcierto en que está la factoría de Chachapoyas, pertenecientes a la real negociación de los tabacos de Bracamoros, etc., Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP, C 3400.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Un zurrón equivale a ochenta mazos de tabaco. Un mazo a veinte hasta veinticuatro onzas. La libra de tabaco introducida más tarde como medida general en todo el territorio colonial tendrá sólo 16 onzas.
30. Real Renta de Tabacos, Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP, C 3400.
31. Ibid.
32. Stapff, "La renta del tabaco," pp .10 - 11.
33. Expediente seguido en Quito sobre provisión y rebaja de tabaco Guayaquil, Quito, 15 de julio de 1808, BNP, D 10125.
34. El gremio de cosecheros de Chiclayo en 1801 depuso las labores y se negó a sembrar las asignaciones de tabaco por pérdidas habidas en cosechas antecedentes "especialmente por la escasez de víveres." Expediente promovido por los cosecheros de Chiclayo, Chiclayo, 23 de mayo de 1801. Carta de los cosecheros al Reconocedor General, s.f., BNP, D 10034. Al parecer solo una parte de los víveres era aportada por las comunidades circundantes (ver abajo).
35. Real Renta de Tabacos, Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP, C 3400.
36. Ibid.
37. Expediente promovido por el Subdelegado de Chachapoyas sobre auxilio de mulas, Lima, 21 de enero de 1804, BNP, D 9310.
38. Llanos y Mendoza había sido en 1802 guarda veedor de Chachapoyas. Cuenta final de consumos y valores de la renta del tabaco..., relativa al año 1802,

- Lima, 20 de abril de 1804, BNP, D 9616, fol. 77. Asimismo es probable que haya sido miembro de la familia Llanos que hacia 1812 controlaba la región de Huánuco. Ver p.407. Expediente sobre la suspensión de su empleo y sueldos del Reconocedor General de la Factoría de Cosechas de Tabaco de Chachapoyas D. Andrés Llanos y Mendoza, Chachapoyas, 28 de abril de 1816, BNP, D 9526, fol. 8.
39. Expediente promovido por el Subdelegado de Chachapoyas, Lima, 21 de enero de 1804, BNP, D 9310.
 40. Ibid.
 41. Expediente sobre promover en el distrito de ésta jurisdicción el asiento de conducción de los tabacos de Moyobamba, hasta Chachapoyas o Cajamarca, Lima, 10 de noviembre de 1802, BNP, D 10093.
 42. Expediente promovido por el Subdelegado de Chachapoyas, Lima, 21 de enero de 1804, BNP, D 9310.
 43. Los Indios de la comunidad del Pueblo de Jaulia de la Doctrina de Olleros, en el Partido de Chachapoyas, sobre que se les amparen la posesión en que están de su Pueblo, s.l., abril de 1804, BNP, D 9322.
 44. La documentación revisada, lamentablemente no permite cuantificar el volumen de este comercio. Expediente suscitado sobre la conducción del pueblo de la Rioja, de los tabacos del partido de Moyobamba y suspensión de sus cosecheros del cuarto de real en cada mazo, Moyobamba, 18 de junio de 1813, BNP, D 9901.
 45. Expediente promovido por el Subdelegado de Chachapoyas, Lima, 21 de enero de 1804, BNP, D 9310.
 46. Expediente suscitado sobre la conducción, Moyobamba, 18 de junio de 1813, BNP, D 9901.
 47. Expediente promovido por el Subdelegado de Chachapoyas, Lima, 21 de enero de 1804, BNP, D 9310.
 48. En 1804, los indios de Chachapoyas pagaban un monto por tributos anuales que ascendía a 31.505 pesos. En el mismo año lo remitido por venta de tabacos en Chachapoyas, por concepto de naipes, papel sellado y pólvora, juntos sólo importaba 16.235 pesos. Ver Cuenta final de consumos y valores de la renta del tabaco, Lima, 20 de abril de 1804, BNP, D 9616.
 49. Ibid.
 50. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," p.152.
 51. Real Renta de Tabacos, Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP, C 3400.
 52. Oficio dirigido por Juan Doroch y Moreno a D. Miguel de Otermin, Lima, 28 de enero de 1785, BNP, C 3200.
 53. Testimonio del expediente seguido sobre tabacos cimarrones que se crían en toda la frontera y montañas de los Andes de órden de la Dirección General de estos Reynos, Huanta, 15 de junio de 1793, BNP, C 676.
 54. Ibid.
 55. Expediente suscitado por la conducción, Moyobamba, 18 de junio de 1813, BNP, D 9901.
 56. Según decreto real del 8 de agosto de 1796, los "plebeyos" debían cumplir una condena de seis años de trabajo en obras públicas o reales con ración y sin sueldo, y siendo "nobles" se les castigaría con encarcelamiento por igual lapso de tiempo y se les confiscaría la mercadería en su poder. En caso de reincidencia la pena aumentaba para plebeyos y nobles a ocho años. Ver Disposi-

- ciones adoptadas para la mejor marcha del comercio marítimo en los puertos intermedios de la costa peruana, Cuzco, 1824, BNP, D 824.
57. Expediente suscrito sobre la conducción, Moyobamba, 18 de junio de 1813, BNP, D 9901.
 58. Real Renta de Tabacos, Lima, 3 de marzo de 1790, BNP, C 3400.
 59. Informe del Ilustrísimo Ayuntamiento sobre el precio de los tabacos, Cuzco, 26 de julio de 1813, BNP, D 11129.
 60. "Causas que motivaron los movimientos que hicieron los indios revolucionarios de Huánuco," Huánuco, 12 de marzo de 1812, en *CDIP*, III:1, 258 - 263.
 61. "Relación del Dr. Angel Jadó al Arzobispo", Huarica, 19 de marzo a 19 de setiembre de 1812, en *CDIP*, III:4, 195 - 227. Recuérdese que el factor de Chachapoyas también se apellidaba Llanos, y que acusado de desfalcos se verificó que hacía repartos entre los cosecheros de Sipasbamba.
 62. John Fisher, "Royalism, Regionalism and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, 1808 - 1815," *HAHR*, 59(1979), 232 - 257.
 63. Informe del Ilustrísimo Ayuntamiento, Cuzco, 26 de julio de 1813, BNP, D 11129.
 64. Ibid.
 65. Ibid.
 66. Ibid.
 67. Ver también Heraclio Bonilla, "Clases populares y estado en el contexto de la crisis colonial," en Heraclio Bonilla et al., *La Independencia en el Perú*, 2a ed.(Lima, 1981), pp.13 - 69.
 68. José Pérez Vidal, *España en la historia del tabaco* (Madrid, 1959), pp.249 - 343.
 69. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," p.145.
 70. Ibid., pp.154 - 155.
 71. Superior Decreto del 26 de Diciembre de 1791, publicado en Hipólito Unánue, *Obras científicas y literarias*, 3 tomos (Barcelona, 1914), II, 138 - 139.
 72. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," p.159.
 73. Operaciones que acreditan el estado actual de la real renta del tabaco del Perú, Lima, 10 de julio de 1796, BNP, C 3739.
 74. Unánue, *Obras*, II, 136.
 75. Operaciones que acreditan el estado actual, Lima, 10 de julio de 1796, BNP, C 3739.
 76. Ibid.
 77. "Relación de viaje de Lister," en *CDIP*, XXVII:4, 170.
 78. Ibid., p.271.
 79. Tomás Guido a Grl. San Martín, Huanura, 1o de febrero de 1821, en *CDIP*, XII, 187 ss.
 80. Expediente sobre la internación en la aduana de dos tercios de tabaco virginia de contrabando, Lima, 19 de setiembre de 1821, BNP, D, 4731.

COMENTARIO

Horst Pietschmann

El estudio del fisco colonial, de su organización, impacto económico y social y de sus rendimientos es un campo bastante descuidado por la historia colonial hispanoamericana. Durante muchos años solo aparecieron estudios de tipo institucional y alguno que otro cuantitativo sobre algunas de las rentas reales en determinadas regiones y épocas. Recién en los últimos años se ha dado un gran paso en adelante con la publicación de las series de la contaduría fiscal en las distintas unidades administrativas coloniales que proporcionaron Herbert S. Klein y John J. TePaske.¹ A pesar de este gran progreso queda mucho por hacer, tanto bajo una perspectiva general como en el campo de rentas individuales.

Vale esto también para el monopolio estatal del tabaco que por su parte ha sido estudiado desde los años cincuenta en algunos análisis regionales y de temática parcial. Al igual que otras rentas como los diezmos de oro y plata, alcabalas, diezmos eclesiásticos, el estanco del tabaco no sólo fue una de las entradas de mayor importancia para la corona, sino también tuvo repercusiones económicas e incluso sociales de gran transcendencia. Efectivamente el cultivo del tabaco, su elaboración, venta y consumo afectaron a muchas regiones del imperio colonial hispanoamericano y ocuparon al parecer a una porción considerable de la población. Monografías históricas sobre la historia del tabaco en las principales regiones productoras y consumidoras constituirían por lo tanto un importante sector en la reconstrucción histórica de la economía y sociedad hispanoamericana. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha todos los estudios parciales sobre el tabaco se limitan a la época en la cual este producto estuvo estancado como monopolio estatal y omiten el rastreo de la historia del tabaco en sus fases pre- y postmonopólicas - sin que los dos estudios que vamos a comentar constituyan una excepción. Esto se explica por el hecho de que la existencia del monopolio proporciona un cuerpo considerable de fuentes producidas por las administraciones estatales y por lo tanto de fácil localización en los archivos, mientras que el estudio del tabaco en el período en que no estuvo estancado resulta mucho más difícil por lo disperso de las fuentes para estas épocas. Con todo hay que destacar que la concentración de los estudios existentes a la

época del monopolio no sólo constituye una lamentable limitación de la temática, sino que incluso impide una verdadera evaluación del monopolio mismo. Hay que admitir que mientras carezcamos de conocimientos sobre la economía del tabaco en las épocas en que no estuvo estancado este producto, careceremos también de puntos de comparación que nos ilustren el impacto del monopolio en la economía del tabaco.

Los trabajos de Susan Deans - Smith y Christine Hünefeldt tampoco escapan a esta problemática. Habría sido por falta de espacio y el carácter algo tentativo de estos ensayos que ambas autoras desgraciadamente no nos presentan una introducción sistemática al estado de la cuestión en la literatura, tanto más grave en el caso de Susan Deans-Smith, ya que ella misma cita dos estudios anteriores que tratan de temas que ella misma abarca en su artículo (véase su nota 2). Con todo hay una diferencia interesante en la aproximación al tema por parte de las autoras. Mientras Deans - Smith al citar al principio el párrafo de John Fisher sobre el carácter de las reformas borbónicas conecta su tema con la discusión sobre si las reformas borbónicas respondieron a un plan premeditado y homogéneo de modernización o no, Hünefeldt sitúa su tema, a lo menos de forma implícita, en el contexto de la discusión sobre la capacidad extractora del estado español frente a sus colonias. Estos dos enfoques distintos responden a dos líneas de interpretación muy difundidas últimamente y que se entrecruzan y parcialmente se enfrentan en la evaluación histórica de las reformas del siglo XVIII.

Todavía no queda claro si las reformas del siglo XVIII respondieron más bien a un plan colonialista que pretendía aumentar los beneficios en favor de España o si prevaleció la idea de modernización colonial como insinúa John Fisher, o si, como tercera posibilidad, ambos intentos se mezclaron premeditadamente para lograr una mayor extracción económica mediante una modernización. En este contexto hay que apuntar a un gran vacío en la historiografía sobre el siglo XVIII hispanoamericano. Este vacío consiste en el hecho de que todavía carecemos de un estudio detallado de la política metropolitana frente a sus colonias. La enorme mayoría de los estudios sobre las reformas borbónicas, partiendo de un breve repaso de las corrientes reformistas, pasa directamente a estudiar las consecuencias de las reformas en América. Sin embargo no disponemos de estudios profundos de las distintas corrientes políticas en la Corte y su postura frente a América, quizás con la excepción del cambio de postura que se efectuó en el seno del Consejo de Indias en la segunda mitad de la centuria. No obstante, tanto en el campo del arbitrio contemporáneo como en la postura de las principales figuras

políticas de la época se reflejan actitudes diferentes y a veces casi diametralmente opuestas que se pueden captar cuando los principales estadistas dan su dictamen sobre problemas políticos en América. Piénsese sólo en personajes con posturas tan distintas como Aranda, Múzquiz y Piedras Albas en los dictámenes sobre la introducción de las intendencias en América. Así que la falta de claridad en torno a este problema que lamenta John Fisher en la cita que trae a colación Susan Deans - Smith, se debe en gran parte a la falta de una investigación profunda de los *policy-makers* en España.

Me parece francamente dudoso que el pretendido reformismo de Carlos III responde a un plan homogéneo de reformas. Más bien parecen entrecruzarse en aquella época dos corrientes reformistas: la primera arranca ya con la época de Felipe V y está caracterizada por una marcada postura mercantilista que tiene como meta principal el aumento de los provechos de España tanto en el aspecto económico en general como en materia fiscal. La segunda corriente, que empieza a surgir durante el reinado de Carlos III y que está caracterizada por ideas protoliberales, a lo menos en asuntos económicos y en política indigenista, pretendiendo mediante una modernización colonial estrechar los vínculos entre América y España. Personajes como Campillo, Ensenada, Esquilache, Gálvez y Múzquiz representarían en España la primera corriente. Mientras que Aranda, en cierta medida Floridablanca y Godoy y, en el caso concreto de la Nueva España, el Fiscal Posadas, los intendentes Flon, Riaño y Bonavía y en parte también el Virrey Revilla Gigedo II responden a la segunda corriente. Frente a estos grupos se mantiene una tercera postura que por el mismo temor de poner en peligro el imperio español prefiere aferrarse al status quo y se opone a las reformas, como por ejemplo Arriaga, Piedras Albas (presidente del Consejo de Indias), el Virrey Bucareli, y más tarde los Ministros Valdés y Porlier. Si este esquema podría comprobarse mediante una investigación más a fondo de lo que se ha hecho hasta ahora, habría que conectar el establecimiento del monopolio del tabaco con la corriente mercantilista de los reformadores, tanto más teniendo en cuenta que se había ordenado la remesa íntegra de los beneficios de la renta de tabaco a la Península. El simple hecho que el establecimiento del monopolio del tabaco en Hispanoamérica se desarrolla entre 1717 y 1778 demuestra, a mi modo de ver, que Deans - Smith se equivoca al relacionar el fenómeno con las reformas de Carlos III, puesto que en esta época las otras potencias europeas ya habían empezado una política antimonopolista, como se ve por ejemplo en la supresión paulatina de las compañías negreras privilegiadas.

Pasando finalmente a la crítica de los dos trabajos que anteceden, hay que resaltar que Susan Deans-Smith recién elaboró una tesis doctoral sobre el monopolio en Nueva España en base a un estudio sistemático de las fuentes. Así el lector puede sospechar que las limitaciones que la autora ha impuesto a su trabajo deben de relacionarse de alguna forma con el plan de la tesis. Si ella quería ceñirse al estudio del grupo de productores de tabaco y de los cigarreros, hubiera sido conveniente que efectivamente se hubiera limitado a estos aspectos omitiendo las partes cuantitativas que presenta en los primeros dos gráficos y tablas. Estas series cuantitativas, si bien constituyen un aporte nuevo, no contribuyen a mejorar la información del lector, si carecen de una discusión detenida. Así, por ejemplo, resulta problemático proceder a la deflación de los ingresos, costos y ganancias con un índice de precios de maíz, elaborado en base a la alhóndiga de México. Esto sobre todo porque no se sabe hasta donde las curvas de Florescano son representativas para Nueva España, en segundo lugar porque ni la serie de precios de Florescano ni la serie de Deans-Smith toman en cuenta la devaluación monetaria de 1773 y en tercer lugar porque el maíz es un producto de consumo sobre todo de los indios y de las clases pobres de la sociedad y es dudoso que este grupo de la sociedad se constituyera en el principal consumidor del tabaco. Finalmente, como las ganancias líquidas del monopolio se transfirieron a España, no tiene mucho sentido una operación deflacionadora utilizando precios novohispanos. Para el renglón de las ganancias hubiera sido mejor utilizar para la deflación un índice de precios españoles.

A parte de esto ni las cifras ni las curvas ilustran mucho al lector sin que se discutan detalladamente los altos y bajos de las series. Uno desconoce los detalles de la estructura de los costos, en que porcentaje los costos responden al pago de las cosechas, al costo de la elaboración y del expendio; ¿porque la curva de costos va tan estrechamente paralela a la de los ingresos totales? También el "Table II" deja al lector con duda que quiere decir "domestically produced." ¿Se refiere al hecho de que estos productos son novohispanos en contraposición con los "Havanna cigars" o son más bien productos de fabricación casera provenientes del tabaco bruto que se expendió (vease renglón 2 de la estadística)? El texto no aclara estas dudas y si bien parece insistir en que la fabricación de cigarros se efectuó sólo en las fábricas reales, esto no corresponde al hecho de la venta de una gran porción de tabaco en hoja. Además hubiera sido interesante que la autora hubiera utilizado sus datos cuantitativos para un intento semejante al de Alvaro Jara en su "Plata y

pulque," publicado hace años en los "Working Papers" de Cambridge. Al igual que el pulque, el tabaco, también una especie de narcótico como aquél, por lo visto se consume en cantidades crecientes a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo y hubiera sido interesante paralelizar consumo de narcóticos y coyuntura. Pero tal vez la tesis de Susan Deans - Smith está respondiendo ya a estos interrogantes.

En cuanto al trabajo de Christine Hünefeldt hay que destacar ante todo que tampoco resulta claro el porqué de la limitación del estudio a la provincia de Chachapoyas, habiendo otras regiones peruanas productoras de tabaco, y si bien estas otras regiones, como Saña, sirvieron para abastecer a Chile, como afirma la autora, su intento de correlacionar la producción y el transporte del tabaco con los intereses económicos regionales dentro del Perú no justifica la omisión del estudio de las otras regiones. Si la autora hubiese tenido la oportunidad de revisar los fondos del Archivo General de Indias en Sevilla, hubiera encontrado material permitiéndole la reconstrucción cuantitativa, que con las fuentes al acceso de ella tenía que quedarse muy parcial y con grandes vacíos, que ponen en duda las cifras en los cuadros presentados. También le hubiera ayudado a la autora una bibliografía más completa, utilizando varias colecciones documentales que traen material sobre el tabaco, tanto como obras sobre la historia económica del Perú - solo quiero hacer referencia a algunos trabajos de Pablo Macera. Estas limitaciones originan que el lector queda con muchas interrogantes tanto sobre el doble circuito comercial que la autora construye alrededor del tabaco de Chachapoyas como sobre los intereses de las élites (y sobre determinar quienes eran estas élites, de las cuales habla). De esta forma también quedan dudosas algunas de las conclusiones generales de la autora. Tanto los cosecheros, como los arrieros, hacendados, comerciantes y las varias veces aludidas élites quedan en una luz muy tibia como igualmente queda todo el mecanismo económico que se describe. Cuando Hünefeldt se dedica a relatar las posturas de Huánuco y Cuzco, mencionando de paso las regiones que abastecen estos centros de consumo de tabaco, ella indirectamente anula el sustento de su planteamiento inicial en términos de concentrarse exclusivamente en el estudio de Chachapoyas y es que resulta que Chachapoyas sólo fue una provincia productora entre varias otras que intervinieron en el comercio de tabaco en el Perú. Así el lector se pregunta qué papel podrían haber jugado en el comercio tabacalero las otras regiones que tangencialmente se mencionan. De esta forma queda pendiente el problema central que plantea, o sea como se puede explicar el escaso éxito del monopolio tabacalero peruano. En suma hay

que decir que el intento de la autora de enfocar el monopolio del tabaco dentro del conjunto económico es metodológicamente el camino acertado, pero por la escasez de materiales utilizados y por la limitación regional inicialmente impuesta y luego inconcientemente abandonada este intento parece quedarse en medio camino.

Los dos trabajos son difíciles de comparar por su enfoque diferente y por sus limitaciones temáticas. Con todo transluce una diferencia fundamental y es que el monopolio en Nueva España al parecer tuvo un éxito desde el punto de vista de la corona, mientras que en el Perú sólo logró un éxito parcial y precario. La razón principal para esta diferencia podría ser el hecho que en Nueva España se logró el establecimiento del monopolio de fabricación de cigarros y puros mientras que en el Perú la elaboración del tabaco quedó, con excepción de un breve lapso de tiempo, en manos de los privados. Claro que esto no se puede afirmar con seguridad porque no sabemos que aportó la elaboración del tabaco a las ganancias líquidas, ya que ni las series parciales de Hünefeldt, ni las series completas de Deans-Smith permiten una desagregación de ingresos que estipule el aporte del tabaco en hoja por un lado y de los cigarros y puros por el otro. Pero aunque esta afirmación sea cierta, quedaría por aclarar satisfactoriamente las causas de esta diferencia entre el Perú y Nueva España. Tal vez esto tiene que ver con la mayor ingerencia en el comercio tabacalero del sector indígena y de las capas bajas de la población rural en el Perú, grupos, que al fin y al cabo, eran muy inclinados a rebelión, como sugiere Christine Hünefeldt, mientras que en Nueva España el comercio y la elaboración del tabaco estuvieron más bien en manos de las poblaciones urbanas antes del estancamiento. Sea esto como sea, lo que la problemática incide en señalar es la necesidad de avanzar en el conocimiento de la economía tabacalera en el período previo a su estancamiento por parte de la corona, como ya indicamos con anterioridad.

Otro detalle común entre ambos estudios se detecta en el hecho que tanto los cosecheros en Nueva España como los del Perú necesitaban crédito para financiar la producción. En Nueva España este anticipo o avío se realizó en forma de pagos en efectivo, en el Perú en cambio parece que los funcionarios del monopolio emplearon el dinero destinado a este fin para hacer sus propios negocios, facilitando a los cosecheros ropa y otros géneros. Es por este motivo que Hünefeldt incluye en el caso peruano este adelanto no bajo el rubro de avío, como lo hace Deans-Smith para México, sino bajo la denominación de "reparto de géneros." Como los cosecheros peruanos, por lo que trasluce del trabajo

de Christine Hünefeldt, no eran indios, esto significaría que en el Perú los repartos no eran destinados sólo a la población indígena, sino que también otros grupos de la población tuvieron que acceder a este tipo de comercio. Cabría la pregunta si en el caso peruano los cosecheros accedieron voluntariamente a este sistema de adelanto de pago – quizás para emplear estos géneros como pago de sus operarios –, o si los cosecheros peruanos no pudieron defenderse frente a la presión de las autoridades. Otra vez resulta necesario saber más sobre quienes fueron estos cosecheros en el Perú, como ya se señaló, para opinar mejor sobre este aspecto. En todo caso parece que sobre el problema de los repartos o repartimientos de géneros aún no está dicho la última palabra, a pesar de la serie de trabajos que en la última década y media se publicaron sobre el tema. Hay que tener en cuenta que o avío y reparto tienen mucho más en común de lo que muchos autores admiten – no constituyendo solamente un comercio forzado y abusivo –, o el mecanismo tiene un significado muy distinto en Nueva España y en el Perú. Para esto no hay que olvidar que en Nueva España por lo menos gran parte de los repartos hechos a los indios fueron también en dinero en efectivo – al igual que el adelanto hecho a los cosecheros de tabaco, de los cuales, según Deans – Smith, algunos pertenecieron a una élite local –, como en el caso de los productores indios de grana cochenilla en Oaxaca. Cabría la pregunta, que ya he planteado en varios trabajos anteriores, si no sería mejor explicar los repartos y repartimientos en términos económicos – por ejemplo integración, tal vez forzada, de grupos marginados en una economía de mercado suprarregional – en vez de insistir únicamente en el aspecto de abuso y explotación.

Finalmente me parece conveniente insistir un poco más en el problema planteado por Susan Deans – Smith sobre si el establecimiento de las fábricas de tabaco significó una especie de industrialización inducida por el estado. Es cierto que el trabajo en las fábricas novohispanas siguió siendo un trabajo manual. Con todo recuerdo haber visto en el Archivo General de Indias uno que otro expediente que propuso el empleo de maquinaria en la elaboración del tabaco, proyectos que parecen haberse frustrados. Me parece que el establecimiento de las fábricas significó un método nuevo en la organización del trabajo que tal vez podría calificarse de proto – industrial y que habría que comparar con el surgimiento de los obrajes textiles que en épocas anteriores habían surgido en competencia con la producción casera de textiles tal como estaba muy difundida entre la población indígena. En este contexto es de notar que los obrajes, en Nueva España a lo menos, estuvieron concentrados más

bien en regiones en donde desde el siglo XVII ya no había fabricación indígena casera de textiles – como en Puebla y el Bajío – mientras que en Oaxaca y Yucatán había, a lo largo del siglo XVIII, pocos obrajes y sí una fabricación casera de textiles muy importante. En todo caso habría que estudiar el surgimiento de nuevas técnicas y métodos de producción en conjunto bajo el aspecto de la llamada proto-industrialización, enfoque tan fértil en la historia económica europea. Bajo esta perspectiva fenómenos como la difusión de obrajes, las fábricas de tabaco, incluso los repartos de géneros (una especie de *Verlagssystem*) y ciertas formas de la organización de la producción agraria en función de la proximidad al mercado (por ejemplo la aplicación de los principios de von Thünen) podrían, previo estudio sistemático, claro está, interpretarse como formas de racionalización de la producción en el contexto de la proto-industrialización europea.² Estudios de esta línea constituirían quizás aportes que permitirían sacar conclusiones mas concretas sobre los orígenes históricos del llamado subdesarrollo latinoamericano en el campo de la economía. Aún sin ir tan lejos tales estudios podrían aclarar la problemática central en torno a los dos trabajos comentados y en torno al tema general de este volumen. Es decir, responder a la pregunta sobre si el monopolio del tabaco tenía mayor éxito en Nueva España que en el Perú o porque la economía novohispana estuvo más avanzada que la peruana o porque la autoridad regia estuvo más firmemente establecida en Nueva España que en el Perú.

NOTAS

1. John J. TePaske, en colaboración con José y Mari Luz Hernández Palomo, *La real hacienda de Nueva España: La Real Caja de México, 1576 – 1816* (México, 1976). John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 3 vols. (Durham, N.C. 1982).
2. Sobre la aplicación de este tipo de análisis a la economía agraria colonial novohispana véanse los trabajos de Ursula Ewald.

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